What Are You Currently Reading? 2007

[Sargent]

Earl Tilford's book is one of the most insightful I've seen regarding both the AF's role in Vietnam and its operational culture (along with The 11 Days of Christmas, although it is focused on Linebacker and LB II). I'm usually pointing our cadets in its direction so they can get a different view on the AF in Vietnam, as the MAS syllabus tends to trot out the "company line." And since it's a free pdf download from the AU I'm hoping at least a couple of them will eventually read it.

Mark Clodfelter also does a very good job examining the air war in Vietnam. He makes one of the best points to counter the critics of the early air war -- the argument that it was too restrained, particularly the interdiction piece -- by pointing out that there simply were not enough targets. The predominant force in the early years was the VC/NLF, and they managed to fight on 35 tons of supplies per day. That translates into 7 deuce and a half trucks -- but probably more like a couple of hundred bicycles -- and such targets are not well-suited to air delivered ordnance, or interdiction of any sort.

This also explains why the air war was more successful under Nixon -- the decimation of the VC/NLF after Tet means more is coming from the North, and they are shifting to a more conventional form of war -- plus, Nixon is dealing with China, so the latter's support to the North is waning a bit. (At the other end, the early campaigns against the North _help_ that regime -- helps them to get assistance from the Soviets and the Chinese -- NVN GDP rises during Rolling Thunder.)

He also argues that the AF would not have conducted the air campaign much differently if it had been in charge.

[SteveMetz]

The Marines seem to have a similar philosophy, and the Navy at least lets them ramble in the pages of Proceedings. Sadly, with the AF it's more a matter of "burn the heretics" than it is anything else. Or they let them write interesting papers for the Air University and then shuffle them away.

I took a course from Don Vandergiff last year. Very interesting guy. I just missed MacGregor when he had the Quarterhorse at Fort Riley, which is something I regret. He was seriously interested in the squadron's history and really pumped his troopers up with it.

Macgregor is an interesting cat. Utterly brilliant guy but I get the impression that he very quickly decides whether he considers someone he's met worth taking seriously. If not, it doesn't matter who they are. I remember an incident when he was a LTC (in uniform at the time) and he was in my office, pounding his fist on the desk yelling, "The Army Chief of Staff is an idiot!!" (An idea he was not alone in holding). Doug was my student at CGSC back in the day, and we've always gotten along fine.

[Ski]

Don is a good friend of mine, and I can't say enough about what he has helped with in my career. The Army should have made him a LTC at least for his work however.

I've only met MacGregor once, and I found him to be probably the smartest officer I've ever met, but with an ego that matches his intellect. I'd rather have 100 of these types of men than the opposite.

[Steve Blair]

Mark Clodfelter also does a very good job examining the air war in Vietnam. He makes one of the best points to counter the critics of the early air war -- the argument that it was too restrained, particularly the interdiction piece -- by pointing out that there simply were not enough targets. The predominant force in the early years was the VC/NLF, and they managed to fight on 35 tons of supplies per day. That translates into 7 deuce and a half trucks -- but probably more like a couple of hundred bicycles -- and such targets are not well-suited to air delivered ordnance, or interdiction of any sort.

This also explains why the air war was more successful under Nixon -- the decimation of the VC/NLF after Tet means more is coming from the North, and they are shifting to a more conventional form of war -- plus, Nixon is dealing with China, so the latter's support to the North is waning a bit. (At the other end, the early campaigns against the North _help_ that regime -- helps them to get assistance from the Soviets and the Chinese -- NVN GDP rises during Rolling Thunder.)

He also argues that the AF would not have conducted the air campaign much differently if it had been in charge.

Yeah, I've read Clodfelter as well. Both had good points, although I really enjoyed Tilford's tales about the AF and truck-busting.

Nixon also had the advantage of being able to target large conventional forces (Linebacker and the whole Easter Offensive). Once the PAVN decided to come across the borders with heavy conventional forces they played right into the hands of the airpower guys. Nixon also benefited from political conditions that helped cut certain supplies to the North (like SA-3s).

