North Korea: 2012-2016

[Fuchs]

Of course it's possible to exert influence, within limits. You're proposing that "influence" can persuade a nation to perform a 180 degree pivot in a long-standing policy and undertake actions that it has consistently considered diametrically opposed to its own interests. That's outside any realistic assessment of the limits of available influence.

Outcomes much more unlikely than that are realistic because they are real.

* U.S. support for Israel after '67

* EU turning on Yugoslavia, ripping a piece of it away and giving it to a group of bands who were previously advised by EU officials how to garner the needed support

* various U-turns in regard to being allied / rivals in the Second World

* Molotov-Ribbentropp pact

* U.S. turning away from preventing/destroying left-leaning governments in Latin America

* half of the U.S. turning towards domestic economic and fiscal policies that hurt their own self-interest

* Germany and others giving up stable national currencies and lender of last resort

* collapse of Apartheid in South Africa

* conservative German government U-turning against nuclear energy

* U.S. so-called "conservatives" u-turning towards nation building '02

* Britain allowing its colonies to go

* U.S. becoming involved in East Asia post-'38 on behalf of China (post-Nanking) despite this actually harming its trade interests

* U.S. participating in WWI without serving any of its interests, after a three-year propaganda campaign by Britain

* sudden U.S. tolerance of North Korea as a nuclear power

* Turkey turning away from EU towards its own neighbourhood policy

* France dropping Arab dictators in favour of good relations with Arab populaces

* Saudi Arabia's sudden tolerance for foreign troops '91 and later


Such U-turns happen all the time, just look at history.
China has even turned on former allies before, and that didn't take any outside influence.

[Dayuhan]

Of course things happen and things change. That doesn't mean they change on command, or that the application of "influence" can reliably dictate the course of political evolution.

[Entropy]

Such U-turns happen all the time, just look at history.
China has even turned on former allies before, and that didn't take any outside influence.

Of course, but one should also realize that much of the time U-turns don't happen. The fact that U-turns occurred, can occur and will occur in the future does not mean that China will, in this particular instance, do a U-turn on North Korea. Nor does it demonstrate your assertion that influence can bring such a U-turn about.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Bob's World

Any effort to go into a post-conflict DPRK and "fix" them would would likely trigger a far worse resistance insurgencies than we created and then attempted to resolve in those two afore mentioned locations. Far better we let China own that mission.

I think this assumption can be challenged. I agree the potential for a serious resistance movement exists since the entire society is militarized and to varying degrees influenced by Juche, but unless China and Russia provide external support it is unlikely the resistance will garner the same level of international attention and subsequent external support such as fund raising to sustain their efforts. Of course we have no idea how this will ultimately unfold, so it could very much turn into an enduring insurgency. Our approach to COIN will most likely fail, so much rather see the South Koreans, Chinese, etc. take the necessary measures to establish security.

Regardless of who wades into the mess it will be expensive and require a large number of troops.

[Dayuhan]

Regardless of who wades into the mess it will be expensive and require a large number of troops.

Probably true, but it's also true that there's no terribly pressing reason for anyone to wade into the mess. I don't see how anyone needs to try and "fix" North Korea. Contain, manage, and wait for it to rot out from the inside seems to me a much more viable strategy.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Dayuhan,

Contain, manage, and wait for it to rot out from the inside seems to me a much more viable strategy.

It seems the South Korean government is quite content to let their fellow Koreans in the north starve as long as it doesn't disrupt their economic miracle. With the exception a few Christian activist groups no one seems to care for the average North Korean.

The world will probably keep pumping just enough money into the DPRK to keep it on life support, of course that dooms millions of North Koreans to a terrible life under a corrupt regime. Definitely not advocating for U.S. intervention, at least directly, but hopefully their is a moral aspect to our policy objectives.

There is also the question about what happens if the DPRK does collapse. Does a failed state with weapons of mass destruction present a threat to regional security or is it over played? Can the problems simply be contained with a little extra border security until they work it out on their own? Would China and S. Korea make a power grab? I just hope we come up with something more intelligent than clear, hold and build.

[Dayuhan]

It seems the South Korean government is quite content to let their fellow Koreans in the north starve as long as it doesn't disrupt their economic miracle. With the exception a few Christian activist groups no one seems to care for the average North Korean.

I'm not sure lack of concern is the operative constraint. What would you want the South Korean government, or anyone else, to do to liberate the north?

The world will probably keep pumping just enough money into the DPRK to keep it on life support, of course that dooms millions of North Koreans to a terrible life under a corrupt regime. Definitely not advocating for U.S. intervention, at least directly, but hopefully their is a moral aspect to our policy objectives.

There's nothing wrong with a moral aspect to policy objectives, but all policy objectives, moral and otherwise, are constraint by a limited range of realistic policy options. Liberating the north and raising the population's standard of living to that of the south is a lovely and moral objective, but without a realistic strategy for achieving the objective, what's it worth

There is also the question about what happens if the DPRK does collapse. Does a failed state with weapons of mass destruction present a threat to regional security or is it over played?

