Quote Originally Posted by Steve Blair View Post
Earl Tilford's book is one of the most insightful I've seen regarding both the AF's role in Vietnam and its operational culture (along with The 11 Days of Christmas, although it is focused on Linebacker and LB II). I'm usually pointing our cadets in its direction so they can get a different view on the AF in Vietnam, as the MAS syllabus tends to trot out the "company line." And since it's a free pdf download from the AU I'm hoping at least a couple of them will eventually read it.
Mark Clodfelter also does a very good job examining the air war in Vietnam. He makes one of the best points to counter the critics of the early air war -- the argument that it was too restrained, particularly the interdiction piece -- by pointing out that there simply were not enough targets. The predominant force in the early years was the VC/NLF, and they managed to fight on 35 tons of supplies per day. That translates into 7 deuce and a half trucks -- but probably more like a couple of hundred bicycles -- and such targets are not well-suited to air delivered ordnance, or interdiction of any sort.

This also explains why the air war was more successful under Nixon -- the decimation of the VC/NLF after Tet means more is coming from the North, and they are shifting to a more conventional form of war -- plus, Nixon is dealing with China, so the latter's support to the North is waning a bit. (At the other end, the early campaigns against the North _help_ that regime -- helps them to get assistance from the Soviets and the Chinese -- NVN GDP rises during Rolling Thunder.)

He also argues that the AF would not have conducted the air campaign much differently if it had been in charge.