Ripples from Mali: events plus outside Mali

[M-A Lagrange]

Hey Dahuyan,

The questions you ask have their importance because it implies that Malian State is able to make a difference between Tuareg’s legitimate grievances and AQMI efforts to impose a terrorist state in Sahara.
The question is: will Malian State blame (and punish) the Tuareg for having allowed AQMI to take control over North Mali.

About racism against Tuareg: it is clear that Tuaregs are perceived, as many nomadic people, as “bandits and un-educated” by many of the southerners in Mali and in the countries southern from Mali. The Tuareg grievances are the result of both a self-exclusion because of their nomadic way of life and exclusion from sedentary populations. A very classical "pre-insurgency" pattern which fuels both hatery and fear on all sides.

In addition you add a complex and ramping but existing tension between Christians and Muslims which has been exacerbated in the last decade.
I spent some time at the border between North Mali and Burkina more than 15 years ago; there was no problem between Christians and Muslims. Last year when the coup took place, first reaction in West Africa capitals were extremely harsh against Tuaregs who were already assimilated to AQ terrorists I the popular imagination. That said, Tuaregs are Muslims but a minority are Islamist.

For a better understanding of the challenges of the approach you propose, I encourage you to read the following article (In French but Google translate can do miracles)

"Le risque est grand de voir Bamako mener de larges représailles contre les Touareg" http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/articl...7055_3212.html

The risks of large scale reprisals against the Tuaregs by Bamako are high
From news paper Le Monde.

This article explains quite clearly the difference between the Tuaregs from MNLA and the Islamist.

[davidbfpo]

Bill,

You cite a WaPo article:

The region was destabilized by a flood of weaponry and armed Tuareg nomads who had fought for Gaddafi but escaped across Libya’s borders. Many of those mercenaries have since teamed with AQIM to take control of the northern half of Mali.

As I have posted elsewhere a recent article points out that Tuareg elements of Mali's army, trained by the USA, deserted to the "other side". One wonders what is the truth?

Post 230 on the parallel Mali thread (cited in part)

A strange NYT article on the US role before the coup in Mali in mid-2012, one wonders why this had been in the public domain and challenges the value of the US DoD programme across West Africa:http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/14/wo...nted=all&_r=2&

According to one senior officer, the Tuareg commanders of three of the four Malian units fighting in the north at the time defected to the insurrection “at the crucial moment,” taking fighters, weapons and scarce equipment with them. He said they were joined by about 1,600 other defectors from within the Malian Army, crippling the government’s hope of resisting the onslaught.

I have a suspicion that much of the writing before the French action, especially in the USA, followed a legend that is was this 'flood' from Libya that split Mali. A convenient, acceptable legend when in fact Mali was a weak state and even weaker when part of the army being Tuareg deserted.

[KingJaja]

Interesting piece by Howard French:

For sheer sexiness, few news monikers can compete with the al Qaeda label.

This, in a word, is how one of the world's most remote and traditionally obscure regions, Africa's arid and largely empty Sahel, has suddenly come to be treated as a zone of great strategic importance in the wake of the recent offensive by a hodgepodge of armed groups, including one called al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, that has threatened the survival of the Malian state and sent violent ripples throughout the neighboring area.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...rench?page=0,0

[davidbfpo]

Under the microscope a hitherto unknown analyst & blogger has provided a snapshot of Jihadist activity in the border region of Illizi Province, Algeria in 2011 and 2012 will follow shortly:http://www.makingsenseofjihad.com/20...n-algeria.html

[KingJaja]

I don't know how authentic this is.

There were indications yesterday in Abuja, that the leader of the Boko Haram Islamic sect, Imam Abubakar Shekau was wounded during a gun battle with security men recently.
Sources said in Abuja that security agencies traced the whereabouts of Shekau, who succeeded late Mohammed Yusuf as leader of the sect to Mali, where he escaped to after sustaining injuries during a gun duel with soldiers of the Joint Task Force, JTF, a.k.a Operation Restore Order.
Sources told Saturday Vanguard that the Federal Government approved the deployment of 1,200 soldiers apparently because of the need to arrest the wounded Boko Haram leader.
The Chief of Army Staff, Lt. General Azubuike Ihejirika who addressed officers and soldiers of the Nigerian army shortly before they were airlifted to Mali Thursday in Kaduna, asked them to be extra vigilant as there are indications that some terrorists had sneaked into the country with the aim of causing havoc.
Ihejirika however, pointed out that the Nigerian Army was not resting on its oars as the war against terror was being won.

http://www.informationng.com/2013/01...s-to-mali.html

[KingJaja]

This is EXTREMELY WORRYING, Nigerian troops en route to Mali are attacked with IEDs WITHIN NIGERIA.

