Tactical Bloggers?

[Rob Thornton]

I looked around for a moment and saw several places that this could be inserted into an existing thread, but then thought since there were so many places - better to start one where it would be a seperate conversation.

I was looking at a DVD narrarated by Tom Hanks about the combat cameramen during WWII and the role they played within the Signal Corps. In many ways not much has changed. Thecombat reporters that occassionally come out on patrols or make it out this way are smart young men and women. They seem more focused on collecting IAW much higher echelon themes. Its a shame - they shoot some really good footage that could be used in local IO efforts - even if they did not come with their own interpreter (which mostly they don't), a sharp IO team at BN level could edit the footage on commercial software with a Local interpreter an produce somthing worthwhile. They could even assist the ISF (or whatever Host Nation we are currently working in) with managing their own site.This is something we could do right now.

Now, take it a step further. There was one WWII Marine who landed with a BN CDR on and atoll who was told by the BN CDR, "I don't like having any Hollywood Marines along!". The reporter replied to the BN CDR, "Sir, I shot expert, I can handle my rifle." How important is the information war? How important is it to "be firstest with the mostest" when it comes to getting your message out in a form that is not just seen, but understood? Is it worth trading out other capabilities at different levels? When I was working FCS there were contractors telling us that robotics operator for the big 10 tons where going to be an "additional duty" - Having done the field tests, I told them they were barking up the tree of one thing well, or many things badly.

You can't just add something I've found. Even small decisions impact all kinds of other things. Everything is a trade unless somebody is willing to start changing platforms for tactical through strategic mobility (it gets cummulative real fast). So how important would it be for example to have tactical bloggers who were trained and equipped (think of them as kind of a platoon FO in terms of low density MOS) and could tie in with the other higher echelons like functions/capabilities? They would not just be passive in the manner of "hey check this out", but active as in they'd be placed with the right element to collect on the event that fit the best with what the overall task and purpose was, and actively engage the enemy's IO, or create our desired IO effects. Its possible, but not a given by any stretch due to wireless bandwith constraints and competition, that they could even be given a window to upload immediately - where they or someone else (could even be at an HSOC) could manipulate it, thread it, hyperlink it, spam it, etc.

This is in effect what the bad guys are doing, but could we do it better an faster then them by recognizing the importance and making adjustments & trades? Thoughts? Thoughts on trades? Thoughts on where our resources are best spent? Work arounds?

Since the squad in my book is the most fundamental of organizations (the fire team is important, but does not have two elements to support maneuver - there is no battle drill - 'team attack', although there is a 'single team-single room'), this and questions like it should cause us to consider the nature of how we fight. Is information worth considering as a forms of contact, in a combined arms line of thought that merits changes at basic levels?

[Rob Thornton]

Marc,
I had missed your post on the rifle squad - here may a good place to expand - I think we're headed in the same cardinal direction.
Regards, Rob

[jcustis]

It's all about resources (laptops) and data pipes. We already have too little of both to fully enable basic combat missions, so I think something like this would be a really tough sell (even to a guy like me) to higher.

[slapout9]

Wouldn't the Land Warrior system essentially do what is being talked about here, since it will have a camera on every soldier so to speak. Couldn't you take the raw input and edit it and use for I/O purposes on the spot more or less?

[Rob Thornton]

JC is right about the bandwidth piece being an obstacle, but it depends on what your talking about doing. Competing with say a WMW waveform where we're sending targeting video from a CL I/II UAV back to a shooter, or doing something between commanders is competing for bandwidth on a military network - encrypted. I've purge allot of the headaches from working Future Combat Systems with its zillion Unmanned Systems, but what if you were not competing for military bandwidth?

You're not competing for military bandwidth because you target audience is not your own military - they don't need to be convinced of anything.

The enemy's target audience is not competing for your military either - but they are competing for the support of both your own population, the ones abroad and the one your operating in.

Your target audience is on the WWW. Your target audience has satellite TV.

