Ripples from Mali: events plus outside Mali

[Bill Moore]

Bill,

You cite a WaPo article:

As I have posted elsewhere a recent article points out that Tuareg elements of Mali's army, trained by the USA, deserted to the "other side". One wonders what is the truth?

Post 230 on the parallel Mali thread (cited in part)

A strange NYT article on the US role before the coup in Mali in mid-2012, one wonders why this had been in the public domain and challenges the value of the US DoD programme across West Africa:http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/14/wo...nted=all&_r=2&

I have a suspicion that much of the writing before the French action, especially in the USA, followed a legend that is was this 'flood' from Libya that split Mali. A convenient, acceptable legend when in fact Mali was a weak state and even weaker when part of the army being Tuareg deserted.

Also in the article:

Some Defense Department officials, notably officers at the Pentagon’s Joint Special Operations Command, have pushed for a lethal campaign to kill senior operatives of two of the extremists groups holding northern Mali, Ansar Dine and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Killing the leadership, they argued, could lead to an internal collapse

.

I don't follow this region as closely as I used to, but the assumption about killing senior operatives to create network collapse is more often a false assumption than a correct one. It is another one of those so called lessons from the last decade of war that we need to reconsider the validity of. There are cases where some leaders are so charismatic that they create a personality cult and their death would be very disruptive, at least for awhile. This doesn't mean we shouldn't endeavor to act early versus waiting for a crisis, but we need to act based on understanding. The issues driving this conflict have been going on for years, and while charismatic leaders are required to mobilize, organize, and direct movements (terrorist, insurgency, or otherwise), once started they can have a life of their own.

I think the U.S. places too much emphasis on its through, by and with mantra because it is based on a generally false assumption that the rest of the world shares our interests and most are willing to act in partnership or better yet as our surrogates to pursue our goals. What the article didn't state is why the U.S. trained officers defected? What were their interests? Why didn't we understand them to begin with? What "expert" told us this was the right course of action? Based on what?

On the other hand I'm not convinced that these incidents call our DOD program in the region into question. If you look at our foreign engagement over the years you'll find we win some and we lose some, but the objectives for the most part appears sound (even if they are pursued incorrectly), and their little doubt that security forces need additional assistance in most cases. What we must do better is gain a deeper and more accurate understanding of what is really happening, what are the real issues in the eyes of the locals, and only then can we hope to realistically reach point where we identify "common interests," that then allows us to develop a collaborative strategy that will be based on understanding instead of wishful thinking. Second we have to stop rushing to the most convenient surrogate as we have done throughout history (most recently in Iraq and Afghanistan), which more often than proves to be counterproductive overtime.