Sir,

Thank you for your patients with my rambling on this topic. I believe based on what I have learned from the war and in my studies that there are fundamental and significant differences between insurgents and terrorists.

Not only in their motives and their Tactics, Techniques, Procedures (TTPs) but in our military response to each--how we fight. However, some experts will quickly say that insurgency and terrorism are inextricably linked. In doing so however, they would fail to recognize the consequence of this association. In my studies, the two are only loosely connected but often each gains tremendous momentum when the two are used interchangeably. I also believe that when we misrepresent one as the other, we do damage to our effort. It is, in our terms "a combat multiplyier" for the enemy in its most synergistic form. For example, when I associate what is happening in Iraq to a religious Jihad or a struggle against demoracracy, it gives the appearance of unification of one large group against another, and of a large scale almost global struggle. The risk is that we incite globally--“Beware the zealous leader who bangs the drums of war in order to whip the citizenry into a fervor, for this is indeed a double-edged sword. It both emboldens the blood, just as it narrows the mind. And when the drums of war have reached a fever pitch and the blood boils with hate and the mind has closed, the leader will have no need in seizing the rights of the citizenry. Rather, the citizenry, infused with fear and blinded by hatred, will offer up all of their rights unto the leader, and gladly so. How do I know? For this is what I have done. And I am, Caesar.” Quote from Julius Caesar.

I think a new thread would be helpful to me too. We should define the two.

Here are some of the things that I believe are the salient differences between the two:

Insurgencies are conditions in which the insurgents spawn within a population because the government will not, or simply cannot provide the appropriate governance for life (law, order, security, water, electricity, sanitation, etc. This population can be likened to the criminal gang and organized crime elements more then freedom fighters or terrorists. Their cause is never an ideology or idealistic dogma, (it is more primal and basic) and therefore they will have the propensity to ebb and flow based on the need of the day and the targets of opportunity. In other words, their cause can change based on the situation. Today insurgents might attack American fighters in response to the surge, tomorrow they might strike a Mosque in a form of sectarian retaliation, the next day it is the Iraq security forces. Their targets are most often tactical. Their goal has nothing to do with winning although they don't mind the enemies (plural) failing--they will fight anyone who tries to bring order. They win if the struggle is protracted because it is from the pure chaos that they get their Utility. Insurgencies are not religiously motivated; in as much as “they” want to present the appearance that they are religious in nature. This is in direct conflict with the traditional paradigm that the war fighter is accustomed. It is important to recognize that religion is ideological; an insurgency is not. This is not to say that religion and religious rhetoric is not important--it is to the insurgents because it gives the appearance of broad support, and it quickly organizes society for them into “us against them.” They gain if they breed hatred and distrust among other religious groups: Sunni, Shiites, Muslims and Christians. However, because they are not driven by a single ideology, members can quickly apostatize. This can be used as a COIN tool, and their members can be reformed.

The insurgents in Iraq are decentralized in their operations, are local within a small territorial range (kilometers from their home) and recruit their fighters from local talent. Here is an equation that predicts the probable distance from an IED strike to the insurgents' home base. P(b) = A * e**-Bx Where A and B are empirical constants determined from the enemy data sets. It is an exponential decay function. As the distance X from the insurgent’s base increases, the less probable that a single group committed it. It is believed that 90% of all insurgent attacks will occur within 15 km of their base.

The Terrorists on the other hand, have very much centralized command and control (decentralized in their execution) and will operate hundred up to thousands of kilometers from their command and control base of operations.
Their struggle is based on the terrorist’s commitment to violence as a small group (usually ranging in group size from few to less than one-hundred- fifty "card carrying" members) in order to intimidate a population or government to cause their perceived fundamental change. The group size is limited by command, control and confidentiality capabilities. Their cause is always ideological and political, based on group-actualization rather than self-serving. In other words, their belief is that what they do is for the "Public good"--acting on behalf of "all." It is aimed at the establishment, not decapitated states. Terrorism however enjoys the freedom to organize and operate unabated in failed states. Finally, rarely will anyone ever develop a counter-terrorist strategy to change this group’s apostasy--it is analogous to trying to change Rush Limbaugh from the right to the left--it simply cannot be done. Their beliefs are so deeply held that they appear to the world as radical and extreme. Terrorists may or may not be highly trained and their operations are top driven and centralized from the command and control elements. Their targets are always strategic. Because the terrorists act on behalf of all, they will never engage in grass roots fighting unless cornered into it. As a result, in my "Opinion," we have very few terrorist cells living in Iraq. Although the insurgents hope that we think differently.

I think a new string would be very helpful.