If you plan to make it out the door walking rather than being dragged you should 1) avoid getting into a drinking contest with an Irishman or a Korean and 2) immediately line up behind either when the bar fight starts.Originally Posted by max161
It will fall into chaos as a result of renewed famine and poverty, resulting in military crackdowns.
There will be a military coup that displaces the current leadership, hopefully soon.
It will continue to remain a closed society, technologically dormant and otherwise insignificant.
The leadership will eventually make a misstep, forcing military action from the United States.
Ganulv,
Korea has been known as both the "Irish of the East" and a "shrimp among whales." And the Korean proverb is "when whales wrestle, shrimp die."
David S. Maxwell
"Irregular warfare is far more intellectual than a bayonet charge." T.E. Lawrence
If you plan to make it out the door walking rather than being dragged you should 1) avoid getting into a drinking contest with an Irishman or a Korean and 2) immediately line up behind either when the bar fight starts.
If you don’t read the newspaper, you are uninformed; if you do read the newspaper, you are misinformed. – Mark Twain (attributed)
max161:
That is a great phrase and in just a few words explains why it is unlikely the Kim dynasty will be toppled by popular unrest. There just haven't been many successful slave revolts in history.
I have a question. I understand your point about seemingly irrational actions seeming rational to a very insular regime. My question is how insular and ignorant of the world are the upper echelons of the Kim regime? I've read that Kim jong-un and other members of his family spent a number of years being educated in the West. Do you think that makes a difference? Also is it common for the offspring of other high ups to have spent years in the West and if so will that make a difference?
"We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene
Have you ever read Tipping Point and The Black Swan?
We cannot really know in advance why and when they will collapse, but they may, and it my happen suddenly and soon. Or very late. We don't know.
It's a classic "Ask me afterwards!" problem.
Posted by max161
Agreed, yet...Ironically the alliance military forces do two things: on the one hand they do deter attack from the north and at the same time they provide the justification for the regime's key internal political orientation which is the military first policy which is the basic justification for why the people must sacrifice and suffer to protect their nation from aggression. Sure it would be a nice thought to remove US forces or reduce the threat but the irony would be that it would lead to internal regime friction as the justification for the military first policy would be removed. The elite would then likely be challenged and it could end up back to the only option the regime has left when faced with internal threats and that would be to execute its campaign plan to reunify the peninsula. And of course it would be more enticing if the ROK-US alliance was weak and there were no US forces on the peninsula.
I understand all the foreign policy theories of negotiations and how we think we should deal with the north from certain theoretical schools of thought but the most important thing is to understand the real nature of the regime and deal with it as it really is and not as we would wish it to be. We have tried many negotiating tactics from 4 party to 6 party talks - direct ROK - north Korea (which have happened in public and private over decades) and the north reverts to its same pattern of action as it has for 60 years. We have had many diplomats who have thought they could negotiate agreements with the north in good faith but the north continues to break them because it suits them to do so (and we end up giving them concessions again and again over the years).
I realize we have to deal with the world we have, yet it seems ironic that we have policy shapers in the Capital region calling for U.S. intervention in Syria which more than likely would empower extremists who would further destabilize another important region of the world, while we completely ignore the humanitarian disaster in North Korea and instead focus almost solely on their WMD program. I tend to agree that the status quo is probably the best solution for the states in the region for now, but it is a crying shame the best solution condemns a few million people abject poverty and no hope for a better tomorrow. On the other hand the Syrian economy was expanding (and of course so was the gap between the haves and have nots), and while the people weren't free to practice religious extremism their life wasn't all that bad. Assayd is was not Qadaffi, but obviously his response to the revolt has put in a positon with few options to reduce the tensions using anything resembling a political solution.
One more thought, while we preach soft power, in reality we leverage our coercive power more often than not. It seems that if we implement sanctions that result in punishing the affected population we can still call it soft power if it is intended to result in freedom, nuke free countries, etc. In reality when you say we have given North Korea several chances, that is true but it has been always been a carrot and stick approach, and the threat of the stick was always there. No where near the extent you have, I have also been watching the regimes behavior for a long time, and I agree we with to deal with the reality of the situation, but also think there will be opportunites to reframe our approach if we remain open to them.
Last edited by Bill Moore; 09-01-2012 at 01:35 AM.
Fuchs:
You're right. We can't know for sure until after the event. And there have been some successful slave revolts in history. Haiti is the one I can think of. I just think it very unlikely but not impossible.
"We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene
The slave analogy isn't a really good one.
The people in power and the masses are neither in the quantity ratio typical for slave societies nor are they separated by ethnicity as has been typical for most slave-keeping societies.
There are probably greater similarities to Pol Pot's regime, Stalin's regime, Ceaucescu's Romania or to (pseudo-)Communist Albania.
I’ve always thought Romania was a decent comparison, though off the top of my head no other modern state has incorporated into their political system the sort of ancestor worship seen in the DPRK. (I know there are still monarchies out there, but that really doesn’t seem to me to be what is going on in North Korea.)
