What will our expedition to Afghanistan teach us?

[Bill Moore]

Every "lesson learned" I have seen so far coming out of our involvement in this conflict has been extremely tactical in nature. "How do we do the wrong thing better."

The lessons not learned, however, are:

1. Punitive Expeditions work.

2. "King Making" has been obsolete for at least 100 years, it is time to retire that COA.

3. "Fixing" some foreign culture where one has no legitimacy to undertake such a program is hubris and folly. Particularly when the concept of what "fixed" looks like is based upon the history, culture and perspective of the fixer, rather than the fixee.

I could add more, but those are my top three.

No issue with any of these, and it seems to me that if we would have embraced these 3 lessons as principles to guide our foreign policy we would seen very few or no failures with our interventions. Time for our leaders to stop selling the COIN snake oil.

[KingJaja]

I'm not an expert on Afghanistan (I'm from faraway Africa), but I think the most important lesson, which the West should heed is this:

A nation is a working social contract and US Military might and aid dollars cannot create a working social contract from scratch. You can create the apparatus of a state quite easily, but you cannot create its essence - that is left for the citizenry.

Another thing Americans don't understand is that so many states in Africa and Asia are legacies of colonial rule, they lack working social contracts - and Western aid money, "counter-insurgency efforts" and military intervention CANNOT create working social contracts.

The biggest delusion of the Western foreign policy elite is that "democracy can create a working social contract" - it cannot, classical example is Mali - elections in Mali will do that State no good, it is a nation more in theory than in fact.

The World's many artificial states will have to work out their own "Peace of Westphalia" - and there is absolutely nothing the US can do about it, except try to truncate the process via "intervention".

[Bob's World]

KingJaja - Good points all.

[Morgan]

What will our Afghanistan expedition teach us:
- Hopefully, it will teach us to have a strategy for winning, or at the very least, a clear goal (as many on SWJ have commented about)
- That sometimes a smaller force (SOF-oriented) is better than a huge force (GPF-oriented). Perhaps following the Central America force-cap of 55 is a better model to follow in the future
- That being more senior in rank doesn't necessarily equate to being more experienced or more knowledgeable
- That if hell-bent on executing COIN, then understanding the language and culture are pretty fraking important (I know JCustis will disagree)
- That micromanagement from multiple levels of bureaucracy does more harm than good
- That if all else fails, wearing a yellow safety belt seems to fix everything (seriously!!)

[Bob's World]

First we must redefine "winning" for internal conflicts. For me it is simply this: "Not preserving some regime; not defeating some threat; but rather winning is increasing the percentage of the popolation who perceive themselves to be included in the overall solution."

In Afghanistan we merely flipped the table and expected the ousted 50% to lay down. Afghans don't lay down.

[jcustis]

- That if hell-bent on executing COIN, then understanding the language and culture are pretty fraking important (I know JCustis will disagree)

I'm typically more dramatic about that topic than I probably should be. I should probably temper my distate for the snake oil sales pitch over culture and language by saying that I'd take a sharp, motivated linguist every time, over a lengthy spin-up package delivered by the culture pimps based at the mission rehearsal sites, or Quantico.

The culture pimps are a fleeting nuisance for commanders who are forced to endure the mandatory training before deployment, at a time when their schedules are already crushed.

Linguists can (and usually do) form powerful bonds that are a better return on investment. That's where the cultural immersion and language should come from.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I should probably temper my distate for the snake oil sales pitch over culture and language by saying that I'd take a sharp, motivated linguist every time, over a lengthy spin-up package delivered by the culture pimps based at the mission rehearsal sites, or Quantico.

The culture pimps are a fleeting nuisance for commanders who are forced to endure the mandatory training before deployment, at a time when their schedules are already crushed.

JCustis, I am going to heartily, and respectfully, disagree with you. Returning to the macro level I am not sure the (US) military, as currently configured and run, has any business getting involved in these types of operations. They can effect regime change, that is easy. They cannot effect the social engineering, modernization, and nation creating necessary in a place like Afghanistan. It is well beyond their training and certainly beyond their temperament. I have heard more than one commander assess his unit's capability based on their historic body count. You are not going to change that attitude with some cultural awareness training.

I agree with KingJaja. What we are attempting to achieve, a democratic Afghanistan, is not something we can accomplish. It is something the Afghans have to do for themselves on their own timeline (if ever). It is the ultimate in Imperial Hubris to believe we can do this.

That does not mean we never get involved. That means that we are more realistic about what military force can accomplish and what it can't.

The military will remain the default organization to go to when things go to #### in a far away country. We, as members of the military, need to stop thinking "here is my chance to kick some ass" and start thinking "maybe this is something that we do not have the capability to do" -- and then have the balls to tell our civilian leadership that. It will be easier for the next decade or so but as those who have never been to war start to get in positions of power their is the inevitable erg to push the limits.