Anthropology (catch all)

[SWJED]

SWJ Magazine - Why Dr. Johnny Won't Go to War by Marc W.D. Tyrrell

SWJ Magazine - Reconsidering "Why Dr. Johnny Won't Go to War" by Hugh Gusterson and David H. Price.

SWJ Comment via e-mail - The Response to the Response by Marc W.D. Tyrrell

SWC Thread - Comments on Marc T's article in Vol 7

SWC Thread - SWJ Mag vol 8 - Reconsidering "Why Dr. Johnny Won't Go to War"

[Steve Blair]

Anthropologists have been used in the first world war and the vietnam war by the Americans. Not to mention in South America. As well Ruth Benedict was contracted to research Japan during ww2.

It does undermine anthropologists everywhere. As well I have read about programs in place in the US where you get your anthropology degree paid for if you work for the government after (this was a few years ago so the details escape me).

Yet no one forces them to do that work, or to accept government financial aid (especially since the part about working for the government once one graduates from college is NOT hidden in the fine print or anything else). It seems to me that this policy is intended more to restrict the professional and research opportunities available to interested anthropologists.

Restricting who people can work for based on ideology? Isn't that rather against the concept of academic freedom?

(just had to toss that one out there...)

And Goesh makes some good points about the fluidity of ethical accountability within the safety of the ivory tower. And no flames coming from me, Van. I think some of 'em might have gotten ticked off when they found out that they might actually have to DO something for that government money...

[FascistLibertarian]

SWJED - thanks
goesh - I agree anthropology and anthropologists have done some horrible things. However I disagree that this is relevant to the current issue under discussion.
Van-

The cynic in me has to ask: is there really a problem, or is there a bunch of Anthropology grad students who just realized that to do field work, they'd be separated from comprehensive medical care, the internet, flush toilets, health inspected restaurants, etc, and were looking for an excuse to stay at their nice comfy university? (I know I'm going to get flamed for saying this, but how many of y'all were thinking it?)

To become an Anthro. Prof. you would need to do some serious fieldwork. Where you do it is your choice (one of my fav. anthropologists did his fieldwork with the Vice Lords in 1960's Chicago, another did his with crack dealers in Harlem).

Steve Blair
Oh I have nothing against people getting anthropology degrees and going to work for the US government or getting funding from the government.
What I do have a problem with is how certain Anthropologists acted during Vietnam. My understanding of this is limited so I could be wrong but what I think happened is:
They worked for the US gov't but told no one (neither the uni's nor their informants). In their fieldwork they figured out specifically and generally who should be high priority anti-communist targets and then the US Military went in and killed those specific people and general people who fit the profile. If they want to do this fine, but they should do it as private citizens not by using their unis and the AAA as a shield.
I believe it is still a matter of controversy as to which anthrologists in S.E. Asia during Vietnam did what and many people still have clouds over their heads.

As for the program to send students through school, regardless of if I am for or against it I think the US Gov't did a horrible job on PR and selling it in an intelligent manner. They could also have made a statement about how the students would not spy on the profs.

[selil]

Most American academics work for the federal agencies at some level. Whether they admit it or not. All state schools are well "state" schools. Their autonomy is regulated usually by the legislature of the state and a board or regents/governors.

Even more importantly in the United States the principle and primary funding agency is the National Science Foundation (NSF). NSF is a competitive federally funded program. With major notable exceptions like Lilly, Macarthur, Carnegie, etc. few if any private agencies fund academics who aren't working for them directly.

Almost all of my external funding is from NSF, NSA, DOD, DOJ, NIJ and really few of my funding dollars are from NSF directly. I do have a tidy no strings attached grand from CISCO for $120K but they were just being nice to me when I started my laboratory.

Personally I've been on a grant seeking/funding hiatus (not a good choice professionally but rewarding personally) as getting the PhD (75% funded by my University, 24% funded by NSA/DOD, 1% by me) is more important for my goals as University faculty.

It is interesting that a doctorate is not required for tenure but funding is required. My choice (knowingly putting myself at risk for continued employment) was to get the doctorate. The drive in academia for funding is something called salary savings. You buy back your salary and are given "release" time to do "research" and they fill the "release" time up with committee assignments and grunt work.

