North Korea: 2012-2016

[Dayuhan]

There has to be a war?

To change the status quo? As I said, if anyone has a realistic suggestion for a way to significantly change the status quo without a war, I'm all ears. Haven't seen one yet. The North Korean regime is not going to change because we want it to change, and an effort to compel change could have all kinds of potential consequences, up to and including war.

I'm all ears waiting for an explanation of the risks relating to doing effectively nothing.

The status quo has risks, certainly, and as Bill points out it certainly sucks for the North Koreans. Whether or not that would make it worth an effort to alter the status quo would depend on what realistic means for altering it are available and on what the associated risks are. The status quo may not be wonderful, but it's manageable. Hardly worth rocking the boat unless you've very good reason to believe doing so would improve matters.

In the absence of any realistic strategy for improving the status quo, what's wrong with staying with it? It's not ideal, but neither is it intolerable.

[JMA]

To change the status quo? As I said, if anyone has a realistic suggestion for a way to significantly change the status quo without a war, I'm all ears. Haven't seen one yet. The North Korean regime is not going to change because we want it to change, and an effort to compel change could have all kinds of potential consequences, up to and including war.

Fuchs has done a better job explaining how he believes "influence" should be approached and could work than you have - continuing your stock position in near every instance - of suggesting doing nothing.

North Korea will change when they have no alternative but to submit to influence/pressure/whatever. In this case the key lies with China, as with Syria the key lies with Russia/Iran.

[Dayuhan]

Fuchs has done a better job explaining how he believes "influence" should be approached and could work than you have - continuing your stock position in near every instance - of suggesting doing nothing.

What Fuchs suggests is simply not realistic. First, it relies on the assumption that the "Great Western Powers" (who he means by that I've no idea, you'd have to ask him) can act secretly and cooperatively toward a common goal without that being patently obvious to anyone who's half paying attention. Second, it assumes that these "Great Western Powers" have sufficient influence to make the Chinese want to do something that they most emphatically don't want to do, have no real reason to want to do and have very real reasons to avoid.

These assumptions seem pulled out of thin air and no basis for them is presented.

I've no objection to trying it: unlike some plans we've seen that are based on fixed assumptions about what can be done and how others will react to proposed actions, the consequences of its failure would not be terribly inconvenient. It won't work, of course, but at least it probably wouldn't blow up in anyone's face. Even when the whole "secret" plot inevitably ends up all over the Internet it would only seem mildly silly.

North Korea will change when they have no alternative but to submit to influence/pressure/whatever.

Do you assume that change in North Korea can only be the consequence of external "influence/pressure/whatever"? If so, why?

In this case the key lies with China, as with Syria the key lies with Russia/Iran.

I don't think that assessment is accurate. The key in Syria is not Russia or Iran, but the Syrian Armed Forces. If enough of his military defects, Assad will fall, no matter what Russia or Iran say or do. If enough of his military stays loyal and fights it out, he will sustain the civil war and possibly win.

Of course even if we assume that Russia or Iran is "the key", that gets us nowhere, because Russia and Iran will act according to their own perception of their own interests, and no combination of Western powers is going to change that perception.

Similarly, "the key" in North Korea is likely to be the DPRK armed forces: I doubt that there will be really meaningful change unless the generals either decide to take over themselves or refuse to suppress a popular uprising. Neither of these seems likely any time soon, though a coup would naturally be unexpected until it occurs.

Similarly, even if China was "the key", that would get us nowhere, because the Chinese have no interest whatsoever in trying to "fix" the DPRK, and that's not something any outside influence is going to change.

The U.S. and other nations openly oppose DPRK's WMD program, but are relatively quiet about the human rights abuses in North Korea. Expanding the focus of pressure to include human rights does put China and other supporters of North Korea is tougher position diplomatically to continue to support an oppressive government.

I have no problem with expanding the focus of pressure to include human rights, but I also have no illusions about that accomplishing anything. It's certainly not going to put China in a tougher position: the Chinese consistently and vigorously oppose any effort to enforce an externally dictated human rights standard on anyone, anywhere. Making human rights an issue might well induce the Chinese to give more support, just to show how little they care and how seriously they oppose the idea of anyone pressuring anyone else to conform to such standards.

Failure to gain support through their normal cycles of provocation because the world is tiring of their treatment of their people puts them in a position where they'll be more likely to adapt changes over time. This would potentially increase the stability of North Korea and the region. A lot of countries are tired of the U.S. determining who can and can't have nuclear weapons, so that is hardly a high moral ground issue that resonates.

