What Are You Currently Reading? 2010

[davidbfpo]

PJMunson,

Looking for an academic, at least well researched and hopefully noted, book on the dynamics of gangs like MS13 and 18th Street and how they have spread across borders from LA to Mexico and Central America.

Methinks the answer lies on this RFI thread:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=9802

I've copied your request to the RFI thread.

[Tukhachevskii]

Saul David’s Victoria’s Wars: The Rise of Empire is an impressive political and military history. I was struck by the particularly forceful notion, an appropriate asymmetry given our current pre-occupation with “asymmetric wars” in general, that a large proportion of Britain’s wars were small for us but considered major for our enemies particularly when one realises that, for the day (and even now), a major war was considered one fought only between comparable (Great) powers (or peer competitors in today’s parlance). Obviously, the Crimean War (Chapter 8) would thus count as a “large” War yet, oddly perhaps, one fought very much like a small one if only because of logistical, command and coalition gremlins. From the influence of those great PMCs (after a fashion) the East and West India Companies to changes in domestic electoral geometry (i.e., the fall of Disraeli to his erstwhile nemesis Sir Robert Peel) to the effects, often deleterious, of international rivalry between Powers that were Allies one day and Enemies the next to the financial burdens for the extension, consolidation and then subsequent “policing” of “empire” much of that past era really is prologue to our current one (in which the “empire” being extended is now that of “the rule of law”). Yet what is also striking is the manner in which, given Britain’s almost otherworldly technological superiority (in comparison with its non-European opponents), financial power and social organisation she still managed to lose wars (i.e., Afghanistan) which, by the standards of the day, should have been a walk-over due to issues which still have contemporary resonance;

[Mountstuart Elphinstone, former governor of Bombay on the proposed British invasion of Afghanistan c. 1835] [q-e]I used to dispute with you against having an agent in Caubul [sic], and now we have assumed the protection of the state as if it were one of the subsidiary allies in India. If you send 27,000 men up the Bolan Pass to Candahar [sic] (as we hear intended), and can feed them, I have no doubt you will take Candahar and Caubul and set up Soojah [Shuja, then claimant to the Afghan throne]; but for maintaining him in a poor, cold, strong and remote country, among turbulent people like the Afghans, I own it seems to me to be hopeless.[/q-e] (p. 21)

Of greater contemporary significance is the excellent book by Ali Ahmad Jalali and L. W. Grau, THE OTHER SIDE OF THE MOUNTAIN: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War. A companion to their earlier The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan this book focuses specifically on Mujahideen TTPs during the Soviet-Afghan war using vignettes of the commanders involved from almost all of the various Mujahedeen groups that participated. Perhaps rather unsurprisingly it is remarkable to see how consistent Afghan TTPs have been with regards to the manner in which ambushes (Ch.1) , raids (Ch.2), Shelling/Mortar strikes (Ch.3), mine warfare (Ch.5) and urban warfare (Ch.14) is conducted when we compare the vignettes in this book to after action reports from current operations. Other chapters reveal Afghan TTPs in the conduct of: attacking a strong point (Ch. 4); Blocking Enemy Lines of Communication (Ch.6); Siege Warfare (Ch.7); Defence against (Soviet Spetznaz) Raids (Ch.8); Countering (Soviet) Heliborne Insertions (Ch. 9); Defending against a Cordon and Search (C.10); Defending Base Camps (Ch. 11); Counter-ambushes (Ch.12); and, Fighting an Encirclement (Ch.13). There are also numerous and revealing tidbits of information that are usually glossed over or omitted in scholarly or historical commentaries one of which, for instance, was the use of video cameras by Mujahedeen commanders which were used not for BDA, propaganda or for later training use (as I would have supposed) but rather to prove to other factions and groups that ordnance had been expended in order to justify the allotting of further weapons and supplies for future operations (p. 108fn2). The Arabs who joined in the Jihad, however, were (apparently) more interested in taking videos, in the earlier stages at least, and were considered prima donnas by many Mujahedeen groups (p129fn4). Another little know operation involved mujahedeen using sympathisers/moles in DRA (the Soviet satellite Afghan army) formations to drug DRA officers prior to an attack; fittingly, one of the Mujahedeen commanders was an M.D! (p.119). I was also surprised to learn that the DRA was not entirely ineffectual as a fighting formation at least if the Battle of Panjawee in 1982 is to go by (pp.123-5).

Having rooted around looking for work on Afghan guerrilla TTPs I was glad to have “hit the mother lode”. Accompanied by detailed maps and candid reminiscences by those involved it is thoroughly recommended. In the quote below it appears that, for one guerrilla commander at least, one up-two back really is best in a company sized attack (with what appear to be large platoon groups composed of 20man sections/squads);

[Commander Wazir Gul on a raid against a security outpost] [q-e]My group's base was in Zandeh Kalay which is some 25 kilometers south of the [Lataband] pass [on the Kandahar-Sairobi highway]. I planned the attack at the base. We left the base at 1500 and moved to the Tezin Valley where we spent the night. We carried our supplies and ammunition on mules. Once we got to the Tezin Valley, I met with the commanders of other groups and we coordinated our attack. The total strength of the combined Mujahideen force was about 150 fighters. We left what we did not need for immediate combat at Tezin and moved out toward our targets. We brought the mules with us. There were three chief components in our combined force—two fire support groups and an assault group. Each fire support group had heavy weapons (three BM-1, four DShK, three 82mm mortars). Their mission was to attack and pin down the Soviet base at Mulla Omar and the Sarandoy base at Lataband. The assault group had twelve RPG-7s and four 82mm recoilless rifles. The assault group was composed of three 20-man teams. Each 20-man team had a designated enemy outpost to attack.[/q-e] (p.93)

