North Korea: 2012-2016

[Dayuhan]

Here's one reason restraining our ramp-down from NE asia: our allies. Our forces are there as much to deter them as to deter potential enemies IMO. A withdraw by the US could precipitate an arms race and even cause Japan and South Korea to consider developing their own nuclear deterrent.

That's not to say that more disengagement can't be done, but I think it needs to happen slowly and incrementally. Indeed, that's been happening for some time now, but I wouldn't expect big changes while the status quo remains on the Korean peninsula.

This is true... and if you look back to what I originally said, I didn't suggest a complete withdrawal. I asked whether we needed to dominate the region, and whether we needed a major force presence there. I'm not convinced that our actual needs require us to do either, though certainly some presence will continue to be needed. We need to balance objectives: we want to convince our allies that they don't need to go nuclear, but we also don't want them thinking that they can rely on us to take care of all regional security issues.

Of course some here might think that anything less than dominance is cringing humiliation, and that China must above all be feared... I don't think those are exactly self-evident truths.

[Tukhachevskii]

we want to convince our allies that they don't need to go nuclear, but we also don't want them thinking that they can rely on us to take care of all regional security issues.

That'll be one hell of a circle to square, IMO you can have one or tthe other, not both. US presence in N.E. Asia provides a security umbrella. Withrdrawing or downplaying that security garuntee (which is essentially what it is) is going to increase pressure for regional players to resort to "self help", i.e. aqcuire nuclear weapons. Remember, that the DPRK/North Korea did'nt begin developing a nuclear weapons programme until after the Soviet Security garuntee (never can spell that word) was withdrawn in 1991 even though the South's SSM development (1950s-60s) provided ample provocation (the US stepped in to halt it). Japan already has a "virtual" nuclear deterrent. IMO it would be better to leave Japan and China in a bipolar regional relationship with Russia and a unified Korea left to balance things out (classic sea power vs. landpower). IMO America's back garden/yard needs more attention from the householder and, funnily enough, all the experience the US Army has gained with COIN in the Middle East will more than likely soon be put to good use south (and north) of the border.

[Dayuhan]

That'll be one hell of a circle to square, IMO you can have one or tthe other, not both.

I'm not sure that's true. We'd need enough of a presence to assure that a nuclear attack on South Korea or Japan would be credibly viewed as an attack on the US. That does not necessarily have to be enough to engage in a conventional battle, which, despite the occasional posturing from the North, is hardly a likely eventuality given the constraints (lack of fuel, for one) that North Korea faces.

US presence in N.E. Asia provides a security umbrella. Withrdrawing or downplaying that security garuntee (which is essentially what it is) is going to increase pressure for regional players to resort to "self help", i.e. aqcuire nuclear weapons.

Again, we can extend a WMD deterrent without a major conventional presence or a commitment that we will resolve all conventional disputes.

IMO it would be better to leave Japan and China in a bipolar regional relationship with Russia and a unified Korea left to balance things out (classic sea power vs. landpower).

I don't disagree, though a unified Korea is easier to postulate than to achieve. I don't doubt that it will happen, but very hard to say when.

I'd also suggest starting a low-key effort to persuade Korea and ASEAN that WW2 was a long time ago, an armed Japan is no longer a threat, and that an ASEAN/NE Asian alliance aimed at keeping trade routes open and resolving regional conflict might not be a bad goal.

In general, the regional powers have the maturity and the capacity to manage their own affairs... with our participation and engagement, but without our dominance.

IMO America's back garden/yard needs more attention from the householder and, funnily enough, all the experience the US Army has gained with COIN in the Middle East will more than likely soon be put to good use south (and north) of the border.

I've a doubt or two there; but that's for another thread...

[Tukhachevskii]

We'd need enough of a presence to assure that a nuclear attack on South Korea or Japan would be credibly viewed as an attack on the US. That does not necessarily have to be enough to engage in a conventional battle, which, despite the occasional posturing from the North, is hardly a likely eventuality given the constraints (lack of fuel, for one) that North Korea faces.

