And when a bad guy pulls out his weapon to participate in an RPG party against a wayward convoy one day, and then drives an explosive-laden Caprice Classic into a crowded market the next (under directives from a centralized cmd) he can be both, depending upon interpretation.
Semantics aside, they are both bad, and both need to be dispatched with careful precision.
If you are fighting a simple terrorist without popular backing than you are right.Originally Posted by jcustis
If you are talking about a terrorist-fighter within an insurgency movement it can be better not to kill him (i think that is what you mean by "dispatching") but to get him over to your side. Than you get the most valuable Actionable Intelligence you can get and you may be able to drain the insurgency.
I would also add a geographic component to the discussion. Insurgents tend to operate in (or near) the region they are rising against/in, while terrorists (in the classic sense) are trans-national. They operate where and when they can. The contention that terrorists have a centralized command structure is also something of a misnomer. They can and do operate as independent units without a central command aside from a shared ideology, while insurgents can have a central command structure.
It's also important to mark a difference between a terrorist and terrorist-like methods. Insurgencies can use terrorism as a weapon, but they are not classic terrorists in my view. Insurgents have a geographic focus or base of operations, while terrorists can, but do not have to.
I think the confusion arises because terrorism is a tool as well as a group naming methodology. One can use terroristic tactics without being a terrorist, and this applies to insurgents and organized crime elements alike.
There are a number of other differences as well, but I'd need to organize my thoughts a bit better. Perhaps the biggest (to me) lies in the realm of legitimacy or perceived legitimacy. Insurgents often have (or can present themselves to have) legitimate and justified complaints against the regime existing in their region (usually tied to concrete and achievable changes or goals), while a terrorist group may have a political/ideological "goal" or "statement," but its objectives are usually Utopian or unachievable. By the second generation, most groups use these "goals" simply to justify more killing and bloodshed, and they become more nebulous and unattainable. Tom's use of extremist is good, but that term also does not convey the level of violence that a fully mature terrorist group can and will use.
Because of the political nature of many terrorist groups, you will often find disenchanted members joining an insurgency, or even providing training to such groups.
Hi Folks,
'fraid we can't "leave the semantics aside" JC. "Semantics" = "meaning", and if we don't have some solid, agreed upon meanings, then we might as well just say "let's kill all the bad guys" (yeah, I know, Bubba says "YEAH!"). Besides that, the more accurate we are in our terms, the more likely we are to be able to use them to produce accurate models that will generate a "win" situation. "Semantics is your FRIEND!"
Generally I'd agree with you on this, Steve. I think that it may be importan to note that what bis really important is the "authority relationship" that is the basis for an insurgency. Certainly, in the past, this has meant that insurgencies had to operate geographically but, would suggest, that not all of them do now what with rapid global communications. A "community of practice" can exist globally and so, in my mind, can an insurgency.
Absolutely!
I'll look forward to those thoughts
Marc
Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
Senior Research Fellow,
The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
Carleton University
http://marctyrrell.com/
Last time I heard this was at a data modeling meeting. One government type complained that one of our SMEs was "harping on about semantics". Which was funny as the entire point of a data model is agreeing on the meaning of things.'fraid we can't "leave the semantics aside" JC
On the terrorist V. insurgent argument I have always been a bit troubled when we treat these words as synonyms. The Germans actually issued an order directing everyone to refer to the French resistance as terrorists. An insurgent is not necessarily a terrorist nor is a terrorist necessarily an insurgent.
All military forces have used tactics to frighten its opponents. The use of a siege or the naval blockade of Germany in WWI and the very real fear of starvation could arguably be called a terrorist tactic. But only in the case that it causes fear in the target audience and will cause them to change their behavior (oops, my Psyop is showing). Yet a naval blockade is a legitimate tactic.
In a case more relevant today, the fear that ones house could be destroyed by a PGM or other bomb, with ones family in it, because insurgents are using your neighbors house to operate out of can be a cause of terror. This is not to say that bombing enemy C2 installations is a terrorist tactic, but it can cause terror.
I would think that it is the intent of the attack that differentiates between a legitimate military action and a terrorist attack. Of course that begs the question of defining intent.
It is right to learn, even from one's enemies
Ovid
I've heard of many reports of Soldiers and marines returning from war, going crazy and opening fire on people in america, recently as well. How do you intend to deal with those murderers in your midst?
