Ripples from Mali: events plus outside Mali

[M-A Lagrange]

Hello,

I'll try to answer Dayuhan question on Tuareg and Islamist. Note, please, that I am no expert on Saharian Afria but on Sub-Saharian Africa (Central Africa to be exact).

As far as I know, Tuaregs do have legitime grieverances and the early hours of the rebellion was mainly aimed to establish a Tuareg State. They kind of took advantage of the chaos generated by the coup.
Tuareg, apparently, received support from AQMI to reach their first and primary objective but AQMI managed to eat the Tuareg rebels and take control of that rebelion.
This appeared very clearly when some Islamist decieded to destroy some of the holliest Muslim monuments of Mali and all Islam in West Africa. The Charia that Islamist apply in North Mali is not the cultural interpretation most of the Muslims living in Mali or in Sahel live by. (Or even the Muslims from Sahel as in Chad or even in Sudan)

Now the operation led by France and Chad troops in Mali officially aims to destroy AQMI capacities in North Mali. Concerning the Tuareg legitimate demands, I really hope the actual trend of the events will not make them disappear and that Mali government will be able to make the part between Tuareg rebels and AQMI.

The situation is complex because the coup initiated in Bamako allowed Tuareg to establish a Tuareg State and because of Bamako domestic disorder and incapacity to address Tuareg problematic, AQMI has been able to develop in North Mali.
I find the analysis that we are now in Lybia civil war act2 a little too easy. It is clear that weapons are coming from Lybia but it is also, the underground root causes, also in a purely Malian domestic problematic that will need to be addressed.
In addition that crisis is a strong challenge for ARICOM that deployed a lot of efforts to train many of the Sahelian states military forces (especially for anti-terrorist operation). AFRICOM will certainly have to re-evaluate its training/follow up procedures in Sahara; especially with failed armed forces of failed states.
That said, Malian army was a lost cause long before the Tuareg deceided to set free from Bamako.

[davidbfpo]

Each time we have a crisis there is a surge of comment as everyone seeks to gain knowledge and insight. New experts appear, hitherto unknown experts get publicity and credit after years of study.

That caveat aside I was amazed to read this FP article, which opens with:

In 1893, in West Africa's upper Niger River basin -- what is now central Mali -- the French army achieved a victory that had eluded it for almost 50 years: the destruction of the jihadist Tukulor Empire, one of the last great challenges to France's rule in the region. The Tukulor Empire's first important conquest had come decades earlier, in the early 1850s, when its fanatical founder, El Hajj Umar Tall, led Koranic students and hardened soldiers to topple the Bambara kingdoms along the banks of the Niger. Umar imposed a strict brand of Islamic law, reportedly enslaving or killing tens of thousands of non-believers over a half century.....Now, the jihadists are back and so are the French -- the two sides slugging it out over the same real estate they fought over 120 years ago.

Link:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...ntry?page=full

The author Peter Chilson has a new e-book ' We Never Knew Exactly Where: Dispatches from the Lost Country of Mali'.

[Fuchs]

The Eradicateurs
Why Algeria doesn't talk to terrorists -- even if that means killing hostages.
BY GEOFF D. PORTER | JANUARY 18, 2013


http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...rists_hostages

[Dayuhan]

Hello,

I'll try to answer Dayuhan question on Tuareg and Islamist. Note, please, that I am no expert on Saharian Afria but on Sub-Saharian Africa (Central Africa to be exact).

As far as I know, Tuaregs do have legitime grieverances and the early hours of the rebellion was mainly aimed to establish a Tuareg State. They kind of took advantage of the chaos generated by the coup.
Tuareg, apparently, received support from AQMI to reach their first and primary objective but AQMI managed to eat the Tuareg rebels and take control of that rebelion.
This appeared very clearly when some Islamist decieded to destroy some of the holliest Muslim monuments of Mali and all Islam in West Africa. The Charia that Islamist apply in North Mali is not the cultural interpretation most of the Muslims living in Mali or in Sahel live by. (Or even the Muslims from Sahel as in Chad or even in Sudan)

Now the operation led by France and Chad troops in Mali officially aims to destroy AQMI capacities in North Mali. Concerning the Tuareg legitimate demands, I really hope the actual trend of the events will not make them disappear and that Mali government will be able to make the part between Tuareg rebels and AQMI.

The situation is complex because the coup initiated in Bamako allowed Tuareg to establish a Tuareg State and because of Bamako domestic disorder and incapacity to address Tuareg problematic, AQMI has been able to develop in North Mali.
I find the analysis that we are now in Lybia civil war act2 a little too easy. It is clear that weapons are coming from Lybia but it is also, the underground root causes, also in a purely Malian domestic problematic that will need to be addressed.
In addition that crisis is a strong challenge for ARICOM that deployed a lot of efforts to train many of the Sahelian states military forces (especially for anti-terrorist operation). AFRICOM will certainly have to re-evaluate its training/follow up procedures in Sahara; especially with failed armed forces of failed states.
That said, Malian army was a lost cause long before the Tuareg deceided to set free from Bamako.

