What Are You Currently Reading? 2009

[Van]

Just finished Anthropolological Intelligence by David Price. An encyclopaedic study of the use and abuse of social science in WW II. All his agonizing over the role of anthropologists serving their country in harms' way didn't impress me much, but the discussion of anthropologists in Germany and working at the internment camps in the U.S. was interesting and disturbing.

This one gives a lot of context for the extreme guilt issues of the outspoken anti-military anthropologists that get mentioned in SWC.

[GBNT73]

Revolutionary warfare:
Dragonwars, by J. Bowyer Bell. He is a diffcult read. I powered my way through teh below one, but I have to read it again.
Dynamics of the Armed Struggle, (by the same)

Origin of war:
How War Began, by Keith Otterbein, just barely started.
War Before Civilization, by Lawrence Keeley -- great read. Causes one to question the whole "4GW" concept.

Separation of God and Man:
The Great Divorce, by C. S. Lewis

Team building/leading
The Five Dysfunctions of a Team, by Patrick Lencioni. it has a stupid narrative "parable", but the model he proposes is excellent. It came recommended by a university professor/team builder.

[LawVol]

Most of what I've read lately could be deemed introductory to various subject matter and I've found that each has met that purpose well.

Soldiers of Reason by Alexa Abella: explores the beginning of the Rand Corporation and traces its development to the modern day. It discuss rational choice theory in the context that Rand developed and used it. I thought this was a good book for some strategic theoretical background.

The Bottom Billion by Paul Collier: examines four traps that cause poorer countries to remain that way and four instruments that can assist in crafting a plan for action.

The Second World by Parag Khanna and The Post-American World by Fareed Zakaria: both examine the second world's rise and implications.

Wired for War by Peter Singer: I liked this book as I approached it as providing introduction to an area I was unfamiliar with. It's written well and explores robotics used in war. The author raises some interesting legal/ethical questions that need further examination.

The Accidental Guerilla by David Kilcullen: although the term "accidental guerilla" is new to me, his thesis that we create additional enemies through our actions isn't. I seem to recall this coming up from the left side of the political spectrum in the 2004 election. That, however, doesn't change the fact that there is some truth to the assertion. This book allowed me to better develop an understanding of the complexity of the situation, particularly with respect to the influence of culture (sometimes more so than religion) on the actions of those we come into contact with.

Seven Deadly Scenarios by Andrew Krepinevich: I did not finish this book as it seemed too sensationalist. The invented footnotes with future dates serve only as self-serving tools rather than assisting the reader with any understanding. The author attempts to paint a picture of future scenarios through a narrative approach, but this method was ineffective for his subject matter (at least for me; some may like it). I did fully read though the chapters on Pakistan and China but found nothing really new. The chapter on Mexico-US was the most interesting IMO.

Next up: Terror and Consent by Philip Bobbitt and The Secret Sentry by Matthew Aid.

[pjmunson]

I have "The Second World" on my bookshelf, but pushed it back in the queue when I read a review from someone that seemed credible (forget who) that panned it. Your take as to its credibility/utility?

I'm interested in Bobbitt's new book. I skimmed/read his "Shield of Achilles" and found it to be huge, but interesting in parts. I don't agree with all of his concepts and analysis, but I think overall he brings up some good points to think through and come to your own conclusions.

[LawVol]

I have "The Second World" on my bookshelf, but pushed it back in the queue when I read a review from someone that seemed credible (forget who) that panned it. Your take as to its credibility/utility?

I'm interested in Bobbitt's new book. I skimmed/read his "Shield of Achilles" and found it to be huge, but interesting in parts. I don't agree with all of his concepts and analysis, but I think overall he brings up some good points to think through and come to your own conclusions.

As an introductory piece, The Second World" is pretty good. Apparently, the author has travelled extensively is researching the book and his academic credentials look good. His bio in the book says he advised SOF in Iraq and Afghanistan so I guess that helps too. There is a bit much of the "America is declining" train of thought, but he's entitled to his opinion and its a logical opinion to derive from his findings. Of course, there is also much to disagree with in reaching those conclusions, but I wanted something a bit outside my normal readings. I found it very helpful in learning a bit about some of the areas that don't always make the news and in understanding the big picture. While I can't vouch for everything he says, it all seems plausible and backed by research. I'd like to find a similar book from a different perspective though, so I can round out the knowledge base.