About 190 Nigerian troops were ambushed a few kilometers from Okene in Kogi state today. The attack took place around 6: 05 AM Nigerian time as militants cut through the convoy of Mali-bound Nigerian army peacekeepers traveling in three luxurious buses via Kaduna too Bamako, Mali. The militants decimated the convoy with the aid of IEDs planted on the highway and began firing on the troops afterwards.
The soldiers were under escort at the time and the military escorts alter returned fire, but the assailants who were parked on both sides of the highway escaped the scene after two soldiers had been killed and several others injured.
Nigerian Army spokesperson, Brigadier General Bola Koleosho confirmed to Saharareporters by phone that two soldiers were killed while the bomb explosion injured four others. The wounded soldiers are receiving treatment at the Federal Medical Center in Okene.

http://www.osundefender.org/?p=87980

[Bill Moore]

Bill,

You cite a WaPo article:

As I have posted elsewhere a recent article points out that Tuareg elements of Mali's army, trained by the USA, deserted to the "other side". One wonders what is the truth?

Post 230 on the parallel Mali thread (cited in part)

A strange NYT article on the US role before the coup in Mali in mid-2012, one wonders why this had been in the public domain and challenges the value of the US DoD programme across West Africa:http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/14/wo...nted=all&_r=2&

I have a suspicion that much of the writing before the French action, especially in the USA, followed a legend that is was this 'flood' from Libya that split Mali. A convenient, acceptable legend when in fact Mali was a weak state and even weaker when part of the army being Tuareg deserted.

Also in the article:

Some Defense Department officials, notably officers at the Pentagon’s Joint Special Operations Command, have pushed for a lethal campaign to kill senior operatives of two of the extremists groups holding northern Mali, Ansar Dine and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Killing the leadership, they argued, could lead to an internal collapse

.

I don't follow this region as closely as I used to, but the assumption about killing senior operatives to create network collapse is more often a false assumption than a correct one. It is another one of those so called lessons from the last decade of war that we need to reconsider the validity of. There are cases where some leaders are so charismatic that they create a personality cult and their death would be very disruptive, at least for awhile. This doesn't mean we shouldn't endeavor to act early versus waiting for a crisis, but we need to act based on understanding. The issues driving this conflict have been going on for years, and while charismatic leaders are required to mobilize, organize, and direct movements (terrorist, insurgency, or otherwise), once started they can have a life of their own.

I think the U.S. places too much emphasis on its through, by and with mantra because it is based on a generally false assumption that the rest of the world shares our interests and most are willing to act in partnership or better yet as our surrogates to pursue our goals. What the article didn't state is why the U.S. trained officers defected? What were their interests? Why didn't we understand them to begin with? What "expert" told us this was the right course of action? Based on what?

On the other hand I'm not convinced that these incidents call our DOD program in the region into question. If you look at our foreign engagement over the years you'll find we win some and we lose some, but the objectives for the most part appears sound (even if they are pursued incorrectly), and their little doubt that security forces need additional assistance in most cases. What we must do better is gain a deeper and more accurate understanding of what is really happening, what are the real issues in the eyes of the locals, and only then can we hope to realistically reach point where we identify "common interests," that then allows us to develop a collaborative strategy that will be based on understanding instead of wishful thinking. Second we have to stop rushing to the most convenient surrogate as we have done throughout history (most recently in Iraq and Afghanistan), which more often than proves to be counterproductive overtime.

[Dayuhan]

The risks of large scale reprisals against the Tuaregs by Bamako are high

I'd think that would be counterproductive, but of course that doesn't mean it won't happen. The question is whether the Western powers or ECOWAS want to help it to happen or enable it to happen.

Would it be feasible to make aid to the Mali government conditional on them reaching a fair settlement on the issues that are pushing the Tuareg to rebel? Would that be a non-starter for the Mali government or for the ECOWAS participants?