I really enjoy research and as I learn more about my field of study my research questions get more and more interesting. I don't really know what those social science, history, anthropologists do for research. All I need is a bunch of computers and some victims (I mean students) to get my research done.

[marct]

Hi Guys,

Well damn, Dr. Marc heads off to Europe and those guys / girls at antropologi.info go and post this:

The Dangerous Militarisation of Anthropology

What else can I say but....

.... Sorry...seemed like the only immediate response to this piece. Maybe Marc will have something to say once he gets back in-theater.

Well, I'm still "out of the theatre", but I finally got a couple of hours of connectivity and I don't have another concert until Wednesday....

I just tried accessing AT to see if the actual article was up - okay, I wanted to see how badly David flamed me . It's still not up yet, so I guess I'll have to wait.

There are a few points in the anthropologi.info blog that should, however, be addressed.

What are the consequences of anthropologists engaging in counterinsurgency work? It's obvious that it both undermines and endangers the work of anthropologists and the life of their families and informants: It is plausible, Gonzales argues, that ‘once Thai peasants or Somali clansmen learn that some anthropologists are secretly working for the US government, they begin to suspect all other anthropologists. Fieldwork will be a lot more dangerous.

<sigh>I wonder if anyone has every to this,..., no, I won't say it, "person", that life is dangerous? Is Gonzalez so simplistic that he thinks that anything he writes won't be looked at by other people and, despite his best intentions, some of it might be useful for either insurgents or counter-insurgents?

It's obvious that it both undermines and endangers the work of anthropologists and the life of their families and informants.

Let's look at this claim a little more closely. First off, if he truly believes this he should logically never publish a thing since anything he writes may be used by someone he doesn't approve of. Second, he is insulting all anthropologists with this statement by implying that any COIN work must be done in secret which, by definition, implies that some anthropologists will break the research code established by the AAA and conduct covert research. My final comment on this, which I will admit is a bit of a reductio ad absurdam, is more of a visual image that appeared in my head. Does he believe that hordes of vengeful "natives" will show up on his doorstep and slaughter his family? Crucify his dog?? Leave tire tracks on his lawn??? Maybe <shudder> imply that he isn't 110% "native friendly" by uncovering his secret stash of twinkies that aren't a "Fair Trade" product????

On a more serious note, what in the name of all that is unholy and indecent does this idiot take "Thai peasants and Somali tribesmen" as? The only way I can read this is that he assumes that they are credulous automatons who are incapable of rational thought and action.

If they're using "informants" it's obvious that they're up to something shady to begin with. With all that cultural subversion going on maybe someone should write a counterpiece called "The Dangerous Anthropologization of the Military" and how we're all going to "go native" and live in strange vine-covered compounds at the end of rivers with Dennis Hopper taking pictures of us while we write bad poetry and mutter "the horror" over and over again....

Hey, Steve, at least 100 years down the road, we can all have Bollywood actors playing us in a "Last of the Westerners" movie or, if we really luck out, in a TV show .

Marc

[mde]

I go to school with a couple anthropoligists, and have met another two, who have "crossed over to the dark side" so to speak and are actively working, researching, teaching, and travelling for the military and the larger government machine. So what? The academics spend so much time bickering between themselves and being "holier than thou" to each other that they miss the point of their education: to DO SOMETHING. Knowledge for the sake of knowledge is wasted time unless you choose to improve the world with it. That is exactly what the military is trying to do with the new Army COIN manual, the FID campaigns going on in Iraq, Afghanistan, Philippines, Djibouti, Colombia, and other places that have not been in the spotlight (and ought not to if we want to succeed). In this, the military is finally conceding that they aren't the smartest people in the world, that the western-traditional military approach does not fit all situations, and they are enlisting the assistance of the people who do actually know better than they.
The anthropologists who choose to work for the government believe they are trying to improve the way our government works. And they know they have an impossible taks ahead of the them, and without mutual support from their academic community. They are indeed shunned -- I have heard all but one of the ones I know talk about that very aspect of their profession and the choices they have made. Companies like RAND are interesting cross-over points, though the commercialism tends to get in the way.
The biggest downside to academics teaching military people -- especially now that we have a battle-hardened and well-travelled military and paramilitary community -- is that often times the academics either have never been to the places they claim to know so much about (and their military student just came from his third tour there), or that their information is from their post-doctoral thesis twenty years ago and, by the way, there was no war going on then. Violent Salafism hadn't reared its ugly head in most parts of the world twenty years ago, and that hurts much of academia's stranglehold on the social scientific crystal ball. Wisdom comes from knowing that you are relatively dumb in the face of real experience. No single person can know everything -- especially in the face of real-world experience in foreign cultures, no matter how restrictive (USMC in Iraq) or permissive (USSF everywhere) their experience may have been. The really good and wise anthropologists will concede this and will use the classroom as an opportunity to learn IN BOTH DIRECTIONS. I had one that did just that last quarter and it was one of my favorite classes I have ever taken.

