North Korea: 2012-2016

[carl]

I have a general question. Let's say the Kim dynasty fell apart. Russia, Red China and South Korea decided to let the South Koreans handle the problem inside the country and all three decided that nobody else would be permitted to interfere. Effectively this would make northern Korea an island.

Now let us stipulate that since there isn't much food to eat in northern Korea in the best of times, and this wouldn't be the best of times, the people there would be dependent upon food coming in from outside northern Korea. Let us stipulate further that some kind of insurgency does break out (I am not so sure this is likely). Since the South Koreans would entirely control the import and distribution of food, could they not use that to throttle the insurgency pretty quick? I do not mean starving people, I mean controlling the distribution in such a way that everybody who wants to eat has to show up in a particular area and be scrutinized. This would be sort of what the British did in parts of Malaya and what we did in parts of the Philippines long ago.

What are people's opinion of this?

[carl]

max161:

I have two questions.

First, since some of the high up Kim dynasty people appear to have spent much time abroad being educated including the king himself, what effect does this have on their ability to judge their kingdom's power relative to the other countries?

Second, if the place does collapse, how would the status of the king, his family and entourage affect things? If Kim and crew found refuge in somewhere what might that mean? If he was killed or ended up in the Hague what would that mean? If the South Koreans caught him what would they do with him and how would that affect things? What do you think?

[ganulv]

offer as good a look-see at the contemporary DPRK as I have seen. [LINK]

[davidbfpo]

Carl asked:

controlling the (food) in such a way that everybody who wants to eat has to show up in a particular area and be scrutinized

I assume the party effectively controls food distribution and production, so giving up that responsibility and power simply would not happen. Now a few years ago the Ethiopian regime, under Mengistu, resisted NGOs taking over food distribution as a famine developed and millions IIRC died.

I expect the regime says the food is given to us in homage, as we are so strong, well-led etc.

[carl]

David:

My question had to do with what might happen after the current order disintegrated, if it came to that.

[max161]

max161:

I have two questions.

First, since some of the high up Kim dynasty people appear to have spent much time abroad being educated including the king himself, what effect does this have on their ability to judge their kingdom's power relative to the other countries?

Second, if the place does collapse, how would the status of the king, his family and entourage affect things? If Kim and crew found refuge in somewhere what might that mean? If he was killed or ended up in the Hague what would that mean? If the South Koreans caught him what would they do with him and how would that affect things? What do you think?

Carl,

Some very good questions. To the first, I would say the regime elite absolutely knows the reality of the north's relative power which is why they feel they absolutely have to have nuclear weapons. I do not think they are under any illusions that they cannot complete head to head with any country. But I also think that they can execute a strategy of perceived strength from a position of weakness. We usually interpret Juche as self reliance and we laugh at that because the north has never been and never will be self- reliant under their current economic and political system. But as a Korean scholar pointed out just the other day at a conference, Juche is really about being in control and controlling your destiny and that is how the regime leadership feels. They believe they can play all sides against the other and manipulate the situation to their benefit. I am sure one of the things that Kim Jong-un has studied in detail is how his grandfather manipulated Stalin and Mao and support for north Korea in the Korean War (and then in the late 1950's purged all the north Koreans who had made the Long March with Mao - and that is the last time China ever really attempted to intervene significantly in the north internal affairs) and how Kim Jong-il has manipulated the 5 parties in the 6 party talks.

