Book #1: Religion and State by L. Carl Brown

[TheCurmudgeon]

Professor Graphei,

How far do you want us to be come the Sep 15th?

[graphei]

I think everyone should be able to finish Part I (74 pages) by then. Part II may need to be split in half to be doable.

[omarali50]

Is it OK to post rolling comments as we read? or to finish part X and then say something?

[graphei]

Sure. I'd focus more on questions now as others may be encountering similar things. Delving into the nitty gritty may be a touch premature.

[Tukhachevskii]

It is the 19th September. I take it the seminar was cancelled? In that case, where's the pub!

[omarali50]

I have only reached page 42 (I started reading Wolf Hall, which turned out to be a MUCH more interesting and intelligent book ) but until now (and of course, it’s still too early to say much) I am not very impressed. It’s a good summary of some basics, but the approach is too conventional and not “rich” or especially insightful.
Until now. I may change my mind later.
A few minor random observations:
Chapter one is a good quick description of where Muslims live and what sects there are (of course, population figures are out of date). But it may be unnecessary to even bring up the fact that “more Muslims live outside the middle east...” because crucial theological and ideological questions are all being fought out on a middle-eastern basis. To the extent that Islam is an issue in the political life of Muslim countries, it is an issue with an almost exclusively middle-eastern history and background.
Chapter 2: p-20’s description of the “Muslim view of Christianity and Judaism” (that Judaism and Christianity are partial revelations, later completed by Islam) is one way some Muslims may look upon this issue. But others (probably more numerous in the general public, and certainly more representative of the Salafist, Wahabist and Maudoodist view) will place emphasis on the fact that God sent an (in its own way) complete revelation to them too (maybe different in some details, but not “partial”) but they have corrupted it. What they now know as Judaism or Christianity is NOT what God sent them. This last point is crucial.
P-21: West Pakistan’s violent suppression of Bengali nationalism is a very poor example of the “narcissism of small differences” that Brown is discussing here.
P-22. This is extreme nitpicking, but really, the way Muslims see Western power today and the way Christendom saw Muslim power in the middle ages are NOT symmetrical opposites.
P-26. The principle of “no compulsion in religion” was historically NOT the basis for tolerance it is now advertised to be. Tolerance was very real in many periods, but it was pragmatic. When less pragmatic rulers decided to be intolerant, masses of clerics and divines did not stand up to say “but you are violating the principle of X”. The principle is a recent discovery.

Btw, if you are interested in comparing monotheisms, professor FE Peters is your man. Really amazing scholarship. http://www.goodreads.com/author/show/397928.F_E_Peters

[jmm99]

From p.20:

Jews, Christians, and Muslims worship the same God, believe in revelation, holy scriptures, heaven and hell, and have similar attitudes toward history and the role of humankind in fulfilling the divine purpose.

If I've heard or read the bolded phrase once, I've heard or read it a thousand times. Of course, it's not true. It's impossible to square a Unitarian God with a Trinitarian God. Nonetheless, "we worship the same God" is a common piece of rhetoric for those who want to bridge the faith gap. I suspect that it does more harm than good.

Brown, while apparently oblivious of this at p.20, recognized the faith gap at pp.23-24:

Indeed, the Islamic religious outlook makes it extremely difficult for Muslims to understand the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, even less to view it sympathetically. To Muslims the idea of God-in-man comes across as shirk (literally, association, thus meaning the linking of any person or thing with the ineffable God), and shirk is the gravest of sins in Islam.

Some years ago I sat in on a discussion between an eminent Egyptian ‘alim and an equally eminent Catholic priest famed for his rich, nuanced scholarly study of Islam. An exhilarating atmosphere of mutual respect and mutual understanding reigned, but then the ‘alim raised the issue of the Trinity, bringing in its wake a discussion characterized by misunderstanding and even animosity poorly papered over by scholarly politesse on both sides.

If I, as a "shirker" (say, a traditional Roman Catholic), tell a Muslim that we worship the same God, am I not blaspheming his God ?

That's the major quibble I found in Chapter 2.

