How effective have Arab armies been at 'small wars'?
Carl in part asked:Carl,So I got a question for all but especially JCustis, how effective have Arab armies been at fighting small wars and suppressing insurgencies over the years?
A number of Arab armies have fought small wars / insurgencies since the 1960's and several have participated in UN peacekeeping, such as the Egyptians in Sarajevo and the Jordanians in Eastern Slavonia. I have not checked, but Wikipedia will have entries on each campaign and army; some are also covered in SWC threads. Not to overlook the volumes by Dr Anthony Cordesman on the arab armies, although I've not seen one of late.
Going from west to east and excluding a number of armies, e.g. Kuwait:
Morocco - long campaign against Polisario over Western Sahara, after the Spanish left; finally achieved a stalemate by building a fortified desert barrier hundreds of miles long. That conflict is not over, but with a ceasefire IIRC. Long ago their army was highly respected when serving with the UN, although most of the commentary was from French sources.
Algeria - a long, brutal COIN campaign, which bubbles along today and rightly their performance is suppression first. It is odd after the brutalities of the anti-French struggle within two decades the state resorted to a 'dirty war'.
Tunisia - at one time a regular UN contributor and rarely used internally.
Libya - during the Gadafy era over-armed and poorly trained. As proved in the Azou Strip (?) border clash with Chad and its French ally (one of the first publicised wars with "technicals") and then their intervention in Libya. If there was a professional cadre I doubt it is involved today, Libya becoming a militia-first state.
Egypt - fought its own "small war" in the Yemeni civil war in the early 1960's, very similar to the early Soviet campaign in Afghanistan; reliant on air power and allegations of CW use. Royalists supported by the UK privately and Saudi Arabia. A largely conventional army with repeated bruising encounters with the IDF, although partly redeemed in the 1973 Yom Kippur war. I don't recall much internal use, Egypt relied on its police and security agencies. Played no role in the Libyan revolt.
Jordan - bruised in wars with Israel and in 'Black September' confronted and defeated the PLO - whose Syrian ally made threats to intervene. Little internal use, relying on its pervasive security agencies. Was a regular UN contributor.
Syria - harsh, brutal suppression of Muslim Brotherhood in Homs (1982?), but very little internal use. Again security agencies to the fore. Decades of involvement in the Lebanon, with shifting alliances and practiced urban fighting regularly - some say marred by corruption and more. There are many comments on the main Syria thread.
Lebanon - a small army with a delicate communal balance having once been Christian-dominated, still has problems of loyalty and effectiveness - which appear to have reduced recently. A history though of ineffectiveness reflecting politics, notably in the south (alongside the UN).
Iraq - far more aware SWC audience, so over to you.
Saudi Arabia - the small army is designed for external defence, with the National Guard (SANG) having internal primacy alongside the police and security agencies. IIRC not exactly a stellar performance in the First Gulf War, despite all the $ spent on kit and training. Rarely deployed externally, including the UN.
UAE - supposedly the new Arab "Prussians", although hamstrung by dependence on non-national recruitment. Its SF have a tiny team in Afghanistan and they were reportedly active in Libya, in larger numbers - alongside other SF.
Oman - a small army, with historical experience of COIN in the Dhofar rebellion, now many years ago and no reported internal deployment since then. I don't recall any UN participation (excl. observers).
From a broader perspective most Arab armies are strictly controlled by the government / royal family, despite assumptions of loyalty they remain a potential threat - as Egypt vividly illustrates. Hence the apparent general preference for using the police and security agencies to repress opposition, with preemption first, and the occasional emergency use of the army. 'Black September' is a good case study, the PLO had been present in Jordan since 1947, more so after 1967 and became a "state within a state". Only after many years was the PLO violently ejected, to the Lebanon and later to Tunisia - another story!
From limited knowledge most Arab armies have not fought full-stop. Only a few have genuine 'small wars' let alone COIN experience.
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