In terms of stuff coming from the North, I believe it was Tilford who suggested (though I've seen this in other place as well) that the interdiction effort actually hurt itself because it forced the Vietnamese to break the Ho Chi Minh Trail down into smaller and smaller pieces. NVA divisions (until the conventional Easter Offensive) still required a very small amount of supplies, and those smaller trails could handle the bikes, coolies, and trucks that kept the divisions going. More trails equaled less concentration, more possible hiding places, and huge targeting problems for the AF. One road with five trucks is easier to target than ten roads with five trucks.

[T. Jefferson]

I should have listed Fred's book in my queue as well. I wrote a letter to the editor of the Weekly Standard about Fred's most recent Iraq essay for them. I hope they run it next issue. Here's what it said,

I've just read Frederick Kagan's "The New Old Thing" in the June 11 issue. While I normally agree with Fred on most things, I take issue with his argument that the Abizaid-Casey strategy which focused on training Iraqi forces "failed" and the current approach of using American forces to protect Iraqi civilians is better. I base this on the history of insurgency over the past fifty years. In almost every instance where insurgents succeeded, the immediate precipitant was not violence against civilians, but a collapse of will on the part of local security forces. The key is not whether Iraqi security forces can themselves substitute for American forces in short term, but that they retain their morale, and coherence. That should be our primary goal over the next few years. Perhaps the Abizaid-Casey strategy was not the best way to assure that. If so, we should adjust our efforts to bolster the Iraqi security forces, not abandon them.

I certainly agree that we ought not to abandon Iraqi security forces in general. The main question seems to be where and how to utilize our limited resources both military and political. Seems to me that only have a very small window left in which to effect many desperately needed changes.

[Ironhorse]

I recently read John Stewart's (et al) America.

T. Jefferson, great work on the forward. That was sheer & epic genius. That and the paragraph summarizing the working of Congress were Pullitzer material.

[Abu Buckwheat]

Now that I finished my book on Iraq I am taking a look at some others ... I am almost finished Assassin's Gate ... I ran across this guy and the charachters in that book so many times its like reading my own Iraq bio! Excellent book in my very biased estimation.

[SteveMetz]

Now that I finished my book on Iraq I am taking a look at some others ... I am almost finished Assassin's Gate ... I ran across this guy and the charachters in that book so many times its like reading my own Iraq bio! Excellent book in my very biased estimation.

How about come over here and finish *my* Iraq book then! I've got 300 pages and am waiting to hear if Potomac Press wants to sign it.

I sat next to Packer at the Chilis in Leavenworth during the famous February 2006 meeting to vet 3-24. Brilliant guy. I loved his piece on Kilcullen in last December 18th New Yorker. And I even made brownie points with my teenager who was impressed that I had dinner with someone who had been on the Daily Show a few weeks earlier.

If you haven't read it, I think Ron Suskind's The One Percent Doctrine is one of the most important books to come out over the past few years.

[Abu Buckwheat]

How about come over here and finish *my* Iraq book then! I've got 300 pages and am waiting to hear if Potomac Press wants to sign it.

Good luck with Potomac. I got told that no one wanted to read a book on the insurgents... by nine publishers over two years. Said Iraq was unmarketable and not likely to last as a political subject! However they all wanted a personal narrative story of my time in the Palace!

I loved the sourcing in the One Percent Doctrine but hated his writing ... terrible prose.

[Sargent]

The Knight book you have in the list is very good, if you haven't read it before. The Frontier Army's one of my big research "things," so I've read it more than a couple of times now.

Current reading?
After Tet by Spector (re-read)
A series of SAMS monographs on cavalry in the UA, MOOTW, and so on (for a paper)
Low Level Hell by Mills (for the same paper - this is a re-read)
Setup by Tilford (for an article project - also a re-read)
Chasin Ghosts by Tierney (about 3/4 of the way through and not impressed)
waiting in the wings:
Taking Haiti by Renda
Masters of Death by Rhodes

I zorched through the Knight book early in my research, to get the lay of the land, and am now going through it in detail for use in the diss. Of course, I think Coffman's Old Army is great for this period as well. The chapter on the families in the post-Civil War period is a hidden treasure. I think most probably skip it -- who wants to read about the families? -- but I could swear that Coffman suggests that Libbie Custer and Bill Hickock had an affair -- she certainly seemed to know how to have a good time. Greene's Ladies and Officers of the US Army (or Army Aristocracy) is another good one, though he is in an obvious snit about all of the partying, and is very critical of any wife who is not on her best behavior.

