Motivation in War

[TheCurmudgeon]

Open question, is anyone working on the motivation underlying conflict. I am working on the idea that group conflict is a natural aspect of human nature and therefore war is just and extension of that (See Gat "War in Civilization" for a basic overview of this idea). Original motivations for conflict were the needs of the group. More modern motivations are also the needs of the group.

In any case, has anyone working on anything similar? Does anyone know of any publications or papers that they felt covered the subject matter?

Thanks in advance.

The Curmudgeon.

[Bill Moore]

Somewhat limited in scope and based on pseudo-social science with a high degree of Western bias, so while being skeptical you can still appreciate their material on motivation.

http://www.soc.mil/ARIS/HumanFactorsS.pdf

Human factors considerations of undergrounds in insurgencies.

http://www.army.mil/professionalWrit...07/8_07_4.html

Rethinking Insurgency

Explores the topic a little more.

Recommend exploring the motivations behind Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, violent street gangs, ethnic conflict motivations in Bosnia, Rwanda, civil wars in Latin America, Asia, ours, etc. Suspect you'll find multiple factors, but if you find anything on how the factors morph after fighting as started due to establishing new social norms please let me know.

http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/d...ornell_SCT.pdf

Paul Collier and his colleagues have argued that many civil wars are caused by economic rather than sociopolitical factors, and by loot-seeking rather than by justice-seeking.5 As Collier and Hoeffler note, this economic approach to understanding civil war differs from political science approaches by focusing on a different motivation for violence—greed, not grievance—and a different explanation for the outbreak of war, atypical opportunities and not atypical grievances.6 The economic approach focuses on the opportunities that arise to belligerents, especially insurgents, during times of civil war. While war leads to great material losses on a societal basis, this does not mean that “war is a disaster for almost everyone concerned.” As David Keen argues, war is not simply the breakdown of order, economy, and social organization, but “the emergence of an alternative system of profit,
power, and even protection.”7 To put it simply, war has functions for some actors. The insecurity and unpredictability of war, coupled with the breakdown or weakening of law and order, implies the turn to a more opportunistic society; an increase in criminality; the disruption of markets; and opportunities for what Collier calls “rent-seeking predation.”8
These consequences are immensely detrimental for society at large, but provide specific opportunities for armed groups to reap significant economic benefits: some people manage to do well out of war.9

[jmm99]

I found this an interesting read, The Origin of War: The Evolution of a Male-Coalitional Reproductive Strategy (by Johan M.G. van der Dennen; 1995) (over 850 pp. with a huge bib).

Good short review by George Modelski (BLUF):

What this particular IR scholar appreciates in particular in this analysis is its facultative aspect. It is good to be shown convincingly that humans are neither inherently bellicose nor innately peaceable. Though it might at time have been opportune, war was not preordained in the long distant past, and it is not preordained in the future. On the other hand, it ought to be pointed out that the male-coalitional strategy has been key not only in war but in all the myriad other cooperative enterprises: business, political, religious, associational and sports, that have marked the evolution of the human race and of the world system. Nor does "reproductive strategy" appear sufficiently convincing as the ultimate cause of modern warfare. Territory remains an important bone of contention but hardly an all-encompassing imperative.

What appears to be missing from this account is sensitivity to evolutionary changes in such a basic political institution as war. Are we to understand that in its basic makeup warfare has remained unchanged for several million years? Or that its basic structure was laid down in the dawn of prehistory, and that all that followed, in the past five thousand years of civilization and of "history", has been nothing but "a nightmare" (p.593)? Has nothing changed in world politics even in the past one thousand years? Arguably, the biological (reproductive) component of the war syndrome is less powerful to-day, and the social (coalitional) more important, and working through social evolutionary mechanisms such as e.g. elections, or innovations, that are analogous to natural selection and genetic variation. That much might indeed be implicit in this account but it could be spelled out more fully if the author looked carefully at modern history as the record of world political evolution.

Regards

Mike

[TheCurmudgeon]

Thanks fo the additional material. I have two books, "Warless Societies and the Origin of War" and "War Before Civilization: The Myth of Peaceful Savage" that deal with the subject taking opposite veiws on whether war, which I will define as "morally acceptable collective violence by one group against another group." Also Azar Gat's book, "War in Human Civilization" covers the same material in the first three chapters. I am also in touch with a ethnographer who is conducting a large "N" study of existing Hunter-Gatherers. He expects that he will find that there was war but it was not universal. It is enough for me to say that it was a normal human activity.

I would like mor material on young men as the primary warriors in these groups. I have some, but not enough. One of my ideas is that certain segments of the society require special attention. Young men are prone to become soldiers if for no other reasons than the excitement and status. Therefore they need to be addressed as a seperate demographic when looking at motivations in conflict - they require very littel to engage in a morally acceptable fight.