If you don’t read the newspaper, you are uninformed; if you do read the newspaper, you are misinformed. – Mark Twain (attributed)
Fuchs:
I think slavery by ethnicity is mostly a modern phenomenon. The Romans and Greeks and all manners of ancient and not so ancient peoples were quite willing to enslave people who looked like them and had the same culture. I read a book once about slavery amongst the American Indians and ethnicity, if I remember correctly, didn't have much to do with it (Ganulv can correct me on this).
But whether the poor North Koreans can be accurately described as slaves was not really the main point when I complemented max161 on the phrase. The main point is that they have about as much chance of throwing off their shackles as the slaves have had in slave societies. Not much. Whether they fit the precise definition of slaves doesn't change that chance much in my opinion.
As far as the Soviet Union goes I read a book about the Soviet Union's WWII war effort, Richard Overy's I think, and it occurred to me as I was reading it that the country seemed to me to be a slave state. Stalin was at the height of his power and nobody but nobody had a chance or a right. I thought they were essentially, slaves.
"We fight, get beat, rise, and fight again." Gen. Nathanael Greene
The iron grip of North Korea's regime likely depends on three conditions
(1) oppression and control by a domestic intelligence service
(2) an elite which would lose almost everything in a revolution
(3) a population that's too lethargic by oppression and malnutrition to revolt
(1) and (2) were very often not enough to maintain a dictatorship in modern times. (3) may change eventually.
Most importantly, the PRC political leadership may some day decide to end the BS in North Korea and could do so as did the Vietnamese end the Pol Pot regime.
The West has probably enough possibilities to make North Korea China's foreign problem #1. It could also assure Beijing that a reformed North Korea would remain an ally of Beijing, in fact it might even be able to promise a neutralised South Korea in the event (at least no foreign forces or bases in South Korea).
How exactly would "The West" be in a position to make assurances about the outcome of Korean reform, or to promise South Korea's neutrality? Would "The West" be making these decisions for either Korea?
I rather doubt that "The West" has the capacity to transform Korea into a problem for China. "The West" is not in control of the Korean Peninsula or of what happens there.
“The whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by menacing it with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary”
H.L. Mencken
Oh, we can turn it into a problem. Carrots and sticks.
Whenever we deny China something, we can say "You would have got it if you had fixed North Korea into something bearable." Whenever we do something embarrassing to china we could say "We would respect your feelings and sensitivities more if you had fixed North Korea into something bearable." Whenever North Korea does something stupid such as firing a torpedo, we can support South Korea in its reaction and publicly blame the PRC as North Korea's big brother and expose that China is either too weak to exert influence on a small neighbour or implicated itself.
We can furthermore create the foreign policy environment for PRC to "fix" NK without accusations of war of aggression et cetera (it could even get a UN permit for an invasion, considering that NK is in theory still at war with South Korea and keeps violating the cease fire!) and the PRC can then exercise enough control to avoid reunification talks for the time being.
Remember, there was a time when Germany and Austria were considered to be one nation (with high tides around 1860 and 1940). A nation can separate permanently.
How does that turn anything into a problem for China? Do you really think they care what we say or what we blame them for? What are we supposed to "deny China" anyway? Not like they're coming to us for favors. Are we going to threaten not to borrow any more money from them if they don't "fix" North Korea?
The Chinese don't control North Korea, can't "fix" them and can't force them to do anything they don't want to do.
Why would the Chinese want to invade North Korea? They don't need to exercise control to avoid reunification talks, there's virtually zero prospect of any such talks under the current dispensation. The Chinese have no particular interest in changing the status quo anyway, and it's not likely that anything the US or "The West" says is going to change that.
“The whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by menacing it with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary”
H.L. Mencken
PRC & North Korea
Dayuhan posted this just:I am not so sure about that. I have a recollection that PRC was not very impressed with the flow, however small or not, of starving refugees across the border into Manchuria, where there was a Korean minority who felt kith & kin affinity required them to offer hospitality.The Chinese have no particular interest in changing the status quo anyway
Secondly, if North Korea continues to starve and has little to offer for foodstuffs, will fraternal relations change?
davidbfpo
There are several major factors that cloud/shape our thinking on North Korea. We really need to not discuss North Korea in terms of problem/solution until we have isolated and taken on each of those factors.
Some of those factors, IMO, are:
1. The obsolete basis for our state to state perspectives and relationships in North East Asia. Born of WWII, designed for the ideological phase of the Cold War in the dark days of Nationalist China falling to Mao, the war in Korea, etc in the tail end of the Truman administration, these things are out of date. We need to get out a clean slate in some back room and reframe the problems, interests, etc for the world we live in today. When one only makes iterative changes to old perspectives and plans one tends to carry over outdated concepts that corrupt the products that come from that approach.