I picked up the "Terror and Consent" book because it purports to examine the interplay between law and strategy, something I'm keenly interested in given that I'm a JAG. While most seem to subscribe to a notion of a change in warfare due to technology or a breakdown in state control over the means of warfare, I think the increasing relevance of law may also have an effect. I'm trying to wrap my head around this issue now and it looks like this book will be helpful in doing that. I'm open to other suggestions though. Bobbitt's "Achilles" book will make into my stack as well.

[Bob's World]

Touring Colleges on the East Coast with my two youngest this week; Today, on the 4th of July will be in Charlottesville and Washington; will Tour UVA, Monticello and the Capital Mall.

In that spirit, I strongly encourage everyone to Google up a copy of the Declaration of Independence to review today!

A piece of timeless genius, and the cornerstone of our nation. Friends and Foes around the world measure us by how well we stack up to the standard established here.

[davidbfpo]

Just read 'Intelligence Matters: the CIA, the FBI, Saudi Arabia and the Failure of America's War on Terror; by Senator Bob Graham (pub. 2004, but updated in paperback 2008). In places wise and in others for a non-American reader dense Washington bureaucratic arguments. Intrigued at his description of the Polish role in Iraq pre-Gulf War Two and comments on the industry-security linkages in the UK. Advances a view that thousands of trained AQ fighters are in the USA and a greater that in the USA comes from Hizbollah, without explaining why.

davidbfpo

[Valin]

I picked up the "Terror and Consent" book because it purports to examine the interplay between law and strategy, something I'm keenly interested in given that I'm a JAG. While most seem to subscribe to a notion of a change in warfare due to technology or a breakdown in state control over the means of warfare, I think the increasing relevance of law may also have an effect. I'm trying to wrap my head around this issue now and it looks like this book will be helpful in doing that. I'm open to other suggestions though. Bobbitt's "Achilles" book will make into my stack as well.

I look forward to your take on this book/subject.

[AnalyticType]

Has anyone yet read Achieving Victory In Iraq: Countering an Insurgency by Col. Dominic J. Caraccilo & Lt. Col. Andrea L. Thompson? If so, what are your thoughts on the book and its authors? Also as it was published last September (and therefore went to press about a year ago,) has the last year borne out their arguments?

I don't recall seeing this one discussed further back in this rather long thread, but I may have missed it. I have not read this book yet, so I'm curious about its reception among SWC's members. I did notice that the Foreward was written by Bing West, which is what brought the book more sharply to my attention.

[Tukhachevskii]

I'm re-reading the following:

Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political. A work which, to quote Nietzsche, counts as a timely untimely meditation. I am surprised that strategists do not read it if only for its clear emphasis on the necessity and meaning of disntinguishing between friend and enemy.

John Buchan, Greenmantle. A work of fiction which, IMO, contains more words of wisdom than will be found in your average, bog standard, academic tome. Set during WWI it revolves around the fortunes of a group of British intelligence officers and their attempt to thwart German plans in the Ottoman Empire. Along the way one gets the best disection of the Middle Eastern mentality and the Mind of Islam you're likely to find; 'No one knows what will set off a jihad!'. Much of it may be politically incorrect but that simply adds to its truth value.

Hegel, The Philosophy of Right (especially section 445)

Shimon Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory. I first read this during my undergraduate studies and, like most fresh faced and easily impressed layabouts, was bowled over by his verbose and self-important proclamations. Though still a valuable study of the development and conceptual foundations of Soviet/Russian deep operations theory (if anything this is its saving grace) I am not surprised that the IDF found his recent theory of SOD (Systematic Operational Design) so hard to digest that they spat it out in favour of a more traditional emphasis on "actual" military art in their recent Gaza campaign which paid dividends.

[Klugzilla]

Blowtorch Bob Komer's Organization and Management of the "New Model" Pacification Program -- 1966-1969. Komer's RAND analysis of pacification organization and management in SVN.

U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins by Alfred Paddock. An analysis of attempted to cope with special warfare after WWII. So far it appears in many ways to be a history of SWCS.