Thank you. I understand that the area is not your specialty, but you know more about it than most of us.

Three questions, possibly dumb ones but they seem relevant:

Might it be possible to divide the Tuareg nationalists and the Islamists and turn the former against the latter if the Tuareg's grievances were recognized and addressed?

To what extent would such a strategy be acceptable to whatever passes for a national government?

How would ECOWAS see such a proposal? Is there traditional animosity between the Tuareg and the primarily southern groups that govern the ECOWAS nations? I'm wondering if the ECOWAS governments might resist accommodation to the Tuareg on the grounds that it might encourage Tuareg or similar out-of-power ethnic groups in their own countries to seek similar accommodation?

Apologies for my ignorance, just trying to sort matters out to some extent!

[Bill Moore]

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/...542_story.html

Algerian stance spoils U.S. strategy for region

The hostage crisis in Algeria has upended the Obama administration’s strategy for coordinating an international military campaign against al-Qaeda fighters in North Africa, leaving U.S., European and African leaders even more at odds over how to tackle the problem.

One person's opinion

The region was destabilized by a flood of weaponry and armed Tuareg nomads who had fought for Gaddafi but escaped across Libya’s borders. Many of those mercenaries have since teamed with AQIM to take control of the northern half of Mali.

“This has just been an utter disaster. It was eminently foreseeable,” the senior U.S. diplomat said of the ripple effects from Libya. “It was the infusion of that additional manpower and weapons . . . that enabled this to happen.”

[M-A Lagrange]

Hey Dahuyan,

The questions you ask have their importance because it implies that Malian State is able to make a difference between Tuareg’s legitimate grievances and AQMI efforts to impose a terrorist state in Sahara.
The question is: will Malian State blame (and punish) the Tuareg for having allowed AQMI to take control over North Mali.

About racism against Tuareg: it is clear that Tuaregs are perceived, as many nomadic people, as “bandits and un-educated” by many of the southerners in Mali and in the countries southern from Mali. The Tuareg grievances are the result of both a self-exclusion because of their nomadic way of life and exclusion from sedentary populations. A very classical "pre-insurgency" pattern which fuels both hatery and fear on all sides.

In addition you add a complex and ramping but existing tension between Christians and Muslims which has been exacerbated in the last decade.
I spent some time at the border between North Mali and Burkina more than 15 years ago; there was no problem between Christians and Muslims. Last year when the coup took place, first reaction in West Africa capitals were extremely harsh against Tuaregs who were already assimilated to AQ terrorists I the popular imagination. That said, Tuaregs are Muslims but a minority are Islamist.

For a better understanding of the challenges of the approach you propose, I encourage you to read the following article (In French but Google translate can do miracles)

"Le risque est grand de voir Bamako mener de larges représailles contre les Touareg" http://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/articl...7055_3212.html

The risks of large scale reprisals against the Tuaregs by Bamako are high
From news paper Le Monde.

This article explains quite clearly the difference between the Tuaregs from MNLA and the Islamist.

[davidbfpo]

Bill,

You cite a WaPo article:

The region was destabilized by a flood of weaponry and armed Tuareg nomads who had fought for Gaddafi but escaped across Libya’s borders. Many of those mercenaries have since teamed with AQIM to take control of the northern half of Mali.

As I have posted elsewhere a recent article points out that Tuareg elements of Mali's army, trained by the USA, deserted to the "other side". One wonders what is the truth?

Post 230 on the parallel Mali thread (cited in part)

A strange NYT article on the US role before the coup in Mali in mid-2012, one wonders why this had been in the public domain and challenges the value of the US DoD programme across West Africa:http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/14/wo...nted=all&_r=2&

According to one senior officer, the Tuareg commanders of three of the four Malian units fighting in the north at the time defected to the insurrection “at the crucial moment,” taking fighters, weapons and scarce equipment with them. He said they were joined by about 1,600 other defectors from within the Malian Army, crippling the government’s hope of resisting the onslaught.

I have a suspicion that much of the writing before the French action, especially in the USA, followed a legend that is was this 'flood' from Libya that split Mali. A convenient, acceptable legend when in fact Mali was a weak state and even weaker when part of the army being Tuareg deserted.

[KingJaja]

Interesting piece by Howard French:

For sheer sexiness, few news monikers can compete with the al Qaeda label.