Sure, but the problem is "how much is enough" and how do you manage enemy perceptions sothat a withdrawal of ground troops/lessening of a commitment isn't seen as a sign of weakness. The siutation is roughly analogous to that of the US and NATO in Europe. Sure, there was a WMD security guarnetee (damn it!) but the presence of ground troops signalled intent, in N.E Asia the US forces signla the same intnet. With a lessening of US direct presence she runs the risk of signalling weakness. As to WMD security when, where and what does the US consider the trigger line that is not only inviolable but visible as such to an oppponent? IMO The US would be better off grooming a replacement (or a Jap-Korean alliance aimed at China) to replace its own position and retreat back into speldid isolation (of the Monroe variety).

Re: the DPRK I agree that a conventional attack is not on the cards (I doubt even the KPA is well-fed enough to march across the border); what people fear more is the collapse of the regime and the resultant mess.

[Dayuhan]

Sure, but the problem is "how much is enough" and how do you manage enemy perceptions sothat a withdrawal of ground troops/lessening of a commitment isn't seen as a sign of weakness... IMO The US would be better off grooming a replacement (or a Jap-Korean alliance aimed at China) to replace its own position and retreat back into speldid isolation (of the Monroe variety).

Re: the DPRK I agree that a conventional attack is not on the cards (I doubt even the KPA is well-fed enough to march across the border); what people fear more is the collapse of the regime and the resultant mess.

If the DPRK hasn't the capacity to mount a conventional attack, to whom are we showing strength by keeping all of those ground forces in place?

China may not be an ally or a friend, but I think it's long past time to stop seeing them as an enemy. Just one more state pursuing their own perceived interests, as states are wont to do. China has huge internal vulnerabilities and has immense pressure to keep trade flowing and the economy growing, war would carry far more risk than gain for them... at least under the status quo. Instead of trying to build an alliance "aimed at China", why not look toward an East Asian security arrangement aimed at peaceful resolution of disputes and keeping trade routes secure... one that would include China?

Certainly there are grounds for conflict between China and the US and/or other Asian countries, but there are many common interests as well.

[Tukhachevskii]

China may not be an ally or a friend, but I think it's long past time to stop seeing them as an enemy. Just one more state pursuing their own perceived interests, as states are wont to do. China has huge internal vulnerabilities and has immense pressure to keep trade flowing and the economy growing, war would carry far more risk than gain for them... at least under the status quo. Instead of trying to build an alliance "aimed at China", why not look toward an East Asian security arrangement aimed at peaceful resolution of disputes and keeping trade routes secure... one that would include China?

I have to say I agree with you in spirit but multilateral international organisations very often need a central core state/hegemon to keep them going (as per US in NATO) or need each state to be relatively equal in terms of size, power and interests (the EU's decision maing process and the "weighting" of votes relative to population is a case in point). Ultimately, the states of N.E. Asia do have a common interest in peace and prosperity in the region but national interests can only be harmonised on the basis of some kind of equality between members, otherwise its just an alliance or a bandwagoning syatem. Would China really feel happ to be one among equals or would she simply interpret that according to her "victim" thesis/narrative (colonialism, Imperialism, etc.: and Japan takes centre stage followed by the US when it comes to Beijing's/ChiCom victimology) and see it as an attempt to restrict her emergence into weltmacht status? I think the latter, she would rather be primus inter pares than simply pares...IMO (that's a lovely cavet isn't it, absolves all sins)

[Dayuhan]

Ultimately, the states of N.E. Asia do have a common interest in peace and prosperity in the region but national interests can only be harmonised on the basis of some kind of equality between members, otherwise its just an alliance or a bandwagoning syatem. Would China really feel happ to be one among equals or would she simply interpret that according to her "victim" thesis/narrative (colonialism, Imperialism, etc.: and Japan takes centre stage followed by the US when it comes to Beijing's/ChiCom victimology) and see it as an attempt to restrict her emergence into weltmacht status? I think the latter, she would rather be primus inter pares than simply pares...

