Porch shines a torch on COIN

[Dayuhan]

All very interesting, but of course none of it has anything to do with the point made in my paragraph that generated it.

Perhaps I failed to express the point clearly. Actually two points. First, in the absence of clear, consistent, and achievable goals, "getting it right" on the military level will at best earn transient and localized success. You may win some battles, but you won't win the war. Second, the tactical passivity you decry seems to me largely a consequence of the policy wreckage that I decry. In the absence of clear, consistent, achievable purpose, is it not natural to some extent for those charged with pursuing that purpose to resort to passivity and to focus on protecting their own?

Not that the US military is perfect, but I actually have considerable confidence in their ability to get a job done, provided that the goal is clearly defined and suitable for accomplishment by a military force. If those conditions are absent, we don't need to change the military, we need a better set of goals and we need to choose the right tool for accomplishing the goals.

Perhaps you are right that our efforts in the Philippines so long ago are not relevant, but I disagree. I think military history most always has things that are relevant and there are things to be learned, especially small wars. I am probably wrong but this is because small wars seem to be more matters of people than weapons and tech. Steve Blair (I think) has a quote from Fahrenbach about the frontier Army knowing all there was to know about small war fighting. That surely was another era but things learned then are still relevant I think too.

In the unlikely and unwelcome event that we ever embark on a war of colonial conquest, the lessons of past wars of colonial conquest might be relevant... though I have doubts. Those lessons would point in directions that cannot be pursued today due to domestic and global political constraints, and they would be employed against a rather different class of antagonist. The world does change.

I haven't read the paper yet but will. In the meantime, people always talk about strategy, but I don't know what they mean in the sense of doing. What, in your view, is a strategy that should be applied to South Asia? What should we do or have done and how? That is a big question but I am not looking for a big answer. But I am sincerely at a loss about actual actions when people talk about strategy.

Before you can have a strategy, you need a policy. Policy defines the goals. Strategy defines the broad plan for achieving those goals. Assuring that AQ and similar groups will not be able to find refuge in Afghanistan is a policy goal. The decision to achieve that goal by transforming Afghanistan into a western-style democracy is, IMO, where we went wrong: that goal was not and is not realistically achievable by any means available to us.

[carl]

Perhaps I failed to express the point clearly. Actually two points. First, in the absence of clear, consistent, and achievable goals, "getting it right" on the military level will at best earn transient and localized success. You may win some battles, but you won't win the war. Second, the tactical passivity you decry seems to me largely a consequence of the policy wreckage that I decry. In the absence of clear, consistent, achievable purpose, is it not natural to some extent for those charged with pursuing that purpose to resort to passivity and to focus on protecting their own?

Not that the US military is perfect, but I actually have considerable confidence in their ability to get a job done, provided that the goal is clearly defined and suitable for accomplishment by a military force. If those conditions are absent, we don't need to change the military, we need a better set of goals and we need to choose the right tool for accomplishing the goals.

Nope. Missed the point again.

In the unlikely and unwelcome event that we ever embark on a war of colonial conquest, the lessons of past wars of colonial conquest might be relevant... though I have doubts. Those lessons would point in directions that cannot be pursued today due to domestic and global political constraints, and they would be employed against a rather different class of antagonist. The world does change.

If you insist on every jot and tittle lining up there are no lessons from history. I think there are plenty of lessons even is there are jittles and tots; especially in small wars which to me are more matters of humans than machines. The world may change, humans, not so much.

Before you can have a strategy, you need a policy. Policy defines the goals. Strategy defines the broad plan for achieving those goals. Assuring that AQ and similar groups will not be able to find refuge in Afghanistan is a policy goal. The decision to achieve that goal by transforming Afghanistan into a western-style democracy is, IMO, where we went wrong: that goal was not and is not realistically achievable by any means available to us.

All very interesting again, but not an answer to the question I asked Bill.

[Dayuhan]

Nope. Missed the point again.

I see. What was the point, then?

If you insist on every jot and tittle lining up there are no lessons from history. I think there are plenty of lessons even is there are jittles and tots; especially in small wars which to me are more matters of humans than machines. The world may change, humans, not so much.

If you dismiss historical context as jots and tittles, you're likely to extract lessons that do you more harm than good. I suspect that efforts to apply lessons from 19th century colonial conquest to the problems of 21st century 3rd party intervention would be in deep trouble.

Humans change a good deal. Freedom changes people. In terms of people's ability to effectively prosecute conflict, I can think of few things that change people as much, or as fast, as believing, even knowing, that they can win. Sometimes the genie doesn't go back in the bottle.

All very interesting again, but not an answer to the question I asked Bill.

Just pointing out that you can't have a realistic discussion of strategy in South Asia (or anywhere else) without first agreeing on the policy goals.

[carl]

If you dismiss historical context as jots and tittles, you're likely to extract lessons that do you more harm than good. I suspect that efforts to apply lessons from 19th century colonial conquest to the problems of 21st century 3rd party intervention would be in deep trouble.

I think that in a small war, the big picture historical context doesn't make all that much difference. It doesn't matter much why those guys want the villagers to do this or that. They want them to do this or rhat and maybe the villagers don't want to. That conflict at the level where the people on either side know each others names, the essentials of that conflict, the human essentials don't change much. That is why there is so much to be learned from the past. Of course, I'm just a flyover person and the bigwig picture doesn't often register.

Humans change a good deal.