Same way as you'd deal with any other kind of murderer right? thought so.
Ain't There No Mechanics On Hand??
Lordy-be, those two guys are listening for engine rattle - lifters/rods/valves not seating properly, etc. A good mechanic can walk by an idling engine and tell you if its timing is off. Listen close and they can do more diagnostics than you would believe. I bet they each got a pack of Salems for their troubles too. The gunner is bored sh**less looking around, away from his weapon and this is supposed to be a propoganda piece? If it was going to be propoganda for our side at least they should have been given a wrench to hold in their hands.
Ok I'll bite, which reports are those? I don't recall news reports of military personnel opening fire on groups of people after their return from Iraq. Admittedly I only follow the US and UK, and a bit of Australian press on a regular basis so I may have missed it.
It is right to learn, even from one's enemies
Ovid
So you can't answer the original question? Somehow this doesn't surprise me. In fact, I'd be surprised if you even considered the premise of the original question, or the history behind it.
In any case, this thread has wandered well off-topic. I'd say we get back on topic or lock the thread.
"On the plains and mountains of the American West, the United States Army had once learned everything there was to learn about hit-and-run tactics and guerrilla warfare."
T.R. Fehrenbach This Kind of War
Good idea! My thinking is that it is the intent of the attack that differentiates between a legitimate military action and a terrorist attack. Thus intent is important in terrorist v. insurgent in the same way that the Common Law tradition differentiates between murder and manslaughter.
It is right to learn, even from one's enemies
Ovid
Insurgents and Terrorists
I can better relate to Steve's recent posting, but Bruz, Marc, and Tom hit home equally well.I would also add a geographic component to the discussion.
I can comment on insurgents from an African and later Estonian point of view.
Where Tom would end up for his last tour in paradise, there were basically two factions, and the outcome was fairly clear. But in Zaire, there were more than 400 tribes. Even though only a handful were more powerful, they still were unable to convice the rest to go along. Intimidation or religious belief was not nearly enough. The money was worthless, so that's out. Exactly what's left ?
In Estonia the insurgents are all now deep into politics. Much like Zaire, the parties and beliefs vary to the point, that it makes the whole process to complicated and only a civil war would break the tie.
Perhaps I'm wrong, but if you have 400 factions that all have a different view on things, how then would say one of the 400 create an effective uprising (insurgency), if the other 399 didn't care ?
It is geography as Steve put so well. Perhaps the Arab insurgents use the Americans to gain momentum and create a stir. That won't work where I am now as well as in Sub-Sahara. The Africans hated the Belg and French, but you still could not get all 400 tribes to agree.
Regards, Stan
Slightly more organized...
There are, in my view, some basic differences between a terrorist and an insurgent. As mentioned before, to my way of thinking the first of these is geography. I also view both terms as neutral in the great scheme of things. There can, from some perspectives, be “good” terrorists and “bad” insurgents, as well as the reverse.
I don't deny the impact of “global community” thought with this, but the relationship between “struggle with authority” (however that may be defined) and a group based on a particular tribe or local issue is to me at the heart of an insurgency. Once it begins leaving local borders, and takes on the trappings of the “global community,” it may well cross into a trans-national insurgency or terrorism. To be more precise, it may become a trans-national insurgent group or terrorist group. I make a distinction between terrorist tactics and methods (terrorism) and groups that practice terrorism.
The base of a typical insurgency remains geographic. While they may solicit outside support and assistance, their goals remain reasonably local (nationalized land holdings, revoking nationalized land holdings, correction of perceived or real social wrongs, and so on). If outsiders can help attain those goals, or distract the local “powers that be,” an insurgent group will use them. I would also argue that while some insurgent groups may have a loose command and control network (although this is not always the case), they still feel responsible to a fixed goal or vision. This is also something that can be easily measured (like the goals mentioned before). Tribal insurgencies, as Stan points out, may have issues getting off the ground, but each tribe remains fairly fixed in its goals and objectives. By this measure, groups like ETA may actually straddle the fence between terrorists and insurgents.
This geographic focus also places, to my view, some limits on the methods an insurgency can employ. These limits are determined more by their base constituency or recruiting pool, and not so much by outside considerations. For example, an insurgency would lose momentum if it continually committed atrocities against its own core population (this is, of course, assuming that the insurgency is not being controlled by others and used for their own ends...my thought here is the Viet Cong by about 1965, although the transition could have taken place earlier). Once they take that step, they become more committed to terrorist methods and the basic profile changes.
