This is, again, an important departure from established al-Qaeda strategy which has traditionally been hostile to other groups — viewing them with suspicion.....
The record doesn't support this claim. They have a long track record of co-opting other groups. Much like any coalition to include ours their are disagreements in the ranks and fissures that can and should be exploited.

In what seems like a clear reference to al-Qaeda’s failure in Iraq, the document argues that the greatest errors happen where the group is overstretched, alienates public opinion, and squanders opportunities to establish safe havens.
AQ Senior Leadership frequently criticized AQI leadership for excesses, so this isn't a good example of AQ core strategy, and furthermore it appears AQI is now making a come back and extending their reach into Syria.

Posed by Fuchs

Forged by US, forged by France, forged by AP, or maybe even forged by AQIM itself to achieve exactly what you wrote last.
It is a narrative many of CT policy folks believe in, and I can't help but think this appears to be crafted to justify their expensive CT strategy. Denying safe havens with occupation forces is not sustainable and all too often results in our actions defeating ourselves.

The tactical fight is important, preventing terrorist attacks is important, but most of our CT strategists seem to confuse the tactical with the strategic. In no way am I implying we should reduce pressure on their foot soldiers and leaders. However, from a strategic view it seems that the only feasible way for AQ and their ilk to achieve their aims is if we enable them by defeating ourselves by over extending ourselves financially. Strategies, campaigns, etc. must be sustainable to be feasible. If what appears to be the perfect strategy isn't sustainable, then it isn't the perfect strategy.

Intelligence, special operations, law enforcement operations for the most part seem to be appropriate and sustainable responses to this type of threat (this includes substantial psychological warfare to hasten their defeat, because ultimately AQ seem to defeat themselves over time whenever they gain a foothold, and regardless of whether they're a learning organization or not, it is likely they'll continue to do so based on their deeply flawed and unappealing ideology). When needed for specific cases we can surge in paratroopers or Marines for a short duration operations to reduce their paramilitary threat.

It is too late in Afghanistan to change course substantially. We need to finish what we started (with more modest aims, but we can't afford to bail), but in the future I hope we don't default to long term stability operations with a large footprint on the ground with the ever elusive goal of denying safe haven. Never say never, as there may be rare exceptions where that is the best course of action, but it shouldn't be the default option.