[William F. Owen]

John Buchan, Greenmantle. A work of fiction which, IMO, contains more words of wisdom than will be found in your average, bog standard, academic tome.

Concur. It's orld Class fiction. It's excellent. My other favourite in this vein is Rogue Male.

Shimon Naveh, In Pursuit of Military Excellence: The Evolution of Operational Theory. I first read this during my undergraduate studies and, like most fresh faced and easily impressed layabouts, was bowled over by his verbose and self-important proclamations. Though still a valuable study of the development and conceptual foundations of Soviet/Russian deep operations theory (if anything this is its saving grace) I am not surprised that the IDF found his recent theory of SOD (Systematic Operational Design) so hard to digest that they spat it out in favour of a more traditional emphasis on "actual" military art in their recent Gaza campaign which paid dividends.

Sorry, but IMO, this book is garbage. He gets it all wrong. He doesn't seem to understand the dissonance between "Deep Battle" theory and actual practice. Big ideas, with little else to support them. All the big ideas fall over when faced with actual operational conditions.
Naveh also plays very fast and loose with the historical record.
Read Nikolas Zetterling rebuttal of Naveh if you can find it. I have a copy, if you PM me your e-mail.

[Red Rat]

Concur. It's orld Class fiction. It's excellent. My other favourite in this vein is Rogue Male.


Sorry, but IMO, this book is garbage. He gets it all wrong. He doesn't seem to understand the dissonance between "Deep Battle" theory and actual practice. Big ideas, with little else to support them. All the big ideas fall over when faced with actual operational conditions.
Naveh also plays very fast and loose with the historical record.
Read Nikolas Zetterling rebuttal of Naveh if you can find it. I have a copy, if you PM me your e-mail.

Glad it is not just me that is finding it somewhat verbose! Looks like I could do with the Zetterling rebuttal as well.

Also on the reading list at the moment:

• Gretchen Peters - Seeds of Terror A look at the heroin/Taliban nexus
  
• History of European Morals by William Lecky - something I should have probably read as an undergraduate...
  
• 41 Years in India by Field Marshal Roberts

and

• The Big katie Morag Storybook by Mairi Hedderwick - at the behest of my 4 year old daughter who has her priorities very clear and generally sets mine!

[REMF]

On the reading list at the moment:
Just finished The Black Swan by Nassim Nicholas Taleb. Wars/conflict being the least predictable of things right after women , it's rewarding reading and a good addition to any perspective of conflict.
Baghdad at Sunrise by P.R. Mansoor. I've been recommended this one, but I've heard mixed reviews. Is it any good?
War Comes to Long An by Jeffrey Rice.
Modern Warfare by Roger Trinquier.

[Tukhachevskii]

Some thoughts on Shimon Naveh’s In Pursuit of Military Excellence that I thought I’d share with you. In many places in his turgid tome Naveh claims that the Soviet Army came up with something approximating what scientists would call a universal or general covering law (i.e, Hempel) regarding operational manoeuvre which formed the foundation of Deep Operations Theory. To prove this Naveh often approvingly cites or paraphrases from the Red Army Field Regulations of 1936;

“By employing the universal combination of the linear holding group and a columnar shock group and an appropriate organisation of troops and resource s for combat the Red Army managed to create both the right synergy and the proper conditions for executing a coherent manoeuvre” (my italics, p. 172-3 but cf. pp. 187-9, 190, 218-9, 224-26) .

Yet for all his “research” Naveh ignores or is ignorant of facts which upset his theoretical edifice. If the Soviet Army did indeed develop a theory of Deep Operations which, in terms of the relationship between a linear front and the operational depth, as the example above purports, came to represent something approaching the fundamental truths of operational art then why did the Red Army Field Regulations of 1944 (which is not cited by Naveh in the text or bibliography) state the following in no uncertain terms;

“The concept of “striking and holding forces” as a part of combat formations which existed in the previous Polevoy Ustav (the 1936 Regulations venerated by Naveh) confused command personnel and led to inaction of so-called “holding forces in combat [!]. This Polevoy Ustav abolishes the division of a combat formation into a striking and a holding force, but it requires the concentration of main effort on the axis of the main attack and a determined attack by lesser forces on the axis of secondary attack” (my italics, p. 5)

