What will our expedition to Afghanistan teach us?

[TheCurmudgeon]

So, we have two questions: (1) is "the political objective a stable, democratic Afghanistan" and (2) if so, is "legitimacy the only issue" (emphasis added)?".

I agree with your questions. I also agree with the first part of your argument in regards to the original objectives as well as your basic arguments regarding why, from a foriegn policy perspective, the US would be interested in exporting democracy (the democratic peace theory). Where you and I fundamentally disagree is what you might call a "the Chicken and the Egg" argument, and I would call an "Apples and Oranges" argument.

This is especially more difficult in the context of conflict, given that trust is notably absent and that numerous actors have sufficient power to act independently; why would anyone obey if they didn't have to? So what comes first, power or legitimacy?

Your Chicken and Egg argument: which comes first power or legitimacy. You say power, with legitimacy following at some later date as the population comes to accept their submissive roles.

State cohesion relies on coercive power (military capabilities, law enforcement, etc) to compel citizens and/or subjects to comply with desired practices; this is true regardless of the type of government in place.

I would argue that these are apples and oranges. Coercion and Legitimacy are two completely separate things: one is not derived from the other.

Coercion, which I would define as including both force and bribery, is based on an external pressure. Legitimacy, founded in the values a person holds true, is in internal motivator. The external pressure of fear (force) or the desire for goodies (bribery) can overcome what a person holds as right and true, but it does not change what they believe it right and true. It can only suppress it.

The use of force and coercion are not the same thing. The use of force by any entity can be either coercive or legitimate depending on how the population percieve the act. You and I disagree on this fundimental point as well.

There is no inherent contradiction between achieving all of the objectives highlighted above in addition to having a "democratic" Afghanistan, while simultaneously not having "legitimacy".

Here I think you are confusing the US military's legitimacy to act, the Karzai government's legitimacy to rule the country, and the distinction between systematic political legitimacy at the national level. I am referring to systematic legitimacy - what is the source of political entities legitimacy. In a theocracy it is God; Monarchy is the King (usually via a grant from God); Democracy it is the individual citizen (We the People,...). You would argue that if we could just gain total control of the country we could impose the type of systematic legitimacy we desire (When you've got them by the balls, their hearts and minds will follow). I believe that our experiences in both Iraq and Afghanistan prove that this is not possible.

As long as we maintain pressure and offer material support the Afghan government will maintain the illusion of democracy. Once that pressure is gone it will return to what others have called "natural stability" - a homeostasis where the legitimacy the people prefer and the legitimacy of the government will more closely align.

As for how we moved from stability to democracy, I will refer you to an article from the Military Review, Policy, COIN Doctrine, and Political Legitimacy , for a more complete description of that process.

I don't believe that you and I are going to agree, but we don't have to.

[Bob's World]

American Pride, you may want to consider a nuanced change of that handle to American Hubris.

What does this have to do with legitimacy? And what kind of legitimacy is necessary? In entering Afghanistan, the US had legal, political, and moral legitimacy, at least according to the norms of the globalized West, in retailation for terrorist attacks on its soil.

You seem to believe that what is legal is also proper. You also are assessing "legitimacy" from the wrong perspective. What is perceived anywhere outside of Afghanistan is totally irrelevant for purposes of the stability of governance there inside of Afghanistan.

Did we have legal legitimacy? Certainly, but then we are in charge of what is legal or illegal for these types of activities, so that is a bit of a false flag to operate under. I suspect if the Chinese or the Russians would have done the same thing for the same reasons we would have found their activities to be illegal.

It can be good to control the law, but never confuse operating within laws one controls with also making ones operations under those laws proper.

We never, however, had "political legitimacy." Perhaps with the American populace, but again, the perspective of the American populace is only important for purposes of stability in America. Did the Northern Alliance /GIRoA patron populace recognize the legitmacy of our actions to lift and sustain them in power? Probably, though even their patience is wearing thin as we ignore what they think is important to pursue and focus on what we think is important.

But we never had, and never will have, political legitimacy with the other half of Afghan society that we deposed from patronage power through our actions. And that is the half of society where the insurgency is coming from.

