North Korea: 2012-2016

[JMA]

[big snip]

I'm going to pass on responding to this but post, for your edification, the following:

Brookings's Lieberthal Interview on China's Diplomacy

[Ken White]

Brookings's Lieberthal Interview on China's Diplomacy

This from that link:

"Relations between China and Japan deteriorated to the lowest point in five years during the 17-day detention of a Chinese fishing boat captain before Japanese authorities last week decided to release him. China opposed U.S.-South Korea military exercises aimed at deterring North Korea, and dismissed regional efforts to mediate maritime territorial claims." (emphasis added / kw)

This is just the latest iteration in the NE Asia who's in charge game, it all -- say again, all -- has been going on cyclically for over 50 years, the fact that you are now paying attention to it doesn't move any of it to major crisis status...

The fact that China now has enough money to be more assertive is obvious and well known. Noting their capability -- accurately -- is wise. 'Predicting' what they will do is less so. Over 12 years in Asia and the ME taught me that attempts to predict intentions in those areas is borderline futile, the thing I did learn was to be alert. We're doing that and that's adequate.

[Entropy]

The fact that China now has enough money to be more assertive is obvious and well known. Noting their capability -- accurately -- is wise. 'Predicting' what they will do is less so. Over 12 years in Asia and the ME taught me that attempts to predict intentions in those areas is borderline futile, the thing I did learn was to be alert. We're doing that and that's adequate.

This bears repeating, IMO. It's why we have a strategic warning system to begin with.

[Dayuhan]

I was about to refer to cyclic sinophobia, but Ken beat me to the word "cyclic". Tension comes and goes, rises and falls, as it's been doing for decades. What's often forgotten is that while China's capacity to rock boats has grown exponentially with their economic success, that same economic success - and it's complete dependence on trade - has vastly increased the risk to China from serious boat-rocking and has given China an enormous investment in the status quo.

All too often we hear China spoken of as if it were the modern analogue of Germany in 1937 or the Soviet Union of the Cold War: the enemy, an evil empire bent on conquest that must be contained, checked, opposed at every turn. A satisfying position for those who feel bereft without an enemy, but not one based on a great deal of substance.

[JMA]

Jimmy Carter was interviewed on the Charlie Rose show of 28 September 2010 and had some interesting comment on the North Korean situation.

Jimmy Carter, Former President of the United States

Segment from 3.20 minutes to approx 9.40 minutes.

[JMA]

All too often we hear China spoken of as if it were the modern analogue of Germany in 1937 or the Soviet Union of the Cold War: the enemy, an evil empire bent on conquest that must be contained, checked, opposed at every turn. A satisfying position for those who feel bereft without an enemy, but not one based on a great deal of substance.

OK so that's what you think THEY believe... what do YOU believe?

[Dayuhan]

... what do YOU believe?

I believe that too many people look at the transition from Chicoms to Chicaps and see only part of the picture. Yes, the Chinese have enjoyed some economic success: monumental by some metrics, modest by others. This econoc success allows them to develop some military capacity, and because it is supported by (completely dependent on, actually) export and important, it creates interests outside China that concern the Chinese.

While China's newfound capacit to rock boats may horrify some, it also has to be recalled that China is now in the boat: a status quo power with an enormous, indeed critical, interest in maintaining the boat in clam order. China actually has numerous interests in common with the US and with the rest of the trading and oil consuming world: stable oil prices and freedom of navigation, for example.

Casual observers also vastly underestimate, and often ignore, China's very tenuous domestic situation. They can keep the lid on as long as they keep the economy growing at a vertiginous rate, but they can't do that forever and any stutter in the economy - even more so the recession that China will eventually have - could have major domestic consequences.

Where all that goes is that China is locked into and utterly dependent on global trade, and while they may flex a bit and try to expand the space available to them (as all rising powers do), they will not and can not do anything that would put their trading position at risk. The risks wouldn't be worth the benefits.

ou hear a bit of nonsense passed around now and then ("China owns the US") but at a certain point it gets too ridiculous to even bother responding to. In theory China has certain leverage over the US, but in practice they can't use it without hurting themselves more than they'd hurt anyone else. Interdependence has its virtues.

China will rise. So will India, and so will others. They will look after their interests, as all powers do. They will push a bit and demand to be treated with respect, as all rising powers (including the US in its day) do. That's the reality of a multipolar world, which is what we live in. That's not going to change, it's something we have to adjust to, not try to resist.

I don't believe for a minute that China has any real intention of moving on Taiwan. Taiwan serves for China the function that Israel serves for Iran: gives the government something to roll out whenever they want to rally the public behind an issue that doesn't involve them. In both cases, an actual military move would have to involve a sober calculation of cost, benefit, and risk, and the output of the calculation is not going to be pretty.

The US has high-value cards in this game, but they aren't the sort of cards you lay on the table in every minor head-bump... laying them down actually devalues them. We know they're there, so do the Chinese; that's enough.

Of course if the current Chinese government were to fall, say as a consequence of some economic collapse, and an extreme nationalist government were to take power, all this would change... and that's possible. It's not something we can do much about, so I'm not going to lose sleep over it.

I recall a comment from a senior manager at a major Taiwanese Compay... we were talking about China, and his observation was that the status quo is acceptable, and in a few decades when "the olds" all die off we can talk a bit of sense. We don't solve these issues, we manage them, and this is by no means unmanageable.

I believe I'll decline to fear.