Nah. Human nature doesn't change. It is now as it has been for hundreds, maybe thousands of generation and as it will be for many more. Us modern people just ain't that special.

[Dayuhan]

I think that in a small war, the big picture historical context doesn't make all that much difference. It doesn't matter much why those guys want the villagers to do this or that. They want them to do this or rhat and maybe the villagers don't want to. That conflict at the level where the people on either side know each others names, the essentials of that conflict, the human essentials don't change much. That is why there is so much to be learned from the past. Of course, I'm just a flyover person and the bigwig picture doesn't often register.

Historical context makes all the difference in the world.

Just to illustrate, suppose you were a present-day sheriff, or a mayor, in a small racially mixed town in the US with a history of racial issues. One of those places where people know each other by name. If you were to ignore historical context and try to manage those issues in the ways that kept the peace so effectively for your predecessors in, say, the 1950s or the 1920s, how do you think that would work out in today's historical context?

Nah. Human nature doesn't change. It is now as it has been for hundreds, maybe thousands of generation and as it will be for many more. Us modern people just ain't that special.

Human nature may not change, but humans certainly do. It is in their nature to do so.

[Bill Moore]

Dayuhan,

I agree with your point on historical context and will go out on a limb and state that is fact, not an assumption. However, I need an example on what you mean by humans changing? In what way? Getting fatter and dumber yes, but relevant to strategy and Small Wars in what way are we changing?

[Dayuhan]

Dayuhan,

I agree with your point on historical context and will go out on a limb and state that is fact, not an assumption. However, I need an example on what you mean by humans changing? In what way? Getting fatter and dumber yes, but relevant to strategy and Small Wars in what way are we changing?

Example:

Go back to Carl's scenario:

It doesn't matter much why those guys want the villagers to do this or that. They want them to do this or rhat and maybe the villagers don't want to.

Imagine two such villages, or provinces full of villages, or nations full of villages, in a situation like this. Imagine that those two scenarios are identical in every respect, except one.

In scenario A, the "villagers" believe, to their core, that "those guys" are their superiors. They have no concept of equality, they have known only submission. They know that "those guys" may be manipulated perhaps, and that they can prosper by joining "those guys" and playing their game, but they know beyond doubt that anyone who tries to directly oppose "those guys" or stand up to them is gonna get nothing but a whuppin', or more likely a killing. They see themselves as completely alone, with little or no chance of finding help or allies.

In scenario B, the villagers believe, absolutely, that they are equal to "those guys" in every respect. They believe that they have rights. They know "those guys" are stronger and maybe they can't fight them head on,. but they know that there are ways they can be beaten, they know it's been done before and they have a pretty good idea of how it's been done before. They know there are people out there who will help them, and they know how to contact them. They believe that they can fight and they believe that they can win.

Between these scenarios you have changed nothing but the attitudes and knowledge of the people... but I suspect that from the perspective of the Small Wars operator, you have changed a great deal.

Now look at it from the perspective of "those guys". In scenario A, "those guys" know they can do any damn thing they please and get away with it. They can kill who they will, torture as they please, burn crops and raze villages, beat and intimidate... and they will face no consequences. n scenario B, "those guys" know that a domestic and international populace that expects them to conform to 21st century human rights standards is watching everything they do. Again, all you've changed is the attitudes of the people on the "those guys" home front... but that change has a profound impact on how "those guys" can prosecute their conflict.

Carl mentioned that in the in the effort to conquer the American west, Americans once learned "everything there is to know about Small Wars". It is of course absolutely true that genocide is an effective way of resolving a small war. A US Congressman is said to have remarked, after observing the pacification efforts in Northern Luzon, that "they don't rebel any more because there's nobody left to rebel". Those tactics are effective, no doubt. That doesn't do us much good, because we don't do that any more. Our standards have changed, and our expectations of ourselves have changed. We have changed.

[carl]

Just to illustrate, suppose you were a present-day sheriff, or a mayor, in a small racially mixed town in the US with a history of racial issues. One of those places where people know each other by name. If you were to ignore historical context and try to manage those issues in the ways that kept the peace so effectively for your predecessors in, say, the 1950s or the 1920s, how do you think that would work out in today's historical context?

You miss the essentials of police work. Those don't change. You know the people. You know their neighbors, the neighborhood, their relations, where they work and where they play. You know who can be trusted and who can't, who is reliable and who is not. You know the law and you know when to enforce it to the letter and when to use officer discretion and you know who that is going to work on and who it won't work on. You know how to listen and remember what you hear and connect to other things you hear. You talk to people and say hello to them. You don't provoke people needlessly, that makes for bad blood and trouble where it doesn't have to be. You make sure to they know that when you indicate you mean business there is no mistake. The list goes on.

These are the essential things, the fundamental things. They don't change. And they don't change because human nature doesn't change. Some things change, the TV stuff that people associate with actual cop work. Yep, not so much rubber hoses nowadays. Good officers never interviewed that way because they knew it didn't work. But the things that differentiate good police work from bad police work, those don't change.

Similarly, the essentials of small war fighting don't change either. Lt. Johnson and Capt. Pershing would probably have figured things pretty quick if they had been time transported to Afghanistan. Capt. Patriquin and COL McMaster would have figured things out in Moroland with the same alacrity. In my view, small wars are very human affairs which is what makes them so interesting. As such, it is the men who make the difference, their ability to think and figure effectively. That don't change much. Smart men did good then, they do good now. That was Moyar's main point in A Question of Command.