Regards

Mike

[Tukhachevskii]

[A] Chapter 2: p-20’s description of the “Muslim view of Christianity and Judaism” (that Judaism and Christianity are partial revelations, later completed by Islam) is one way some Muslims may look upon this issue. But others (probably more numerous in the general public, and certainly more representative of the Salafist, Wahabist and Maudoodist view) will place emphasis on the fact that God sent an (in its own way) complete revelation to them too (maybe different in some details, but not “partial”) but they have corrupted it. What they now know as Judaism or Christianity is NOT what God sent them. This last point is crucial.

[B] P-22. This is extreme nitpicking, but really, the way Muslims see Western power today and the way Christendom saw Muslim power in the middle ages are NOT symmetrical opposites.

[A]
Correct, indeed according to Akhtar, Quran and the Secular Mind

With the coming of Islam, the earlier people of the book are dismissed as a failed spiritual experiment (Q:57:16–17). p. 29

And in Freidman’s words, Tolerance and Coercion in Islam,

Islamic tradition Islam is not only the historical religion and institutional framework, which was brought into existence by the Prophet Muhammad in the seventh century, but also the primordial religion of mankind, revealed to Adam at the time of his creation. This is intimately related to the conception that Adam was a prophet,16 and to the notion that Ibrahim was a Muslim in this metahistorical sense. The idea that Islam had been the primordial religion of mankind, preached by the prophets of old, created an affinity between the Prophet Muhammad [an excellent legitimating strategy on his part- T] and his predecessors in the prophetic office. Muslim tradition frequently presents the Prophet as a brother, or a spiritual heir, of ancient prophets. Numerous episodes in his traditional sıra reflect this perception. During his visit to the city of Ta’if, the Prophet met a young man from the city of Nınawa (= Nineveh) and described himself as brother of Yünus b. Matta (= Jonah) who hailed from the same city (dhaka akhı kana nabiyyan wa ana nabı). When he reached Medina and was told that the Jews were fasting on the tenth day of the first month (ashüra, corresponding to the Day of Atonement, yom ha-kippurim), because on that day Allah saved the sons of Israel from their enemies and Moses fasted on that day, Muhammad said: “I am more deserving of Moses than you are” (ana a˛aqqu bi-Müsa minkum) and fasted on that day. He is also reported to have said that he was “the person worthiest of Jesus” (ana awla al-nas bi-Isa b. Maryam). The intimate relationship between Jesus and Muhammad is sometimes explained by the belief that no prophet was sent by Allah between them.All these traditions can be subsumed under the general statement according to which “the prophets are half-brothers: their mothers are different, but their religion is one” (… al-anbiya ikhwatun li-fiallat ummahatuhum shatta wa dınuhum wahid). This is understood to mean that the prophets’ belief in the unity of God and in the principles of their respective religions (usül al-dın) is one, but they differ with regard to the particular laws ( furü amaliyyat, fiqhiyyat). This is comparable with certain changes which occurred in the religion of Islam itself: at one time the Muslims were commanded to face Jerusalem in prayer; later their qibla was changed to Mecca. Nevertheless, Islam remained the same religion. Similar developments can be discerned in the development of the prophetic religions in general. For instance, the Children of Israel had been commanded to keep the Sabbath; when Islam emerged, the observance of the Sabbath was forbidden and replaced by Friday. Thus, though particular laws have been changed by Allah in the course of time, the religion of all the prophets is still the same.

In other words, Islam abrogated all previous religions (anything that comes afterward is just madness of course). Of course, with Islam the concept of fitrah states that all people are born Muslim and are only perverted from Truth by their non-Islamic parents or the culture they live in. One of the purposes of Jihad (as a subordinate concept [ways] of Dawa [ends]) is to free them from the “shackles of self-imposed immaturity” (if I may pervert Kant). What we call the Islamic conquests were called the futuhaat (the openings) and aimed at freeing the world from Jahilliya and bringing it back to Truth. Sort of like the Yanks making the world safe for democracy and freedom (or, rather their concept of it) or even the Communists.