The second question is one that requires further analysis and assessment based on Kim Jong-un taking over. One of the lines of thinking was if Kim Jong-il (if it was even possible but assume it was) sought some kind of political asylum it would cause two things - it might be able to be exploited as a way to illustrate the illegitimacy of the regime by showing the Kim Family is no longer infallible and that it has abandoned the country. But some speculate it could have the alternate effect - either it would not be believed, or it would be believed that he was removed under duress but regardless of which, it could on the one hand harden the resolve of some segments of the population while on the other, it would be extremely psychologically and emotionally damaging to many in the population who once were "true believers." Although it is an extreme example we should remember that the Kim Family Regime has been deified and raised to a religious stature (remember that everyone has to pledge personal loyalty to the leadership and not to the nation or a constitution or even the party - we should also recall that north Korea is the only country of the world that is a necrotocracy - it is ruled by dead people - Kim Il sung is still the supreme leader even in mortal death - Kim Jong-il did not assume any of his father's titles and in his death his son has not assumed any of his father's titles - each creates new titles while preserving the previous father's titles, but I digress). So if the regime was to bolt the country it is difficult to say how the people will react. I think it would end up causing a lot of problems and different ones among many different people in many segments of society. With Kim Jong-un in power now, things have changed again. One of the things that some scholars speculate and it seems to be born out in the press is that Kim Jong-un has embarked on what they are beginning to call "Image Politics" which is a combination of tying him to his very charismatic grandfather who is still revered as the Great Leader and introducing the people to western images which makes Kim Jong-un seem to be cosmopolitan and a man of the world who knows how to operate in the modern world (a fiction of course but it might play to the internal audience). But if he becomes as revered as his grandfather we might wish for Kim Jong-il to still be alive because he was not and never will be loved as Kim Il-sung was. Which brings us to an important question, what happens at the end of the regime? To borrow from Linda Robinson's book "Tell me how this ends," how does the end of the regime come about. If Kim Jong-un was to go away, the various scenarios under which that might happen could have very different effects on the population and military. If he was killed as a result of military action (even if the north initiated hostilities) he could be idolized as a martyr. Of course if he was killed in some kind of internal coup - the ROK could or would likely be blamed and he could also be made a martyr. Regardless the end of the regime is going to cause tremendous internal problems within north Korea and the effects cannot be predicted with any certainty. That said, the ROK should be preparing for that eventuality now. There are many things that should be done from a policy perspective (and the majority of them are non-military) to try to inform and influence the population so that the effects of the end of the regime can be mitigated to the extent they can be. But that is the subject of a lot of ongoing research now. So I will stop here and look forward to continuing the exchange of ideas.

[max161]

Please see the article linked here:

09/06/2012 16:42
NORTH KOREA - CHINA
After Chinese voice criticism, Pyongyang reacts harshly
http://www.asianews.it/news-en/After...hly-25743.html


My comments: Although China's three no policy is oft-stated (no war, no instability or collapse, no nukes) I have heard some postulate that China is as strongly focused on convincing the north to institute Chinese-style economic reforms (with less emphasis on no nukes) as the US is so strongly focused on getting the north to end its nuclear program and rid the Peninsula of nuclear weapons. The irony is that both global powers seem to have little sway over regime thinking and actions. It seems to simple to us as outsiders – give up nuclear weapons and get tremendous economic benefits and support – Open up and reform and you will get support from the international community. But I think this illustrates the true nature of the regime –not only is it completely recalcitrant, it is thoroughly paranoid, trusts no one, and believes that regime survival requires developing and maintaining nuclear weapons and not changing its political and economic system in anyway.

[carl]

max161:

I agree that the Kim dynasty cannot let up even a little bit. All they have to do is look at what happened when the Reds loosened up a little in Russia and what happened to the Shah. Police states expose themselves to great danger when they open up or loosen up.

I have some further questions.

Do you think the people of northern Korea can be likened to "institutional men"? Those are the guys who have been in prison for most of their lives and really have no idea how to function on their own; the kind of guy depicted in a Joseph Wambaugh novel who gets out and almost immediately does something to get back in. If or when the Kim dynasty goes away, will those poor enslaved people be something like that? The comment about the paralysis of the people brought this question to mind.

This would apply to the oppressors in the security organizations also. Could they be likened to people like the big wigs in the prison gangs, people who only know the most base kind of brutality and can thrive in prison but are totally out of their element on the outside? If they are like that (I don't know) what would you do with them? Will these guys be worse than the official killers of other fallen police states?

This question has to do with something Bill Moore said and has to do with targeting second tier leadership for coercion and co-option. It seems to me that would be more effective the earlier you could do it. Is it possible to do that to any extent now given the nature of the system in northern Korea? How able are the South Koreans to talk even in an informal way with those second tier leaders? Has that ability or lack thereof been increasing or decreasing over the years?

I understand the logic of an aggressive information campaign. If those poor people can be thought of as "institutional men" then an info campaign might serve the function (a little bit) of a halfway house. How would the info campaign be conducted? How would you get the info in to the enslaved?

I keep saying the South Koreans because it seems to me that they are the ones who are by far most important in dealing with this problem.