Insurgents vs Terrorists -- Is there a difference?

[Tom Odom]

COIN can work very well with Muslims, but it will have no impact on RAF/IRA-type groups.

I agree, Steve. In that realm I look at them as extremists and you cannot alter their mindsets. Certainly terror and terrorism, and terrorists are terms that predate what is called GWOT now. I also agree that GWOT is not the proper term; as you probably recall, there was a brief period where the White House actually started to use extremist. That soon stopped.

But we deal with those same terms as they applied in current context, as the terms terrorist and insurgent were juxtaposed to begin this thread.

My point is simply that the terms terrorists, terrorism, and terror have been used on so many contexts that their meanings muddle rather than clarify. And that confusion seeps into our strategy.

Best
Tom

[kaur]

Here is quite good article, which is trying to define difficult (often emotional) terms.

http://ictconference.org/var/119/170...az%20Ganor.pdf

[GPaulus]

The article you referenced "Defining Terrorism:
Is One Man’s Terrorist Another Man’s Freedom Fighter?
by Boaz Ganoris" is accurate in its definition of Terrorists and groups of Terrrorists. The article rightly defines Terrorism based on three critically important elements:
1. The essence of the activity—the use of, or threat to use, violence. According to this definition, an activity that does not involve violence or a threat of violence will not be defined as terrorism (including non-violent protest—strikes, peaceful demonstrations, tax revolts, etc.).
2. The aim of the activity is always political—namely, the goal is to attain
political objectives; changing the regime, changing the people in power,
changing social or economic policies, etc. In the absence of a political aim, the activity will not be defined as Terrorism. A violent activity against
civilians that has no political aim is, at most, an act of criminal delinquency, a
felony, or simply an act of insanity unrelated to terrorism. I also add ideological aims to the list of political aims. The motivation—whether ideological, or political is relevant for the purpose of defining terrorism. In this
context, the following statement by Duvall and Stohl deserves mention:
Motives are entirely irrelevant to the concept of political terrorism. Most
analysts fail to recognize this and, hence, tend to discuss certain motives as
logical or necessary aspects of terrorism. But they are not. At best, they are
empirical regularities associated with terrorism.
3. The targets of terrorism are always "strategic" and aimed at innocent people (civilians, noncombatants, public servants, military not engaged in hostililites e.g. 'USS Cole'.) Terrorism is thus distinguished from other types of political violence (guerrilla warfare, freedom fighting, civil insurrection, etc.). Terrorism exploits the relative vulnerability of the civilian “underbelly”—the tremendous anxiety, and the intense media reaction evoked by attacks against strategic civilian targets.
4) Terrorist activities transend boundaries where as insurgencies are local within kilometers of the insurgent's base of operation.

The paper does not discuss insurgencies but makes reference to violent activity against civilians that have no political aim as acts of criminal delinquency, a felony, or simply an act of violence aimed at chaos.
1. The essence of the insurgency activity—the use of violence to create chaos and to disrupt lawful activities within a community. According to this definition, an activity that does not involve violence, extortion or a threat of violence will not be defined as an insurgency (including non-violent protest—strikes, peaceful demonstrations, tax revolts, etc.).
2. The aim of the insurgent activity is never political —namely, the goal is not to attain political objectives; changing the regime, changing the people in power, changing social or economic policies, or even winning the "war." It is however, aimed at protractedness and disrupting the lawful act of governance. A violent activity against civilians that has no political aim is included in the definition of insurgency. It is never an ideological struggle. Most analysts fail to recognize this and, hence, tend to discuss certain motives (sectarian, religious, tribal) as logical or necessary aspects of insurgencies. They are not. At best, they are attempts to incite others into the chaos by breeding hatred, mistrust and playing on strongly held belief systems such as religion. That is why religious entities are often targets.
3. The targets of insurgencies are targets of opportunity and "tactical" and although aimed at those that are associated with restoring law and order --they will include attacks on innocent people (civilians, noncombatants, public servants inorder to ensure protractedness. It is the protractedness that provides "Utility" to the insurgent population. Insurgency must also be distinguished from other types of violence (guerrilla warfare, freedom fighters, etc.) and others that have political aims. Insurgencies exploit the vulnerability of security and lack of security for civilians given that a government cannot secure the entire community at the same time.

In the end, it is important that we separate the two in order to effectly understand and engage each.

[slapout9]

In this
context, the following statement by Duvall and Stohl deserves mention:
Motives are entirely irrelevant to the concept of political terrorism. Most
analysts fail to recognize this and, hence, tend to discuss certain motives as
logical or necessary aspects of terrorism. But they are not. At best, they are
empirical regularities associated with terrorism.

This is nonsense! There is always a motive. You may not understand it, but it is there. It answers the question who benefits.

