Background on AQIM: a growing threat?

[davidbfpo]

Moderator's Note

This thread was entitled 'In Timbuktu, al-Qaida left behind a manifesto' and was merged today with a single post thread 'AQ centre's final letter to their most difficult employee'. The thread has been renamed 'Background on AQIM: a growing threat?'.

There are several closely related threads, in the Africa section, which provide far more background, notably 'Ripples from Mali: events plus outside Mali' and 'Mali mainly...', neither of which qualify for merging here today.(Ends).

Thanks to AP an amazing discovery in Mali, that sits better as a source document for AQ globally, hence here!

It starts with:

In their hurry to flee last month, al-Qaida fighters left behind a crucial document: Tucked under a pile of papers and trash is a confidential letter, spelling out the terror network's strategy for conquering northern Mali and reflecting internal discord over how to rule the region.

The document is an unprecedented window into the terrorist operation, indicating that al-Qaida predicted the military intervention that would dislodge it in January and recognized its own vulnerability.

I know there is a thread on AQ's management structure mimicking modern, commercial management, so this fits in:

The clear-headed, point-by-point assessment resembles a memo from a CEO to his top managers and lays out for his jihadists in Mali what they have done wrong in months past, and what they need to do to correct their behavior in the future.

Puzzling to note the emphasis on slowing down implementation of Sharia rule, which whilst acknowledged as needed was not followed.

Read all the AP article:http://m.apnews.com/ap/db_289563/con...tguid=A1KPEpDa

There is a much shorter article:http://english.alarabiya.net/article...14/266280.html

Further context is given by FP, which cites other documents, in an article 'Inside the Islamic Emirate of Timbuktu: An exclusive trove of al Qaeda documents found in this fabled city shows a theocracy in the making in Mali':http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...mali?page=full

[Bill Moore]

Al Qaeda in Mali sought to hide foreign designs

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archiv...ite-Wide%29%29

"As for foreign policies, you must adopt mature and moderate rhetoric that reassures and calms," he writes. "To do so, you must avoid any statements that are provocative to neighboring countries and avoid repeated threats. Better for you to be silent and pretend to be a 'domestic' movement that has its own causes and concerns. There is no call for you to show that we have an expansionary, jihadi, Qaeda or any other sort of project."

Droukdel then notes the importance of keeping Mali under al Qaeda's sphere of influence in order to keep it as a "refuge" and a base for operations.

"Gaining a region under our control and a people fighting for us and a refuge for our members that allows us to move forward with our program at this stage is no small thing and nothing to be underestimated," he notes. "The enemy's constant, persistent effort now is to not leave any safe havens for the Mujahedeen. So take that into account."

[Dayuhan]

Foreign Affairs on Mali and Niger, worth a Look...

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articl...niger_4-021313

After Mali Comes Niger
West Africa's Problems Migrate East

Last month, the French army's rapid advance into northern Mali and the timely deployment of troops from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) seemed to result in a swift victory over Islamist and Tuareg militants there. Equally important, however, was the Islamist and Tuareg militants' hasty withdrawal into northeastern Mali. With France planning to pull its troops out of the country as soon as March, Mali will almost certainly be turned into an ECOWAS trusteeship. The most likely upshot is not a neat end to the conflict but, rather, a migration of the problem into neighboring Niger...

[Fuchs]

Al Qaeda in Mali sought to hide foreign designs

http://www.longwarjournal.org/archiv...ite-Wide%29%29

This sounds an awful lot like a forged document.
Right now I cannot remember another war-related document capture confirming suspicions so nicely, being such a perfect vindication of fears.

The papers captured in the Mechelen incident are the closest historical example I can recall.

[Bill Moore]

This sounds an awful lot like a forged document.
Right now I cannot remember another war-related document capture confirming suspicions so nicely, being such a perfect vindication of fears.

The papers captured in the Mechelen incident are the closest historical example I can recall.

Those are my feelings exactly, it appears to be generated to champion the current strategy. The question is who generated it? France or the U.S.? Definitely doesn't read like the other translated Islamist Manifestos I read. I think this so poorly conceived that it doesn't come across as feasible. If it is legitimate I would be surprised and wonder if this is the view of one Jihadist who can't think strategically or the movement as a whole?

Previous manifestos emphasizing waving the black flag in various countries to draw the West in intentionally with the stated intent of bankrupting us. That is a true asymmetric strategy. Unless there has been a considerable change in their approach, I suspect their intent was to draw the West in. There are different levels of drawing in, if the French keep their intervention short and then the West conducts small scale low visibility special operations it will be affordable and ultimately result in their defeat. If we attempt another major stability operation we'll be playing into their game.

[M-A Lagrange]

This comes just after Canada expressed their fear of a "new Iraq or Afghanistan" in Mali to justify not sending troops.
IMHO this (the document + Canada position + that particular discussion) translate the feeling some political deciders may have: after 2 invasions that turned to be half victories at best they are very much affraid to engage their troops in an another military adventure. In that perspective, AQ reached one of its objectives: terrorise governments.

