Rifle squad composition

[Rifleman]

I thought it was a great article and enjoyed it a lot.

I always liked the fire team wedge, though, since it put the fire team halfway between column and line. The fire team could go either way quickly from the wedge.

[Norfolk]

I suppose a question that can be raised at this point, is the reaction to effective enemy fire better handled by a squad moving into line from fire teams in wedge formation with all men firing back, or from a squad or even fire teams in file responding with just one or two 7.62mm (not 5.56mm) LMGs or even GPMGs?

Granted, the Germans weren't using assault rifles until late in the war, and only then in limited quantities, but perhaps a pair of 7.62mm LMGs (I'm not sure one would cut it, but the Bundesheer used only one MG-3 GPMG per Infanterie Gruppe until just recently) would be just as effective for winning the firefight and suppressing the enemy as a pair of 5.56mm LMGs and the squad's assault rifles?

Most of the squad would be under cover while the MGs won the firefight and then suppressed the enemy (unless the SL ordered otherwise or the squaddies spotted enemy close at hand). Ideally, this would lead to lower losses and a better chance of success in the assault. Or is this just plain wishful (and obsolete) thinking?

[ROKMAN]

I suppose a question that can be raised at this point, is the reaction to effective enemy fire better handled by a squad moving into line from fire teams in wedge formation with all men firing back, or from a squad or even fire teams in file responding with just one or two 7.62mm (not 5.56mm) LMGs or even GPMGs?

Granted, the Germans weren't using assault rifles until late in the war, and only then in limited quantities, but perhaps a pair of 7.62mm LMGs (I'm not sure one would cut it, but the Bundesheer used only one MG-3 GPMG per Infanterie Gruppe until just recently) would be just as effective for winning the firefight and suppressing the enemy as a pair of 5.56mm LMGs and the squad's assault rifles?

Most of the squad would be under cover while the MGs won the firefight and then suppressed the enemy (unless the SL ordered otherwise or the squaddies spotted enemy close at hand). Ideally, this would lead to lower losses and a better chance of success in the assault. Or is this just plain wishful (and obsolete) thinking?

So basically a two team squad would work. Each team has a machine gun.

However from two studies conducted in 1946 and during the Vietnam war, they concluded that two machine guns only resulted in most of the fires being misdirected. Also the squad ceased to function as a separate fire/maneuver teams when the squad size fell to 9 soldiers and below. This finding seems contradictory to me.

[Norfolk]

So basically a two team squad would work. Each team has a machine gun.

However from two studies conducted in 1946 and during the Vietnam war, they concluded that two machine guns only resulted in most of the fires being misdirected. Also the squad ceased to function as a separate fire/maneuver teams when the squad size fell to 9 soldiers and below. This finding seems contradictory to me.

Hi ROKMAN,

I seem to remember that one of those studies was by either Paul Melody or Timothy Karcher - anyway, there's been no shortage of studies, let alone papers written on those studies. Yeah, I read that too, but I seem to recall (correct me on this if my memory if faulty here or I'm not thinking straight about it) that one of those officers wrote that the second MG not only led to wasteful use, but that the combined suppressive effect was actually lower than that of just one MG properly employed. I gotta tell ya, I still haven't quite been able to wrap my mind around that.

I will try to offer two qualifications to those tests results: 1. First, that the U.S. Army provided relatively little to no formal NCO training until recent decades, and in Vietnam especially, the availability of experienced NCOs who had learned on-the-job how to do things properly was low; as such, a lot of NCOs at the times those tests were conducted may not have been capable of properly directing the fires of the weapons they had. 2. Second, one of the studies you mentioned noted how a second MG could act as a sort of dead weight; while useful in the defence, it tended to destroy the offensive capacity of the Squad because even as the squad lost rifleman due to battle attrition, the same number of MGs still had to be manned and supplied, leaving few riflemen to actually close with and destroy the enemy in the assault. It was either Melody or Karcher I think that mentioned that no more than about 30% of a Squad's strength should be used to carry Automatic Rifles/Machine Guns - to this I would add Grenade Launchers as well.