I can see the point about overreliance on the WMD issue, and mostly agree. I doubt, though, that changing the focus of complaint to anything else is going to produce much meaningful change. China will support the DPRK just enough to keep the regime afloat, because they do not want the regime to fall. That's not something any external influence is going to change. As long as the DPRK is assured of that support, they've little incentive to change, and of course they are institutionally very deeply against change.

There are cases in which "we" - the US, the West, whatever - are simply not in control, and where attempting to take control is likely to create a bigger mess than what we've already got. Sure, we can try to exert influence, but don't expect much tangible result, because the influence "we" can bring to bear is quite limited.

I seem to recall some rather lofty and unrealistic policy objectives for both Iraq and Afghanistan.

And that got us... where?

Again you're the one saying liberate the North, I'm looking for strategies for changing the behavior of the regime in the North, not replacing it. Change is already happening in North Korea, so I'm leary of the experts who continue to believe the legacy system will continue forever without a military intervention. It is evolving now and the world should explore ways to shape that evolution.

I'm not convinced that "the world" has common objectives in this, or most, cases, and I think the capacity to shape and change the regime is very limited. No objection to trying various carrots and sticks, but they haven't worked well in the past and aren't likely to work well in the future.

Realistically, I think we're stuck with the status quo or some minor variant thereof, and are likely to be in that position for some time. We can talk less about WMD and more about human rights, but is anything likely to change? I doubt it. The catalyst for change is probably going to be internal, it will probably take us by surprise, and it will not be dictated or controlled by any outside power.

Bill: If a serious resistance movement did arise and neither South Korea, Red China nor Russia supported it, it would have no chance. It would have no sanctuary and no external support. Northern Korea would be essentially an island and what resistance there was would wither and die.

I hesitate to say this since I haven't read any of max161's papers yet, but I agree with you in questioning how much of a resistance could develop especially if the South Koreans showed up and contrived to provide everybody with 3000 calories a day. Juche might be have some appeal but enough or more than enough food to eat is a pretty powerful motivator.

Insurgency in the Philippines has been going on for 40+ years with no sanctuary and no meaningful external support. Different situations of course, but sanctuary and external support are not absolutely necessary for insurgency to endure.

Invasion and foreign occupation can be a powerful motivator... though it seems a very moot point, since I don't think anyone is likely to invade the DPRK any time soon.

[Fuchs]

What Fuchs suggests is simply not realistic. First, it relies on the assumption that the "Great Western Powers" (who he means by that I've no idea, you'd have to ask him) can act secretly and cooperatively toward a common goal without that being patently obvious to anyone who's half paying attention.

Look, if you quote with "", quote correctly.

A correct quote would be "Western great powers".

Next, if unsure what a "Western great power" is, accept the help of an encyclopaedia, preferably one quite up-to-date.
This one might help, but other encyclopaedia exist as well, of course.


It's late and I'm not in the mood of creating another long list (about great powers acting secretly, cooperatively and not totally obviously in history).

[Dayuhan]

Look, if you quote with "", quote correctly.

A correct quote would be "Western great powers".

Next, if unsure what a "Western great power" is, accept the help of an encyclopaedia, preferably one quite up-to-date.
This one might help, but other encyclopaedia exist as well, of course.

From the link provided:

There are no set or defined characteristics of a great power.

So we still have no idea whatsoever who you meant when you used the expression.

It's late and I'm not in the mood of creating another long list (about great powers acting secretly, cooperatively and not totally obviously in history).

No need to bother, because such a list would be completely irrelevant in any case. It's like suggesting that because nations have historically reversed policy in some cases, it is therefore possible to reverse another nation's policy as desired, on cue. Just because something has happened in the past doesn't mean you or anyone else can make the same thing happen again at any time of your choosing.

The idea that any combination of Western powers can make the Chinese reverse a long-standing perception of self-interest and inspire them with a sudden desire to "fix" the DPRK makes an amusing hypothesis, but it seems too dependent on the assumption of predictable and controllable reaction to have much place in the real world.

[Fuchs]

Does it make sense to debate with someone who first asserts something strongly, then in face of historical evidence to the contrary plays the same down and finally proceeds to preventively declare all non-consenting evidence irrelevant for his other assertion?


It's kinda like debating with a priest about science.*


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*: I'm curious if comparing a SWC member with a priest is (also) an offence in the eyes of the mods.

