What will our expedition to Afghanistan teach us?

[Red Rat]

Where again did we turn the corner towards nation-building in AFG? Was it a creep or a sharper turn, because I cannot put my finger on it.

If I remember rightly the initial 2001 Bonn Agreement was setting the course towards nation-building, reinforced by the long term approach adopted in the 2002 Tokyo Donor's Conference. Certainly at the beginning of the UK's involvement there was widespread recognition that the UK would be involved for something like 25 years in order to achieve a degree of capacity building. Then as security conditions worsened long-term capacity building appeared to have been increasingly shelved in favour of short-term mitigation measures; we went from a rehabilitation programme to sticking plasters on the patient.

So to answer the question I think we turned the corner away from nation building and that this happened incrementally over the period 2006-9.

[jcustis]

That is an amazingly interesting perspective.

I will bone up on those events and agreements you have referenced. I believe we will require a brutally-honest and transparent post-mortem of the train wreck if we are to pay any honest respect to the dead. I want the responsible actors to be accountable and the history to remain clear.

[Firn]

@Red Rat: I guess you are right. It is important to remember how quickly the enemy has been 'defeated' and a good deal of the beating was given. The policy makers seemed to have turned quickly to nation-building, stating so much in it the Bonn agreement in December 2011.

Now paper is patient as the Germans say and between the saying and the doing lies the sea we Italians all too often state. The big questions are:

1) How shovel ready were the important political and economic projects. Were there enough of them?

2) How much mental effort and ressources were available and were directed towards them?

3) How smartly and efficently were those projects put into practice?

It would be nice to see for example the scorecard of basic physical infrastructure (streets, grids, water, ITC,...) created in the first years in Afghanistan after 9/11. At least that should be relatively easy to evaluate in an objective way.

[Madhu]

Because it was felt early on that "Rumsfeldian transformation" had worked so quickly and brilliantly at toppling the Taliban without the dreaded mass (which, to be fair, was seen as exacerbating Afghan sensibilities, too many troops I mean), attention was turned almost immediately to peace time activities. And, of course, to Iraq.

NATO thought it had got a peacetime nation building activity, so the reliance on 90s era lessons learned, as in "capacity building". But violence didn't stay down so building could not be done. The violence precluded nation building activities so of course one turned away, except, we didn't really, we just added violence to the mix: FM3-24.

Posted at SWJ earlier in the blog section was a piece by the Afghan Analysts Network entitled "Snapshots". From that piece:

2002-2003: Despite some on-going fighting in the Southern part of the country, the resistance was basically deemed to have ended and many countries were not sure of the utility of further international forces.

As the building went on, and attention turned elsewhere, the old neighboring regional and local compulsions slowly re-emerged and the 2009 surge only made the desire to hold onto gains that much stronger by all local and regional partners and adversaries, the entire mad mix of players, good and bad depending on one's point of view.

It is curious. A global war on terror was envisioned but almost no thought was given to the reasons for disorder spilling onto American shores from the region other than, "we need stability." This goes for both Administrations, Bush and Obama, and is embedded in both approaches, the Rumsfeldian and the AfPak strategy. NATO leadership had the same ideas.

That is why I keep asking people to review the history of the American military and its Nato partners in the region going back to the early days of the Cold War. We've been here before when it comes to creating or sustaining armies/intelligence and expecting it all to fit into our larger security paradigms. The late Lt. Col Nathaniel Hoskot is the name to look up on our early involvement in the region and its intellectual residues within the military, etc.

PS: On a certain level, FM 3-24 was simply the militarized version of the basic 2002-2003 understanding and phenomenon of capacity building and stability as a source of security in the region.

I don't know why the idea of capacity building as a deterrent to violence remains so embedded within the institutional mindset. The evidence in Afghanistan doesn't support the conclusion.

[Firn]

Because it was felt early on that "Rumsfeldian transformation" had worked so quickly and brilliantly at toppling the Taliban without the dreaded mass (which, to be fair, was seen as exacerbating Afghan sensibilities, too many troops I mean), attention was turned almost immediately to peace time activities. And, of course, to Iraq.

NATO thought it had got a peacetime nation building activity, so the reliance on 90s era lessons learned, as in "capacity building". But violence didn't stay down so building could not be done.
.

I wonder if the economic emphasis on small government played a role in the lack of quick direct investments in big and small infrastructure. Basically let us first set the proper liberal market and political framework in place to then allow the Afghani economy to flourish. Correct me if I'm wrong on the 'lack' of said investment.

Figuratively spoken, employing quickly hundred thousends of Afghan men with shovels in relative sensible way for a very low wage for American standards on things like road work might have very efficient for the Western taxpayers if nation-building was it indeed. Maybe many thought there was a good amount of time as the peace was secured, so one had not to hurry to get such things underway. I certainly don't know...

[Steve Blair]

That is an amazingly interesting perspective.

I will bone up on those events and agreements you have referenced. I believe we will require a brutally-honest and transparent post-mortem of the train wreck if we are to pay any honest respect to the dead. I want the responsible actors to be accountable and the history to remain clear.

Agree 100%.