If I may I’d like to offer a counter-point in the form of an anecdote. In 2008 I was sitting at the library in Brunel “university” researching for an essay on Soviet security policy, sharing a table with a four Pakistani girls, one with a hijab. They were talking about boys so I ignored them for the most part (apart from when they used their mobiles…in the library!) Anyway, somewhere between Chapter 1 and Chapter 3 of Tucker’s, Soviet Political Mind, their conversation had turned to religion. One of the girls said that their father had told them that all religions were equal and that everyone had a heaven to go to. Some of the girls nodded. Except for Hijab-girl. She smiled condescendingly and said (and I paraphrase) “that’s what they say but that’s not what our deen (i.e. religion) says. If you knew Islam properly you would know that. How can the kaffir be equal to a Muslim?” Knowing where that conversation was going (not an untypical conversation for Brunel, or SOAS, or Kings, or even Oxford) I decided to repair to the bar. Sometimes having a permanent tan has its advantages you know (I wouldn’t have heard that conversation otherwise).


[B] An important point often neglected. Many people forget, or don’t even know, that up until the end of the Second Crusade the Crusaders themselves were unaware that they were fighting a rival universalist group and had been calling the Muslims “Hagarenes” up to that point. The whole collision of Europe with Islam is a messy field of, if I may borrow a phrase, perception and misperception.

[Tukhachevskii]

[C] P-26. The principle of “no compulsion in religion” was historically NOT the basis for tolerance it is now advertised to be. Tolerance was very real in many periods, but it was pragmatic. When less pragmatic rulers decided to be intolerant, masses of clerics and divines did not stand up to say “but you are violating the principle of X”. The principle is a recent discovery. [/url]

[C] Let’s not forget, firstly, that that verse is a meccan verse and was thus, in Islamic theology, abrogated by the following Medinan verses. Of course there will be those who decry recourse to Naksh as hair-splitting. Apparently, Islamic theology is irrelevant and the use of it by Mujahedeen forces globally is nothing more than opportunism (i.e., they’d do what they do anyway). But one tends not to be able to argue with people like that.

As per the Encyclopedia of the Quran, Vol. 5,

Q 2:256, “There is no compulsion in religion . . .” (lā ikrāha fī l-dīni) has become the locus classicus for discussions of religious tolerance in Islam. Surprisingly enough, according to the “circumstances of revelation” (asbāb al-nuzūl) literature (see occasions of revelation), it was revealed in connection with the expulsion of the Jewish tribe of Banū l-Nadīr from Medina in 4⁄625 In the earliest works of exegesis (see exegesis of the Quran: classical and medieval), the verse is understood as an injunction (amr) to refrain from the forcible imposition of Islam, though there is no unanimity of opinion regarding the precise group of infidels to which the injunction had initially applied. Commentators who maintain that the verse was originally meant as applicable to all people consider it as abrogated (mansūkh) by q 9:5, q 9:29, or q 9:73 (see abrogation). Viewing it in this way is necessary in order to avoid the glaring contradiction between the idea of tolerance and the policies of early Islam which did not allow the existence of polytheism — or any other religion — in a major part of the Arabian peninsula. Those who think that the verse was intended, from the very beginning, only for the People of the Book, need not consider it as abrogated: though Islam did not allow the existence of any religion other than Islam in most of the peninsula, the purpose of the jihād (q.v.)against the People of the Book, according to q 9:29, is their submission and humiliation rather than their forcible conversion to Islam.[...]

These tolerant attitudes toward the non-Muslims of Arabia were not destined to last. After the Muslim victory in the battle of Badr (q.v.; 2⁄624), the Qur_ān started to promote the idea of religious uniformity in the Arabian peninsula. q 8:39 enjoins the Muslims “to fight… till there is no temptation [to abandon Islam; fitna] and the religion is God’s entirely” (cf. q 2:193).Once this development took place, the clauses in the _ahd al-umma bestowing legitimacy on the existence of the Jewish religion in Medina had to undergo substantial reinterpretation. The clause stipulating that “the Jews have their religion and the believers have theirs” was now taken to mean that the Jewish religion is worthless (ammā l-dīn fa-laysū minhu fī shay.[...] According to them [spiritualist theologians], q 2:256 is not a command at all. Rather it ought to be understood as a piece of information (khabar), or, to put it differently, a description of the human condition: it conveys the idea that embracing a religious faith (q.v.) can only be the result of empowerment and free choice (tamkīn, ikhtiyār). It cannot be the outcome of constraint and coercion (qasr, ijbār). Phrased differently, belief is “an action of the heart (q.v.)” in which no compulsion is likely to yield sound results (li-anna l-ikrāh _alā l-īmānlā ya_i__u li-annahu _amal al-qalb). Religious coercion would also create a theologically unacceptable situation: if people were coerced into true belief, their positive response to prophetic teaching would become devoid of value, the world would cease to be “an abode of trial” (dār al-ibtilā_; Rāzī, Tafsīr, vii, 13; Ibn al-Jawzī, Zād, iv, 67; see trust and patience; trial) and, consequently, the moral basis for the idea of reward and punishment would be destroyed. This argumentationuses the verse in support of the idea of free will. p.292