In another “after-action-report” concerning an ambush in the Kandahar area Commander Mulla Kalang reveals the general disregard for civilian casualties/reprisals against civilian families of rival Mujahedeen (i.e., his own countrymen) who refused to participate in the action but who would, nonetheless, be blamed for it while also revealing the Mujahedeen’s understanding of the relationship between terrain & time, their ability to co-ordinate attacks with groups from other locales and Soviet SOPs (i.e., the absence, at this time, of Soviet reconnaissance efforts contrary to extant Soviet doctrine):

[q-e]We decided to divide the 250 available Mujahideen into several groups. The groups were armed with RPG-7 antitank grenade launchers and four-to-five 82mm recoilless rifles. All ambushes were sited in the green zone to the south of the road. Each ambush group had an assigned sector of the kill zone. All groups were instructed to open fire simultaneously as the head of the column reaches the Ashoqa villages. It was expected that at that time the tail of the column would have just cleared the Pashmol villages. At that time, most of the local population still lived in their homes along the road. Few had migrated to Pakistan since no major Soviet military actions had taken place there. The Mujahideen groups coming from Malajat (the southern and south-western suburbs of Kandahar) and other neighbouring bases moved during the night to their designated ambush sites. The ambush plan was kept secret from the local population and local Mujahideen units since resistance groups based in the ambush area were reluctant to participate, fearing retaliation directed at their homes and families still living there.[/q-e] (p.44)

Also one wonders what the outcome would have been had Soviet COIN efforts been more effective at engaging the locals and sowing dissent amongst the Mujahedeen (perhaps by buying them off/co-opting them as the Romans had done with the Goths and the Byzantines had done with the Avars, Bulgars et al and turned them against one another) especially when the Mujahedeen cared even less about civilian casualties than the Soviet’s did as is evinced in a local saying amongst civilians;

[q-e] the government oppress us during the day and the Mujahedeen oppress us at night[/q-e] (p.115)

[Bullmoose Bailey]

Warrior's Rage Douglas Macgregor Ph.D.

$26.00USD in the mini mall at Ft. Knox. Only paid full price because I really want to read before its out in paperback.

Has anyone read it? I really like it so far.

[gute]

Finsihed WAR by Sebastian Junger a couple of weeks ago. Good book. I have tried to follow the 173BCT and their tours in Afghanistan.

Just finished Rage Company: A Marine's Baptism By Fire by Thomas P. Daly (it's okay, save your money and get it from the library) and The Last Stand: Custer, Sitting Bull, and the Battle of the Little Bighorn by Nathaniel Philbrick (nothing new in this book, Custer loses - I know big suprise).

Also reading Rakkasans: The Combat History of the 187th Airborne Infantry by E. M. Flanagan

[davidbfpo]

A Stranger to Myself, by Willy Peter Reese, a young German soldier on the Russian front during the second world war who was killed in 1944 at the age of 23....His accounts were discovered only in 2002

From:http://www.spectator.co.uk/columnist...r-writer.thtml

A review article of several books by a military historian, from Arnhem 1944 'Coward at the Bridge' by James Delingpole, Imjin River 1951 'To the Last Round' by Andrew Salmon, set in the Korengal Valley 'War' by Sebastian Junger and from the later:

Not since his first world war namesake Ernst, I think, has any writer got closer to the dark, terrible but strangely touching secret of why it is that men so love war.

Link:http://www.spectator.co.uk/columnist...love-war.thtml

[SJPONeill]

On the reading stand at the moment are the 1942 version of Douhet's Command of the Air and 'Johnnie' Johnson's Wing Leader...taking up a new appointment next week on the air side of the house so thought that I might start looking forward by looking back...have just finished Benoit Mandelbrot's The (mis)behaviour of Markets which is an interesting first principles look at irregularity. Although its focus is upon market systems a large proportion of his thinking, IMHO, could inform how we consider our own irregular environment...book review to follow...

[Mike in Hilo]

Learned about the book from SWJ. The author contends:

1) Jihadism is but one phase of a worldwide insurgency that will bedevil us for decades and that is an expression of alienation of 3rd world immigrant communities within rich nations. A future phase, he says, may involve millions of destitute 3rd world refugees from global warming-induced inundation of their homelands, who will have found their way to western cities.

2) Thus, the most important theater of the conflict is within the western nations, not in some Middle Eastern or Central Asian land. Not least, he posits, because the "expeditionary approach" of taking the fight overseas is stillborn by the western nations' obsession with an exit strategy even before we charge through the entrance. So, he argues, as domestic politics forecloses a winning strategy overseas, we are left to focus on the domestic threat..which is the main one in any case.

3) He cites as a potential model a UK op involving LE cum the whole of gov't
approach in engaging the Islamic immigrant community.

Opinion: May provide some insight into a Weltanschauung prevalent in some European circles. ....Also, no problem for a retired guy like me, but if your time comes at a premium you might want to weigh the opportunity cost of reading....

Cheers,
Mike.