Just like your assessment of the nature of governance in North Korea in an earlier post. Certainly it looks pretty bad in the DPRK from what we know here in America, and as assessed through the lens of what an American thinks the standards for good or legitimate or effective governance are. But truthfully, we have no real idea how the people of the DPRK perceive or feel about their government. Surely some are not happy, but we don't know who, how many, what groups they might represent, or how significant those perceptions are. To me DPRK looks like a classic case of artifical stability, much like what exists in the KSA; but the reality is that DPRK may very well have fairly natural stability. It is much easier to operate at a lower standard when people don't know any better. The more informed the people are, the higher the standard is that governments must strive for in order to either maintain order through an artifical system (where security forces have the primary mission of protecting the government from the people), or naturally stable systems (where security forces have the primary mission of proctecting the people from each other in the day to day purusit of life, liberty and happiness as defined by that culture).

Cheers,

Bob

[AmericanPride]

@Curmudgeon: I accept your definition of legitimacy ("founded in the values a person holds true, is in internal motivator"). And I agree with you about coercion, force, suppression, etc.

But I don't see how the acceptance of whatever form of established governance by an arbitrary percentage of the population's version of "legitimacy" is necessary or relevant to achieve the definied military objectives and political outcomes. If anything, the lesson from Afghanistan is that clear and achieveable aims are necessary, must be communicated to every level of government, and should avoid mission creep (i.e. how stability become democratization). Is it an "illusion" of democracy? Or a "military state"? Does it matter?

If it's true, as Bob states, that "what is perceived anywhere outside of Afghanistan is totally irrelevant for purposes of the stability of governance there inside of Afghanistan", then we should not be concerned with legitimacy at all. Our focus should be exclusively on the fulfillment of our own interests, legitimated by Afghans or not. And if the Afghans get something out of it, good for them.

You would argue that if we could just gain total control of the country we could impose the type of systematic legitimacy we desire

To some extent I would argue that; but as I've stated, I'm less concerned about "legitimacy" than I am about outcome. Can the objectives be achieved without "legitimacy"? If so, then why are we concerned about it? And if the "legitimacy" of the local population is unattainable, why is it an objective?

As Bob stated:

But we never had, and never will have, political legitimacy with the other half of Afghan society that we deposed from patronage power through our actions. And that is the half of society where the insurgency is coming from.

If both of these statements are true, then what other recourse is there other than the use of force? When there is a collision between two equal forces, who or what decides the outcome? There are no common frameworks for US and opposition actions (i.e. legal structures, norms and values, etc); so who is legitimate and who is illegitimate? So, really, it comes down to who gains the material advantage and who suspends his actions because the material cost is not worth the gain of continued conflict -- legitimation for either party will not aid in the conflict unless there is a direct material advantage cultivated from having "legitimacy" (however measured). And if we're going to investigate the meaning of "legitimacy" why do we assume that the occupants of any defined area of land have any more legitimate right to deciding political outcomes than anyone else? If "what is perceived anywhere outside of Afghanistan is totally irrelevant" then we must also dispose of any Western metrics that measure the organization, values, and behavior of Afghan political actors; up to and including the idea that any "tribe" or "nation" within Afghanistan is at all relevant to the formulation and achievement of our political goals outside of their impact on our own interests. That is, if "legitimacy" and the things that constitute it are transitory, then they are disposable, and if they are disposable, why are we concerned with preserving them if that comes at the costs of our own interests?

American Pride, you may want to consider a nuanced change of that handle to American Hubris.

@Bob:It's not hubris. I don't think America has any special rights or dispensations. I think every government has interests, and every government will pursue its interests while it has the power and freedom to do so. That America, with its power and freedom, failed to articulate and achieve any meaningful objectives in Afghanistan over 12 years is a strong signal that America should beware of hubris.

[TheCurmudgeon]

So, really, it comes down to who gains the material advantage and who suspends his actions because the material cost is not worth the gain of continued conflict -- legitimation for either party will not aid in the conflict unless there is a direct material advantage cultivated from having "legitimacy" (however measured).

Here you have distilled the fundamental problem with the United States Army on the macro level. We are all about the how, we don't think about the why. Let me explain.

