Insurgents vs Terrorists -- Is there a difference?

[emjayinc]

SWC Thread Center of Gravity Construct #82 has Jedburg link to Kilcullen paper that kind of pulls together much of what you all have discussed, very educationally for me. Especially noted that terrorists and insurgents in modern warfare can and do operate in ways that make it important to know, if possible, which one you've got in your sights. But also that the buggers may switch back and forth, depending on the strategic state of play. My first post, beg pardon if someone made this point earlier and I've missed it.

[Bill Moore]

Gentlemen,

With all due respect to the years of expertise gained through academia and muddy boots field work, I find it both alarming and refreshing we can't agree on to define insurgents and terrorists. Scary because I think it paralyzes us to some degree, as there are clearly different strategies for countering insurgents and terrorists. We all know one size doesn't fit all.

Refreshing in the sense that inability to agree may hopefully lead us to disregard the sometimes futile effort of trying to categorize the enemy, and instead more accurately describe the threat without the legacy terms and baggage that goes with them.

Let's face it, in the government these terms are tied to mandates, laws, and funding issues. If it is terrorism, then this organization owns it (and the funding that goes with it), if it an insurgency, then that one, if criminal then another one. We have a way of defining problems that tends to fit the interest of our organization, not so much our national security.

[marct]

Hi Bill,

With all due respect to the years of expertise gained through academia and muddy boots field work, I find it both alarming and refreshing we can't agree on to define insurgents and terrorists. Scary because I think it paralyzes us to some degree, as there are clearly different strategies for countering insurgents and terrorists. We all know one size doesn't fit all.

Refreshing in the sense that inability to agree may hopefully lead us to disregard the sometimes futile effort of trying to categorize the enemy, and instead more accurately describe the threat without the legacy terms and baggage that goes with them.

I know that Steve has been working on a think piece coming out of this thread, and I'm looking forward to it (hint, hint).

Bill, I think that your comment has captured the core difficulty with taxonomies, which is how the terms "terrorist" and "insurgent" tend to be used. By relying on definitions that conflate goals and operational tactics, I think we are locked into a reactive model that is poorly adapted to current realities.

Possibly more dangerous, at least in the long term, is that each evocation of a particular toxon, say "terrorist", will tend to also evoke its polar opposite, say "freedom fighter". In situations where these terms are highly politically charged, and you also have a polarized political scene, this means that you inevitably generate support for any group labeled "terrorist" simply because the people labeling it that are opposed politically. It's one of those "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" pieces of "logic".

Let's face it, in the government these terms are tied to mandates, laws, and funding issues. If it is terrorism, then this organization owns it (and the funding that goes with it), if it an insurgency, then that one, if criminal then another one. We have a way of defining problems that tends to fit the interest of our organization, not so much our national security.

This is one of the reasons I am arguing for a matrix organization in the GCOIN environment. Put another way, we are dealing with trans-national, non-state actors so why are our response units based on states (see this thread)? Country teams make a certain amount of sense when most players are nation states or alliances of nation states, but little sense when dealing with non-state actors.

Bill, you are quite right in saying that "We have a way of defining problems that tends to fit the interest of our organization", and one way to get around that problem is to create a new institutional mindset and organizational forms to go with it. Why, for example, should membership in an operational or "project" team be restricted to Americans? For example, we can be fairly certain that radical Islamist groups are "fund raising" through defrauding government tax programs. The EU has already noted this publicly, and the Canadian government is also looking at it. The operational tactics of this type of defrauding are very similar and are operating through trans-national networks and, in my opinion, our responses should be as well.

Marc

[slapout9]

Marc, to a certain extent this is already being done. In Alabama criminal gangs,terrorist,hate groups are being pooled under the title "Security Threat Groups". Task forces are often organized a long the lines of what you call Matix management. Some of the most successful that I have seen personally are in the area of domestic violence/stalking cases. We used to have the DA who would prosecute the case plus a victim advocate and the primary investigator all assigned to the same prosecution team and would work through to conviction.