[Dayuhan]

Why not propose that we summon up earthquakes and volcanoes to dispose of our rivals? If anyone points out that you don't have the power to do that, you can easily refute the claim by posting a list of historical earthquakes and eruptions...

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*: I'm curious if comparing a SWC member with a priest is (also) an offence in the eyes of the mods.[/QUOTE]

[carl]

Insurgency in the Philippines has been going on for 40+ years with no sanctuary and no meaningful external support. Different situations of course, but sanctuary and external support are not absolutely necessary for insurgency to endure.

Invasion and foreign occupation can be a powerful motivator... though it seems a very moot point, since I don't think anyone is likely to invade the DPRK any time soon.

Well Dayuhan, I have to admit, you got me. You are right. Sanctuary and external support aren't absolutely needed to keep and insurgency going at such a low level for 40 years that is might well be mistaken for the kind of disorder and banditry that has been going on in and around the various islands of the Philippines for the last (you pick a number) hundred years.

I agree that nobody is likely to invade the Kim Kingdom. Though (don't get mad at me max161, this is an uneducated guess) if the place does collapse, or when, I don't see the restoration of the said Kim Kingdom being a very powerful motivator.

[Dayuhan]

Sanctuary and external support aren't absolutely needed to keep and insurgency going at such a low level for 40 years that is might well be mistaken for the kind of disorder and banditry that has been going on in and around the various islands of the Philippines for the last (you pick a number) hundred years.

From the early 80s through the mid 90s the insurgency was a clear and direct threat to government, with up to 40k men under arms and a presence in virtually every part of the country... without sanctuary or external support. That's a wee bit beyond disorder and banditry.

I agree that nobody is likely to invade the Kim Kingdom. Though (don't get mad at me max161, this is an uneducated guess) if the place does collapse, or when, I don't see the restoration of the said Kim Kingdom being a very powerful motivator.

I also do not think anyone would be trying to restore the dynastic monarchy, but there might be some serious issues over who gets to succeed that monarchy. Whether or not any outside power will want to get involved in those issues is of course impossible to say, but it would not be something to be undertaken lightly.

[carl]

From the early 80s through the mid 90s the insurgency was a clear and direct threat to government, with up to 40k men under arms and a presence in virtually every part of the country... without sanctuary or external support. That's a wee bit beyond disorder and banditry.

By my reckoning, the early 80s through the mid 90s is about 15 years, not 40. And since it is not now what it was, I figure that one of the reasons it isn't is because it didn't have sanctuary and external support. Lack of those two things allowed the gov to suppress/defeat it to the point where it went back to the disorder/banditry stage. Which happened a couple of times before in the last 113 years.

I also do not think anyone would be trying to restore the dynastic monarchy, but there might be some serious issues over who gets to succeed that monarchy. Whether or not any outside power will want to get involved in those issues is of course impossible to say, but it would not be something to be undertaken lightly.

That sounds reasonable.

[Dayuhan]

As far as external support needed to wage a resistance, I'd say a lot was needed. Critical even it be. If Kim Kingdon collapsed and the plucky (and uniformly slim) residents of the northern part of Korea decided to fight for a return of those halcyon days they would need some money from somewhere since they ain't got any.

Who ever said anything about fighting to restore the Kim regime? How do you know they wouldn't fight to be able to define the successor to the Kim regime themselves, rather than having it defined by an outside power? Or that various factions who want to take over wouldn't fight with each other and anyone else willing to be on the spot?

I wouldn't be prepared to bet that the north would simply submit to foreign intervention, or that lack of money or sanctuary would render them unable to insurge. It might happen, but it might not... and if it didn't, the occupying power could find themselves in a quite unpleasant situation.

By my reckoning, the early 80s through the mid 90s is about 15 years, not 40. And since it is not now what it was, I figure that one of the reasons it isn't is because it didn't have sanctuary and external support.

The insurgency has gone on for over 40 years. If you include the Huk rebellion (which is reasonable), it's gone on for well over 60 years... without sanctuary or significant foreign assistance. Of course it's had ups and downs within that time, but even now it's by no means over.

Lack of those two things allowed the gov to suppress/defeat it to the point where it went back to the disorder/banditry stage. Which happened a couple of times before in the last 113 years.

Not so. The government didn't suppress/defeat the insurgency. The insurgency collapsed to the extent that it has because of the sudden and unexpected loss of the Marcos regime and because of its own inability to adapt to the post-Marcos political landscape, not because of anything government did.

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Reed11b
Anyone ever consider that ENDING sactions against NK would provide the current leadership far more challenge and adversity then maintaining the current sanctions?