I think that the Germans had developed something of a way of dealing with this in their Panzergrenadier Gruppes. Originally, the Armoured Infantry Group had 12-men (with 2 SPW APC drivers if Armoured) or 14-men (with 2 truck drivers if Motorized) divided into identical two Trupps (Troops). The Armoured Infantry Troop would have 5 men with a GPMG and the Motorized Infantry Troop (having more space on the truck to carry more members of a Group/Squad) would have 6 men with a GPMG. I don't have the link to this, but it comes from "The Regimental Officer's Handbook of the Germany Army, 1943" published by the British War Office: apparently the Panzer-Grenadier Group would advance/move-to-contact in two separate Troops about 80 yards apart, each with its own GPMG, and each would act as a sort of mini-Squad, except in coordination with one another.

I'm not quite confident in saying this, but I would suggest that although the two 5-or 6-man Troops in a German Armoured Infantry Group certainly used Fire-and-Movement like our Fire Teams do, I would not necessarily describe what they did as Fire Team Tactics, but someone else may know more about this. For one, I suspect that the Germans were much more prone to use the single file, and use the Machine Gun in each Troop of the Infantry Group to win the Firefight while keeping the Riflemen under cover until it was time for the Assault. If this is a more or less correct interpretation of what they did, then this should affect our thinking about a Two-Team Squad. I think the critical thing about a 2-Team Squad is the number of men in each Fire Team; 4 men maybe doesn't cut it and maybe even 5 won't. It seems that the Squads in the studies and in Vietnam functioned well as large Fire Teams after they had gone below 8 or 9 men and had to reorganize from two to one Team. Maybe that's a guide for the effective size of a Fire-Team.

I still very much think that a Three-Team Squad offers crucially greater capacity to win the Firefight quickly and suppress the enemy thoroughly, leading to lighter friendly losses, not to mention a much greater capacity to absorb battle losses.

If you really, really, have hankering for some more info I've got some links posted to more sources on some pages here:

http://www.sinodefenceforum.com/blogs/norfolk/

If you're looking for all sort of sources, not just U.S., just click on each "Infantry Section" post (so far there's about eight I think) and go down to the "Selected Sources" at the bottom of the page. Read my own spiel if you like, but the Sources are what's important, the rest is just commentary.

[Rifleman]

Norfolk,

Thanks for the link. I read your posts there and quite a few of your other links. I found the links interesting and I'm still reading through them.

It seems like the USMC might be the only organization since WWII that has remained satisfied with their squad structure. A lesson for everyone else?

Although I come from the two team, nine man squad background I always liked things better when we had a MG crew directly attached, making us, defacto, a squad similar in size and design to the USMC squad.

I spite of all the interesting studies it seems like it always boils down to this: the USMC squad has withstood the test of time and conflict the best; if you don't want (or can't have?) a squad that big then dispense with fire teams altogether and organize along German WWII lines. Most Army units in Vietnam sort of defaulted into that anyway: an MG crew, a grenadier, and a handful of riflemen seems to be the squad remembered by most Vietnam infantry vets. This is depicted pretty accurately in the film Hamburger Hill.

On a related note: if the USMC eventually adopts a true AR - heavy barrel, magazine fed, open bolt - it will be interesting to see if the Army also does and how that might change their squad structure. Hopefully they won't try to put both an AR and an LMG in the same fire team!

[Norfolk]

Thanks Rifleman. Yeah, when you pore over what everyone else has written, and then take a look at the Marines and see how happy they've been for over 60 years (and consider how all the Other Armies look at the Marines and just wish they had that king of Squad), its seems pretty clear that the Marines are either right, or as close as anyone has ever come to it. And taking from Tom Odom's proposal for a Marine-like Squad for the Army, I'd be pretty satisfied with just adding a second NCO to handle most of the admin and comms with higher echelons so that the Squad Leader can be left alone to fight his Squad, and only talk to the higher echelons when he really needs to.

