What Are You Currently Reading? 2009

[davidbfpo]

No doubt because they wanted to get back to fighting "real" wars.

I am not a military historian but after 1815 (Battle of Waterloo mainly) the British Army (which then did not include the Imperial Indian Army) did not fight a "real" war till the Crimean War 1853-56, which was in alliance with France, Turkey and part of Italy. Then there was a long gap till 1914. Post-1945 there has only been one year when the Britsih Army was not on active operations.

Just a point.

davidbfpo

[Tom Odom]

I am not a military historian but after 1815 (Battle of Waterloo mainly) the British Army (which then did not include the Imperial Indian Army) did not fight a "real" war till the Crimean War 1853-56, which was in alliance with France, Turkey and part of Italy. Then there was a long gap till 1914. Post-1945 there has only been one year when the Britsih Army was not on active operations.

Just a point.

davidbfpo

Understand. Point was that many armies discount or completely ignore relevant experience until someone else remainds them none too gently. No issues with the long stretch of colonial brush wars with one exception. The 2nd Boer had many of the elements of the Great War to come.

As a historian and a lessons learned guy, I have come to believe that militaries don't really learn until blood is spilled. A lesson not paid for is not a lesson--it's that "history stuff". I actually had that one tossed at me by a flag officer several years ago regarding convoys and convoy security TTPs.

That is why--and I know Wilf will appreciate this one--it is inevitable and often necessary to cloak the old in the new so folks will listen.

Best
Tom

[Rifleman]

What about the Boer War did the British not consider a "real" war? They were certainly on the receiving end of some "real" marksmanship!

Off topic, but pity the U.S. didn't adopt the 7x57 Mauser. It would have been a far better choice than the .30-40 Krag and, I hate to admit it, the .30-06 Springfield too.

[wm]

As a historian and a lessons learned guy, I have come to believe that militaries don't really learn until blood is spilled. A lesson not paid for is not a lesson--it's that "history stuff". I actually had that one tossed at me by a flag officer several years ago regarding convoys and convoy security TTPs.

That is why--and I know Wilf will appreciate this one--it is inevitable and often necessary to cloak the old in the new so folks will listen.

Best
Tom

I think that a lot of lessons are learned and carried forward, but it is a cult of personality thing. For example, Sir Garnet Wlsey had his ring, which was able to apply lessons learneduntil its members died, passed out of service, or passed out of favor (as happened to Redvers Buller in that second--or maybe third if you count the Zulu War--"small war" in South Africa). The US Army has had its "rings" as well. I'm sure we could all recount and reminsice about those "rings" at our leisure. The point is that I think Armies (and hierarchical organizations in general) tend to apply only those things that the current leadership values. The German Army learned what to avoid from WWI in the interwar years, but, after France 1940, I submit quickly "forgot" those important lessons when the Fuhrer through the OKW marginalized von Brauchitsch and the OKH to put his personal leadership stamp on the conduct of the ground war.

[tequila]

What about the Boer War did the British not consider a "real" war? They were certainly on the receiving end of some "real" marksmanship!

A similar tendency would be the opinion of many U.S. Army and Marine officers that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan do not count as "real war", despite the fact that the two combined undoubtedly stretched U.S. ground forces near the breaking point.

[Ken White]

...the two combined undoubtedly stretched U.S. ground forces near the breaking point.

that the stretching occurred over a long period to a small US Force as opposed to a 'real war' shooting past the breaking point of elements of a larger force in a very short period of time.

It's all about intensity. To discount the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as not 'real wars' is foolish and incorrect and in some cases is stupid as its predicated on the fact the opponent is not 'first class' -- that's stupid because they can kill you just as dead as can a better trained and equipped foe...

To say neither war is high intensity combat against a peer or near peer competitor is true and is saying a quite different thing. One Corps or even one Division taking the KIA toll for Afghanistan from 2001 to date in one day is a whole different kind of war; the Bulge in Europe, 1944-45 saw over 16K KIA in a little over a month. Not long after that, Iwo Jima saw over 6K KIA in about the same amount of time.

[Tom Odom]

What about the Boer War did the British not consider a "real" war? They were certainly on the receiving end of some "real" marksmanship!

Off topic, but pity the U.S. didn't adopt the 7x57 Mauser. It would have been a far better choice than the .30-40 Krag and, I hate to admit it, the .30-06 Springfield too.

Look at the first year and a half of the war and you will see. The commanders considered the Boers illterate peasants--peasants yes, illiterate no--who would fold at the first whiff of gunpowder. Even Churchill who actually saw the threat felt compelled to point out the Brits were going to need twice as many troops. He was proved wrong. They started around 100K and Winnie said 200k. War ended with 400K.