The US Army's mission is to fight and win America's wars. It defines winning on a military level - destroying the enemy's ability to continue to fight by destroying his material war-making ability: how an enemy fights. We design tactics and strategies to destroy his planes, tanks, and weapons and eliminate his fuel and industry so he can no longer support his war machine. The logical result is surrender. It is a material based strategy, and one we have perfected though our wealth, industry, and technology.

But it is not designed to look at why an enemy fights. It is designed to take and hold land, not win over the population. This is perfectly reasonable since the outcome of major wars since the industrial revolution have been largely centered on material advantage, as almost any foreign policy realist will remind you. But recently that changed. In the last hundred years or so there have been instances where the big industrialized power could not defeat a materially lessor enemy. That is because we were not fighting to win the why.

And if we're going to investigate the meaning of "legitimacy" why do we assume that the occupants of any defined area of land have any more legitimate right to deciding political outcomes than anyone else?

No, we don't have to. We did not with the American Indians, we just killed them off and then re-educated them more in line with what we thought were the proper morals and values - what we believed made a government legitimate. The English did the same in the Boar war. It was a common tactic, until it no longer became politically viable at home. Historically speaking, Mai Lai should have been the way things got done in Vietnam and that tactic probably would have worked in the long term. Remove those who think you are wrong and all that is left in the population are those who think you are right or who are to scared to get involved. But it was not an acceptable way for a democracy to act at home. It is not that we can't win, it is that we no longer feel that winning using these methods is an acceptable way for a modern Army to act.

If "what is perceived anywhere outside of Afghanistan is totally irrelevant" then we must also dispose of any Western metrics that measure the organization, values, and behavior of Afghan political actors; up to and including the idea that any "tribe" or "nation" within Afghanistan is at all relevant to the formulation and achievement of our political goals outside of their impact on our own interests.

Yes, and no. Certain western ideas, like the nation, are primarily western ideas and we have imposed them on the rest of the world. We are now suffering the revenge of the map makers as the lines we drew for convenience turn out to be inaccurate in terms of reality. But a Tribe is a Tribe everywhere.

That is, if "legitimacy" and the things that constitute it are transitory, then they are disposable, and if they are disposable, why are we concerned with preserving them if that comes at the costs of our own interests?

Legitimacy, like the values you hold dear, is not disposable. Would you walk away from all you believe is right and good tomorrow because someone asked you too? Are your beliefs in right and wrong transitory? Would you be willing to fight with an army that believed that rape was an acceptable tactical technique, and participate in the rape of women as part of your duties as a Soldier? Or would you fight against those who felt that tactic was acceptable. Don't discount the power of simply being human.

[omarali50]

Zaid Hamid explains the Paknationalist viewpoint about Afghanistan

http://www.brownpundits.com/2013/05/...medium=twitter

The US expedition to Afghanistan has been awful in many ways. The Pakistan expedition even worse (for Pakistan and Afghanistan), both in its US supported and financed phase and in its more ambiguous recent phase. But is it possible that both Pakistan and the US (or enough influential people in both..obviously they are not unities) can still learn enough to make the next phase less of a disaster?

[mustardobardo]

I wrote out a big long reply to this, but then my computer crashed so I'm going to keep this one short. I think the definition of legitimacy needs revisiting in terms of its importance to counterinsurgency. I am working on a thesis attempting to create a model of insurgent conflict that incorporates the population and both repressive and soft government approaches.

Legitimacy can have the value-laden meaning put forward in this debate so far, but more important is legitimacy derived from being able to back up your words with actions. This lends itself to understanding legitimacy from a political economy perspective rather than a normative one.

The oppressive government that chooses to obliterate population centres associated with insurgent groups needs to convince the population that it will do so if it has to have the desired effect, namely force the population to stop supporting the insurgent group.

The same still applies to governments who attempt to use the softer 'carrot' approach. Socioeconomic improvements and good governance are only going to have the desired effect if the government can legitimately claim to be able to keep providing them in the long term. Upon doing that the population will change its behaviour in order to maintain access to these incentives - one aspect of which will be the provision of security (the military aspect of the ops).