[Merv Benson]

Rather than tie ourselves in knots over describing the enemy, it is clear to me that whether they are called Insurgents or terrorist they are using a raiding strategy. The response to a raiding strategy is what we are now seeing in Baghdad with a troops surge that has a high concentration of force to space in the area where the enemy wants to operate. Their are check points to make movement to contact more difficult for the enemy. Troops patrol the area to look for the enemy and also make his movement more difficult. The enemy is most vulnerable when he is trying to move and these tactics inhibit movement.

The enemy in Iraq has shown little interest in a hearts and minds strategy. He seeks to dominate through intimidation in much the same way Saddam did when he was in power. Those facts argue in favor of calling him a terrorist. But what ever you call him he is still a raider.

[Bill Moore]

I think the "raider" strategy is a gross attempt at over simplifying the threat, nor does it offer much in designing a counter strategy. The enemy raids, infiltrates, occuppies, defends, establishes parallel shadow governments, etc. We're not fighting a one trick pony. If the only response to a so called raider strategy is to saturate the area, then we have lost, because we can only saturate so much area for so long. I'll meet you half way and admit the enemy uses raiding as one line of operation, and that robust population control measures will impede that line of operation, but the enemy will quickly adapt to the measures, and then we'll develop counter measures, and so the game is played.

The enemy is focused on the population, and we seem to forget there is more than one way to skin a cat. You can attempt to win the populations' good will, or you can demand it through coercion. Is it terror? Of course, but is also an insurgent strategy. Not all insurgents embrace Mao's little book, even Mao didn't follow it. You can swim in the sea by joining a school of fish and blending in, or you can become a shark and swim where you like.

We accept too way too many ideas as scared principles, when they are far from it. You don't have to win the hearts and minds. Did the Russians win the hearts and minds in Eastern Europe? Did Mao really win the hearts and minds? His new biography is revealing.

[marct]

Rather than tie ourselves in knots over describing the enemy, it is clear to me that whether they are called Insurgents or terrorist they are using a raiding strategy. The response to a raiding strategy is what we are now seeing in Baghdad with a troops surge that has a high concentration of force to space in the area where the enemy wants to operate.

Merv, I wold certainly agree with Bill that "raiding" is a tactical option rather than a strategy. Some of the confusion here might be coming fromn the specifics: "raiding", in the sense of a cultural adaptation, is quite commong amongst pastoralist groups (I'm not going to go into lecture mode, so don't worry ). Even historically, however, "raiding" aimed at shaping the "hearts and minds" of the population that was being raided. Check out the Epic of Gilgamesh if you want an early example from Iraq. The point behind the tactic, however, was to get access to resources that the pastoralists had difficulty producing themselves; it's not a "war" strategy except in certain very limited cases.

Furthermore, and again with the historical examples, the set piece defense or saturation, doesn't work in the long term. As with most strategies of this type, you have to bind the raiders into a coalition or alliance system, historically usually based around kinship (see how Alexander dealt with the Sogdians). The trick is always to get enough of these groups into that alliance and use them against the ones who won't join. In modern Iraq, that would translate to getting a solid buy-in from the vast majority of the Tribal Sheiks and using them against the AQ crowd.

The enemy in Iraq has shown little interest in a hearts and minds strategy. He seeks to dominate through intimidation in much the same way Saddam did when he was in power. Those facts argue in favor of calling him a terrorist. But what ever you call him he is still a raider.

Here I have to disagree with you completely. Many of the insurgents are following their cultural codes. Check out an article by LtC Craig T. Trebilcock called The Seven Pillars of Modern Iraq in the February issue of Army Magazine. While I don't agree with everything he says (I think he is way too far over the edge in many of his comments), he does capture many of the realities of tribal life.

Domination through a "balance of terror" is nothing new. This is standard practice in many pastoralist cultures, and has certainly been the practice in many Western cultures as well. I think you are making a categorical error if you equate "Hearts and Minds" with "Bunnies and Light" .

Marc