Arab armies in 'Small Wars' and the 'Arab Spring' (merged thread)

[davidbfpo]

A fascinating review by Colonel Norvell B. DeAtkine, a ret'd US Army officer, a SME on the Arab military; the full title being 'Western Influence on Arab Militaries: Pounding Square Pegs into Round Holes', that appeared on an Israeli website today:http://www.gloria-center.org/2013/03...o-round-holes/

The introduction:

This article is a personal account of U.S. Army Colonel Norvell DeAtkine’s experience in dealing with Arab militaries for over 40 years. Based on observation and study of Arab military establishments, he concludes little of significance has happened to change the deeply embedded character of the Arab military mindset. While there is some evidence that Arab soldiers historically performed better under European officers, there is no evidence that the Western tradition of command ethos outlived the departure of the officers. There is indeed a distinct Arab military tradition and attempts to recreate it in one’s image are not only fruitless, but often counter-productive.

It is in part an update on his 1999 article 'Why Arabs Lose Wars' and much has changed since then - in the Middle East and for outsiders, notably the USA.

Sub-headings are:

THE ARAB AS UNCONVENTIONAL FIGHTER, CONTINUITY IN THE ARAB MILITARY CULTURE, THE RAPID EVAPORATION OF WESTERN INFLUENCE, PERSONAL OBSERVATIONS ON THE EGYPTIAN ARMY, THE IRAQI ARMY EXPERIENCE, WESTERN VERSUS RUSSIAN TRAINING AND LOGISTICS SYSTEMS, THE SAUDI EXPERIENCE and CONCLUSION.

Having read a British Army Review article on the UK Mission to the Saudi Arabian Army, this article provides a good counter-balance (the BAR article is not in the public domain, let alone on-line).

The footnotes have some other gems, especially an US Army Arab-American's comments.

[davidbfpo]

A special issue of the Journal of Strategic Studies on The Role of the Military in the Arab Tumult, with free access to The Egyptian Army and Egypt's ‘Spring’ by Hillel Frisch; Abandoned at the Palace: Why the Tunisian Military Defected from the Ben Ali Regime in January 2011 by Risa Brooks and The Military Role in Yemen's Protests: Civil-Military Relations in the Tribal Republic by Michael Knights:http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/fjss2...t#.UZOHwCt35uI

[slapout9]

Link to New Yorker article on Topless Jihad and the Arab Spring and Cyber-Warfare! This John Boyd to a tee as he recomended attacking the enemies ethics! The American military is really going to look bad when a bunch of topless girls with computers and facebook pages bring down the Jihad movement
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blog...ntcid=obinsite

[davidbfpo]

There is a good short review of the Algerian military's response to the Arab Spring by Michael Willis, alas behind the FP registration / pay wall. Then I found this alternative 'Algeria Three Years After the Arab Spring' by the German Marshall Fund of the US and the second chapter is worth reading.

Link:http://www.gmfus.org/wp-content/blog..._Jan14_web.pdf

[CrowBat]

A very interesting file, no doubt. Still, I can't but criticise the description of how the Algerian authorities and military handled the In Amenas affair.

While spending plenty of time with description of BelkMoktar's intentions, this account provides absolutely no details about his planning, nor about how much he managed to realize (or not at all). Considering that Algerian authorities actually have no problem to provide such info, that one of USN's EP-3s from Sigonella was nearby, and that an FBI team inspected the site once this affair was over - this is quite surprising.

Namely, BelMoktar wanted to capture a bus full of foreign workers as hostages (including the Boss of the BP), destroy a part of the industrial complex - which, BTW, is some 100 square kilometres in size - in order to attract attention of security services and fire-fighters, and then, once the military and fire-fighters would enter the complex, blow up the entire complex in order to cause a maximum of destruction of casualties.

The first part of the plan was spoiled by Gendarmes that escorted the bus. They identified attackers on time and opened fire. Sure, and sadly, two passengers (one Briton and one Algerian) were killed by Jihadists (and two Gendarmes injured too), but BelMoktar didn't manage to capture the bus and had to rush into the complex with empty hands.

The guards at the main (and only) gate recognized what is going on and sounded alert; control centre shut down the entire production, and started evacuation. Means, part 2 of the plan was spoiled too.

Now, the Jihadists killed the guard who sounded alert and managed to enter the place and started planting bombs around the complex. They also managed to capture a number of foreign and Algerian workers. However, by that time no less but 600 Algerians and 134 foreigners (out of some 800 employees) were evacuated. Means: the third part of the plan was spoiled too.

It was only then that BelMoktar began babbling about French ops in Mali and Algerian support for the same - and he did so while trying to open negotiations with Algerian authorities.

This is making it instantly clear that the story about the authorities not negotiating with BelMoktar being a hogwash. They did. Otherwise, the Jihadists wouldn't get a number of 4x4 vehicles from authorities, the following night, and wouldn't be able to load these with hostages and try to escape.

The security services went into action when that column drove out of the complex - and then because they realized that the cars in question contained only a part of Jihadists and their hostages: this made it obvious that those remaining inside the complex have decided to blow themselves and their hostages up. And in such cases, ladies and gentlemen, there is simply no other solution but 'assault the place'. That was when Mi-24s became involved. They set two vehicles on fire, while the third was detonated by one of occupants and set on fire. This is where most of hostages were killed.

Meanwhile, the Jihadists that remained inside the complex have started to liquidate hostages. However, Beech 1900s have blocked most of explosive vests the Jihadists installed on hostages, and thus only one of these was killed.

In summary, the Algerians killed 32 Jihadists, and captured four or five alive (not only 3; although this might be a figure released by the authorities 'for public consumption'). About 40 hostages were killed too (including Algerian workers, not only foreigners). Eight ANP troops were WIA. BelMoktar's gang has left behind a significant arsenal, including two mortars, at least two RPG-7 launchers, several dozens of mines, about two dozens of machine guns, over 50 hand grenades etc.

[davidbfpo]

I have just merged the two threads Arab Armies and the Arab Spring, with 12,307 views; and How effective have Arab Armies been at Small Wars? with 15,911 views.

The thread has been renamed accordingly.

Since 2014 commentary on Arab Armies appear in many threads, notably on the conflicts in Iraq, Syria and the Yemen.

[davidbfpo]

A new book from Hurst & Co (London) entitled 'Guardians of the Arab State: When Militaries Intervene in Politics, from Iraq to Mauritania' by Florence Gaub.

From the publishers email notice:

Guardians of the Arab State explains clearly and concisely how and why military organisations become involved in politics across the Middle East and North Africa, identifying four key factors: a high degree of organisational capacity, clear institutional interest, a forgiving population and weak civilian control.

Looking at numerous case studies ranging from Iraq to Mauritania, the book finds that these factors are common to all Arab countries to have experienced coups in the last century. It also finds that the opposite is true in cases like Jordan, where strong civilian control and the absence of capacity, interest, or a positive public image made coup attempts futile. Gaub convincingly argues that the reasons are structural rather than cultural, thereby proving a counter-narrative to conventional explanations which look at Arab coups along religious or historical lines.

In essence, the questions addressed in this groundbreaking book lead back to issues of weak statehood, legitimacy, and resource constraints — all problems the Arab world has struggled with since independence. It picks up where previous literature on Middle Eastern military forces dropped the debate, and provides an updated and insightful glimpse into the soul of Arab armies.

Link:http://us2.campaign-archive2.com/?u=...6&e=80d42c7c0a

It is not for me, too many books await reading. If you register there is free global P&P. No, I am not on a commission.