[marct]

2. The aim of the insurgent activity is never political —namely, the goal is not to attain political objectives; changing the regime, changing the people in power, changing social or economic policies, or even winning the "war." It is however, aimed at protractedness and disrupting the lawful act of governance. A violent activity against civilians that has no political aim is included in the definition of insurgency. It is never an ideological struggle. Most analysts fail to recognize this and, hence, tend to discuss certain motives (sectarian, religious, tribal) as logical or necessary aspects of insurgencies. They are not. At best, they are attempts to incite others into the chaos by breeding hatred, mistrust and playing on strongly held belief systems such as religion. That is why religious entities are often targets.

This is nonsense! There is always a motive. You may not understand it, but it is there. It answers the question who benefits.

And, I have to say, that a broad generalization of "The aim of the insurgent activity is never political" is equally nonsense. GP, do you think that Ganoris ever bothered to read Lenin, Mao or Guevera? I find it incredible that anyone who had, or had had studied any history, could make such an outrageous claim.

In the end, it is important that we separate the two in order to effectly understand and engage each.

I certainly agree with the sentiment . I would, however, add in the caveat that such a separation does require that the terms not be completely redefined.

Marc

[jcustis]

And, I have to say, that a broad generalization of "The aim of the insurgent activity is never political" is equally nonsense. GP, do you think that Ganoris ever bothered to read Lenin, Mao or Guevera? I find it incredible that anyone who had, or had had studied any history, could make such an outrageous claim.



I certainly agree with the sentiment . I would, however, add in the caveat that such a separation does require that the terms not be completely redefined.

Marc

I'm with the Canadian...I have no idea where this definition of insurgents is going sir. Maybe it's just not getting through my thick head, but are you really arguing that insurgents do not have political goals?

[GPaulus]

I'm with the Canadian...I have no idea where this definition of insurgents is going sir. Maybe it's just not getting through my thick head, but are you really arguing that insurgents do not have political goals?

Yes that is what is going around in my head--insurgents (at least in Iraq)are apolitical. I believe that insurgents have motives but that their motives are much more primal. I believe that others like freedom fighters, terrorist and others have more of self actualizing goals whereas the insurgents are much more fundamental in their needs. This population can be likened to the criminal gang and organized crime elements more then conventional war fighters or terrorists. The insurgency in Iraq is composed of primarily men 18-40. They tend to be local within a very small territorial range Km from the homes, and recruit their fighters from local talent. When the group gets too large (100+), there may be internal violence, mass killings and rival rifts as members compete for upward mobility. Their “Cause to Die For” is the failure of the government to meet the most basic levels of life. They almost always spawn from decapitated states especially if the levels of basic services do not improve with time. Their cause is never an ideology or idealistic dogma, and therefore they will have the propensity to ebb and flow based on the need of the day and the targets of opportunity. Because they are not driven by a single ideology, members can quickly apostatize. I believe that Insurgency warfare is not politically, ethnically or religiously motivated. Notice how this flies in the face of the conventional war fighter’s paradigm proposed by Clausewitz, “War is the extension of politics by other means.” If a word could describe insurgents, it is self-serving—power, money, lawlessness, food, freedom from oppression, survival, etc., and once spawned, their aim is protractedness; it is not about winning. Simply stated, insurgencies are protracted because that provides the most utility to the insurgents; they are not protracted because it is an insurgency. Insurgents don’t have a goal of winning although they would not mind seeing their enemy fail. They win if the struggle continues to gain momentum and they draw others into the fray—that breeds chaos. In addition, and contrary to popular belief, insurgencies are not religiously motivated; in as much as “they” want to present the appearance that they are religious in nature. This is in direct conflict with the traditional paradigm that the war fighter is accustomed. It is important to recognize that religion is ideological; an insurgency is not. This is not to say that religion and religious rhetoric is not important--it is to the insurgents because it gives the appearance of broad support, and it quickly organizes society for them into “us against them.” They gain if they breed hatred and distrust among other religious groups: Sunni, Shiites, Muslims and Christians. It is an attempt to give the appearance of unification of one large group against another of a large scale struggle. In some cases they will also turn the ends against the middle if that is the only way to disrupt recovery. After serving in the war that is the only thing that makes sense to me regarding the events in Iraq. You have a right to call me on it as I try to piece together my experiences. I saw insurgency targets change from government, to religious, to security, to military, American Journalists, to tribal targets--this tells me that they are attacking for the purpose of instability and not strategic and/or political.

[Tom Odom]

This is nonsense! There is always a motive. You may not understand it, but it is there. It answers the question who benefits.

Agreed, Slap.

If you do not look at motives you will always be reactive, serving as a news reporter or a historian. And as for the latter, I always considered motives in writing history; that is one of the joys of contemporary history. You can talk to the participants versus looking at diaries, letters, and official records (which are never complete).

This also goes straight to Rule #2: They have an agenda in everything they do with you. That is, what is their motive in their interactions with you? If you do not ask that simple question, you cannot forecast where their motives (or their relationship with you) will take you next--or how you can steer the direction it takes.