Terrorists, on the other hand, have goals and objectives that cannot be easily measured or attained (bringing Ireland under a Socialist/Marxist/whatever government, for example). For them geography is a consideration but not a focus. Also, these groups tend to spin out of control over time, becoming much more hazy in their goals and more violent in their methods. They become, in short, addicted to the killing (their own methods) and less focused on what those methods are supposed to achieve. Some insurgencies (like the ETA, the Khmer Rouge, and others) transition into terrorist groups as their goals become less clear and their methods more violent and less focused.
To me, a trans-national insurgency runs the very real risk of becoming a terrorist group because they lose that geographic focus. One of the first signs of a terrorist group spinning out of control is the conversion to a more hazy political or socio-political goal. “Global Community”-type insurgencies would be especially vulnerable to this, as their leadership would be dispersed and more open to influence by more radical (or extremist) elements. And once they start shedding their self-imposed limits, they run the real risk of falling into the classic terrorist spiral of violence.
Just some slightly more organized thoughts...
I would further propose that a great deal of what we see now is a more evolved form of terrorism, considering the base that the recruiting efforts are tapping into. Iraq is, for the most part (in my view) a variety of insurgency in terms of the geographic components and social objectives of most groups involved, but it is also vulnerable to the terrorist sway I mentioned earlier.
You know, Steve, I still have that caveat about geography
In Iraq, I would tend to agree with you that it is a variety of insurgency. On that note, however, I think that we need to create a new term to cover what we have been calling "criminal enterprises". The main reason for creating a new term is that calling something "criminal" means that there must be a generally accepted legal code, and that isn't the case in many failed or failing states. I would further suggest that a "criminal enterprise" is, in actuality, a tactical option in the same way as terrorism is a tactical option. So, if we are going to "build a better mousetrap" (model), then we should clearly distinguish betwen tactics and group motivations.
Marc
Sic Bisquitus Disintegrat...
Marc W.D. Tyrrell, Ph.D.
Institute of Interdisciplinary Studies,
Senior Research Fellow,
The Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, NPSIA
Carleton University
http://marctyrrell.com/
Marc,
I do believe in the construct of what I call a trans-national insurgency, but I also feel that once you start spreading past certain geographic areas you cross from insurgency into terrorism. We may just agree to disagree here...
Criminal enterprises...now there's an interesting one. Terrorist groups use these sorts of activities to finance their operations, so the two clearly mix. I do feel that there is a difference between an organized criminal activity (such as the Mafia or larger cartels) and smaller ones that crop up in unstable locations. Perhaps "organized crime" might be a better term for the "criminal enterprises" in disorganized territories, with the enterprise term limited to the criminal tactics and not the organization.
Al Qaeda is the CIA's tool.
The Iraqi resistance does not and will not associate with them.
That being said, i think the real terrorists are the state terrorist imperialist occupiers.
Long live the resistance.
That's an opinion we don't get around here every day.
Line 1 - that's just wacky.
Line 2 - increasingly so! Anything more to say? Maybe in this forum?
Line 3 - where you sit is often where you stand
Line 4 - see #3. But one day when you're not resisting, what will you do?
When my grandfather fought and defeated the occupation of our country, he lived out the rest of his life in peace.
What's really wacky is your ignore the connections between the CIA and Osama bin ladin, just as you ignore the connections between the CIA and Saddam. Go watch your hate minute winston.
Where i stand is against injustice, whether it's near my seat or not. Thankyou.
Last edited by Thepartisan; 06-03-2007 at 03:01 AM.
I'm going to say the same thing to you as I have to others:When my grandfather fought and defeated the occupation of our country, he lived out the rest of his life in peace.
What's really wacky is your ignore the connections between the CIA and Osama bin ladin, just as you ignore the connections between the CIA and Saddam. Go watch your hate minute winston.
Where i stand is against injustice, whether it's near my seat or not. Thankyou.
Your postings take on more meaning when we know where you're coming from. Update your profile and introduce yourself in the appropriate thread.
Until then you sound like a college student who is gunning for a history or drama major.
Example is better than precept.
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