I have a memory of reading Mills, for my MA thesis, but I read so many VN memoirs I could just be making it up. What is the paper?

Cheers,
Jill

[SteveMetz]

Good luck with Potomac. I got told that no one wanted to read a book on the insurgents... by nine publishers over two years. Said Iraq was unmarketable and not likely to last as a political subject! However they all wanted a personal narrative story of my time in the Palace!

I loved the sourcing in the One Percent Doctrine but hated his writing ... terrible prose.

The project Potomac is looking at isn't really about the insurgency per se. It's called Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy and looks at the way we used our conflict with Iraq as a lesson and a model from at least 1991 on. In other words, it first drove RMA thinking and transformation in the Cebrowski/Owens mode, then drove a revised version of transformation that we're in the midst of today.

My Learning From Iraq will be one chapter.

[jonSlack]

Since March I have managed to find time to read "God's Terrorists" by Charles Allen, a biography on Orde Wingate titled "Fire in the Night", "Banker to the Poor" by Muhammad Yunus, a biography of Mike Calvert titled "Mad Mike," Farwell's "Mr. Kipling's Army," and Chuck Palahniuk's "Survivor." I also read a smattering of articles and essays from various authors from sources such as Foreign Policy and The Atlantic to include Huntington's "Clash of Civilizations" essay from Foreign Affairs and Fukayama's essay "The End of History."

Right now I am taking a break from military history and working my way through Lord of the Rings for the first time. I should finish the Two Towers today or tomorrow and then move right along into the Return of the King. Next is either going to be Charles Allen's "Soldier Sahibs" or "Brave New War" if it finally gets here.

I highly recommend both "God's Terrorists" and "Fire in the Night." "God's Terrorists" centers on the origins, development, and history of militant Sunni Islam in the Indian subcontinent and the development of Wahabism in Saudi Arabia and its spread and impact on the Indian subcontinent and the rest of the world. The book ends in modern times with the rise of the Taliban and AQ in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

As mentioned above, "Fire in the Night" is a biography of Orde Wingate. It chronicles his entire life but specifically centers on his service in Palestine, Ethopia, and finally Burma. While his service and accomplishments in those three theaters were very interesting and remarkable. However, also interesting are the authors' coverage of Wingate as an individual including his eccentricities, some of which made me laugh out loud a number of times and also lead me wonder how an officer like Wingate would fare in the US Army today. One especially humorous, but not atypical, incident involved Wingate's packing list on a reconnaissance flight of Italian controlled Ethopia which consisted of nothing but "a large piece of cheese, an onion, and an old-fashioned alarm clock with a bell and carrying handle." Following the completion of the recon, when asked why he carried the alarm clock, Wingate responded by announcing "Because wrist watches are no damned good - they never work."

[Steve Blair]

I have a memory of reading Mills, for my MA thesis, but I read so many VN memoirs I could just be making it up. What is the paper?

Cheers,
Jill

Working on an idea for using cavalry as a reaction force for UW efforts. It's something I've been kicking around for a while, and the class gives me a nice excuse.

[SteveMetz]

Working on an idea for using cavalry as a reaction force for UW efforts. It's something I've been kicking around for a while, and the class gives me a nice excuse.

Horse cavalry? (I suspect Huba wass de Czege would love that!).

If so, I remember that the original Small Wars manual does offer some useful advice on how to pack a mule.

[John T. Fishel]

From my vantage point here on Rancho La Espada I can argue that horses DO provide some real advantages in terms of mobility - especially in insurgent warfare. BTW, both the Small Wars Manual and Callwell's Small Wars discuss the use of horses and mules.

During the El Salvador war, one of the major problems faced by the ESAF was pursuit of guerrila units. The standard G tactic was to drop anti-personnel mines on the trail to discourage direct pursuit from getting too close. Indeed, most ESAF casualties were caused by mines. One obvious solution was increased use of helicopters but the US was not going to supply more helos in the significant numbers required.