Exactly, and we need more outspoken critics of our excessive and cowardly use of economic sanctions to pursue foreign objectives. This is policy that our State Department embraces because it creates the illusion of effective action while in fact accomplishing little other than strengthening the Regime targeted by the sanctions and undermining their people, the same people that could pressure their regime to change.

We're stuck in the past because old school self proclaimed experts continue to push ineffective policies and approaches to ahieve those policies. I find it comical to the extreme to see the constant stream of attacks against Department of Defense for not being adaptive, when other calcified government agencies such as State, Justice, etc. get a free ride in the media.

Human rights is another issue that creates a dilemna for any nation that is part of the globalized economy. Most governments, to include China, can't hide from the various forms of global media (North Korea is currently an exception, but that too appears to be changing), and exposure of human rights violations will in many cases weaken their legitimacy with their
populace. If the populace is empowered, and empowerment comes through economic engagement and development, not sanctions, over time that government is compelled to modify its behavior.

There a few lonely nations out there that continue to support authoritarian regimes, China, Iran and Russia, but they do so at considerable risk to their long term interests.

Posted by Bob's World

Just how much "external support" do you think they will need to wage a resistance?

Some level of logistical support is an inescapable fact for sustaining any resistance. They can and most likely will wage a tough resistance if invaded, but it is unlikely it will be able to sustain that effort for years. How much support can the local populace provide the resistance forces? This is one case where I hope the S. Koreans (I have little hope for our capability) could wage an effective PSYOP campaign if we keep the gringo presence out of North Korea (or at least minimize it). China and Russia may find it in their interests to provide support for the resistance, if they do then the argument is mute to begin with.

[JMA]

What Fuchs suggests is simply not realistic.

That of course is merely in your opinion.

First, it relies on the assumption that the "Great Western Powers" (who he means by that I've no idea, you'd have to ask him) can act secretly and cooperatively toward a common goal without that being patently obvious to anyone who's half paying attention. Second, it assumes that these "Great Western Powers" have sufficient influence to make the Chinese want to do something that they most emphatically don't want to do, have no real reason to want to do and have very real reasons to avoid.

You can argue persuasively that the Chinese "emphatically don't want to" force any change to the status quo in North Korea? I would be interested to hear such an argument ... if you can make it.

"Secrecy" in some matters can never be guaranteed. To claim it to be a critical success factor is a poor attempt to bolster a weak argument.

These assumptions seem pulled out of thin air and no basis for them is presented.

The same can be said for your increasingly desperate need for just doing nothing.

I've no objection to trying it:

You? Where do you come into the equation? You don't really think the "Great Western Powers" give a hoot what you think, do you.

... unlike some plans we've seen that are based on fixed assumptions about what can be done and how others will react to proposed actions, the consequences of its failure would not be terribly inconvenient. It won't work, of course, but at least it probably wouldn't blow up in anyone's face. Even when the whole "secret" plot inevitably ends up all over the Internet it would only seem mildly silly.

So that means everyone should just sit back and do nothing? LOL

[Dayuhan]

Exactly, and we need more outspoken critics of our excessive and cowardly use of economic sanctions to pursue foreign objectives. This is policy that our State Department embraces because it creates the illusion of effective action while in fact accomplishing little other than strengthening the Regime targeted by the sanctions and undermining their people, the same people that could pressure their regime to change.

This is largely true, but I can also understand that the people at State have a limited menu to choose from when the politicians ring up asking for something they can do that will make them look like they are doing something without actually having to do anything. In many cases I suspect that sanctions are adopted less for their impact on the country being sanctioned than to give politicians an opportunity to look as if they're engaged and taking a stand without having to run risks. I can understand the desire to avoid risk, especially when there's little gain to be had, but the resulting pile of sanctions, which often drag on long after any marginal utility they might have had is gone, is not helping anything.

Sanctions targeting specific individuals and entities do IMO have a place in the repertoire, but have to be used carefully. The nation-wide variant are an overused and largely ineffective device.

Human rights is another issue that creates a dilemna for any nation that is part of the globalized economy. Most governments, to include China, can't hide from the various forms of global media (North Korea is currently an exception, but that too appears to be changing), and exposure of human rights violations will in many cases weaken their legitimacy with their populace. If the populace is empowered, and empowerment comes through economic engagement and development, not sanctions, over time that government is compelled to modify its behavior.

I'm not sure I follow this. China's disregard for human rights and open sponsorship of others who disregard human rights is blatant, open, and widely discussed in media... has that created any dilemma for the Chinese?

