Modernization Theory is Hokum.

[Fuchs]

Actually, Germany and "West" has a special meaning.

Germany (FRG) embraced the "West" under Adenauer as a way of cooperating with instead of confronting France.
Previously, it had been stuck between the post-NapoleonIII bloc of France/UK and the Russians. The West/East talk as we know it today only came into being in the late 40's.

[Dayuhan]

Actually, Germany and "West" has a special meaning.

Germany (FRG) embraced the "West" under Adenauer as a way of cooperating with instead of confronting France.
Previously, it had been stuck between the post-NapoleonIII bloc of France/UK and the Russians. The West/East talk as we know it today only came into being in the late 40's.

I was thinking of culture, rather than transient political alliance. Hasn't Germany been fundamentally European, hence "Western", at least since 1871?

Granted, these are very loose terms, but their use in discussions of "Westernizing" other countries is equally loose. The context in which the term "Western" was invoked a few posts back appeared to characterize a cultural and economic identity rather than a political alliance. If that interpretation is incorrect I'm sure the author of the post will clarify.

[Dayuhan]

The question is thus not one of how to push a foreign country to modernity, but whether there's a trigger for making it move towards a certain development direction on its own and how to identify and activate it...

...A trigger for an average African country - say Zambia - could be to find a way how the powers that be can profit of giving women much more relevance in the non-subsistence economy. Add the Japanese custom of wifes managing family finances (an awesome limiter on alcohol and cigarette consumption as well as whoring), maybe through some African-made movies, bank regulations and the like. This could lead to substantial economic growth.

Simply put, you have to convince them it was their own idea.

The comments above seem to take the principle of "social engineering" a step farther, to what might be called "cultural engineering". The obvious question there is whether or not this is even possible. However desirable it might seem (to us) to transplant elements of Japanese culture to Zambia, is this, or anything like it, a realistic option in dealing with the problems of developing economies and cultures, or the problems of economies and cultures that are either not developing or actually regressing? I admit that it's an appealing theory, but is there any remotely realistic way of putting it into practice?

[Fuchs]

I was thinking of culture, rather than transient political alliance. Hasn't Germany been fundamentally European, hence "Western", at least since 1871?

Granted, these are very loose terms, but their use in discussions of "Westernizing" other countries is equally loose. The context in which the term "Western" was invoked a few posts back appeared to characterize a cultural and economic identity rather than a political alliance. If that interpretation is incorrect I'm sure the author of the post will clarify.

It's been that kind of Western since Charles the Great at least.
The only relevant East-West divide prior to Lenin was the persistence of serfdom (or a similar kind of lower class / caste) in Poland and Russia throughout and after the Enlightening. The Eastern European upper classes and urban population in general were in synch with France, Spain, England, Germany since about Peter the Great.


"Western" isn't a useful description for the pre-Iron Curtain period.

[Dayuhan]

It's been that kind of Western since Charles the Great at least... The Eastern European upper classes and urban population in general were in synch with France, Spain, England, Germany since about Peter the Great.

That was the point I was trying to make, in response to the suggestion that Germany was "well on the road to Westernization" prior to WW2.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I think you are confusing cause and effect. Communism and commercialism are both effects, not causes. Industrialization allows for modernization (broadly defined as a free-market economics, cosmopolitan society, and representative governments) but it is not essential. Many small cities and states managed the same thing through trade (Venice, the Dutch Republics). It is a large, stable economy that eventually allows for the general masses to enjoy the freedoms usually reserved for the wealthy in pre-modern societies.

Fuchs raises a good point that serfdom was only recently abolished in Russia at the time of their revolution which allows for communism to take root instead of capitalist republic. Society, or the culture, or however you want to term it (we should probably define some terms) was not primed for capitalism. There was still a strong client-patron relationship amongst the masses and the idea that the state would take care of them in an equitable fashion was easier to take then the idea that you are now free and hopelessly poor. In this case communism was a necessary intermediate stage to allow for modernization, and it only took about 80 years.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Here is an idea I would like to throw out to the general audience. Individual salvation as a primer for democracy.

I have a paper somewhere that argues that those "uncivilized" countries where protestantism was spread by English ministers were more successful in transitioning to democracy many decades later. I can't remember his argument as to why, but my argument would be that protestantism teaches a very rudimentary form of individualism - you, and only you, are responsible for getting into heaven. Catholicism does the same thing but it is more rule bound, fundamentally more "group" oriented (evangelical), and hierarchical. By implanting the idea of individual salvation it fostered the idea of individual worth and individualism in general.

Just a thought.

[wm]

Here is an idea I would like to throw out to the general audience. Individual salvation as a primer for democracy.

