Ripples from Mali: events plus outside Mali

[davidbfpo]

Phil Mudd, a former analyst at the FBI & CIA, offers his perspective on what has happened and ends with:

We did not know how these types of al Qaedist fringes would play out 10 years ago, when I remember sitting at the nightly threat briefings at CIA, wondering, after yet another attack in yet another locale, whether we might be losing. Today, though, history has taught us the lessons of how these groups fail: trailing brightly from the fading al Qaeda comet, they win their 15 minutes of fame. Or maybe 15 months. Tomorrow, though, their real challenge begins. They have been, and will be, the architects of their own demise.

Link:http://www.thedailybeast.com/article...ying-gasp.html

[davidbfpo]

A rather long, but worthwhile review by Andrew Hussey, a UK-based academic whose specialism is France and North Africa. It's title is:

'Algiers: a city where France is the promised land – and still the enemy' and the sub-title: believes the only way to makes sense of the problems Algeria faces today is to look back into its colonial history. He takes a journey through 21st-century Algiers – into a dark past

Link:http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013...ial-past-islam

He is writing a book:

The French Intifada, which is a parallel attempt to make sense of French colonial history in north Africa. This book is a tour around some of the most important and dangerous frontlines of what many historians now call the fourth world war. This war is not a conflict between Islam and the west or the rich north and the globalised south, but a conflict between two very different experiences of the world – the colonisers and the colonised.

SWC has many threads that include Algeria; the main one is 'France's war in Algeria: telling the story':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=15864 , but until Mali little on what happened in Algeria after independence fifty years ago.

I stand corrected there is a small thread 'Algeria Again? Contemporary affairs':http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=2079


As Omar Ashour reminds us Algeria had a 'Spring' twenty years ago that led to a bitter civil war.

[Bill Moore]

Phil Mudd, a former analyst at the FBI & CIA, offers his perspective on what has happened and ends with:

Link:http://www.thedailybeast.com/article...ying-gasp.html

This is a very poor piece of analysis in my opinion. I don't think anyone claimed the Algerian attack represented a spike, but rather it was part of a much larger spike of activity that has been enduring throughout the region from Nigeria, to Mali, to Libya, and Algeria.

As for AQ being on the short and final, Al Shabab gained in strength, AQ in Yemen gained in strength, Baku Harim (sp?) in Nigeria gained strength over a period of years and months. No one can evaluate a trend on a particular event, regardless of its media coverage, but on the other hand you can't dismis the trend either. Happy thoughts are a substitute for real analysis.

[davidbfpo]

Jason Burke, of The Observer adds a review article and poses the question:

But does this all add up to al-Qaida 3.0, more dangerous than ever before? There's a simple test. Think back to those dark days of 2004 or 2005 and how much closer the violence seemed. Were you more frightened then, or now? The aim of terrorism is to inspire irrational fear, to terrorise. Few are as fearful today as they were back then. So that means there are two possibilities: we are wrong, ignorant or misinformed, and should be much more worried than we are; or our instincts are right, and those responsible for the violence are as far from posing an existential threat as they have ever been.

Link:http://m.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/j...sm-threat-west

[davidbfpo]

A very short USIP commentary 'Regional Security Lessons from the Attack on Algeria's In Amenas Gas Plant', which draws attention to:

average annual attacks on energy infrastructure have risen from slightly more than 200 worldwide during 1980-99 to 380 over the last decade, 2000-11.

Not only do attacks tend to cluster in certain regions, they also occur in waves. The crests of these waves tend to correspond with flashpoints of instability that are characterized by localized ‘bursts’ of violence aimed at energy infrastructure. Algeria and the Maghreb are not peculiar in this regard. Other recent waves and clusters could be identified in Colombia, Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nigeria, and Russia.

Four lessons:

Four important lessons can be gleaned from USIP's project on the vulnerability of energy infrastructure. First, attacks on energy facilities historically occur in 'waves,' and we might be at the start of one such wave in the Maghreb and the Sahel. Second, attacks are likely to cluster around natural gas and oil installations because they are often far removed from major administrative centers and because they provide a wide variety of high-value targets.