Meanwhile, in the Small Wars Operations Research Directorate (SWORD) we had a countermine program going with the ESAF. It involved a combination of off the shelf metal detectors, blast chaps and booties from Natick labs, and a c-m training program. I tried to sell my boss on using horses to substitute for the helos that were never going to come. One cultural problem was that the ESAF cavalry (like most horsemen) really loved their horses and such a program would put them at risk. So, I proposed calling these folk "Mounted Infantry" and mounting them on cheap little horses that could be had for about $150 each. My idea was a mounted pursuit platoon with a remuda of 5 horses per rider. The point man would be equipped with the blast chaps and booties. His horse would trigger the mine - the animal would be destroyed but the rider would be safe - and a second equally equipped rider would take point. The first guy would mount a new horse and follow on. Meanwhile, there would be no slowing of the pursuit.

Needless to say, I failed to convince my boss but it was still a good idea.

BTW, SF has used horses both in Afghanistan and, more importantly, in JTF 6 on the border with Mexico in the "Drug War."

[Steve Blair]

Horse cavalry? (I suspect Huba wass de Czege would love that!).

If so, I remember that the original Small Wars manual does offer some useful advice on how to pack a mule.

Not so much horse (although I'm not opposed to that at all). I'm looking at the Vietnam-era division cavalry squadron as the framework. That said, I'm sure that horse mounted elements could be worked in, and they certainly have a role to play in some situations.

[SteveMetz]

From my vantage point here on Rancho La Espada I can argue that horses DO provide some real advantages in terms of mobility - especially in insurgent warfare. BTW, both the Small Wars Manual and Callwell's Small Wars discuss the use of horses and mules.

During the El Salvador war, one of the major problems faced by the ESAF was pursuit of guerrila units. The standard G tactic was to drop anti-personnel mines on the trail to discourage direct pursuit from getting too close. Indeed, most ESAF casualties were caused by mines. One obvious solution was increased use of helicopters but the US was not going to supply more helos in the significant numbers required.

Meanwhile, in the Small Wars Operations Research Directorate (SWORD) we had a countermine program going with the ESAF. It involved a combination of off the shelf metal detectors, blast chaps and booties from Natick labs, and a c-m training program. I tried to sell my boss on using horses to substitute for the helos that were never going to come. One cultural problem was that the ESAF cavalry (like most horsemen) really loved their horses and such a program would put them at risk. So, I proposed calling these folk "Mounted Infantry" and mounting them on cheap little horses that could be had for about $150 each. My idea was a mounted pursuit platoon with a remuda of 5 horses per rider. The point man would be equipped with the blast chaps and booties. His horse would trigger the mine - the animal would be destroyed but the rider would be safe - and a second equally equipped rider would take point. The first guy would mount a new horse and follow on. Meanwhile, there would be no slowing of the pursuit.

Needless to say, I failed to convince my boss but it was still a good idea.

BTW, SF has used horses both in Afghanistan and, more importantly, in JTF 6 on the border with Mexico in the "Drug War."

I hope PETA doesn't monitor this board. You're going to end up with a bunch of unshaven protesters outside Rancho La Espada. Of course, the idea is not without precedent. The Navy used to train dolphins to blow up underwater mines. But I think it gave up because it was so hard to convince the dolphins to wear that white silk headband before a mission.

[Tom Odom]

How about come over here and finish *my* Iraq book then! I've got 300 pages and am waiting to hear if Potomac Press wants to sign it.

I sat next to Packer at the Chilis in Leavenworth during the famous February 2006 meeting to vet 3-24. Brilliant guy. I loved his piece on Kilcullen in last December 18th New Yorker. And I even made brownie points with my teenager who was impressed that I had dinner with someone who had been on the Daily Show a few weeks earlier.

If you haven't read it, I think Ron Suskind's The One Percent Doctrine is one of the most important books to come out over the past few years.

I really enjoyed Packer's insights on the evolution of the neo-cons and their rise to influence. Pages 30-31 are especially interesting.

His writings on Chalabi are on the mark; funny that we dismissed pretty much out of hand in the early 90s reports sourced to the "Iraqi resistance". Packer's book does much to explain how that all changed.

Tom

[Granite_State]

Working on an idea for using cavalry as a reaction force for UW efforts. It's something I've been kicking around for a while, and the class gives me a nice excuse.

Can you throw a post up when this gets published and is available on the internet? My PhD stuff covers similar territory, about eighty years back though, and I'd love to read it.

[Steve Blair]

It's for a class, so it might not make it to the internet (at least not initially...if it's solid enough I'll look at shopping it out). But I'd be happy to send you a copy once it's over and done with.