It's true that China's economic development has significantly empowered much of the populace, and that the empowerment may at some point in the future compel China to modify its behaviour toward its own citizenry, but that hardly seems imminent. China's support for North Korea doesn't seem to be imposing any negative economic or other consequences.

Some level of logistical support is an inescapable fact for sustaining any resistance. They can and most likely will wage a tough resistance if invaded, but it is unlikely it will be able to sustain that effort for years. How much support can the local populace provide the resistance forces? This is one case where I hope the S. Koreans (I have little hope for our capability) could wage an effective PSYOP campaign if we keep the gringo presence out of North Korea (or at least minimize it). China and Russia may find it in their interests to provide support for the resistance, if they do then the argument is mute to begin with.

Maybe I'm not following something, but all this talk of resistance insurgency seems very hypothetical. Who would want to invade the DPRK in the first place? If the place collapsed into complete disarray there might be calls for somebody to go in and stabilize the place, but I'd guess that would be one of those things that everybody thinks somebody else ought to do but nobody wants to do.

That of course is merely in your opinion.

Of course. Everything anyone says here is their opinion, unless otherwise stated and appropriately referenced. I don't think it's an unreasonable opinion: the idea that any combination of Western powers can induce a 180 degree policy shift by the Chinese simply by manipulating media does seem... improbable at best, does it not?

You can argue persuasively that the Chinese "emphatically don't want to" force any change to the status quo in North Korea? I would be interested to hear such an argument ... if you can make it.

Looking at the way China has managed relations with the DPRK over the last few decades, what other conclusion is possible?

"Secrecy" in some matters can never be guaranteed. To claim it to be a critical success factor is a poor attempt to bolster a weak argument.

Agreed. It was Fuchs who pointed out that transparency would have to be avoided. I simply pointed out that avoiding transparency is easier said than done. Of course it's difficult to manipulate people when they know you're trying to manipulate them, and of course the Chinese would know. So would everybody else.

Of course it's easy to declare that you know exactly how to reverse the Chinese perception of self-interest and give a generic list of devices that you say will "pull it off". Actually doing it would be another thing altogether.

You? Where do you come into the equation? You don't really think the "Great Western Powers" give a hoot what you think, do you.

Of course not. Neither do they give a hoot what Fuchs thinks, or anyone else here. All of these discussions are purely hypothetical. Surely you don't think that anyone's paying attention. Even if we all agreed that Fuchs' Jedi mind trick hypothesis could actually make the Chinese want to "fix" the DPRK, it still wouldn't happen and it still wouldn't work. We're just a few guys yakking on the internet.

So that means everyone should just sit back and do nothing? LOL

In the absence of a clear, concrete, limited and achievable objective and a realistic, practical strategy for achieving that objective, what would you want anyone to do? Contain, manage, and wait for an internal shift isn't "doing nothing", it's acceptance of the reality that the situation is not amenable to control, influence is limited, and any attempt to significantly alter the status quo is likely to make things worse for everyone concerned. Should someone simply "do something" for the sake of doing something, even without a clear goal or a realistic strategy? Why? What do you think should be done, and by whom?

[Bob's World]

A few points to consider:

1. A resistance insurgency is not an effort by the people to restore the government that was defeated, a resistance is an effort by the people to remove a foreign influence/presence that they believe has no right to be there. This is a critical point we for some reason refuse to understand, and that refusal led us to believe that neither the Iraqi nor the Afghan people would resist our efforts to "free them from oppression." We look to what happened in Germany and Japan post WWII and draw the wrong conclusions. Both those populaces were subjected to long, sustained warfare prior to the defeat of their respective militarize and governments. In Japan we wisely sustained the Emperor, viewed as the core of "legitimacy" or we would have likely faced a major insurgency there. Also, with with China (under natioanalist or communist rule) so near and full of reasonable motivation to exact revenge on a war weakened Japan, we were the lesser of two evils. In Germany all Germans well appreciated that it was far better to subject themselves to the Allies than to be subjected to the Soviets. We were not accepted because we were better than Hitler, but because we were better than Stalin.

If the DPRK attacks and is then pushed back forcing a regime change, or if the current regime collapses and foreigners move in to "build a nation" and "bring democracy" etc it will not be going into a populace that has been subjected to years of warfare, nor will it be going into a populace that perceives this help as the lesser of two evils. By any logical assessment and reasonable understanding of resistance insurgency, the people would resist. Hard.