Thus, the theoretical tents expounded by Naveh were never actually adhered to by the Red Army and were promptly abandoned in 1943 during which time the 1944 regulations were being revised. For all of Naveh’s linguistic acrobatics it appears the supposedly pristine theory of Deep Operations (in the above respects at least) never existed outside Naveh’s own head. As D. M. Glantz explained in Soviet Military Operational Art, which Naveh cites but evidently never read, Deep Operations “theory” was actually a set of assumptions which were in constant evolution (p.12). The Red Army constantly went back and forth over their experiences in an attempt to ascertain which facets of the “theory” were applicable and which, like the above, could be jettisoned (at any given time). Relying on the 1936 Regulations to prove that the Red Army had discovered the timeless “laws “ of operational art is sheer nonsense given they themselves had the good sense to ditch much of what they had initially assumed correct. Funny that.

[Tukhachevskii]

On a different note I have recently downloaded a number of works which I shall soon be tackling with gusto. I got them free from www.archive.org.

J. H. Breasted, The Battle of Kadesh

C. E. Callwell, Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance

Moltke, Moltke’s Military Correspondence, 1870-71

C. von der Goltz, The Nation in Arms

F. A. Bayerlin, Jena or Sedan? (think Tolstoy’s War and Peace)

U.S . War Department, A Survey of German Tactics, 1918

Prince Kraft zu Hohenlohe Ingelfingen, Letters on Infantry (1889)

F. N. Maude, Military Letters and Essays

A.J. Tonybee, The Murderous Tyranny of the Turks
A.J. Tonybee, Turkey and the Western Question

[William F. Owen]

“The concept of “striking and holding forces” as a part of combat formations which existed in the previous Polevoy Ustav (the 1936 Regulations venerated by Naveh) confused command personnel and led to inaction of so-called “holding forces in combat [!]. This Polevoy Ustav abolishes the division of a combat formation into a striking and a holding force, but it requires the concentration of main effort on the axis of the main attack and a determined attack by lesser forces on the axis of secondary attack” (my italics, p. 5)

... or even that the very reason PU-44 was written is stated that PU-36 "Has become obsolete!! - and "requires thorough revision."

A constant feature of Naveh is stating that sources says "X" when in fact, if studied in detail, it does not. I recently discovered Naveh was very influenced by Simpkin ("Pursuit" is actually dedicated to Simpkin) and I think Simpkin has a nasty habit of ascribing qualities and insights to Soviet thinking that simply did not exist. I think Naveh continues this, in the belief that in by doing so, he is doing something useful. I submit he is wrong.

[Bill Jakola]

In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan
by Seth G. Jones

http://www.amazon.com/Graveyard-Empi.../dp/0393068986

I just finished the history of the recent 2001-2009 events in Afghanistan. I fonund nothin new here. Seth Jones captures this history in a cogent text totally consistent with what most everyone already knows.

His most useful concept is an explanation of the enemy as a hybrid and complex organism composed of many disperate parts from Taliban and al Qaeda to corrupt qovernment officials and drug traffickers, common crimials to tribal leaders to foreign national interests. Mr. Jones' characterization of the enemy as composed of many parts is helpful in understanding the problems we face in this region; however, he provides no solutions or even potentials for future success.

In this regard, Mr. Jones only provides an overview of recent events without greater context or long term history. I found it helpful as a single source reference, but encourage those interested in Afghanistan to complement it with other works like the "The Great War for Civilisation: The Conquest of the Middle East" by Robert Fisk. Althought, Mr. Fisk is mostly appoligetic for all Western nations' action in the Middle East, he does provide a different perspective.

[pjmunson]

I'd hope Fisk provided more historical context as he took over 1000 pages to do it.

[OpsIntel]

Guys,

Finishing Warfare 2.0 on the heels of The Utility of Force (Smith). Preceeded by Hunting Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Leadership Targets (Turbiville) and for some historical flavor A Scratch of the Pen.

Anyone looking at today's and tomorrow's engagements would be well served by reading the first two. They provide interesting context for discussions of the nuts-and-bolts of warfare.