Book #1: Religion and State by L. Carl Brown

[TheCurmudgeon]

That’s a very post-Aquinas view of politics.

I am not so sure. As the book mentions, the separation of politics and religion can at least be traced back to Jesus' advice to render onto Caeser that which is Caeser's. This would indicate that at least the religious and the political could be considered separate.

The separation of religion from politics or church and state is a peculiarly Western European, post-protestant phenomena/mania.

I am not so sure that Westerners have actually separated politics from the church; we have only compartmentalized their organizational charts. That was simply the result of dealing with multiple religions. India had a separation of church and state for two thousand years.

I believe that any complex society that has to deal with multiple religions either has to suppress religions not in concert with the political entities or would have to find a way to tolerate them – a defacto separation if not one sanctified by a constitutional separation. That does not mean that religion, or politics, or any other component of society are separate (or separable) from the human animal or the human condition. They are creations of the human condition and have no life without it; they are immutable from their creator.

The relationship of “religion” to other “spheres” of human existence (if such divisions are to be accepted; a la political “science”) remains a problem to be explained not a phenomena to be taken at face value.

I don't accept it at face value, and I accept the challenge of attempting to explain the phenomena.

[Tukhachevskii]

I am not so sure. As the book mentions, the separation of politics and religion can at least be traced back to Jesus' advice to render onto Caeser that which is Caeser's. This would indicate that at least the religious and the political could be considered separate.

My short rebuttal would be to mention ... the Divine Right of Kings. A longer (though still to short) response is...
Like the forgoing passage about coercion in the Quran that saying attributed to Christ has been as misunderstood and abused as it has bandied about for all number of political purposes (usually shorn of its context and transformation over the centuries). The adventure of that particular idea is complex. The meaning of that phrase had changed over the centuries and meant one thing to the Church Fathers (and Augustine), another thing to the pre-modern Princes in their conflict with the Pope and yet another to the post-Lockean generation (and Americans in particular). Its easy to forget the context of the statement and also how it was understood at the time. It has everything to do with Pilate and the attempt to “frame” Christ as a political authority in opposition (and that’s the key) to Rome. That is how St. Paul understood that phrase and how many of the later saints understood it. Once Rome itself became Christian the temporal and spiritual powers are united in the form of the Pope and the Emperor, one a lord temporal and the other a lord spiritual (so to speak). That is not a division of church and state it is a division of powers toward the same end. Again, it is not until Luther and the Reformation that the meaning attributed to that phrase begins to resemble what you Americans (via Locke) understand it to be.
Christian political theory can be said to begin (in terms of its codification) with St. Paul (during the Roman era) and find its ultimate conceptual maturity or culmination with St. Augustine and begins its long, slow unravelling with St. Aquinas. We can divide it, for convenience sake, into three periods; 1) formative, 2) consolidation (and I use that word deliberately), 3) sundering. However, the pre-Christian era needs an honourable mention so I’ll let Robin Osborne (“The Religious Contexts of Ancient Political Thought” in the Blackwell Companion to Greek and Roman Political Thought), do it for me;

“Not only was there no single voice with religious authority, but there was no separate sphere of ‘‘religious’’ matters held to be outside the authority of the state. In the modern western world religious convictions are held to be fundamentally a private matter and in the liberal state religion provides the key example of a private matter in which political interference is regarded as inappropriate. In both Greece and Rome religious life was public life and religious behaviour as proper for political control as any other form of behaviour.”p.119

The formative phase (the periodisations are all mine and for convenience only) lasts from the Roman Empire to its conversion under Constantine (however, Constantine’s belief that the Emperor reigns over the church rather than vice versa is what leads to the next major development in the West, although Eastern Orthodox Christianity virtually accepts that concept especially later, in Russia when it becomes the “third Rome”, but we are getting ahead sidetracked).
I’ll let Carlyle, The History of Medieval Political Theory in the West, Vol. 1 speak for me,
[quote]“The most important passage in the New Testament which is connected with this subject is that in the thirteenth chapter of St Paul's epistle to the Romans. "Let every soul be in subjection to the higher powers : for there is no power but of God; and the powers that be are ordained of God. Therefore lie that resisteth the power withstandeth the ordinance of God: and they that withstand shall receive to themselves judgment. For rulers are not a terror to the good work, but to the evil. And wouldest thou have no fear of the power? do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise from the same : for he is a minister of God to thee for good. But if thou do that which is evil, be afraid; for he beareth not the sword in vain: for he is a minister of God, an avenger for wrath to him that doeth evil. Wherefore ye must needs be in subjection, not only because of the wrath, but also for conscience' sake. For this cause ye pay tribute also; for they are the ministers of God's service, attending continually upon this very thing. Render to all their dues: tribute to whom tribute is due; custom to whom custom; fear to whom fear; honour to whom honour." This passage, which is of the greatest importance throughout the whole course of medieval political thought, being indeed constantly quoted from the second century onwards, is indeed pregnant and significant in the highest degree. It defines in the profoundest way the Christian theory of the nature of political society” p.89-90