Anyway, thanks

[TheCurmudgeon]

Bill,

One of my categories is what I call Wars of Personal Gain. In the primitive world these were raids either for stuff or for women (probably more often for both). The motivation is a version of greed, but greed is not easily defined as a independent motivation, so I am having some problems fitting it in. How far that motivation can be used in large scale conflicts is difficult for me to determine. Since my definition includes a moral component (hence making it socially acceptable to the group) personal gain will most likely be tied to some other motivation, like revenge or collective identity. This is a sticky problem and l many not have a complete solution by the time I have something to publish.

[TheCurmudgeon]

The definition of War I plan to use.

"Deadly or potentially deadly organized violence committed by a subset of one group, morally sanctioned by that group, against a politically or otherwise distinguishable group with a specific objective."

[Bill Moore]

Bill,

One of my categories is what I call Wars of Personal Gain. In the primitive world these were raids either for stuff or for women (probably more often for both). The motivation is a version of greed, but greed is not easily defined as a independent motivation, so I am having some problems fitting it in. How far that motivation can be used in large scale conflicts is difficult for me to determine. Since my definition includes a moral component (hence making it socially acceptable to the group) personal gain will most likely be tied to some other motivation, like revenge or collective identity. This is a sticky problem and l many not have a complete solution by the time I have something to publish.

As you know there is no single right answer, or silver bullet solution based on motivation. Identifying greed as primary motivator for large modern conflicts may be a hard link to make. In this type of conflict we see motivation based on identity (nationalism), fear, pride, hatred, and self-preservation. I'm not sure if Saddam's invasion of Kuwait was based on greed or self-preservation (didn't he believe Kuwait was threatening his oil fields with horizontal drilling?). However, with insurgencies and civil wars greed is often a prime motivator. Using your definition of war, I guess we could consider the conflict between Mexico's government and their cartels war(fare), and there is certainly an element of greed involved. I think in the end several factors motivate people to resort to violence on large scale, but generally believe identity politics is almost always a factor. If you can't identify with a particular group why would you fight with them? Once you start fighting then group dynamics takes on a life of its own, forget the political and economic factors being the main drivers. What you believed at one time becomes subordinate to the group norms and loyalty. That is why I think loyalty to the chain of command in the military can be over done, because personal loyalties replace loyalty to our Constitution and nation.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I found this an interesting read, The Origin of War: The Evolution of a Male-Coalitional Reproductive Strategy (by Johan M.G. van der Dennen; 1995) (over 850 pp. with a huge bib).

Facinating book. Interestingly I can't find it anywhere else than at the web site.

Do you know what became of the organization that Dennen was a part of when he wrote this. I saw that it merged with another group (The ISHE) but that link does not go anywere.

[davidbfpo]

Slightly different, but have you looked at Ted Gurr's 'Why Men Rebel'. It was a classic political science recommended book thirty plus years ago and all I can recall now is the title.

How about honour and miscalculation?

One post referred to The Falklands (1982), when these factors featured on both sides.

Thinking - a little - it is curious how much the British sense of honour has featured in our declaring war in 1914 for "plucky little Belgium", at least that was a long-standing strategic interest; quite unlike Poland in 1939, whose security had quickly became a national interest. I hesitate to look at imperial era wars.

Miscalculation is not confined to decision-makers. How many public's would be so "jingoistic" if told a war could last way beyond Christmas?

[TheCurmudgeon]

How about honour and miscalculation?.....One post referred to The Falklands (1982), when these factors featured on both sides.

Honour ties back to Relatedness. If I figure out how to reduce the size of an image I can demonstrate how the Relatedness need ties in to certain values including Face, Tradition, and Conformity. Face is closely associated with honour.

Miscalculation is not so much a motivation as it is an error in accurately percieving the situation, so I do not go into it.

Thinking - a little - it is curious how much the British sense of honour has featured in our declaring war in 1914 for "plucky little Belgium", at least that was a long-standing strategic interest; quite unlike Poland in 1939, whose security had quickly became a national interest. I hesitate to look at imperial era wars.

Strategic interests would always play into Security.

What I would find more interesting is the "Christmas Truce", where "peace" broke out. Why was it that suddenly the motivation for war no longer mattered to the two sides?

My guess is that they temporarily lost the ability to see each other as seperate groups. Their commonalities (Christian backgrounds and love of soccer) outweighed their perceived differences. They lost the Relatedness motivation and there was not a clear Autonomy motivation at this point in the war (or revenge). I don't have time to go into it, but that would be a facinating flip-side to this question.