The Arab Spring (a partial collection)

[slapout9]

Bob,

Don't disagree with the general pattern. I would say that you could compare it to the revolutions of 1848 in Europe. Even though things were changing they had not reached a tipping point toward republican rule. There were still powerful forces trying to hang onto the dynastic monarchies. Likewise, there are forces trying to maintain the power of religion in the Arab world. This may seem like BS to some (or most) but it seems pretty obvious to me.

In any case, the question isn't who is going to win, the question is, "why is it happening now?" I would argue that it has to do with a growing middle class ala Schumpeter (Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy). What that would mean is that force has little direct roll in the transition. It has to happen on its own.

Do you think Schumpeter's "Creative Destruction Theory" has any impact on the situation?

[AdamG]

The weapons that helped Libyan rebels oust dictator Muammar Qaddafi are turning up for sale at clandestine auctions in Egypt’s lawless Sinai Desert, where shadowy buyers purchase firearms for Al Qaeda and Hamas operatives, sources told FoxNews.com.

The illicit sales take place in the barren Sinai peninsula, where Moses is believed to have wandered with the children of Israel for 40 years. Auctions announced through the grapevine bring caravans of foreigners, all with huge sums of money at their disposal and all with the same mission, Israel Defense Force sources told FoxNews.com.

The hosts of these auctions aren’t just doing it for the money, the source said. Al Qaeda-linked jihadists are becoming more and more influential in the region, and playing a large role in who shows up for the auctions and who leaves with the bombs, anti-tank missiles, rocket-propelled grenades and automatic weapons that are peddled there.

http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/02...#ixzz2MeDgTC5A

[TheCurmudgeon]

Do you think Schumpeter's "Creative Destruction Theory" has any impact on the situation?

Some Yes, but mostly no. Creative Destruction (as I understand it) is a socioeconomic theory basically says that as a free-market economy develops it changes over time to keep up with the demands of the buyers. Some products flourish while others fall from favor. This means that for any advancement in product design or utility there is often some form of decline. The result is that those workers and investors in the declining industry are left in the dust. Something must be destroyed if other things are to grow. It accurately justifies a number of the ills normally associated with free market economies like unemployment and inequality.

You could make a parallel argument that this is what is happening in the political realm, and that argument would be an accurate description of what is going on if you make the assumption that democracy is actually a "better" form of government, but I think it would oversimplify a more complex problem that exists at the sociopolitical level.

The more interesting question to me is: why do these changes happen at all? What is the connection between a growing economy and a changing value system that embraces both contract capitalism and democracy. Heck, not only embraces it but demands it. Fights and dies for it. This is not just new replacing the old; the better replacing the bad. In my mind there is a drive that is based in the human need for autonomy - a drive that is only activated once certain other needs are met. In places like Afghanistan, where we cannot even succeed in meeting basic needs, you will never activate the need for autonomy on a wholesale level. Survival will be the predominant need and survival needs produce a different set of values - values based in collective survival.

But as with survival needs and collective values, they have a good and a bad and they have a limit. Does autonomy have its limits? How does a society built on autonomy deal with collective needs like government? Does it become every person for herself leading to an inability to find any common ground? The ancient Athenians voted themselves out of democracy by failing to support their military in the face of a Macedonian invasion after a failed military adventure in Sicily. Is this the common fate of all democracies?

Back to the assumption you have to make to use Creative Destruction as a geopolitical model for these revolutions. That assumption is that democracy is a "better" form of government. I would argue that it is only "better" if you have an individualistic value system - one that demands that I have a say in the running of my government. If I have a collective based value system democracy is not a requirement. In fact, it can be an impediment. What I require is for my government to provide the things I need to survive. Democracy slows that process down with endless meetings to gain consensus. An Autocratic system simply delivers - an order is given and things happen. Different values systems prefer different governments. Part of the reason why, when given the opportunity, people with collective values will vote in a person they well know has dictatorial tendencies.

OK, I am done pontificating. I hope I answered your question.

[davidbfpo]

Perhaps part of the problem in understanding the Arab Spring is that we have forgotten other recent occurrences, from a tweet:

Algeria 1988-93, Sudan 1989, Mauritania 2005-2008...