Certainly it's a threat, but trying to force or impose an unwelcome change on a failed state with weapons of mass destruction also poses risks.

If anyone has a realistic proposal for a way to "fix" North Korea without a war (thought to be undesirable), I'm all ears...

[JMA]

If anyone has a realistic proposal for a way to "fix" North Korea without a war (thought to be undesirable), I'm all ears...

There has to be a war?

I'm all ears waiting for an explanation of the risks relating to doing effectively nothing.

[JMA]

There is also the question about what happens if the DPRK does collapse.

Its a good question too.

[carl]

I think this assumption can be challenged. I agree the potential for a serious resistance movement exists since the entire society is militarized and to varying degrees influenced by Juche, but unless China and Russia provide external support it is unlikely the resistance will garner the same level of international attention and subsequent external support such as fund raising to sustain their efforts. Of course we have no idea how this will ultimately unfold, so it could very much turn into an enduring insurgency. Our approach to COIN will most likely fail, so much rather see the South Koreans, Chinese, etc. take the necessary measures to establish security.

Bill: If a serious resistance movement did arise and neither South Korea, Red China nor Russia supported it, it would have no chance. It would have no sanctuary and no external support. Northern Korea would be essentially an island and what resistance there was would wither and die.

I hesitate to say this since I haven't read any of max161's papers yet, but I agree with you in questioning how much of a resistance could develop especially if the South Koreans showed up and contrived to provide everybody with 3000 calories a day. Juche might be have some appeal but enough or more than enough food to eat is a pretty powerful motivator.

[Bob's World]

Carl,

Just curious, by your own reporting, these are an incredibly hardy people used to living on very little in best of times. Just how much "external support" do you think they will need to wage a resistance?

Now, perhaps, DPRK government takes full responsibility for the hardships of living in North Korea, so that the populace will welcome as liberators any invading foreign military forces. But I suspect that is not the case. I suspect this is a populace that will see foreign military presence as just that, a foreign invasion of their homeland, and they will logically resist.

We have a bad habit of thinking that what we offer is so good, and that those who we oppose are so bad, that of course their populaces will be immediately grateful for our efforts to remove their government and then occupy their country while we give them new, better government, coupled with development and all manner of modern goodies.

Yet we caused a resistance insurgency in Iraq that bled us hard for several years. President Obama's plan for curing Afghanistan, as promoted by General Petreaus, has been making the resistance insurgency stronger in Afghanistan with yearly growth numbers he wishes he could replicate in his programs designed for improving our economy at home. Seems it is easier to grow an insurgency than it is to grow an economy. Bottom line is that it is human nature to resist, and North Koreans being human will likely resist as well.

As to "sanctuary" that will come from within the very populace that is resisting us. Will we be willing to employ the hard measures such as used by the Germans in WWII to reduce such internal sanctuary? No. I hope not. Instead we will attempt to bribe the support of the populace, and through our very largess will become the primary supporter of the very insurgency we are attempting to quell.

Likely we will blame China or some ideology for the insurgency, and not be able to realize that it is our very presence that is driving it, or that the very people who smile and accept our aid by day are passing it on to the fighters by night.

If we have learned anything about insurgency over the past 10 years it should have been that we don't know anything about insurgency. Like most governments faced with some form of insurgency we do not accept our own causal role and instead see the insurgents as somehow distinct from the larger populace they emerge from and blame the fighting elements on malign actors, foreign agitators and radical ideologies. Historically, the best governments at COIN have been those that recognized their causal role and that focused on fixing the broken aspects of governance rather than the "broken" aspects of the populace. The US is not among "the best governments at COIN," at least not in our foreign efforts.

Any assumption other than the expectation that any regime change forced upon the DPRK will be met with revolution; and that any foreign occupation of the DPRK will be met with resistance is dangerous. There is no earthly reason to ever place an American boot on DPRK soil. This is a mission best left to the ROKs, and even they will find a violent welcome, I suspect. Best we let this sleeping dog lie. Conditions will evolve in time of their own accord, and there is far more risk than gain from any thoughts of rushing that inevitable day along.

[carl]

Bob:

I figured I would draw you out with that one.

No time now but will reply shortly.

[carl]

Carl,

Just curious, by your own reporting, these are an incredibly hardy people used to living on very little in best of times. Just how much "external support" do you think they will need to wage a resistance?

Now, perhaps, DPRK government takes full responsibility for the hardships of living in North Korea, so that the populace will welcome as liberators any invading foreign military forces. But I suspect that is not the case. I suspect this is a populace that will see foreign military presence as just that, a foreign invasion of their homeland, and they will logically resist.

We have a bad habit of thinking that what we offer is so good, and that those who we oppose are so bad, that of course their populaces will be immediately grateful for our efforts to remove their government and then occupy their country while we give them new, better government, coupled with development and all manner of modern goodies.

