What will our expedition to Afghanistan teach us?

[TheCurmudgeon]

So, we have two questions: (1) is "the political objective a stable, democratic Afghanistan" and (2) if so, is "legitimacy the only issue" (emphasis added)?".

I agree with your questions. I also agree with the first part of your argument in regards to the original objectives as well as your basic arguments regarding why, from a foriegn policy perspective, the US would be interested in exporting democracy (the democratic peace theory). Where you and I fundamentally disagree is what you might call a "the Chicken and the Egg" argument, and I would call an "Apples and Oranges" argument.

This is especially more difficult in the context of conflict, given that trust is notably absent and that numerous actors have sufficient power to act independently; why would anyone obey if they didn't have to? So what comes first, power or legitimacy?

Your Chicken and Egg argument: which comes first power or legitimacy. You say power, with legitimacy following at some later date as the population comes to accept their submissive roles.

State cohesion relies on coercive power (military capabilities, law enforcement, etc) to compel citizens and/or subjects to comply with desired practices; this is true regardless of the type of government in place.

I would argue that these are apples and oranges. Coercion and Legitimacy are two completely separate things: one is not derived from the other.

Coercion, which I would define as including both force and bribery, is based on an external pressure. Legitimacy, founded in the values a person holds true, is in internal motivator. The external pressure of fear (force) or the desire for goodies (bribery) can overcome what a person holds as right and true, but it does not change what they believe it right and true. It can only suppress it.

The use of force and coercion are not the same thing. The use of force by any entity can be either coercive or legitimate depending on how the population percieve the act. You and I disagree on this fundimental point as well.

There is no inherent contradiction between achieving all of the objectives highlighted above in addition to having a "democratic" Afghanistan, while simultaneously not having "legitimacy".

Here I think you are confusing the US military's legitimacy to act, the Karzai government's legitimacy to rule the country, and the distinction between systematic political legitimacy at the national level. I am referring to systematic legitimacy - what is the source of political entities legitimacy. In a theocracy it is God; Monarchy is the King (usually via a grant from God); Democracy it is the individual citizen (We the People,...). You would argue that if we could just gain total control of the country we could impose the type of systematic legitimacy we desire (When you've got them by the balls, their hearts and minds will follow). I believe that our experiences in both Iraq and Afghanistan prove that this is not possible.

As long as we maintain pressure and offer material support the Afghan government will maintain the illusion of democracy. Once that pressure is gone it will return to what others have called "natural stability" - a homeostasis where the legitimacy the people prefer and the legitimacy of the government will more closely align.

As for how we moved from stability to democracy, I will refer you to an article from the Military Review, Policy, COIN Doctrine, and Political Legitimacy , for a more complete description of that process.

I don't believe that you and I are going to agree, but we don't have to.