I would add the 'Cedar Revolution' in the Lebanon 2005.

[TheCurmudgeon]

In places like Afghanistan, where we cannot even succeed in meeting basic needs, you will never activate the need for autonomy on a wholesale level. Survival will be the predominant need and survival needs produce a different set of values - values based in collective survival.

An example of my argument from a non-Arab country. In the current Kenyan elections

NAIROBI, Kenya — Uhuru Kenyatta, a Kenyan politician who has been charged by the International Criminal Court with crimes against humanity, was leading by a wide margin in the Kenya election on Tuesday, with nearly half the votes counted.

Mr. Kenyatta, who comes from one of the richest, most powerful families in Africa and has been accused of bankrolling death squads that killed women and children during the chaos of Kenya’s election five years ago, was leading 54 percent to 42 percent over the second-place candidate, Raila Odinga, Kenya’s prime minister.

He is preferred over candidates that are actually running on issues.

But in the end, the presidential candidates who tried to gain momentum on issues-based campaigns, like Peter Kenneth and Martha Karua, got almost no votes. It seemed that most voters still felt the leader from their ethnic group was the best one to protect them — especially in an edgy environment where many fear a replay of post-election violence.

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/06/wo...s&emc=rss&_r=0

In the end, what the people want is security and stuff. It is a patron-client system that does not have the economic stability - Kenyan per capita GDP in 2011 was $808 US according to the World Bank - to activate autonomy needs. They are not interested in knowing what their government does, they just want their government to provide them what they need to survive ... and they think they are more likely to get that if a member of their ethnic group is in charge.

[TheCurmudgeon]

While the international media loves to focus on secular, liberal protestors, they are not representative of the general population of Egypt: neither their will, their values, nor their interests. Nor were they responsible for the transition in Egypt; in fact, many of the current protestors against Muhammad Mursi were in favor of the Mubarak Regime. The recent protests have been relatively small; the opposition movement is divided and disorganized; there have been constant counter-demonstrations in favor of the President, sometimes larger than those against him.

For years, labor movements and Islamists represented the primary opposition blocs to the Mubarak regime. Accordingly, the narrative that the Islamists "hijacked" the revolution seems problematic.

Egypt is overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim; culturally, the society is very conservative. Consider this: in one of the first scientific polls following the fall of Hosni Mubarak, a plurality of respondents (41.4%) identified Saudi Arabia as their ideal model of government to replace the regime (four times more votes than the runners-up, being the U.S., China, and Turkey, with 10% each). Saudi Arabia, of course, is extremely conservative, religious, and authoritarian; clearly, the will of the Egyptian people seems to diverge drastically from their portrayal on Western media.

These respondents did not get what they wanted, despite electing Islamists to parliament by huge margins – including a number of representatives from ultra-conservative salafist Nour Party (they ranked 2nd, behind the Muslim Brotherhood; these two parties alone garnered nearly 72% of the total vote). In total, 54% of the electorate turned out at the polls.

http://www.yourmiddleeast.com/opinio...mocratic_13232

My only disagreement is when the author claims that liberals were not responsible for the transition. If they were not, then the Islamists would have succeeded years ago. It was the liberal catalyst that pushed the people over the edge. None-the-less, it is not a united front, and a large number of the people who possibly remained on the fence during the revolution support a more conservative Islamic government.

As long as this level of division exists in the population it is likely that instability will be the order of the day.

[slapout9]

The more interesting question to me is: why do these changes happen at all? What is the connection between a growing economy and a changing value system that embraces both contract capitalism and democracy. Heck, not only embraces it but demands it. Fights and dies for it. This is not just new replacing the old; the better replacing the bad. In my mind there is a drive that is based in the human need for autonomy - a drive that is only activated once certain other needs are met. In places like Afghanistan, where we cannot even succeed in meeting basic needs, you will never activate the need for autonomy on a wholesale level. Survival will be the predominant need and survival needs produce a different set of values - values based in collective survival.

I think you are on to something there! Please pontificate (big word for me) if you want to.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Slap,

Here is something I have been working on. I apologize for my inneptitude at inserting images.