I have a paper somewhere that argues that those "uncivilized" countries where protestantism was spread by English ministers were more successful in transitioning to democracy many decades later. I can't remember his argument as to why, but my argument would be that protestantism teaches a very rudimentary form of individualism - you, and only you, are responsible for getting into heaven. Catholicism does the same thing but it is more rule bound, fundamentally more "group" oriented (evangelical), and hierarchical. By implanting the idea of individual salvation it fostered the idea of individual worth and individualism in general.

Just a thought.

At a more fundamental level, I think the notion of salvation is tied to a notion of progress, which is, in turn, connected to how one views history. Folks seem to have two senses of the flow history (or the lack therof).
View one: History (and time) is linear--which tends to be a more Western view. Salvation becomes something that makes sense: one can progress through history and, perhaps, make things better, with salvation being an example of things getting better.
View two: History (and time) is circular. Here salvation makes little sense. If things just happen over and over again, progress is not possible; what you have is what you get. Why bother trying to change things?

Protestantism and Christianity in general subscribe to a linear view of history. However, personal salvation seems to be a red herring in the casual trail, if such casaulity actually exists, I suspect that another point about the apparent success of some colonies' transition to democracy may be more closely tied to the affinity of a colonized population with the so-called Protestant Work Ethic.

[TheCurmudgeon]

However, personal salvation seems to be a red herring in the casual trail, if such casaulity actually exists, I suspect that another point about the apparent success of some colonies' transition to democracy may be more closely tied to the affinity of a colonized population with the so-called Protestant Work Ethic.

I do believe in causality but not in a simplistic way. I also think that Weber got the causal arrow backwards in "the Protestant Ethic". I think that those peoples who were more industrious preferred Protestantism if for no other reason than it allowed them to keep more of their profits since they did not have to pay the Papal taxes.

[TheCurmudgeon]

OK, this is going to take a little more effort and will become a long term project.

However, what I have noticed is that each of the colonial powers (including the US) looked at the issue of how to deal with the indigenous population differently. The US had two models, internal and external. Internally we were interested in assimilation – forcing the indigenous population to become good American citizens (over their dead bodies if necessary). Externally, modernization did not become an issue until the start of the Cold War.

The French saw social change through the lens of their own revolutionary period (1789 -1871) and the related social revolution. They expected the peoples of Indochina to go through a smiliar transitional period (yet seemed to fight them tooth and nail when they tried).

The British seemed to simply view the locals as a lower form of life at least until the 1850s but from there on I am not sure. I have a book on sociological theory that talks about the odd dichotomy in British Social theory where there was one theory for them and another theory for everyone else in the world well into the twentieth century.

I am curious if anyone knows how the Germans and the Spanish viewed their colonial subjects in the period from 1850 to 1940. Was there any obligation based on sociological theories, or ethical obligation, to help their colonial subjects modernize?

[TTucker54]

If you have not read it yet, had you considered Reading Samuel Huntington's Political Order in Changing Societies? It was written in 1968, updated in 1995 and essentially destroys Modernization Theory. The updated version has a good forward by Francis Fukuyama.

[TTucker54]

Also regarding how the Germans might have viewed their colonial subjects. it might be helpful to review the Herero Rebellions and the Maji-Maji Rebellions.
It might also be helpful to re-look Eugene Fishers experiments during this time. For what its worth, the pot calling the kettle black? The British felt the Germans inept in its scramble for Colonial Empire but very effective at its Colonial Administration. I AM NOT agreeing or disagreeing, just offering fodder for you to work with. ))

[ganulv]

Here is an idea I would like to throw out to the general audience. Individual salvation as a primer for democracy. […] By implanting the idea of individual salvation it fostered the idea of individual worth and individualism in general.

Maybe you are thinking of Weber’s Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism? Weber was more interested in the origins of capitalism than of democracy, though, so maybe not.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I am pretty sure I mentioned this somewhere else, but Weber was wrong. Catholics did not magically gain a work ethic because of a change in their confessional habits - those groups that converted to Protestantism because they already had a strong work ethic and wanted to keep more of what they made. They were avoiding Papal taxes. The individualist inclinations were already there. Think of them as the TEA party of the Late Renaissance.

Individual salvation plants the seed of an idea, that you have worth in Gods eyes and you are responsible for your own fate. A radical idea in some more communal societies, especially strongly caste societies where the entire justification of the horribly inequitable system is based (at least partially) on Gods design. Now the Catholics did a better job of using these ideas to justify the inequity - pay now, heaven later - it was all God's plan. There had been dissenters for a long time in Europe but they were always suppressed. The dissent was founded in the Roman Church's corruption and wasteful spending - on worldly matters. Once Luther opened the door people like Henry VIII jumped through it. People like Calvin came up with new ideas about how to please God which matched their own predilections.

