Special Operations and Strategy by James D. Kiras and To Dare To Conquer by Derek Leebaert. Bought both after Wilf recommended them. The former concentrates on WW II through today, the latter purports to cover 'from Achilles to Al Qaeda.'

Both books essentially make the same two principal points; (1) At the operational and strategic levels, most 'special operations' do not succeed in producing major effects; and (2) many special operations that do achieve success are not performed by special operations forces but rather by 'conventional' units -- or even worse...

Both also make the valid points that hasty wartime expansion of SOF historically entails lowering standards often creating more problems than are solved and that, regardless of the historical lack of coup de main success, such forces are very important today and should be encouraged to be innovative and flexible (and that, in the west, they are generally not...). Both also make the point that direct action is probably over rated as a tactic and that coordination or operating with conventional forces are problematic.

Of the two, I believe the Kiras book to be far superior; Professor Leebaert possesses considerable knowledge but he tends to share only part of it; for but one of many examples, he apparently refers to Paddy Mayne but doesn't bother to give him a name. He also has the, to me, disconcerting habit of frequently trying to compare historical events (from Drake's round the world voyage as one instance) to current actions while interjecting political commentary. In short, he teaches International Relations and not strategy, military subjects or history -- and it shows. That specialization does allow him to note the mutual antipathy between SO and conventional forces has been around for centuries.

Both are good reads but I'd recommend "Special Operations and Strategy" as the better single choice. It's concise, well done and accurate.