[IMG]C:\Documents and Settings\s.wiechnik\My Documents\My Pictures\Governance Chart - Small[/IMG]

The three dimensions are economic capability on the left, nature of the source of legitimacy along the top, and category of value system along the bottom. Sources of legitimacy are based on either a centralized figure, like a king or dictator (essentially a client patron relationship); and decentralized meaning that the source of legitimacy is the population itself, as in a republican government. Along the bottom are the value systems: primarily communal or collective and individualistic or liberal. The result in the middle is the most probable stable government. Of course, where there is not consensus among the population on a value system or form of legitimacy you will have instability.

One of the problems Westerners have created is the modern State - particularly since many state borders were arbitrarily established. Many parts of the world like the Middle East and Africa have borders that don't make sense when compared with the functioning political systems. We perpetuate this mistake in places like Iraq, which probably should be three separate states.

Also we feel the need to replace any system that is not like ours. That is not the only way. South Africa still has many Chiefs. The state pays them but does not attempt to remove them. Many liberal minded people don't like this - yet South Africa is still considered a democracy. I think using traditional systems that still make sense where the economic and political conditions on the ground still support (demand) them is the best way to go. It is the only way to play the game if your goal is stability. We were wrong to try to replace a "warlord" system in Afghanistan with a central government when the economic conditions on the ground could not support it. The common joke is that Karzai is the mayor of Kabul and that is all he is. We would have been better off supporting the traditional loya jirga system that already existed, a form or fledgling republic. But, alas, our political objective is not always stability.

Anyway, enjoy

[slapout9]

Curmudgy, that looks like a very powerful tool..............trying to print it off in a larger format and do some thinking on it. The organizing principle you use seems excellant!!!!

[Bill Moore]

Slap,

The three dimensions are economic capability on the left, nature of the source of legitimacy along the top, and category of value system along the bottom. Sources of legitimacy are based on either a centralized figure, like a king or dictator (essentially a client patron relationship); and decentralized meaning that the source of legitimacy is the population itself, as in a republican government. Along the bottom are the value systems: primarily communal or collective and individualistic or liberal. The result in the middle is the most probable stable government. Of course, where there is not consensus among the population on a value system or form of legitimacy you will have instability.

One of the problems Westerners have created is the modern State - particularly since many state borders were arbitrarily established. Many parts of the world like the Middle East and Africa have borders that don't make sense when compared with the functioning political systems. We perpetuate this mistake in places like Iraq, which probably should be three separate states.

Also we feel the need to replace any system that is not like ours. That is not the only way. South Africa still has many Chiefs. The state pays them but does not attempt to remove them. Many liberal minded people don't like this - yet South Africa is still considered a democracy. I think using traditional systems that still make sense where the economic and political conditions on the ground still support (demand) them is the best way to go. It is the only way to play the game if your goal is stability. We were wrong to try to replace a "warlord" system in Afghanistan with a central government when the economic conditions on the ground could not support it. The common joke is that Karzai is the mayor of Kabul and that is all he is. We would have been better off supporting the traditional loya jirga system that already existed, a form or fledgling republic. But, alas, our political objective is not always stability.

Anyway, enjoy

Assuming this model is correct, and while I'm generally critical of social models that claim one size fits all situations regardless of cultural differences, I have to admit that your hypothesis about the underlying economic changes needed to facilitate social (and then political) change tend to ring true based off my observations and studies.

Assuming it is true, then it seems to me that our COIN doctrine is deeply flawed because we fail to recognize this evolution from economic, to social, and then to political change. In fact we attempt to reverse this evolution by first imposing political change (installing a democratic government), then attempting to build the economy, and then hope the social change follows.

That doesn't seem like a recipe for success to me.

If your model is generally correct and my critic of our COIN doctrine is generally correct, then what is the right the end for our military involvement and how do we achieve it?

[TheCurmudgeon]

Assuming this model is correct, and while I'm generally critical of social models that claim one size fits all situations regardless of cultural differences, I have to admit that your hypothesis about the underlying economic changes needed to facilitate social (and then political) change tend to ring true based off my observations and studies.