In Afghanistan the first option was, for good reason, not available to us. So we had to pursue to softer approach. We lost legitimacy not because we held fundamentally different beliefs to the Afghan people but because we did not provide the positive changes we promised. Largely because we placed in power a whole load of people who had no incentive to alter their behaviour to make those changes.

Democracy to this end does not create legitimacy because it idealises freedom, but because it creates a mechanism for the people to hold the government to account for failed promises. This makes the government more likely to adhere to promised improvements, knowing it will be removed if it does not. This makes long-term promises more legitimate. In Afghanistan they are rejecting democracy not because it does not sit right with their beliefs, but because democracy to them has just seen the same old people returned to power and made them powerless to resist - other than through the insurgency, which is only attractive to a few. Perhaps this is our big mistake in the West, being single minded in that democracy is the only way to create this mechanism - without understanding how more traditional systems of government create the same effect and better incorporate these into the system of government in Afghanistan.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Democracy to this end does not create legitimacy because it idealises freedom, but because it creates a mechanism for the people to hold the government to account for failed promises.

Not really, that is a common misconception. Democracies are designed to allow the general population the ability to have input in the political process, but it really does not hold anyone responsible for anything. It is too slow. In the American Federal system people are elected for two to six years. Once elected, it is very difficult to get someone out. If it was really designed to hold people accountable it would have a recall process that would be on a regular basis. I can only think of one recent instance of that happening, and it was a state governor, not a federal Senator, Representative, or President.

[jcustis]

Gents,

Talk of democracy, legitimacy, chicken and eggs, is fascinating and deep stuff, but I am going to prune it off into its own thread shortly.

Please take a tactical time out and reserve this thread for discussions of more concrete Afghanistan issues.

[mustardobardo]

Not really, that is a common misconception. Democracies are designed to allow the general population the ability to have input in the political process, but it really does not hold anyone responsible for anything. It is too slow. In the American Federal system people are elected for two to six years. Once elected, it is very difficult to get someone out. If it was really designed to hold people accountable it would have a recall process that would be on a regular basis. I can only think of one recent instance of that happening, and it was a state governor, not a federal Senator, Representative, or President.

Before we get canned - you are confusing practice and theory. First, two to six years is very regular in political terms. Moreover, democracy is 100% designed to allow the general population to hold politicians to account - do individuals find ways to subvert that mechanism, absolutely. And it is to the detriment of our systems that we have not updated them over the years to iron out these kinks. When that happens though the system is no longer democratic. However, because that happens so often in practice it does not take away from the fact that democracy's principle purpose is to create a responsive and accountable government.

In terms of Afghanistan I think this is a fundamental question. In Afghanistan we were too quick to equate democracy/elections with good governance, and that led to rushing through a poorly designed constitution that did not in anyway reflect the structure of society in Afghanistan. This led to 'democracy' being coopted by vicious powerbrokers rather than having a pacifiying effect on them as we would hope, essentially making the government as undemocratic as ever. Good governance is the absolute key to defeating an insurgency through the methods we espouse. If you make improvements in that area everything else falls into place because you create a bottom-up pressure on the insurgency to use political means to support those it claims to represent. The biggest lesson we need to learn is that you cannot take short cuts on making sure that the system of government reflects and mitigates potential cleavages in society. We have suffered every minute of this campaign and are still suffering today from our failure to do this in 2002, and one way or another the highly centralised formal system of government we currently see in Afghanistan cannot last.

[KenWats]

Not really, that is a common misconception. Democracies are designed to allow the general population the ability to have input in the political process, but it really does not hold anyone responsible for anything. It is too slow. In the American Federal system people are elected for two to six years. Once elected, it is very difficult to get someone out. If it was really designed to hold people accountable it would have a recall process that would be on a regular basis. I can only think of one recent instance of that happening, and it was a state governor, not a federal Senator, Representative, or President.

I would disagree with you, to a point. Gross abuses (like say, former representative Weiner, former Governor Spitzer, etc- I'm offering these examples because they're on my mind and somewhat familiar to me) can be called to account in a representative system by putting pressure on their associates who are up for reelection soon. If Elliot Spitzer was Saddam Hussein's brother in law, I have no doubt he would have been left in his position.