Yet we caused a resistance insurgency in Iraq that bled us hard for several years. President Obama's plan for curing Afghanistan, as promoted by General Petreaus, has been making the resistance insurgency stronger in Afghanistan with yearly growth numbers he wishes he could replicate in his programs designed for improving our economy at home. Seems it is easier to grow an insurgency than it is to grow an economy. Bottom line is that it is human nature to resist, and North Koreans being human will likely resist as well.

As to "sanctuary" that will come from within the very populace that is resisting us. Will we be willing to employ the hard measures such as used by the Germans in WWII to reduce such internal sanctuary? No. I hope not. Instead we will attempt to bribe the support of the populace, and through our very largess will become the primary supporter of the very insurgency we are attempting to quell.

Likely we will blame China or some ideology for the insurgency, and not be able to realize that it is our very presence that is driving it, or that the very people who smile and accept our aid by day are passing it on to the fighters by night.

If we have learned anything about insurgency over the past 10 years it should have been that we don't know anything about insurgency. Like most governments faced with some form of insurgency we do not accept our own causal role and instead see the insurgents as somehow distinct from the larger populace they emerge from and blame the fighting elements on malign actors, foreign agitators and radical ideologies. Historically, the best governments at COIN have been those that recognized their causal role and that focused on fixing the broken aspects of governance rather than the "broken" aspects of the populace. The US is not among "the best governments at COIN," at least not in our foreign efforts.

Any assumption other than the expectation that any regime change forced upon the DPRK will be met with revolution; and that any foreign occupation of the DPRK will be met with resistance is dangerous. There is no earthly reason to ever place an American boot on DPRK soil. This is a mission best left to the ROKs, and even they will find a violent welcome, I suspect. Best we let this sleeping dog lie. Conditions will evolve in time of their own accord, and there is far more risk than gain from any thoughts of rushing that inevitable day along.

You are right there is no good reason to put any American troops in the northern part of Korea. Who suggested that? That would be a silly thing being as there are so many South Koreans available for that. Besides, they speak the language and some of them are related.

As far as external support needed to wage a resistance, I'd say a lot was needed. Critical even it be. If Kim Kingdon collapsed and the plucky (and uniformly slim) residents of the northern part of Korea decided to fight for a return of those halcyon days they would need some money from somewhere since they ain't got any. I have noticed that insurgencies, no matter how noble the participants, need money to insurge. If Red China, Russia and South Korea isolated the place nothing much from the outside could get in hence no money. (Though what external player in their right mind would want to bankroll a restoration of the Kim Kingdom?)

And again if Red China, Russia and South Korea isolated the place there would be no physical sanctuary available for those who would restore the Kim Kingdom or an approximation thereof. I have read that sanctuary is of critical importance to insurgents. They need someplace to go where the enemy can't physically follow. This is important because closets with false walls will only get you so far. Now maybe the thin but plucky residents of the northern area of Korea could pull that off but it would be hard and a bit of a historical anomaly.

If the Kim Kingdom does eventually fall apart, I suspect there will be a lot, or not a lot, of South Koreans headed north. Whether those thin people will resist them, I don't know. But maybe if they contrived to give the former Kim subjects enough to eat so they won't be so skinny, maybe the chances of a noble resistance will be lessened.

[Bill Moore]

I'm not sure lack of concern is the operative constraint. What would you want the South Korean government, or anyone else, to do to liberate the north?

First off, I never implied anyone should invade to liberate the north, that is a reach on your part. My point goes back to my original point, the U.S. and other nations openly oppose DPRK's WMD program, but are relatively quiet about the human rights abuses in North Korea. Expanding the focus of pressure to include human rights does put China and other supporters of North Korea is tougher position diplomatically to continue to support an oppressive government. Failure to gain support through their normal cycles of provocation because the world is tiring of their treatment of their people puts them in a position where they'll be more likely to adapt changes over time. This would potentially increase the stability of North Korea and the region. A lot of countries are tired of the U.S. determining who can and can't have nuclear weapons, so that is hardly a high moral ground issue that resonates.

There's nothing wrong with a moral aspect to policy objectives, but all policy objectives, moral and otherwise, are constraint by a limited range of realistic policy options. Liberating the north and raising the population's standard of living to that of the south is a lovely and moral objective, but without a realistic strategy for achieving the objective, what's it worth

What world are you writing about? I seem to recall some rather lofty and unrealistic policy objectives for both Iraq and Afghanistan. Again you're the one saying liberate the North, I'm looking for strategies for changing the behavior of the regime in the North, not replacing it. Change is already happening in North Korea, so I'm leary of the experts who continue to believe the legacy system will continue forever without a military intervention. It is evolving now and the world should explore ways to shape that evolution.

In simple terms I'm recommending widening our aperture and getting in front of the problem instead of our continuing ### for tat. ### for tat may be the appropriate short term response to hold things in place, but it is inadequate for longer term shaping actions and activities.

[reed11b]

Anyone ever consider that ENDING sactions against NK would provide the current leadership far more challenge and adversity then maintaining the current sanctions?
Reed