A triband cell phone that does video and stills. A lap top with Commercial ISP. How many countries have the ability to access the WWW right now? How many cities and villages in those countries? How many in 5 years? A broadcast. A pod cast.

I think it is doable. I think it is relatively cheap in terms of those resources. The question is how important is it to us to be able to do something like it, and what is worth trading - because you can't have it all - if you try to do that, you do it all poorly.

[Rob Thornton]

Slapout,
The landwarrior could sort of do it. Its more of a question of getting what you get, or getting what your after. Imagine you have all these sensors out there (includes the Soldier), and they are moving around, potentially sending images, or other types of feeds back to a HQs. Are they active or passive? When I say that I mean in terms of are they providing context to the content? If they are doing another task, then probably not. Lets say you pipe those feeds (or some of them) into the IO Cell. Back to JCs observation about bandwidth, there is not enough of it. So how does someone no when push priotiy of bandwidth to the IO guy? This also comes back to the KO vs. NKO cultural thing - if its a question of watching a NLOS (Non-LOS) or BLOS (Beyond LOS) round impact some HVT - or looking for some IO materials who gets the bandwidth by default?
When the UAV feed on the RV at the BDE TOC thinks they see a hot spot - why does everybody cease work and watch UAV TV?

I still think its a question of how important is it that we win the IO and the supporting questions of at which levels and what are we willing to trade?

[jcustis]

I'm going to go out on a limb here and speculate that too often we confuse IO with psyop. More on that after I bang out this thought...

Those of your who have been on the ground know all too well how difficult it can be to get an IO message approved and produced. I think for that reason, the only thing a tactical blogger could do is the "hey, look at this stuff." Even then, the question is what media do we use? What language do we use? Anyone able to come up with an educated guess on who long it would take to generate an accurate Arabic translation of a 500-1,000 word English story? I don't know the answer, but unless it can be accomplished within a very finite and short period of time, we've lost the bubble.

The most effective IO product is a simple one, in my mind. It contributes a little bit to our psyop campaign because it presents a professional image of us, and can show that we care, but if it has any psyop value at all, that value is very subtle. Take for example the IO products that are handed out to articulate current curfews, restrictions on vehicle movements, or voting center information. Those products are pretty succint and to the point, and they pass information effectively.

Right now, approval levels on psyop efforts are pretty high. Is that because psyop operations are doctrinally structured that way? I don't know. We've learned from our mistakes made in Iraq, but those mistakes highlights how complex the problem is when we decide to try to manipulate minds. While I think your ideas have merit Rob, we've got to overcome some of the tribal effect. An Iraqi might see an incredibly powerful message that show IAF kicking ass against true die-hard AQ elements, but simple shrug his shoulders because it's happening in Rawah, and it (in his mind) has very little to do with his problems in Hillah.

Want to really take a huge risk, but do something with great potential? Allow Gen Petraeus to appear on an Al-Jeezerah or Iraqi talk show. I think that we fail to make aggressive enough shifts in this fight, and resort to packaging IO is familiar ways. Maybe it's time to step out of the paradigm we live with here in the US (military members staying out of public and possibly embarrassing situations) and let it all hang out. I think the man on the street, or the barber shop, or tea shop, would embrace a message from Petraeus if it came out in that venue. Everything else coming from us, I fear, simply sounds like Charlie Brown's teacher.

If I'm sounding like the teacher on this reply, feel free to slap me around.

EDITED TO ADD:

Rob, I was still typing out my post above when you replied. I think your statement below would be very difficult to implement, simply because we would be such a cumbersome sloth if we had to determine if you proposed activity needs to happen over a covered net. The old hands are probably going to say, keep it all covered, until it gets to the higher echelons that do the manipulation, reproduction, spamming, etc.

You're not competing for military bandwidth because you target audience is not your own military - they don't need to be convinced of anything.

The enemy's target audience is not competing for your military either - but they are competing for the support of both your own population, the ones abroad and the one your operating in.