2. Given the Western programs of "COIN" and our refusal to appreciate that the fighting force of the insurgency is just the tip of a much larger populace iceberg of discontent, we, the Western or even Chinese society going in to mold things in their image, would become the primary supplier of the insurgency through our aid to the populace writ large. China would probably be more effective at this than we would, and US interests would not suffer if the PRC had the lead on dealing with any kind of governmental collapse in the DPRK.

3. We still have a hard time balancing what we WANT with what we NEED. Interests are (should) be based on needs. We have a lot of "wants" in our current national policy. We "wanted" to make Iraq and Afghanistan democracies shaped and valued in our image. We needed those countries not to grant formal sanctuary to terrorist NSAs or to attack our interests and allies. There is a massive gap between those wants and those needs. Attempting to bridge that gap is indeed, a bridge too far.

We should ask sincerely, what do we "need" in terms of the DPRK and our interests, and do our policies and plans reflect those needs, or some much fluffier concept of "wants."

[max161]

I am mystified that no one is talking about the elephant in the room which is of course Korean Reunification. We all talk about various aspects of the Korean problem (or the Korea Question as stated in paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement) without regard to what is established Alliance Policy as per the June 2009 Joint Vision Statement. Whether north Korea attacks or the regime collapse the ultimate end state that everyone should be discussing is Korean Reunification and how to help South Korea achieve it.

The other point is we continue to talk about the Korean Problem with little regard for Korea. Again, many of the comments in this string are seemingly made in the spirit of big brother knowing how to solve all and again with little understanding of Korean culture, politics, tradition, history (and emotions)of the Korean people. I cannot emphasize enough how many of these comments sound just like discussions of Afghanistan by those who knew nothing of the culture, politics, tradition history (and emotions) of the Afghan people. And we see how things have turned out for us in Afghanistan.

We need to understand the process of Korean Reunification and how the Koreans are going to achieve it. And as counter-intuitive as it will seem to many of you, although the Chinese desperately want to maintain the status quo (their policy is the three "no's": no war, no collapse, and no nukes) they are prepared to allow South Korea to shoulder the burden of Korean Reunification following war or collapse. They do not want the burden of a collapsed north Korea and they believe that by allowing South Korea to reunify the Peninsula they can achieve their major Northeast Asian regional aim and that is to get US troops off the Peninsula. You can see the Chinese hedging strategy playing out with its 50 and 100 year leases of vast tracts of mineral deposits which provides currency to the regime (helping to keep it afloat and thus prevent collapse and possibly war) and ensures their long term access even after reunification (they will exploit the provisions in the South Korean Constitution that says that all Koreans are citizens of the Republic of Korea and they will claim they made deals with Koreans that should be honored by Koreans) Furthermore, they will intervene with troops not to fight South Koreans or even Americans but to prevent north Koreans from coming across the border (and also likely to try to police up all evidence of their complicity in the north's nuclear programs). But they will use the fact that China and South Korea have good relations (and that China is South Korea's number one trading partner) and that China has no interest in preventing reunification and in fact is willing to withdraw its troops from the Korean Peninsula and to press South Korea as it reunifies to have no foreign troops on the Korean Peninsula. With post-collapse or post-conflict and the path to reunification many (including some in the US) can argue there is no reason for US troops on the Peninsula. Ironically though, China could not only live with but would tacitly support US troops remaining in Japan as this is believed to reduce the chances of Japan remilitarizing which is the fear of Chinese and Koreans alike.

But I would urge everyone wanting to make policy and strategy recommendations to please do so from an understanding of the Korean situation and all its history, culture, customs, and politics.

[carl]

If the DPRK attacks and is then pushed back forcing a regime change, or if the current regime collapses and foreigners move in to "build a nation" and "bring democracy" etc it will not be going into a populace that has been subjected to years of warfare, nor will it be going into a populace that perceives this help as the lesser of two evils. By any logical assessment and reasonable understanding of resistance insurgency, the people would resist. Hard.

How hard can you resist when starving? I don't think you give those people much credit for seeing and remembering. They see that they are all pretty skinny. They remember times of starvation. They remember the people and families who disappeared. They know what happens if they forget their Kim pin. I don't think the South Koreans would have to go far to be the lesser of two evils.

China would probably be more effective at this than we would, and US interests would not suffer if the PRC had the lead on dealing with any kind of governmental collapse in the DPRK.

I wonder if the Red Chinese would send any large numbers of people into northern Korea if the Kim dynasty fell apart. All those Chinamen walking about might provoke some resentment from the Koreans north or south.