I think you summed up the dilemma really well, Rifleman; if you have the means, get a Marine Squad, and if you don't, get a German Group. And to add Cavguy's point about all this, you have to have good Squad leaders who know what to do and how to make it happen with what they've got. Finally, Ken kept beating it into everyone's skulls that the Leaders have to be free to do what they see they have to do, and have very well trained troops to do it with.

I hope the Automatic Rifle push to replace the Light Machine Gun/SAW dies a rapid death - no AR can provide Squad-level suppression like an LMG can. An AR with a good heavy barrel, bipod, and scope is great for long-distance single shots or short bursts of 2 or 3 rounds to take out important or distant enemy point targets like Heavy Weapons crews; 3 or 4 Designated Marksmen at Platoon level armed with these ARs could be very useful in a firefight I suspect.

[slapout9]

Don't forget Rob Thornton's comments about 60mm mortars being attached if possible. Nothing like being able to put direct and indirect fire on a target. in Vietnam Charlie was bad news with a 60mm mortar.

[Norfolk]

Don't forget Rob Thornton's comments about 60mm mortars being attached if possible. Nothing like being able to put direct and indirect fire on a target. in Vietnam Charlie was bad news with a 60mm mortar.

Perfectly right Slap. In my old Platoon, we had a Weapons Det with an FN MAG GPMG, a Carl Gustav, and a 60 mm Mortar in the hand-held role. "Triple Jeopardy" was the tactical term we used for it.

[ROKMAN]

This whole thing leads me to my own conclusions.

The literature that I am reading has the Marine squad doing the three teams bit. However as James Webb wrote once the team takes two casualties then if effectively ceases to be a maneuver element. I read that Marines in Iraq are naturally reverting to two 6 man teams, in order to sustain casualties and still keep at least a fire and maneuver capability. So we increase the fire team to 6 troops as James Webb advocates. However at that point it looks more like a mini-platoon than anything else. Each team becomes a squad and the squad into a platoon. This is the result of a squad focused organization. I noticed that Marine field manuals go like this. SQUAD, PLATOON/COMPANY while the Army goes SQUAD/PLATOON, COMPANY. If the squad increases in size anyways then why not simply operate as a Germans did. Each squad focused on a machine gun and some rifleman. Since the US Army's own studies conclude that once the squad fell down to just 9 men it ceased to function as separate fire and maneuver elements anyways. Hence another squad had to support the squad. Thus it makes more sense to use the German Army methodology anyways because it is has in itself an ability to absorb casualties. The primary tactical unit is thus the platoon not the squad.

Also the issue with two machine guns used in world war 2 was where panzergrenadiers took the other machine gun mounted on the halftrack. Even then the machine gun is an auxiliary to the squad. Regular infantry squads used 2 assistant machine guns, but once the panzergrendiers carried two machine guns then one of the assistants is assigned to the other machine gunner. Even then both machine guns were being directed by the Squad Leader and turns out not simultaneously. But lets say that we give the assistant squad leader his own machine gun. Two teams would then benefit with the squad leader separate to conduct the battle. But then we see the creeping of focusing on platoon again. Hence we should start with the focus on the platoon anyways. Finally with regards to SAWs. The Marine squad seems to be ideal for the SAW. If each team upgraded to a machine gun, then the team must be enlarged. Again going to the whole platoon focus.

Since attrition will happen it is better to allow a organization to absorb attrition at the lower levels than at the higher levels. In other words larger squads, resulting in larger battalions instead of more battalions. If the squad after some attrition can operate, it would still be better than to place fresh replacements into the squad. The German replacement system seems to be built upon this idea.

I guess what I am trying to say is that I want to thank everyone here on this forum but the conclusion that I ended up based on the historical trends of the documents and application in current combat seems to lead me to this principle on small unit organization.

A unit of certain size must have a machine gun, grenadier, and enough troops to provide pinpoint suppression, carry and assist the machine gun, and take a certain amount of attrition. Hence rather than a fireteam the squad should be this unit. The squad does not operate independently but always as part of a platoon with other squads to provide for the fire and maneuver capability. There is one thing that I definitely advocate here is that an NCO should be leading platoons.