[marct]

Some very interesting articles here.

CONTENTS
Peter Jan Margry and Cristina Sánchez-Carretero 1
Memorializing traumatic death
Sylvia Grider 3
Public grief and the politics of memorial: Contesting the memory of ‘the shooters’ at Columbine High School
David H. Price 8
Buying a piece of anthropology, Part 1: Human Ecology and unwitting anthropological research for the CIA
Roberto J. González 14
Towards mercenary anthropology? The new US Army counterinsurgency manual FM 3-24 and the military-anthropology complex
COMMENT
David Kilcullen 20
Ethics, politics and non-state warfare: A response to González
Montgomery McFate 21
Building bridges or burning heretics?: A response to González
Stephen Ellis, Jeremy Keenan 21
The Sahara and the ‘war on terror’: A response to Jeremy Keenan (AT 22[6])
Laura A. McNamara 22
Culture, critique and credibility: A response to Houtman (AT 23[2])
Gerhard Anders 23
Follow the trial: Some notes on the ethnography of international criminal justice

Marc

[Steve Blair]

Any links or is it just paper?

[marct]

Hi Steve,

Any links or is it just paper?

The TOC is here. I'll see if I can find the URLs for the rest; probably need an institutional account for access though...

[added]
It looks like it's available online via Blackwell Synergy - you definitely need an institutional account.

Marc

[SteveMetz]

The solution is for anthropologists to concentrate on sexual mores in Samoa. Then people who have to deal with contemporary, real world problems won't come bothering them.

[marct]

Hi Steve,

The solution is for anthropologists to concentrate on sexual mores in Samoa. Then people who have to deal with contemporary, real world problems won't come bothering them.

But that would be imposing a Western ideological hegemony upon them via the obviously misrepresented presentation of such sexual mores !!!! The more obvious recourse is to just sit safely in the ivory tower and critique anyone who is actually out doing anything productive. Far safer, from a moral purity standard, to just should how impure everyone else is .

Marc

[RJO]

(I just came across this thread. Apologies if it's expired and no longer of interest.)

Jonathan Shay in Achilles in Vietnam argues that one of the functions of Athenian theater was the reintegration of combat veterans into civil society. From his footnote on pp. 229-230:

The ancient Greeks had a distinctive therapy of purification, healing, and reintegration that was undertaken by the whole community. We know it as Athenian theater. While a complete presentation is beyond the scope of this book, I want to summarize my view that the distinctive character of Athenian theater came from the requirements of a democratic polity made up entirely of present or former soldiers to provide communalization for combat veterans.... The Athenians communally reintegrated their returning warriors in recurring participation in rituals of the theater. The key elements of my argument are: the notable military backgrounds of Aeschylus and Sophocles; the prominence of military matters in the processions and ceremonies held before and between theatrical events; the use of the theater (according to Aristotle) for military training graduations; ... the distinctively transgressive character of the actions of the powerful main characters, played against themis [rightness/justice] voiced by the disempowered chorus; and that the centuries-old controversy over what Aristotle meant when he said that tragedy brings about katharsis of compassion and terror can be resolved by reference to the experience of combat veterans. [etc.]

There is a stunning version of Aeschylus' Agamemnon now available online in ten parts.

RJO

[marct]

Hi Bob,

(I just came across this thread. Apologies if it's expired and no longer of interest.)

Jonathan Shay in Achilles in Vietnam argues that one of the functions of Athenian theater was the reintegration of combat veterans into civil society. From his footnote on pp. 229-230:

There is a stunning version of Aeschylus' Agamemnon now available online in ten parts.