Similar was the fate of q 109:6, which was declared abrogated by q 9:5 (āyat al-sayf ) or interpreted as a threat against the polytheists. This new attitude was also expressed in the prophetic tradition according to which “no two religions will coexist in the Arabian peninsula” (lā yajtami_u dīnāni fī jazīrat al-_arab). Despite the apparent meaning of q 2:256, Islamic law allowed coercion of certain groups into Islam. Numerous traditionists and jurisprudents ( fuqahā_) allow coercing female polytheists and Zoroastrians (see magians) who fall into captivity to become Muslims — otherwise sexual relations with them would not be permissible (cf. q 2:221; see sex and sexuality; marriage and divorce). Similarly, forcible conversion of non-Muslim children was also allowed by numerous jurists in certain circumstances, especially if the children were taken captive (see captives) or found without their parents or if one of their parents embraced Islam. It was also the common practice to insist on the conversion of the Manichaeans, who were never awarded the status of ahl al-dhimma. Another group against whom religious coercion may be practiced are apostates from Islam (see apostasy). As a rule, classical Muslim law demands that apostatesbe asked to repent and be put to death if they refuse.
P. 292

As Friedman explains in, Tolerance and Coercion in Islam,

Concerning the question of abrogation (naskh), two exegetical trends can be discerned in the Quranic commentaries. According to some traditionists and commentators, Quran 2:256 initially applied to all people, and was one of the “armistice verses” (ayat al-muwadafia).75 Eventually it was abrogated. Quran 9:73 abrogated it with regard to the polytheists, and Qur√n 9:29 did the same with regard to the People of the Book. According to numerous other traditions, it was abrogated by “the verse of the sword” (yat al-sayf ), a term normally used for Quran 9:5. In other words, Quran 2:256 was revealed as universally valid and prohibited religious coercion with regard to all humanity. After the revelation of the two later verses, however, it was abrogated and the ruling included in it has not been in force ever since. This view of the doctrinal development can be supported, at least in part, by the jurists’ perception of the history of Islam during the Prophet’s lifetime: according to this perception, the Prophet fought the Arab mushrikün, forced them to embrace Islam, and did not accept from them anything except conversion. It is inconceivable that the Prophet would have done this if he had been obliged to follow Quran 2:256.

Both verses that are said to have abrogated Quran 2:256 speak about jihad. It can be inferred from this that the commentators who consider Quran 2:256 as abrogated perceive jihad as contradicting the idea of religious freedom. While it is true that religious differences are mentioned in both Quran 9:29 and 9:73 as the reason because of which the Muslims were commanded to wage war, none of them envisages the forcible conversion of the vanquished enemy. Quran 9:29 defines the purpose of the war as the imposition of the jizya on the People of the Book and their humiliation, while Quran 9:73 speaks only about the punishment awaiting the infidels and the hypocrites in the hereafter, and leaves the earthly purpose of the war undefined. Jihad and religious freedom are not mutually exclusive by necessity; religious freedom could be granted to the non-Muslims after their defeat, and commentators who maintain that Quran 2:256 was not abrogated freely avail themselves of this exegetical possibility with regard to theJews, the Christians and the Zoroastrians. However, the commentators who belong to the other exegetical trend do not find it advisable to think along these lines, and find it necessary to insist on the abrogation of Quran 2:256 in order to resolve the seeming contradiction between this verse and the numerous verses enjoining jihad. p. 102-3

I am also a fan of Peters work BTW.