Butch Tilford will be ecstatic to know he still has readers. He teaches history at Grove City College now.Originally Posted by Steve Blair
Butch Tilford will be ecstatic to know he still has readers. He teaches history at Grove City College now.
Earl Tilford's book is one of the most insightful I've seen regarding both the AF's role in Vietnam and its operational culture (along with The 11 Days of Christmas, although it is focused on Linebacker and LB II). I'm usually pointing our cadets in its direction so they can get a different view on the AF in Vietnam, as the MAS syllabus tends to trot out the "company line." And since it's a free pdf download from the AU I'm hoping at least a couple of them will eventually read it.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
In my opinion the Air Force is the service least tolerant of deviation from the company line. Butch retired as a major, in part because he was an iconoclast.
I would agree with that opinion. Been pondering an article or something along those lines for some time now. And they do themselves no favors with that attitude.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
You're probably familiar with it but the classic work on service cultures was Carl Builder's The Masks of War.
Having spent most of the career working for the Army, I've always liked the fact that it tolerates loyal iconoclasts (even though it doesn't promote them to flag rank). Krepinevich, MacGregor, McMaster, and Vandergrift come to mind. I was worried that under GEN Shinseki, the attitude seemed to be spreading that the Air Force routinely trounced the Army in budget battles because it "spoke with one voice." So the Army appeared to be moving in that direction. Luckily it was a passing fad.
The Marines seem to have a similar philosophy, and the Navy at least lets them ramble in the pages of Proceedings. Sadly, with the AF it's more a matter of "burn the heretics" than it is anything else. Or they let them write interesting papers for the Air University and then shuffle them away.
I took a course from Don Vandergiff last year. Very interesting guy. I just missed MacGregor when he had the Quarterhorse at Fort Riley, which is something I regret. He was seriously interested in the squadron's history and really pumped his troopers up with it.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Macgregor is an interesting cat. Utterly brilliant guy but I get the impression that he very quickly decides whether he considers someone he's met worth taking seriously. If not, it doesn't matter who they are. I remember an incident when he was a LTC (in uniform at the time) and he was in my office, pounding his fist on the desk yelling, "The Army Chief of Staff is an idiot!!" (An idea he was not alone in holding). Doug was my student at CGSC back in the day, and we've always gotten along fine.The Marines seem to have a similar philosophy, and the Navy at least lets them ramble in the pages of Proceedings. Sadly, with the AF it's more a matter of "burn the heretics" than it is anything else. Or they let them write interesting papers for the Air University and then shuffle them away.
I took a course from Don Vandergiff last year. Very interesting guy. I just missed MacGregor when he had the Quarterhorse at Fort Riley, which is something I regret. He was seriously interested in the squadron's history and really pumped his troopers up with it.
More on VN Air War
Mark Clodfelter also does a very good job examining the air war in Vietnam. He makes one of the best points to counter the critics of the early air war -- the argument that it was too restrained, particularly the interdiction piece -- by pointing out that there simply were not enough targets. The predominant force in the early years was the VC/NLF, and they managed to fight on 35 tons of supplies per day. That translates into 7 deuce and a half trucks -- but probably more like a couple of hundred bicycles -- and such targets are not well-suited to air delivered ordnance, or interdiction of any sort.
This also explains why the air war was more successful under Nixon -- the decimation of the VC/NLF after Tet means more is coming from the North, and they are shifting to a more conventional form of war -- plus, Nixon is dealing with China, so the latter's support to the North is waning a bit. (At the other end, the early campaigns against the North _help_ that regime -- helps them to get assistance from the Soviets and the Chinese -- NVN GDP rises during Rolling Thunder.)
He also argues that the AF would not have conducted the air campaign much differently if it had been in charge.
Yeah, I've read Clodfelter as well. Both had good points, although I really enjoyed Tilford's tales about the AF and truck-busting.
Nixon also had the advantage of being able to target large conventional forces (Linebacker and the whole Easter Offensive). Once the PAVN decided to come across the borders with heavy conventional forces they played right into the hands of the airpower guys. Nixon also benefited from political conditions that helped cut certain supplies to the North (like SA-3s).
In terms of stuff coming from the North, I believe it was Tilford who suggested (though I've seen this in other place as well) that the interdiction effort actually hurt itself because it forced the Vietnamese to break the Ho Chi Minh Trail down into smaller and smaller pieces. NVA divisions (until the conventional Easter Offensive) still required a very small amount of supplies, and those smaller trails could handle the bikes, coolies, and trucks that kept the divisions going. More trails equaled less concentration, more possible hiding places, and huge targeting problems for the AF. One road with five trucks is easier to target than ten roads with five trucks.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
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