2. Having a 4-star US Command in South Korea. Four Star Generals don't succeed by doing less or by reducing the assessment of the threats they face. We are probably 1-2 ranks over-grade in every single position in the military, so this is not just a Korea problem, but the senior US commander there should probably be a Major General. Yes, the rest of the commands in PACOM would need to adjust in similar fashion. (20 years ago TSOC commanders were Colonels, and we've had to grow those billets up to 2-stars just to have some degree of parity at the table. We'd be better served if we reduced all of the others by two grades instead.)
3. Our poor understanding of the nature of and the distinction between revolution and resistance. Our doctrine is a hot mess that is still far too weighted in the colonial experience of Western nations, with good doses of logic-corruption stirred in from our own containment and war on terrorism experiences. We don't have a good idea of how close the DPRK populace is to revolution because we don't have a good understanding of what factors contribute most to creating the coiled spring with in a populace for some event to unleash, nor do we have a good appreciation for how the populaces of DPRK actually feel about their situation or who they blame. (I suspect they blame other governments more than they blame their own). This brings us to Resistance. One can almost guarantee that any military effort to "liberate" or "stabilize" or "nation build" North Korea will be met with a determined resistance insurgency. One that will probably find sanctuary and support in the PRC. Any ideas about conducting those types of operations really need a reality check. But there is no such reality in our current doctrine.
4. Our fixation on WMD. This is a tough issue, but while I have no silver bullet answer, I do believe that our current fixation on and weighting of this issue is unhealthy to our overall national security. We need to rethink this. The only nation that the DPRK could destroy or defeat through the employment of nuclear weapons is their own. They know that. Same is true for Iran. Tough issue, but we need a smarter, more balanced perspective.
There are other issues as well, of course, but the beauty of each of these for the US is that these are all problems of our own creation, and therefore fully within our duty and authority to fix. We need to fix ourselves first, then go out and see what we can do to shape the actions of others. We tend to cling to outrageous positions, and then make equally outrageous demands of others to comply to us. That approach is wearing thin.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
#1 and #2 reasons there is no revolution in the DPRK:
Last edited by Bob's World; 09-01-2012 at 02:22 PM.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
Dayuhan, the Chinese see themselves as a thousands of year old superior civilization that's again on the rise and bound to become the centre of the world again that makes all other nations look bleak.
You underappreciate the weight of embarrassment in such a context.
Besides, of course they can "fix" North Korea. All it takes is will.
easier and better that China attempt to "fix" North Korea than the US.
Our most recent Defense Strategic Guidance says in effect, "no more massive, expensive COIN/nation building efforts like we just stumbled through in Iraq and Afghanistan" (paraphrase).
Any effort to go into a post-conflict DPRK and "fix" them would would likely trigger a far worse resistance insurgencies than we created and then attempted to resolve in those two afore mentioned locations. Far better we let China own that mission. I think we can live with China having greater influence in the DPRK than we can with what it would cost for us to attempt to force an American solution.
Robert C. Jones
Intellectus Supra Scientia
(Understanding is more important than Knowledge)
"The modern COIN mindset is when one arrogantly goes to some foreign land and attempts to make those who live there a lesser version of one's self. The FID mindset is when one humbly goes to some foreign land and seeks first to understand, and then to help in some small way for those who live there to be the best version of their own self." Colonel Robert C. Jones, US Army Special Forces (Retired)
That is one reason why the Chinese don't want to disrupt the status quo. Any such disruption would probably create violence and disorder, and generate a similar flow of refugees. I think the Chinese are smart and observant enough to know that while a decision to disrupt the status quo is easy, controlling the consequences of that disruption is often not so easy.
China's Korea policy has for decades been based on keeping the DPRK afloat and existing. That derives from the assumption that any likely scenario for a DPRK collapse would be chaotic and likely violent, would provoke a flood of refugees, and could lead to a unified Korea under the auspices of the ROK, an outcome China sees as unacceptable. Of course nobody can be sure that a DPRK collapse would lead to that outcome, but neither can anyone assure that it would not.
Paradoxically, the policy of keeping the DPRK afloat no matter what has given the DPRK leverage over China. In theory, China could force the DPRK to do what China wants by threatening to stop giving aid. In practice, the DPRK knows that the aid will keep coming, because the Chinese don't want the DPRK to collapse... so they can essentially go ahead and do what they please, knowing that China will carry on supporting them.
What makes you think that accusations or blame from the US embarrass the Chinese?
That's optimistic, to say the least. I'm not personally convinced that any nation can reliably expect to "fix" any other in any circumstances, and the degree of control that China has over North Korea is often wildly overrated.
Why would the Chinese want to do that? Why assume that anyone must, should, or will try to "fix" North Korea?
How did we get to the assumption of a "post-conflict DPRK"? What conflict are we talking about? Are we assuming a revolution? A war?
When things do fall apart, nobody knows how they will shake out, and nobody will be in any position to offer assurances about the post-conflict disposition. There are things not amenable to control.
“The whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to safety) by menacing it with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of them imaginary”
H.L. Mencken
What makes you think "we" is "US"?
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