Again thank you all for your input, yall were most helpful.

[Norfolk]

Very thorough analysis, Rokman! Ever thought of remustering from Armor to the Infantry?

[ROKMAN]

Well though they say that the King of Battle is Artillery and the Queen of Battle is the Infantry.

I have this input..... the God of Battle is Armor.

Muahahahahahahahah

[selil]

Well though they say that the King of Battle is Artillery and the Queen of Battle is the Infantry.

I have this input..... the God of Battle is Armor.

Muahahahahahahahah

It's like rock, paper, scissors....

The clay feet of armor is close air support.

[ROKMAN]

It's like rock, paper, scissors....

The clay feet of armor is close air support.

I know it was just a joke.

[selil]

I know it was just a joke.

Yeah I know.. But, I was hoping somebody would say that the bane of CAS is infantry with shoulder fired missiles.

[Distiller]

Hello, my first posting here.
My background is quite diverse, but aerial forces heavy, so to speak.


Nice discussion and an old problem.
But I think there is an answer: 9 and the German system.
The reason for 9 are APC/IFV and helicopters.
Nine soldiers fit in just nicely, more are getting complicated.
And then if your enemy is lucky, 9 wounded/dead (plus 2-3-4 from the vehicle) are bad enough.

And I think it is also important NOT to rip appart the squad or Gruppe, if you want to use a German word.
Of course, more would be fine, and in a pure infantry war 14 or 18 would be better.
But with 9 they get out/off the vehicle in one sweep and don't have to wait for the other half to arrive (like when you have 13 in one squad).

I also think that even if you are talking light infantry, the basic squad size should not differ from mechanized or airborne squads. Because of flexibility. Light might become airborne tomorrow, and airborne might find itself inside an APC.

And the thing about the German Schuetzengruppe: Probably it's right not to view the squad as an "independent" unit.
If you do so you ahve to answer the questions about direct fire support, indirect fire support, anti-tank/structure capability, flame throwers, &c.
The thing I would do is substitute "MG" by "multi crew served weapon".
Can be a MG, but can as well be a mortar, or some ATGMs or MANPADS. I know, such equipment resides "higher up" - but the basic crew size to operate them is not too bad with 9 either.

But basically I think the best reason for 9 these days are ground and aerial transport vehicles.

[Penta]

But basically I think the best reason for 9 these days are ground and aerial transport vehicles.

...Shouldn't we be designing the vehicles around the unit, not the unit around the vehicle?

[Distiller]

...Shouldn't we be designing the vehicles around the unit, not the unit around the vehicle?

In principal, yes. But since you are limited in vehicle width by public roads, you can only do two rows of seats vis-á-vis, and since you don't want to build the vehicle too long you end up with 2x4 + 1 troops and 2/3 drivers/gunners for an APC. And that is already quite a lot, since there are enough APCs out there that can't accomodate that number.
Same goes for helicopters (thinking about the UH-60 here, as the prototypical air assault helicopter). Two rows with 4 seats each, the squad leader between or besides the gunner(s), plus two pilots.
Only a irregular force can assume it never has to fit into any of these. For such units 18 on a open truck is not a problem, there you can go for large squads.

[Norfolk]

In principal, yes. But since you are limited in vehicle width by public roads, you can only do two rows of seats vis-á-vis, and since you don't want to build the vehicle too long you end up with 2x4 + 1 troops and 2/3 drivers/gunners for an APC. And that is already quite a lot, since there are enough APCs out there that can't accomodate that number.
Same goes for helicopters (thinking about the UH-60 here, as the prototypical air assault helicopter). Two rows with 4 seats each, the squad leader between or besides the gunner(s), plus two pilots.
Only a irregular force can assume it never has to fit into any of these. For such units 18 on a open truck is not a problem, there you can go for large squads.

Hello, Distiller. Welcome to Small Wars. When you have some time, formally introduce yourself on the Introduction Thread ("Tell Us Who You Are").