This, in a word, is how one of the world's most remote and traditionally obscure regions, Africa's arid and largely empty Sahel, has suddenly come to be treated as a zone of great strategic importance in the wake of the recent offensive by a hodgepodge of armed groups, including one called al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, that has threatened the survival of the Malian state and sent violent ripples throughout the neighboring area.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...rench?page=0,0

[davidbfpo]

Under the microscope a hitherto unknown analyst & blogger has provided a snapshot of Jihadist activity in the border region of Illizi Province, Algeria in 2011 and 2012 will follow shortly:http://www.makingsenseofjihad.com/20...n-algeria.html

[Bill Moore]

Bill,

You cite a WaPo article:

As I have posted elsewhere a recent article points out that Tuareg elements of Mali's army, trained by the USA, deserted to the "other side". One wonders what is the truth?

Post 230 on the parallel Mali thread (cited in part)

A strange NYT article on the US role before the coup in Mali in mid-2012, one wonders why this had been in the public domain and challenges the value of the US DoD programme across West Africa:http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/14/wo...nted=all&_r=2&

I have a suspicion that much of the writing before the French action, especially in the USA, followed a legend that is was this 'flood' from Libya that split Mali. A convenient, acceptable legend when in fact Mali was a weak state and even weaker when part of the army being Tuareg deserted.

Also in the article:

Some Defense Department officials, notably officers at the Pentagon’s Joint Special Operations Command, have pushed for a lethal campaign to kill senior operatives of two of the extremists groups holding northern Mali, Ansar Dine and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Killing the leadership, they argued, could lead to an internal collapse

.

I don't follow this region as closely as I used to, but the assumption about killing senior operatives to create network collapse is more often a false assumption than a correct one. It is another one of those so called lessons from the last decade of war that we need to reconsider the validity of. There are cases where some leaders are so charismatic that they create a personality cult and their death would be very disruptive, at least for awhile. This doesn't mean we shouldn't endeavor to act early versus waiting for a crisis, but we need to act based on understanding. The issues driving this conflict have been going on for years, and while charismatic leaders are required to mobilize, organize, and direct movements (terrorist, insurgency, or otherwise), once started they can have a life of their own.

I think the U.S. places too much emphasis on its through, by and with mantra because it is based on a generally false assumption that the rest of the world shares our interests and most are willing to act in partnership or better yet as our surrogates to pursue our goals. What the article didn't state is why the U.S. trained officers defected? What were their interests? Why didn't we understand them to begin with? What "expert" told us this was the right course of action? Based on what?

On the other hand I'm not convinced that these incidents call our DOD program in the region into question. If you look at our foreign engagement over the years you'll find we win some and we lose some, but the objectives for the most part appears sound (even if they are pursued incorrectly), and their little doubt that security forces need additional assistance in most cases. What we must do better is gain a deeper and more accurate understanding of what is really happening, what are the real issues in the eyes of the locals, and only then can we hope to realistically reach point where we identify "common interests," that then allows us to develop a collaborative strategy that will be based on understanding instead of wishful thinking. Second we have to stop rushing to the most convenient surrogate as we have done throughout history (most recently in Iraq and Afghanistan), which more often than proves to be counterproductive overtime.

[Dayuhan]

The risks of large scale reprisals against the Tuaregs by Bamako are high

I'd think that would be counterproductive, but of course that doesn't mean it won't happen. The question is whether the Western powers or ECOWAS want to help it to happen or enable it to happen.

Would it be feasible to make aid to the Mali government conditional on them reaching a fair settlement on the issues that are pushing the Tuareg to rebel? Would that be a non-starter for the Mali government or for the ECOWAS participants?

"Mali" in my first second language means "mistake". Coincidence of course, but still...

[davidbfpo]

A long analysis on Algeria's stance, interesting as clearly outside the government there is no consensus. Algeria IMHO is one of the key players, yes partly due to its military capability, but more due to its diplomatic role with factions and nations:http://themoornextdoor.wordpress.com...oor+Next+Door)

[Surferbeetle]

David,

Found this article to be of interest:

Jihadists’ Surge in North Africa Reveals Grim Side of Arab Spring, By ROBERT F. WORTH, Published: January 19, 2013, NYT, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/20/wo...nted=1&_r=0&hp

Algeria’s authoritarian government is now seen as a crucial intermediary by France and other Western countries in dealing with Islamist militants in North Africa. But the Algerians have shown reluctance to become too involved in a broad military campaign that could be very risky for them. International action against the Islamist takeover in northern Mali could push the militants back into southern Algeria, where they started. That would undo years of bloody struggle by Algeria’s military forces, which largely succeeded in pushing the jihadists outside their borders.

The Algerians also have little patience with what they see as Western naïveté about the Arab spring, analysts say.

“Their attitude was, ‘Please don’t intervene in Libya or you will create another Iraq on our border,’ ” said Geoff D. Porter, an Algeria expert and founder of North Africa Risk Consulting, which advises investors in the region. “And then, ‘Please don’t intervene in Mali or you will create a mess on our other border.’ But they were dismissed as nervous Nellies, and now Algeria says to the West: ‘G*dd@&n it, we told you so.’ ”