"Mali" in my first second language means "mistake". Coincidence of course, but still...

[davidbfpo]

A long analysis on Algeria's stance, interesting as clearly outside the government there is no consensus. Algeria IMHO is one of the key players, yes partly due to its military capability, but more due to its diplomatic role with factions and nations:http://themoornextdoor.wordpress.com...oor+Next+Door)

[Surferbeetle]

David,

Found this article to be of interest:

Jihadists’ Surge in North Africa Reveals Grim Side of Arab Spring, By ROBERT F. WORTH, Published: January 19, 2013, NYT, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/20/wo...nted=1&_r=0&hp

Algeria’s authoritarian government is now seen as a crucial intermediary by France and other Western countries in dealing with Islamist militants in North Africa. But the Algerians have shown reluctance to become too involved in a broad military campaign that could be very risky for them. International action against the Islamist takeover in northern Mali could push the militants back into southern Algeria, where they started. That would undo years of bloody struggle by Algeria’s military forces, which largely succeeded in pushing the jihadists outside their borders.

The Algerians also have little patience with what they see as Western naïveté about the Arab spring, analysts say.

“Their attitude was, ‘Please don’t intervene in Libya or you will create another Iraq on our border,’ ” said Geoff D. Porter, an Algeria expert and founder of North Africa Risk Consulting, which advises investors in the region. “And then, ‘Please don’t intervene in Mali or you will create a mess on our other border.’ But they were dismissed as nervous Nellies, and now Algeria says to the West: ‘G*dd@&n it, we told you so.’ ”

[davidbfpo]

Jason Burke is a British journalist and author who has become a well-known commentator on terrorism, for The Guardian and The Observer in the UK; currently he is faraway from the UK and 'Sahelistan' in India.

His column looks at two aspects, the British setting and the global counter-Jihadi approach and ends with (with my emphasis):

There is another problem with framing the threat as "global". From General David Petraeus reformulating counter-insurgency tactics for the US army to MI5 putting spooks in police stations, the grand realisation of the middle of the last decade for those combating extremism was "think local, not global". This meant dumping identification of militants through profiling in favour of painstaking tracking of networks; questioning the vision of al-Qaida as global terrorist masterminds and unpicking the granular details of every extremist group from Morocco to Malaysia; it meant tailoring tactics to ground conditions and the customs of local communities; it meant degrading the credibility of the enemy by minimising the danger they posed.

The new challenge this decade may be an unforeseen one: the hard-learned lessons of last decade being neglected, if not deliberately unlearned.

Link:http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013...isis-dark-days

[KingJaja]

Seems like another front is being opened.

(Reuters) - An armored column of Chadian troops in Niger moved towards the Malian border on Tuesday, part of an African military force that is gradually deploying to support French operations against Islamist rebels in northern Mali.

A Reuters reporter witnessed the Chadian forces, who are experienced in desert operations, advancing north from the capital Niamey on the road to Ouallam, some 100 km (60 miles) from the border, where a company of Niger's troops are already stationed.

France, which launched air strikes in Mali 11 days ago to halt a surprise Islamist offensive toward the capital Bamako, has urged a swift deployment of the U.N.-mandated African force to back up its 2,150-strong ground forces already there.

Niger President Mahamadou Issoufou, who visited the troops at Ouallam military base, condemned the al Qaeda-linked Islamist alliance controlling Mali's vast desert north. An Imam, or Muslim cleric, said prayers for the troops.

"We are going to war. A war imposed on us by traffickers of all kinds, an unjust war, from which the peaceful citizens of northern Mali are suffering terribly," Issoufou told the forces.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/...90L0GK20130122

[davidbfpo]

A wide ranging article from The Economist, which has some odd references, such as the bulldozers and tunnelling in insurgent Mali and a very useful map of religious observance across northern Africa:http://www.economist.com/news/briefi...sm?frsc=dg%7Ca

It ends, IMO not very helpfully with:

Should radicalised and militant forms of Islam spread farther, current grounds for confidence will be undermined. Intelligence agencies already have a heavy presence in Nairobi, the Kenyan capital, to sniff out terror links with the east African diaspora in the West. The real threat, though, is to African countries themselves. In many, including resource-rich ones like Nigeria, religious cleavages are widening. Both action by jihadists and action against jihadists could exacerbate the dangers.