Quote Originally Posted by carl View Post

For example, he said that one of the primary reasons for the success of the much debated "Surge" in Iraq was that AQI overplayed its hand by its homicidal fanaticism. I haven't read that in too many other places and it is interesting to contemplate what would have happened if their political platform had extended much beyond maniacal killing.
This isn't all that new - it is closely connected to the "Iraqi agency" argument that has picked up steam recently, but it really started at least as far back as Abdul Sattar Abu Risha, who said the Anbar Awakening was the result of the Sunnis having to be the ones to make the decision that they had finally had enough.

This isn't wrong, but the problem with focusing specifically on this point, is that it is used to argue that an increase in US troops (called "the surge") was not responsible. The problem is that it considers each element of what happened in Iraq in 2007-2008 in isolation, trying to figure out which one was the cause of the reduction in violence. In reality, all of these things were connected, and without one you probably wouldn't have the other. Yes, the Iraqis had to make this decision for themselves, but it is not a coincidence that it also came at a time when the US finally was able to provide a viable alternative to AQI. Likewise, an increase in US forces was important, but more important was how those forces were used, and demonstrating to Iraqis that they had an alternative to al Qaeda that would keep them alive. "The Surge" was not just dumping additional bodies into Iraq and calling it a day. It was an ongoing, interconnected process in which the actions of the US, Iraqis, and al Qaeda all had an effect in reducing the violence at the time and weakening AQI.

To get back to the topic of the thread though, I just finished Execute Against Japan: The US Decision to Conduct Unrestricted Submarine Warfare. I am reading Gunther Rothenberg's The Art of War in the Age of Napoleon. After that will be John Lynn's Bayonets of the Republic: Motivations and Tactics in the Army of Revolutionary France.