Third, the interconnected nature of causes demands an examination of the people, equipment and virtual networks that support energy operations. This will help tailor solutions to fit the local context. Fourth, violent non-state actors are less likely to be homogenous groups with a singular focus.

Link:http://www.usip.org/publications/reg...enas-gas-plant

USIP are IMHO a long way behind the "oil majors" in thinking about the issues, the "majors" have long had facilities in vulnerable areas, which has included Algeria for at least twenty years. Somehow I doubt the "majors" or insurers will comment preferring discretion and commercial confidentiality.

[davidbfpo]

Three succinct comments by Brian Jenkins from RAND

Part 1: The Motivations Behind the Amenas Terrorist Attack

This opens with a sharp caveat:

If the assault on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi held any lessons for government officials who must make immediate assessments, eager-to-be-interviewed experts, or critics ready to point fingers, it was this: What is initially known about a terrorist attack beyond the what, when, and where often turns out to be wrong. Many of the critical details may not be known for days, weeks, months—or ever. There will always be omissions and distortions. That lesson undoubtedly applies to the bloody terrorist attack on the Amenas natural gas facility in Algeria

Link:http://www.rand.org/blog/2013/01/the...st-attack.html

Part 2: The Dynamics of the Hostage Situation at Amenas

A thorough review, including historical aspects like:

In the 1970s, hostage situations accounted for about 20 percent of all terrorist incidents. (On the risk to hostages)... 79 percent of the hostages who died in hostage incidents were killed during a rescue operation, either by their captors or by their rescuers (Based on a 1977 RAND Study).

Link:http://www.rand.org/blog/2013/01/the...at-amenas.html

Part 3: What Does the Amenas Attack Mean for U.S. Policy in Africa?

This is very short, almost a "holding" action as France acts in Mali and the USA decides what to do next:http://www.rand.org/blog/2013/01/wha...policy-in.html

There is an very different point of view in a SWJ Blog piece today 'The Amenas Siege and the Growing Hostage Problem in Africa':http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/the...blem-in-africa

[KingJaja]

davidbfpo,

The best thing the US should do is to look beyond the Al Qaeda bogeyman.

There's a lot going in Africa that would have occurred irrespective of Libya etc.

[M-A Lagrange]

After the quick progression, comes the time for search and destroy...

Mali: the battle continues Iforas, 30 Islamists killed in the operation

Operation "Panther IV", "continues" and "progress." This was said Thursday the staff of the French army. Monday started, this operation is to dislodge the Islamists in the region of the Adrar des Iforas in north-eastern Mali. "This is not just a progression, it is also quite favorable search this area is that people can hide. Should therefore avoid exceeding the terrorist positions and have people in the back, it is therefore a thorough enough search, "said the spokesman of the General Staff, Colonel Thierry Burkhard, at the weekly press briefing of defense.

"It is estimated that twenty terrorists were neutralized in the first place attachment" on Tuesday, in which Harold died Legionnaire Vormezeele. Wednesday, a little further east, "a little less than a dozen terrorists" have in turn been announced Thierry Burkhard, bringing the death toll on the side of jihadist thirty dead.

The previous count, announced Wednesday by Defense Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian was 25 Islamists killed. Several ammunition depots were also destroyed, according to the staff. A wide Mali entire Staff announcement "about 200 sorties" from Thursday, February 14, with "sixty" carried about by hunters, although they are not necessarily made of keystrokes, at we said.

A "ten goals" have been destroyed by air strikes, mainly carried out by fighters but also some by helicopter, according to Colonel Burkhard. These "targets" were mainly in the region of the Adrar des Ifoghas but also in the region Bourem. These are "half" of logistics sites that have been destroyed, but also "an armored reconnaissance and four pick-up," he said. Weapons caches were discovered and several rocket-propelled vehicles were recovered.

En savoir plus sur http://www.atlantico.fr/pepites/mali...YMbxZpOL1EF.99