The central issue in the formative phase is therefore centred around authority over the body and soul of the body politik. Does the soul take precedence or the body? It is not a question of separation of purpose but rather division of labour. With specific reference to the magic phrase “Render unto....”(&c), it really didn’t figure too prominently in writing of the time except polemically.

In a letter to the Emperor Constantine, Hosius of Cordova uses the phrase in its commonly accepted meaning; that temporal powers have no business interfering with God’s representative but that that does NOT apply the other way around (the Church therefore, supervenes, on the affairs of the Empire);

(from, Francis Young, ‘Christianity’, Cambridge History of Greek & Roman Political Thought) Intrude not yourself into ecclesiastical matters, neither give commands unto us concerning them; but learn from us. God has put into your hands the kingdom; to us he has entrusted the affairs of his church... It is written, 'Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's.' p. 658

Bishop Ambrose (of St. Augustine fame) is similarly dismissive in AD386 when, angry at Imperial interference over the question of the Arian heresy, he writes to the political powers in Milan that

'the emperor is within the church, not above the church'. ”p. 658 (my italics, from, Young, “Christianity”, Ibid)

In the consolidation (Early Mediaeval) phase Christian political theory further develops and the theory arises that the church administers to the soul and the state to the body but it is a functional differentiation only. They are both doing the same job, the sheparding of Man (what Foucault in “Security, Territory and Population” called the pastoral mode of government or “the government of souls”). One administers to the transcendent the other to the temporal (the “long arm of the church”) but both as aspects of the same reality and project. If the early church fathers had believed in the separation of church and state the concept of the divine right of kings would never have come into being nor would it have been needed in the first place (the king, as Kantorowicz tells us, had two bodies). Using a British example the relationship between church and state is analogous to that between the Queen and Parliament, or a president and prime minister, there is a hierarchy (in fact, Iran probably represents a homologous case....another thread needed there methinks!). A cavalry squadron and an artillery battalion may be functionally separate but both have the same mission (with God in this schema being the Commander-in-Chief, who has other non-military responsibilities, and the Emperor/Monarch the Chief-of-Staff). To Understand this one needs to understand the imagery, culture, symbolic references and other stuff they thought with (such as the metaphor of the body, hierarchy of spheres, corpus mysticum, which is where we get the phrase “body politic”, etc.). The very role and purpose of a Monarch is derived from and legitimated and regulated by Christian doctrine (a feat modern day doctrine writers can only envy). In Figgis’ words (Political Thought from Gerson to Grotius),

“In the Middle Ages the Church was not a State, it was the State; the State or rather the civil authority (for a separate society was not recognised) was merely the police department of the Church. The latter took over from the Roman Empire its theory of the absolute and universal jurisdiction of the supreme authority, and developed it into the doctrine of the plenitude potestatis of the Pope, who was the supreme dispenser of law, the fountain of honour, including regal honour, and the sole legitimate earthly source of power, the legal if not the actual founder of religious orders” p.8
[...]
the medieval mind conceived of its universal Church-State, with power ultimately fixed in the Spiritual head bounded by no territorial frontier; the Protestant mind places all ecclesiastical authority below the jurisdiction and subject to the control of the “Godly prince,” who is omnipotent in his own dominion. It was not until the exigencies of the situation compelled the Presbyterians to claim rights independent of the State, that the theory of two distinct kingdoms is set forth”p.45

Cont/. below....