Anyway, Weber was looking as a snapshot in time well after the transitional period. He opened a door to an idea that different parts of society may be interrelated, but he was wrong about cause and effect.

[condottiere]

My demographics are probably wrong, but northern Germany, Netherlands, England and Scandinavia just screams Anglo-Saxon. (And Danes, Jutes, Geats etcetera.)

Basically, people more used to autonomy and a tribal structure than ruled top down in an Imperial bureaucracy.

Doesn't quite gel with the entrepreneurial spirit of the Phoenicians, the Greeks, the Romans and supposedly the Jews.

[TheCurmudgeon]

My demographics are probably wrong, but northern Germany, Netherlands, England and Scandinavia just screams Anglo-Saxon. (And Danes, Jutes, Geats etcetera.)

Basically, people more used to autonomy and a tribal structure than ruled top down in an Imperial bureaucracy.

Doesn't quite gel with the entrepreneurial spirit of the Phoenicians, the Greeks, the Romans and supposedly the Jews.

I think you have the connection right. It is not the entrapeneurial spirit (See Greenfeld's "The Spirit of Capitalism" which ties it to nationalism) but the individualistic spirit. I don't have enough of a background in the nature of the tribal history of that region but I have material that indicates the Brits had individualistic leanings at least back to the tenth century, so you may be on to something.

[Dayuhan]

However, what I have noticed is that each of the colonial powers (including the US) looked at the issue of how to deal with the indigenous population differently. The US had two models, internal and external. Internally we were interested in assimilation – forcing the indigenous population to become good American citizens (over their dead bodies if necessary). Externally, modernization did not become an issue until the start of the Cold War.

The French saw social change through the lens of their own revolutionary period (1789 -1871) and the related social revolution. They expected the peoples of Indochina to go through a smiliar transitional period (yet seemed to fight them tooth and nail when they tried).

The British seemed to simply view the locals as a lower form of life at least until the 1850s but from there on I am not sure. I have a book on sociological theory that talks about the odd dichotomy in British Social theory where there was one theory for them and another theory for everyone else in the world well into the twentieth century.

There was often a very substantial difference in views of indigenous peoples between the home front of the colonial power, where there was often much noble and idealistic talk of spreading civilization and modernity, and among those members of the colonizing power who actually ran the colonies.

I am curious if anyone knows how the Germans and the Spanish viewed their colonial subjects in the period from 1850 to 1940. Was there any obligation based on sociological theories, or ethical obligation, to help their colonial subjects modernize?

The Spanish hadn't much empire left by 1850. The Philippines was largely autonomous in actual practice by that time, with the Spanish colonizers managing the affairs of the territory for their own benefit rather than according to any direction from the home country. Sociology, ethics, and modernization were not priorities.

[ganulv]

The Spanish hadn't much empire left by 1850. The Philippines was largely autonomous in actual practice by that time, with the Spanish colonizers managing the affairs of the territory for their own benefit rather than according to any direction from the home country. Sociology, ethics, and modernization were not priorities.

I haven’t thought about the topic for a long time so my knowledge is rusty, but IIRC the Philippines, Cuba, and Puerto Rico were all quite distinct internally and in terms of their affairs with Spain during this period despite all falling under the umbrella term of “colonies.”

[TheCurmudgeon]

If you have not read it yet, had you considered Reading Samuel Huntington's Political Order in Changing Societies? It was written in 1968, updated in 1995 and essentially destroys Modernization Theory. The updated version has a good forward by Francis Fukuyama.

Modernization theory is like a Hydra – you cut off one head and it grows two more. It is based on a fundamental assumption that the West got something right because we “modernized” first. If we could just figure out what we got right we could shove it down the throats of the rest of the world and fix everything. That last sentence was only half in jest – it is a combination of pride in thinking we did it “right” first, hubris that we think everyone else wants what we have, and double-dog-dare hubris in believing we can recreate it at will. It is that base idea that keeps reviving the theory in a new form. The latest was functional-structural; if you create the institutions and allow them to function the rest will follow.

I am trying to show that the entire idea of is off base, but I need to do a lot more research.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Also regarding how the Germans might have viewed their colonial subjects. it might be helpful to review the Herero Rebellions and the Maji-Maji Rebellions.
It might also be helpful to re-look Eugene Fishers experiments during this time. ))

Thanks for the information. After a little more research it was interesting to see how the attitudes and activities during that period well before WWI were recreated in the Nazi ideology, including conducting medical experiments on a population deemed eugenically inferior. Another country-specific response to how to deal with unruly indigenous peoples.