Boers used superior rifles with absolute mastery of the ground--Spion Kop is a classic on the risks of occupying high but not the highest ground. They also fought from dug in positions that resisted artillery.

Other lesson was railroads are marvelous for supplies and disastrous for tactical flexibility. The Brits were tied to the rails and the Boers could raid at will. Breaking the cycle lead to population control at its worst: the concentration camp.

I like the 7x57; I have a CZ 550 full stock in that caliber. But I still prefer my 1903 in 30-06.

Tom

[William F. Owen]

That is why--and I know Wilf will appreciate this one--it is inevitable and often necessary to cloak the old in the new so folks will listen.

Sadly very true, and which is why Military Thought has really got to become the formalised study of the past to gain knowledge and skills to apply to the future.

We say we do it.... but we do not.

[karaka]

Peter Mansoor's "Baghdad at Sunrise" or Dexter Filkin's "The Forever War": which should I pick up next?

[Fuchs]

Sadly very true, and which is why Military Thought has really got to become the formalised study of the past to gain knowledge and skills to apply to the future.

We say we do it.... but we do not.

That's good for catching up to the benchmark - where we should already be, but aren't.

The world is nevertheless changing and it requires new balances and new ideas as well. The innovative thought is important to address that.
It's not enough to adopt old innovations, ideas and insights.

[patmc]

I have both on the shelf, but have only read Filkin's book so far. That said, it is a deep and emotional read. The book is stories and observations from his travels during The Long War. Some really exciting and sad stuff, definitely a must read.

Peter Mansoor's "Baghdad at Sunrise" or Dexter Filkin's "The Forever War": which should I pick up next?

[tequila]

Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia.

Feeding my poli-sci side. Not the most involving read, but a good way to refocus on the importance of informal networks and power relations after focusing on state-level relations for so long.

[Zack]

Now reading After Hegemony, Nagel's the Sling and the Stone, and Xenophon's Anabasis

[Zack]

Clan Politics and Regime Transition in Central Asia.

Feeding my poli-sci side. Not the most involving read, but a good way to refocus on the importance of informal networks and power relations after focusing on state-level relations for so long.

You dirty dirty realist.

[Cap'nJake]

Am finishing up William Manchester's bio of MacArthur (American Caesar).
MacArthur's actions in post-war Japan are ripe for what can be done WRT nation-building.

Sadly, the "global network" makes things too interconnected today to allow an individual that level of autonomy; nor is any entity (nation, military, criminal enterprise, economic aid, diplomatic resolve, etc.) able to be that decisive.

[davidbfpo]

Sadly, the "global network" makes things too interconnected today to allow an individual that level of autonomy; nor is any entity (nation, military, criminal enterprise, economic aid, diplomatic resolve, etc.) able to be that decisive.

Cap'n Jake,

I think you are wrong it is possible for an individual to be decisive. The US retired General Jacques "Joe" Klein led a remarkable UN mission in Eastern Slavonia, a Serb rebel enclave in Croatia, which was re-integrated with robust action: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_...estern_Sirmium

IIRC he was backed by "interested parties", with a UN mandate, which both Croatia and local parties had to accept and a robust Jordanian Army battallion which gave him "muscle".

Cannot recall other UN missions which had such a figure and mission.

davidbfpo

[Eden]

I just finished Tommy Franks' American Soldier. Did anybody else's BS alarm go off constantly as they read this?

[carl]

Peter Mansoor's "Baghdad at Sunrise" or Dexter Filkin's "The Forever War": which should I pick up next?

I have Filkin's and have read Mansoor's. "Baghdad" is a great book, well written, interesting and from a civilian's point of view, it opened up a whole new world about how an effective brigade did things in unconventional and relatively conventional roles.

[MikeF]

Doing a little 'light' reading on some topics outside of small wars. All three are philosophical in nature but explore science, religion, and capitalism in very definitive ways.

1. Why does E=MC^2 by Brian Cox and Jeff Forshaw

2. A New Earth by Eckhart Tolle

3. Atlas Shrugged by Ayn Rand

Next up is Tom and Stan's most excellent adventure. It was on back order at Border's, but the assistant was well aware of the author.

Mike

[Zack]

Doing a little 'light' reading on some topics outside of small wars. All three are philosophical in nature but explore science, religion, and capitalism in very definitive ways.

1. Why does E=MC^2 by Brian Cox and Jeff Forshaw

2. A New Earth by Eckhart Tolle

3. Atlas Shrugged by Ayn Rand

Next up is Tom and Stan's most excellent adventure. It was on back order at Border's, but the assistant was well aware of the author.

Mike

Ayn is a bit of a crazy person, but can (sometimes) be fun to read nonetheless. The recent book of her Q&As was particularly interesting to me. You should check it out if you are interested in some of her philosophy.