RJO

Thanks for the reference and the link! I did a lot of research on theatre as a community integration tool in my MA and PhD (more in the MA). As a communal integration tool, it is really amazing, although somewhat tricky to use in the modern world.

Marc

[SWJED]

7 September Christian Science Monitor - US Army's Strategy in Afghanistan: Better Anthropology by Scott Peterson.

Evidence of how far the US Army's counterinsurgency strategy has evolved can be found in the work of a uniformed anthropologist toting a gun in the mountains of eastern Afghanistan. Part of a Human Terrain Team (HHT) – the first ever deployed – she speaks to hundreds of Afghan men and women to learn how they think and what they need.

One discovery that may help limit Taliban recruits in this rough-hewn valley: The area has a preponderance of widows – and their sons, who have to provide care, are forced to stay closer to home, where few jobs can be found. Now, the HHT is identifying ways to tap the textiles and blankets traded through here to create jobs for the women – and free their sons to get work themselves.

"In most circumstances, I am 'third' gender," says Tracy, who can give only her first name. She says that she is not seen as either an Afghan woman or a Western one – because of her uniform. "It has enhanced any ability to talk to [Afghans]. There is a curiosity."

Such insight is the grist of what US forces here see as a smarter counterisurgency. "We're not here just to kill the enemy – we are so far past the kinetic fight," says Lt. Col. Dave Woods, commander of the 4th Squadron 73rd Cavalry. "It is the nonkinetic piece [that matters], to identify their problems, to seed the future here." Nearly six years after US troops toppled the Taliban, the battle is for a presence that will elicit confidence in the Afghan government and its growing security forces. "Operation Khyber," which started Aug. 22, aims for a more effective counterinsurgency – using fewer bullets and more local empowerment.

US commanders have doubled US troop strength in eastern Afghanistan in the past year. They are also fielding the HHT – a "graduate-level counterinsurgency" unit, as one officer puts it – to fine-tune aid and to undermine the intimidating grip of militants in the region...

Much more at the link...

[Beelzebubalicious]

This point has probably already been made, but I find the use of "counterinsurgency" as an umbrella term for all these efforts is confusing. From what I understand, there are efforts to weaken/destroy/counter the insurgents, but the core of this seems to be about "winning the hearts and minds" of the general populace so that insurgents can't make footholds in the community. The former is opposition, the latter is more partnernship. Given that it's often difficult to know who is friend and foe, the whole matter is confused.

Is the equation counterinsurgency (including win hearts and minds/build and hold) or is it counterinsurgency + win hearts and minds/build and hold? Perhaps I just miss the point, but I would be interested in hearing what SWJ folks have to say about this....

[Rank amateur]

Is the equation counterinsurgency (including win hearts and minds/build and hold) or is it counterinsurgency + win hearts and minds/build and hold? Perhaps I just miss the point, but I would be interested in hearing what SWJ folks have to say about this....

My humble amateur opinion. The mission is to separate the insurgents from the population. Once they are out in the open we can use our superior firepower/training etc. to kill them.

Hearts& minds, build hold, etc. are all tactics. Like any tactics, you need to be proficient at them all and use whatever combination works to complete your mission. Like any enemy the insurgents can adapt. Just like they can reinfiltrate captured territory they can reinfiltrate "cleared" populations. To make things even harder, insurgents can become civilians and stay civilians before changing back to insurgents. Anything that turns them into civilians, or prevents civilians from becoming insurgents, is a highly effective tactic. If you can use an anthropologist to prevent civilians from becoming insurgents, do it.

Tactical success is supposed to lead to a political end to the insurgency. The key words being "supposed to." The strategy, and the ability to achieve the ultimate objective, is in the hands of diplomats.

For the trigger puller, it's not that much different from traditional combat. You just complete the mission: take the hill. Someone at HQ worries about what's happening on all the surrounding hills and will tell you if you have a new mission. For the boots on the ground, COIN just means learning and deploying new tactics.

It's really the HQ guys who need a new mindset. Militarily, they need to get used to managing tactical missions. If they want strategic progress, they need to become diplomats.

[Tom Odom]

For the trigger puller, it's not that much different from traditional combat. You just complete the mission: take the hill. Someone at HQ worries about what's happening on all the surrounding hills and will tell you if you have a new mission. For the boots on the ground, COIN just means learning and deploying new tactics.