On the other hand, what Bob is saying makes a lot of sens:

There are different levels of drawing in, if the French keep their intervention short and then the West conducts small scale low visibility special operations it will be affordable and ultimately result in their defeat. If we attempt another major stability operation we'll be playing into their game.

But I believe many in the field and at the flag level are aware of that choice.

[J Wolfsberger]

By all means, let's adopt the George Armstrong Custer Strategy:

1. Disregard available intelligence.
2. Disparage the opponents capabilities.
3. Adopt a tactically (and in this case, strategically) inferior position.
4. Victory!

Look how well it worked for him!

Because, it could be a fraud. There's no evidence whatsoever that it is, but we all know how clever those intelligence agencies are at making completely undetectably fraudulent documents that read exactly as though they were written by the people they want us to think wrote them. They're even so devilishly clever they have the documents written saying exactly the same things as the purported authors would say!

Probably the same group that Bush, Chaney and Haliburton used to plan 09/11.

</sarc>

[Fuchs]

Those are my feelings exactly, it appears to be generated to champion the current strategy. The question is who generated it? France or the U.S.?
(...)
That is a true asymmetric strategy. Unless there has been a considerable change in their approach, I suspect their intent was to draw the West in. (...) If we attempt another major stability operation we'll be playing into their game.

Forged by US, forged by France, forged by AP, or maybe even forged by AQIM itself to achieve exactly what you wrote last.

Anyway, I've rarely had had such a strange feeling about news. It's fitting too nicely to a simple narrative. Reality rarely does this.

[davidbfpo]

Shiraz Maher, ICSR @ Kings College London, has written a short 'Insight' commentary:http://icsr.info/2013/02/icsr-insigh...from-mistakes/

It ends with:

This document offers one insight from a primary source document of just how al-Qaeda is reconsidering its strategic approach.

The main points start with:

This ICSR Insight summarises key themes, revealing how al-Qaeda is learning from its previous failures, becoming more aware of the need to engage and capture public opinion in the territories it controls, and maturing in tactical awareness.

One of the most notable features of al-Qaeda’s internal communications which discuss how the movement should best exploit the political turmoil arising from the Arab uprisings is its implicit recognition of past failures.

In what seems like a clear reference to al-Qaeda’s failure in Iraq, the document argues that the greatest errors happen where the group is overstretched, alienates public opinion, and squanders opportunities to establish safe havens.

To consolidate al-Qaeda’s position in northern Mali, Droukdel advises his fighters to engage other Islamists. This is, again, an important departure from established al-Qaeda strategy which has traditionally been hostile to other groups — viewing them with suspicion.....Finally, Droukdel is acutely aware of the need to manage perceptions of al-Qaeda’s ambitions among both policy makers in the West, and local Muslims. He advises fighters to adopt a more temperate tone and to avoid making unnecessary statements which inflame public opinion.

[davidbfpo]

A fascinating AP report on the relationship between AQ centre and their affiliate Moktar Belmoktar in the Sahara (AQIM); almost amusing. There is a very short thread on AQ's management style, AQ's M&A Strategy is a franchising network:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=11974

Here is one passage:

Your letter ... contained some amount of backbiting, name-calling and sneering. And such brotherly, official correspondence should not contain this style of language....We refrained from wading into this battle in the past out of a hope that the crooked could be straightened by the easiest and softest means. ... But the wound continued to bleed, and in fact increasingly bled, until your last letter arrived, ending any hope of stanching the wound and healing it.

AP's article:http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/05...aced-internal/

Link to letter itself:http://hosted.ap.org/specials/intera...er-english.pdf

Step forward CWOT with is analysis:http://selectedwisdom.com/?p=1088

[davidbfpo]

A rather catchy title from Reuters, but has some gems within:http://mobile.reuters.com/article/id...30809?irpc=932

This report served as the catalyst for merging threads (see Post No.1).

[davidbfpo]

Professor John Schindler of the U.S. Naval War College and blogger 20Committee, has re-Tweeted a 2012 article 'The Ugly Truth about Algeria', with many links worth pursuing:http://nationalinterest.org/commenta...t-algeria-7146

One link I peered at:http://www.lrb.co.uk/v26/n19/adam-sh...murder-mystery

Outside France few know of the Algerian military intelligence, DRS:

The lead agency in the fight against the Algerian mujahidin has been the country’s military intelligence service, the feared DRS. With a reputation for ruthlessness and efficiency second to none in the Arab world, the DRS is arguably the world’s most effective intelligence service when it comes to fighting Al Qaeda; it is also probably the most cold-blooded.

(Later on)To what extent the local Al Qaeda affiliate is secretly controlled by the military—as GIA and GSPC were—is an open question, but its recent record suggests that DRS influence over any Algerian extremist group is considerable.

The DRS appear in the main thread on Mali IIRC and there is a small thread on contemporary Algerian matters:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=2079

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Andrew Lebovich for noting this development in his blog commentary 'Of Mergers, MUJAO, and Mokhtar Belmokhtar', a summary and a longer 3k word piece:http://thewasat.wordpress.com/2013/0...ar-belmokhtar/ and http://thewasat.wordpress.com/2013/0...ar-belmokhtar/