I'd humbly submit that it isn't so much lethargy or difficulty in recognizing opportunites for change. The corporate knowledge also holds the burned-in images of those moments when we failed terribly; risk-aversion then comes into play.Why we are both reluctant and lethargic to changing organizational culture and other aspects that could benefit us. We have the biggest problem recognizing things, then acting in manner that quickly changes things in our balance.
I remember something I learned about IO years ago. A Marine unit thought it had developed a pretty good flyer and pushed a lot of products out. The problem was that the message, while directed at the muj, was easily misinterpreted by the innocents as meant for them as well. It portrayed us as some omnipotent entity that would come after "you" at any time of the day. Screwed up thing was that who "you" actually was, did not get defined properly.
We're afraid to fail in these areas. It does require a cultural shift from the top, perhaps all the way up to SecDef. I don't think there are too many battalion commanders (where the rubber really hits the road) who are willing to hang their hat on an unapproved message or technique. the top needs to define the left and right lateral limits, as you say, as allow more latitude. One question that I submit to you is this: Does the top know what the message is? When I use the term message, I mean the overall framework or theme of IO for a certain. You remember when the push was elections, or joining the IA, etc. What's the current theme? I don't think the top knows what the theme is, and thus we have stasis, outside of the run-of-the-mill products that say "hey, look at what we are doing for you."
The issue of the surge or escalation is going to draw significant mental energy along with it, and other warfighting functions suffer.
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