Best

Tom

[Steve Blair]

Insurgents are certainly NOT apolitical. They may wish you to believe that they are, but that contention is untrue.

And Tom, good historians always look at motive. One of the problems I have with contemporary history is that the people you're talking to can easily spin their own actions and motives. The best history examines motive and uses all available sources. Anything else is a sham, or has an agenda of its own. Good examples of this are the "instant histories" that came out after Vietnam, as well as the flood that's being produced by Iraq. Some of them are good, others are not.

Insurgents don’t have a goal of winning although they would not mind seeing their enemy fail.

-from GP's post

This is also certainly untrue. The majority of insurgencies have the goal of winning; that is, meeting their own political goals and objectives. That can be something as mundane (to us) as securing voting rights to something as major as carving out their own nation or "homeland" within an existing nation.

Where I think you're confusing things is that in Iraq you have insurgents AND fellow-travelers who happen to be terrorists. Terrorists thrive on chaos and bloodshed (in many ways it's the only actual goal they have). The two often exist side by side (and within the same umbrella group), and it isn't always possible to get a clean separation between the two.

[AdamG]

Bizarre tale of Shia messianic cult plot
By Roger Hardy
BBC Arabic Affairs analyst

More details have emerged about the shadowy cult whose followers fought Iraqi and US forces in a day-long battle in southern Iraq on Sunday.

Iraqi officials say 200 members of the group - which calls itself the Soldiers of Heaven - were killed in fierce fighting near the Shia holy city of Najaf.

A well-armed group, a charismatic leader and an audacious plot to attack a holy city and kill its religious leaders.

If a novelist had invented the story of the Soldiers of Heaven, it might have been dismissed as a dark fantasy.

But an account of the bizarre drama in southern Iraq, albeit with puzzles and inconsistencies, has now emerged from Iraqi officials and eyewitness accounts.

Messianic belief

A young Shia leader, Dia Abdul-Zahra, had gathered hundreds of his followers, including women and children, in an encampment a few miles north of Najaf.

They were well armed and had come to believe that Abdul-Zahra - also known as Ahmed Hassan al-Yamani and Samer Abu Kamar - was the Mahdi.

According to Shia belief, the Mahdi is a Muslim messiah who disappeared hundreds of years ago and whose return will usher in an era of peace and justice before the end of time.

Abdul-Zahra and his followers regarded the religious leadership in Najaf as illegitimate.

Iraqi officials say their extraordinary plan was to enter the city in the garb of pilgrims, declare that the Mahdi had returned, and assassinate Ayatollah Sistani and other senior clerics.

All this was to happen on Ashura, the holiest day in the Shia calendar.

Instead, the Iraqi authorities seem to have had a tip-off. According to their account, they attacked the encampment and foiled the plot.

At least 200 of the Soldiers of Heaven were killed. Officials insist these included the group's leader, though some clerics dispute this.

Among those captured were Sunnis as well as Shia and foreign fighters as well as Iraqis.

Unholy alliance

Iraqi officials have claimed the group had links with the militant jihadists of al-Qaeda.

Given that Sunni jihadists are fiercely anti-Shia, this seems unlikely.

They also say the group was working with former Baathists.

It seems the former Iraqi ruler Saddam Hussein did try to use a Mahdist faction as a weapon against the traditional religious leadership in Najaf, whom he saw as a threat.

Whether those links survived the fall of Saddam is not clear.

Shia divisions

Iraq's Shia-led government may have an interest in promoting the idea of such an unholy alliance.

It may want to deflect attention from the embarrassing fact that the majority Shia community is riven with factions and divisions.

The authorities may also have exaggerated their own military success.

The signs are that they underestimated the strength of the Soldiers of Heaven and had to call for urgent American air support.

History of the Mahdi

There are both Sunni and Shia versions of the Mahdi tradition.

Throughout Islamic history, Muslim leaders have risen up in rebellion claiming to be the Mahdi or to be acting in his name.

Britain's General Gordon was killed in Sudan in 1885 during a Mahdist insurrection.

In Saudi Arabia in 1979, Sunni militants took over the Great Mosque in Mecca, claiming the Mahdi had returned.

But Shia attachment to the Mahdi tradition is particularly potent.

One of the most powerful Iraqi militias (which has no known link to the Soldiers of Heaven) is the Mahdi Army of the radical cleric Moqtada Sadr.

For many Shia, the idea of a Muslim saviour who will end suffering and oppression has a special appeal.

At moments of crisis and chaos, they are more susceptible to the idea that the end of time is at hand.

Iraq is experiencing just such a crisis.

And in current circumstances southern Iraq - the Shia heartland and traditionally the poorest and most neglected part of the country - seems fertile soil for zealotry.

Story from BBC NEWS:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/h...st/6313433.stm

Published: 2007/01/30 13:22:46 GMT

(And the latest addition to FM 22-5 is "Front rank, kneel! Rear rank, stand!")