Assuming it is true, then it seems to me that our COIN doctrine is deeply flawed because we fail to recognize this evolution from economic, to social, and then to political change. In fact we attempt to reverse this evolution by first imposing political change (installing a democratic government), then attempting to build the economy, and then hope the social change follows.

That doesn't seem like a recipe for success to me.

If your model is generally correct and my critic of our COIN doctrine is generally correct, then what is the right the end for our military involvement and how do we achieve it?

The short answer is, I don't know.

The model was designed to explain why things were not going as I thought they should in Afghanistan. I was a firm believer in the liberal COIN model. After about five years I have come to this.

You are completely accurate in that my model says that economic changes facilitate social changes that result in political changes. This is a general pattern based on human needs and therefore should be applicable despite cultural differences. That is not to say that cultural differences don't matter. When there is a stable agricultural economy with some trading AND there is a communal value system the model predicts that any one of several communal systems can be stable - anything from a theocracy to a monarchy - even communism can work. The model is built on the idea of political legitimacy being associated with societal values. But, on occasion, legitimacy can be built on personality - Weber's Charisma - which throws a wild card into the mix. I can only guess at the probability of stability, I cannot guarantee it.

The model is more helpful in predicting instability based on a mismatch of economic and social factors than it is on saying which side will win out. For example, under that same scenario (stable agriculture with some trading but limited manufacturing and a communal value system) both a monarchy and a communist system could be stable. In a fight between the two the model is generally silent on which one will win out. It cannot predict which one of two monarchs are likely to win under the same conditions if there is an internal power struggle between factions. Likewise, in a separatist situation where both sides have the same economic and social conditions it is just as unhelpful. What it can do is predict that the odds of installing a functional democracy in a society that is barely living above subsistence level with strong collectivist (tribal) values is next to nil.

As for our current doctrine, you are also completely accurate when you say it has things backwards. This is its fatal flaw. Further, the FM 5-34 also only allows for one form of legitimacy, one built on individualistic values. That won't work in a collectivist society. You have to build a network of client/patron relationships. You have to support what westerners see as corruption and human rights violations. A difficult sell politically. Arreguin-Toft's model of strong/weak state and direct/indirect conflict is accurate in that the only way to suppress a weak state counterinsurgency is through barbarism. I would argue that this is not because the state is weak, it is because the weak state tend to have a different value system. The same economic conditions that make them weak predict that they have communal values that respond better to a show of brute strength than a helping hand. That said, I do not believe you have to resort to barbarism to keep order, but I don't know what mix of tactics best supports stability and does not run afoul of Western societal sentiments.

It is really not the economic conditions that matter, although that has been the best proxy I can come up with. It is more quality of life which would include things like security in all its forms (food, peace and stability, the belief in a better future, that my children will live to adulthood, that I will not be killed or have my property taken from me, and a job that pays my bills and then some). That is the catalyst that causes the people to transition from worrying about security to caring about autonomy and ultimately demanding more freedoms. As long as you keep the people scared and hungry (Ala North Korea) they will embrace dictatorship. So, if we are promoting democracy, we need to promote economic security and then wait, perhaps a generation or two, for the society to change. We must also realize that by doing this we are going to create instability. We have to learn to help control that instability and assist the society in it's transition. We can't do it for them.

Back to the question, I really don't know how much help this theory, which I shall dub my theory of conditional values, can be to COIN strategy.

I would add one comment. It is clear that this is a social, not a military, theory. That does not mean the Army is off the hook. Do to the conditions in regions where there is instability the Army is probably the only element that can function in that environment. We are the Land Forces Combatant Commander - which I translate into the Army being the occupying authority. We don't like that. We prefer big tank fights. But big tank fights are probably not in our future. The world is going to vacillate between communal and individualistic values for some time to come. I believe that we had better figure out how to manage the instability that is part and parcel to those transitions.

[slapout9]

Marx believed all real change was based upon economics, part of his idea of of Creative Destruction which was a great deal different than Schumpeter's. It is also part of the reason he believed so much in focusing on Economic Targets as opposed to others, which seems to have been lost when he is talked about in the modern senses.

Now for the question. The model appears to be a way to analyze a country before you invade or commit to military action was that your intention? Proper understanding of the country/problem you are dealing with before jumping to a solution?