A 9-man Squad as you propose is certainly doable, if, as you suggest, the German Gruppe composition is followed. Now, since my own experience of helicopters and Airmobile/Air Assault Operations has been with Twin Hueys and Chinooks, I can only say that while the Blackhawk's troop-carrying capacity may afford that, but the Huey unfortunately does not, unless there are no door gunners or unless you rip out the benches and have every sit on the floor (or their helmets). Likewise, while the M-113 of unhappy memory (and continued and surprising longevity) could carry a 9-man Squad (11 men was perhaps a stretch), there is no IFV in Western service that can carry a 9-man Squad, unless of course all the seats are ripped out, or, failing that, the troops are stacked in the back like cordwood. The Bradley, for example, was originally intended to accomodate a full 11-man Rifle Squad, the Army-wide standard when the MICV was first planned in the early 1970's. Well, the plan didn't quite turn out and it can only accomodate 6, maybe 7 men.

Same with many other Western IFVs. But you are quite correct, Distiller, that the Rifle Squad should be the same throughout the Army; and in recent years, it has (more or less). Penta is also quite right that the vehicles should be designed around the Squad, rather than its weapons fit, or whatever. But the Army is stuck with the Bradley (and now the Stryker) unless and until the FCS comes on-line in the next decade or so, if that in fact does occur. Hopefully any Infantry Carrier that may come out of it will fully accomodate a properly-sized and full-strength Squad.

Bear in mind though, if the German Gruppe model were to be adopted, hypothetically speaking, it would be necessary to have four full Squads per Platoon. For the Mechanized Infantry, that would at the very least require a restoration of the Weapons Squad in each Platoon. The Germans discovered during WWII that 3 Infanterie Gruppe and a Granatewerfer Trupp (Light Mortar "Troop" - Squad) per Infanterie Zug ("Train" or Platoon) was insufficient to win the firefight quickly, and a fourth Gruppe was added. Later, a "Reserve" LMG was added to the Platoon HQ when the fourth Gruppe was formally disbanded due to manpower shortages. Each Infantry Carrier or Assault Helicopter would therefore need to have a capacity of 10-11 men at least; more if the full 10-man strength of the German Gruppe were to be adopted as well (and given Infantry battle losses, that would be advisable). Given the possibility that entire Squads may be lost when their Carrier or Helicopter is destroyed, it may well be advisable to lean towards larger Platoons with the tried-and-true 3-1-1 composition.

The SAMS Monograph by Paul E. Melody that Rifleman posted on this thread (Post #73) a little while ago laid out many of the basic requirements when determining the composition of a Rifle Squad; the 10-man German Gruppe fits them perfectly.

[William F. Owen]

Well here’s where I am currently coming from (should anyone care!)

1. The obsession with squad/section organisation is essentially pointless. There are few agreed definitions, and almost all discussions lack them. Contrary to popular belief very few of the things that people say squads/sections should be capable of doing have been subjected to much rigor or analysis.
2. What is needed is a discussion as to how to develop some principles of organisation that will enable any number of men with almost any variety of weapons and equipment to operate successfully.
3. We need to recognise that there are emotional, organisational, economic and even cultural human needs that people want to maintain and address. Cost is by far the biggest driver in the so-called experiments and decisions taken to support various squad and section organisations.

…And at the risk on being very contentious, my opinion is that words and phrases like “Assault” and “Fire and Manoeuvre” have actually become blockers to useful discussion. Most discussion on infantry doctrine is hampered by a lack of widely agreed definitions and understandings. How can we sensibly discuss any organisation issues or TOE, when we probably all have different ideas of what it is infantry actually do, or should be doing.

My current “opinions” can be very briefly summarised as follows.

1. Platoon organisation is far more important than squad or section
2. The Platoon should be configured to generate 2-3 task organised dismounted patrols that can either co-operate or achieve certain tasks independently – Why differentiate in terms of training and doctrine between a 30 man fighting patrol and what a platoon aims to achieve in a

[slapout9]

For William Owen. What do you think of each squad member having a radio that he can talk to everyother squad member like Police Officers ro SWAT teams have?