That simply is not true and therein lies the complexity of COIN. The Soldier on the ground is strategic in his effects. The mission is not take a hill; it maybe search a house. It may be escort a VIP to a meeting. It may be simply patrolling with a purpose. The greatest source of information in COIN is the small units and the tactical HUMINT teams out there on the ground. They--not the headquarters--know better than anyone what is happening on the ground.

Keeping those same Soldiers motovated in such a war is a leadership challenge; it is easy to allow the troops --and oneself--to slip into the "just another mission" mode. Then the troops get careless.

Best,

Tom

[tequila]

LTC Gian Gentile wrote about this dichotomy in AFJ, an article I looked up after reading his comments on SWJ's Blog.

Eating Soup With a Spoon - LTC Gian P. Gentile, Armed Forces Journal.

The natural instinct for a combat soldier when attacked is to protect himself and his buddies. Yet the paradox that "the more you protect yourself, the less secure you are" becomes counterintuitive to the soldier. It does not make sense because he experiences the essence of war fighting almost every day. So the paradox creates cognitive dissonance in the mind of a combat soldier in Iraq because it essentially tells him to do something that is unnatural to him and his environment — to not fight.

A blog I read a month or so ago makes clear that many soldiers believe that concern for civilian casualties gets soldiers killed:

http://armyofdude.blogspot.com/2007/...ect-world.html

You might have heard about the six soldiers and one Russian reporter that died when their Stryker hit one such bomb. They were on their way to investigate the actual site before it blew. They knew it was there. Beforehand, an Apache helicopter identified several men digging a hole in the road, putting something large in the hole, and running away. The pilot asked for clearance to shoot a Hellfire missile at them. It was the best catch a pilot can hope for: killing Al Qaeda and taking out a bomb at the same time. Once again however, our rules and tactics became a bigger enemy than any terrorist could. They were denied permission to fire repeatedly because of the possibility of collateral damage. In the sagacious words of Hurley from the TV show Lost, we looked in the face of the enemy and said ‘whatever man!’

...

I don’t think I have to go into details about what came next. A whole squad, save the driver, was no more. They didn’t die for Iraqi liberty or American freedom. They died for trial and error. They died because an officer somewhere didn’t want to fill out paperwork because some dude’s car might have been damaged in a missile strike.

Also:

American soldiers are breaking their backs to be the good guys in this war, to represent our leaders and the public we serve. We’re trying to remove the shame of Abu Ghraib and soldiers who raped and murdered Iraqi girls. When clearing blocks, we cut locks and if necessary, kick doors off hinges to search for weapon caches. If the people are home, we give them a number to call so they can collect money for their damaged property. In WWII, troops cleared houses by throwing in grenades without checking to see if a family is huddled in the corner. A terrible thing could happen, but it’s a war after all. We now have paintball guns and non-lethal shotgun rounds. Do you think the enemy carries the same? Who is this really helping?

...

Minutes after the firefight, all of us noticed a black sedan making the same rounds through alleys and side streets. ...

This car was using textbook actions in a moving sniper platform. Immediately my team leader called up to my squad leader, who too became suspicious. We all wanted to take a shot, at least in the trunk of the car to scare the driver off, who was more than 300 meters away.

...

It came back down the chain: don’t take the shot. It became a political decision; what if we were wrong? That's a lot of paperwork. We all cursed whoever kicked it back ...

We watched the car leave, only to round the corner one more time and stop. He backs up, once again exposing his rear right window in a perfect line of sight to our rooftop.

Once again the request to open fire was denied.

The window comes down.

Children in the alleyway scatter in all directions.

A flash of light fills the open window.

PSSSSSHEW.

...

Kill or no kill, the sniper made it back to his family that night. He used against us our most honorable and foolhardy trait: our adherence to the rules. And we, the most powerful force the earth has known, have been effectively neutered ...

[SWJED]

Council member Matt Armstrong has a new post up on his MountainRunner web log - Anthropology and Global Counterinsurgency: to some, a natural pairing, to others, not so much.

This should be interesting. This weekend the University of Chicago holds a conference titled Anthropology and Global Counterinsurgency...