[Tukhachevskii]

Or, alternatively, in Gierke’s words (Political Ideas of the Middle Ages), according to Christian political theorists in the early to mid medieval period (what I have called the consolidation phase),

“the Emperor, and likewise all other Rulers, derive their offices but mediately from God, and immediately from the Church's Head, who in this matter as in other matters acts as God's Vice- Regent-this became the general theory of the Church. It was in this sense that the allegory of the Two Swords was expounded by the ecclesiastical party. Both Swords have been given by God to Peter and through him to the Popes, who are to retain the spiritual sword, while the temporal they deliver to others. This delivery, however. will confer, not free ownership, but the right of an ecclesiastical office-holder. As before the delivery, so afterwards, the Pope has utrumque gladium. He has both Powers habitu, though only the Spiritual Power actu. The true ownership (dominium) of both swords is his, and what he concedes in the temporal sword is merely some right of independent user, which is characterized as usus immediatus, or perhaps as dominium utile. In the medium of feudal law the papal right in the Temporal Power appears as neither more nor less than a feudal lordship. The Emperor assumes the place of the highest of papal vassals, and the oath that at his coronation he swears to the Pope can be regarded as a true homagium". In any case the Emperor and every other worldly Ruler are in duty bound to use in the service and under the direction of the Church the sword that has been entrusted to them'. It is not merely that the Pope by virtue of his spiritual sword may by spiritual means supervise, direct and correct all acts of rulership". Much rather must we hold that, though in the general course of affairs he ought to refrain from any immediate intermeddling with temporal matters, and to respect the legitimately acquired rights of rulers, he is none the less entitled and bound to exercise a direct control of temporalities whenever there is occasion and reasonable cause for his intervention (casunliter et ex rationabili causa).Therefore for good cause may he
withdraw and confer the Imperium from and upon peoples and individuals": and indeed it was by his plenitude of power that the Imperium was withdrawn from the Greeks and bestowed upon the Germans (translation Imperii)”p.14

Let’s not forget too that even as early as the fifth century Pope Leo I (440–61),

had attributed monarchical powers to the popes as successors of St Peter and had attached to the papacy the old pagan imperial title of “supreme pontiff” (pontifex maximus) not long since abandoned by the emperors themselves (in Oakley, Kingship: The Politics of Enchantment, p. 111)

That’s not to say the Kings went along with it, their grumbling and contestation of the role of the Papacy would continue until the Treaty of Utrecht (or thereabouts)


However, it is also during this period that we see St. Aquinas (forgetting Tertullian’s admonition 'What has Athens to do with Jerusalem?') tinkering around with Aristotle and once again the adventures of ideas takes centre stage. Says, McClelland A History of Western Political Thought
“Thomas’s [Aquinas] problem was to try to reconcile the polis of the Greeks with Augustine’s city of fallen men. Again, it has to be emphasised that ignoring the Politics of Aristotle was out of the question. The reputation of Aristotle was so much a part of the intellectual landscape of Thomas’s time that Aristotle did not even have to be mentioned by name in philosophical treatises. When Thomas’s contemporaries wrote ‘as the Philosopher says’, or even ‘as He says’, everybody knew it meant Aristotle.”p.106
His resolution of that would have profound consequences for political theory and practice during and after the reformation (to which I have alluded in a previous post).


In fact, had the Roman empire not adopted Christianity as the official legitimating discourse and market of belonging (in the Greek and Roman sense, which see opening quote) then the modern concept of separation of church and state we see germinate during the reformation may, I stress, may, have occurred earlier. But it didn’t. It is precisely the concept of divine right of kings that causes the problems we see prior to the reformation and which come to a head with the Thirty Years War. After all it was Luther’s complaint that religion has no business in politics (or being tainted by it) that led him to reformulate the phrase “Render unto Caesar”. Toward the end of the early-modern period (the sundering phase) then the legitimacy (and purpose) of a Monarch rests less on the Papacy and more on a nascent conception of the popular will which is a story for another time/thread. It is with John Locke’s Two Treatise on Government, however, that the legal constitutional formulation for the separation of church and state as it is understood today first arises (especially in the American case). It is, however, false to take that concept and apply it retrospectively. The foregoing is also a gross oversimplification of what is a hugely complicated and confusingly entangled set of processes.