The US has sought and achieved primus inter pares status in enough organizations that it might be just a wee bit hypocritical to object to anyone else holding it! Of course such an organization wouldn't solve all problems; it might be of use... which is all one expects of such organizations in any event.

The Chinese "victim thesis" has some substance to it, which is why it remains a potent narrative. Of course the series of catastrophes that China endured from the Opium Wars to the Cultural Revolution cannot reasonably be blamed entirely on foreign intervention, but it will inevitably be noted that they did coincide with the period of weak central government and extensive foreign intervention.

I think where some people go off the rails in observing Asia is in trying to impose a cold-war-europe paradigm, with China as the focal evil empire villain enemy that must be contained and deterred. I don't think the comparison is at all valid. For one thing, China (unlike the Soviet Union of yore) is a trade-dependent power, deeply engaged with the regional and global economies and deeply reliant on imports and exports. It's also a very successful power under the current order, with a great deal to risk from rocking the boat. The Chinese know (as those who observe China should) that the main (only, really) threat to their security is internal, and they are deeply concerned with that threat... but the assumption that China is about to boil over into an attack on Taiwan and/or an attempt to conquer the South China Sea seems quite wildly overstated to me (and I live on the perimeter of the South China Sea).

Of course those who feel bereft without someone to fear will tend to focus on China, but I see no reason to obsess over it. Relations with China will have to be managed and there will be some complexities in the management; it's not an apocalyptic scenario.

[Backwards Observer]

or would she simply interpret that according to her "victim" thesis/narrative (colonialism, Imperialism, etc.: and Japan takes centre stage...IMO (that's a lovely caveat isn't it, absolves all sins)

Perhaps you are aware that Imperial Japan is generally considered the "more successful" aggressor in the Second Sino-Japanese War, perhaps not. An estimated 17 million Chinese civilians were killed. It is not inconceivable that a goodly percentage of these were "victims" of a "foreign invader", regardless of your worthy opinion of the chicoms and the central government.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second_Sino-Japanese_War

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nanking_Massacre

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unit_731

[JMA]

That'll be one hell of a circle to square, IMO you can have one or tthe other, not both. US presence in N.E. Asia provides a security umbrella. Withrdrawing or downplaying that security garuntee (which is essentially what it is) is going to increase pressure for regional players to resort to "self help", i.e. aqcuire nuclear weapons.

Not even squaring the circle, more like the impossible dream.

I can't understand what the concern is about Japan or South Korea or even Taiwan developing a nuclear weapon is when there is little concern about Iran doing just that. Why do the same deterrent arguments not hold true in this neck of the woods?

Not only NE Asian states but also ASEAN states and all other Asian states are watching what is happening in the Middle East apropos the supposed US security commitments to Israel. If it appears the US is wavering then I would support and agree that the Asian states that feel threatened by China should post haste start to look for alternatives.

China clearly feels it is strong enough to take on Japan over what was probably a contrived incident. Asia is watching this one very carefully. Will the US show some leadership or just sit on its hands?

[Dayuhan]

Not only NE Asian states but also ASEAN states and all other Asian states are watching what is happening in the Middle East apropos the supposed US security commitments to Israel. If it appears the US is wavering then I would support and agree that the Asian states that feel threatened by China should post haste start to look for alternatives.

Is the US wavering in its commitment to Israel? How so?

China clearly feels it is strong enough to take on Japan over what was probably a contrived incident. Asia is watching this one very carefully. Will the US show some leadership or just sit on its hands?

Why would the US need to show leadership in a dispute between Japan and China?

[Tukhachevskii]

when there is little concern about Iran doing just that.

Er, not from what I've heard and read. Iran's nuclear programme is hardly "accepted".