[Madhu]

You cannot divorce these lessons from the larger regional competitions. We turned away from nation building because violence increased and it increased for a complicated reasons.

We mistook the idea that our original victory was in any way durable. And a 25 year time span is nonsensical. I'm sorry I'm so adamant on this point but this is the source of so many troubles in Afghanistan and the larger neighborhood; the idea that others won't react to our long term plans because they conflict with local and regional plans.

If this is the lesson learned, that we turned away from nation building and that is the source of our troubles, then I am very afraid the lessons will not help.

Again, sorry to be so troublesome on the matter but it really requires a broader lens.

[Madhu]

That's an interesting thought. I don't know. Maybe I'm wrong and it requires both a broad and very detailed lens so this is exactly the conversation that needs to take place?

[omarali50]

Just a few of quick points:
1. Too many people underestimate how good a system "western democracy" is..for any country.
2. But its not black or white. You can (and will) have modern democracy with many many shortcomings for a very long time...in any country. But especially in poor countries where many of its modern institutions and traditions are imported and not organically developed in-situ...but even so, it can work.
3. US policy makers seem to have tried a "worst of both worlds" approach. Cynically manipulate, bribe, kill etc..and dont do it with enough intelligence to make it work.
4. That's a case by case judgement. In the best case, the people running the intervention have to be exceptional...in many cases, one exceptional person is the key. But the US is not an ancient imperial power with personalized leadership and informal networks..its a very bureaucratic modern state. That makes one think it shouldn't have tried what its institutions are not designed to do well. But there are second best options it could still have tried. Hell, it could try them even now.
5. The perfect is the enemy of the good.
6. Afghanistan is a viable country. It is even a viable democracy, but with Afghan characteristics (which may be far from Nebraska norms..but that's their problem, why should everything be America's problem?). But it was not (and is not) going to work if the hardcore Taliban are brought into it. At the same time, keeping them out is primarily an Afghan problem. WITH American help and intelligent use of its absolutely stunning technological superiority there is no reason why an American Najibullah could not beat them back for good. Even now.
7. Underestimating the hardcore enemy and having no clear mission proved costly. Were whatever "real" aims the US had in Afghanistan too base to be publicly admitted? if so, its good the US failed. If not, why the lack of clarity? It reflects poorly on US bureaucratic decision making either way.
8. In the proverbial long run, the hardcore Taliban are just a tool and not one that will last forever or work too well. If not the US, then China, or Russia or Iran or India..someone will help other Afghans cook their primitive goose. Their more modern backers, cough cough, were a different issue. They could have been convinced to let them go if the "convincers" were surer of their own ground (I am not convinced of the theory that the convincers have secret malevolent intentions that are very different from what "we" are being told...I think if they were that kind of evil genius, we wouldnt be having this discussion...but then again, how would I know?).

[TheCurmudgeon]

These are a few thoughts, not five yet, still thinking about it. I look at these as root issues: what caused us to approach the problem, and therefore develop a solution, the wrong way. Unfortunately I see them more as lessons we should have learned, but didn't.

1. Values are not universal, they are conditional. To steal a quote from Fredrick Engles: "the simple fact, hitherto concealed by an overgrowth of ideology, that mankind must first of all eat, drink, have shelter and clothing, before it can pursue politics, science, art, religion..." Or, looked at another way, people value survival and identity more than freedom and liberty when survival is the more pressing need. The neocons assumed that everyone love freedom above all else, and therefore would swarm to democracy. This was an error. Unfortunately it is an error shared by many in the west. Look at the difference between the UN's declaration of "Universal " human rights and the African Union's declaration and you will see significant differences. As long as we believe that everyone is (or at least wants to be) like us we will continue to intervene to fix problems we don't understand.

2. Political legitimacy and coercion are not the same. Here I must define my terms. Political legitimacy is "precisely the belief in the rightfulness of a state, in its authority to issue commands, so that those commands are obeyed not simply out of fear or self-interest, but because they are believed in some sense to have moral authority, because the subjects believe they ought to be obeyed" (Barker). Notice the quote, "not out of fear or self-interest". The threat of punishment or the offer of benefit constitute coercion. So, using the offer of new roads or hospitals or even economic reward does not make your government legitimate. It is a form of coercion that lasts only as long as the goods keep coming. Legitimacy is following the edicts of the government because you believe they are right: that they match you moral beliefs and values. You cannot create political legitimacy using either threat or benefit. You can control a population using threat or benefit: using coercion. Just don't confuse the two.

3. The idea of a State or Nation is not universal. In fact, the idea of a "Nation" is a foreign concept in many parts of the world. In remote areas government authority only extends to the edge of the valley or this side of the river. Government - or political leadership - is a very local concept. The idea of being part of a "state" is not real. It is an illusion westerners created and imposed on the rest of the world to make it easier for us to understand and work with, not easier for the indigenous population to work with.

4. Nation Building and Social Engineering are not the same thing. Even assuming the population sees itself as part of a "Nation" it does not mean that they are socially ready to work within it. When you are trying to take a society that is deeply religious and turn it secular you are not Nation Building, you are trying to alter the cultural make-up of the society. This is infinitely more difficult that simple Nation Building.

I am still working on five.