Suffice to say and more to the point,...we can’t simply say “what about Render unto Caesar?” without understanding what the phrase meant to the people who used it or how it changed. Just like the passage in the Quran about coercion. However, unlike Islamic theology which has relatively strict (hermeneutic) rules about how things are to be interpreted (think Hadith, Naksh and Shari’a scholarship in the Islamic case) most conceptual systems tend to suffer from a sort of semantic drift in which meanings can be lost, changed or just perverted. “Render unto Caesar” may be all things to all men which why we need to situate its usage to divine meaning. Quentin Skinner, Visions of Politics, Vol. 1 calls this process of (deliberate) semantic drift “paradiastolic redescription” (not one for catchy phrases old Quentin) and calls the people who practice this “innovating ideologists” that’s a simplification but I hope you’ll forgive me for it). Skinner uses Weber as an example (please read Skinner in the original, he is worth the effort);

Focusing on the early capitalists, Weber [in the Protestant Ethic] shows how they represented their behaviour in terms of the concepts normally used to commend an ideal of the religious life, emphasising their dedication to their calling and their careful and painstaking lives. As he indicates, this was undoubtedly a rational choice for them to make. Not only were they right to see that, if they could apply such concepts to their own behaviour, this would provide them with a powerful legitimising device. They were also right to see that it was plausible to make the attempt. The Protestant conception of the calling echoed their own worldly asceticism, and there were many affinities between the distinctively Protestant ideal of individual service and devotion to God and the commercial belief in the importance of duty, service and devotion to one’s work. p. 150-1 [...][Another] example is provided by the history of the word commodity. Before the advent of commercial society, to speak of something as a commodity was to praise it, and in particular to affirm that it answered to one’s desires, and could thus be seen as beneficial, convenient, a source of advantage. Later an attempt was made to suggest that an article produced for sale ought to be seen as a source of benefit or advantage to its purchaser, and ought in consequence to be described as a commodity. For a time the outcome of this further effort by the early English capitalists to legitimate their activities was that commodity became a polysemic word. But eventually the original applications withered away, leaving us with nothing more than the current and purely descriptive meaning of commodity as an object of trade. Although the capitalists inherited the earth, and with it much of the English language, they were unable in this case to persuade their fellow language users to endorse their attempted eulogy of their own commercial practices. p.169

I don’t mean to be flippant but time and more importantly, space precludes a deeper discussion of this (in fact I don’t even know if I said what I wanted to say or if I flew off on a tangent! The latter me thinketh). I pray you read the references above. They can explain things better than this mere mortal can! I also have not meant to be condescending in any way either. It’s a hazard of our medium that emoticons just can’t ameliorate. However if you are ever in town we can have a good old pagan symposium and thrash it all out conversationally (always my strongpoint).


I sometimes wonder if that great absconder MarcT wouldn’t be able to do a better, more succinct job.

[Tukhachevskii]

I am not so sure that Westerners have actually separated politics from the church; we have only compartmentalized their organizational charts. That was simply the result of dealing with multiple religions. India had a separation of church and state for two thousand years.

I don’t quite know what you mean by that unless you mean Protestantism and Catholicism are two separate religions which is what they meant at the time (I know, strange to our ears though it may be. As for India it hasn’t existed for two thousand years, it is a post-colonial creation. Prior to the Empire the geographical area in question contained kingdoms that were either Hindu, Muslim or Buddhist.

I believe that any complex society that has to deal with multiple religions either has to suppress religions not in concert with the political entities or would have to find a way to tolerate them – a defacto separation if not one sanctified by a constitutional separation. That does not mean that religion, or politics, or any other component of society are separate (or separable) from the human animal or the human condition. They are creations of the human condition and have no life without it; they are immutable from their creator.

A belief is not a statement of fact it is a desire. That sort of constitutional thinking is typical for the heirs of Locke and that “unvarnished Doctrine” splinters a little too much for my liking sir. But I cans ee where you are going (though I don't have to go there).

I don't accept it at face value, and I accept the challenge of attempting to explain the phenomena.

You may want to investigate the Putney debates by the New Model Army during the English Civil war (itself an instructive case) to determine what is political and what religious or even if the distinctions apply. Personally, I gave up on high brow pursuits like that in favour of trying (dismally) to scratch a living so I’ll leave it to fitter minds like yourself to grapple with it.