Syria: the case for action

[TheCurmudgeon]

'You' didn't?

Well, that's new.

Shall we discuss the US involvement and politics in every single of these cases, in-depth and in detail?

I would love to hear your thoughts on the matter as long as you are willing to stick to the relevant time period (2009 - present) and the relevant actors (the Obama administration) since that was the context that the statement was made in.

If you are looking to go back to the colonial, post-colonial, WWI, WWII, and post WWII time frame than I would counter by arguing that you would have to go back to at least 632 and the failure of the Prophet Muhammad to leave a clear successor for the Islamic people.

[CrowBat]

I would love to hear your thoughts on the matter as long as you are willing to stick to the relevant time period (2009 - present) and the relevant actors (the Obama administration) since that was the context that the statement was made in.

OK, then let's 'limit' this discussion to period since 2009.

The essence of ongoing 'don't get involved in Syria' argumentation in the USA is something like 'we don't want to fight for al-Qaida', primarily based on standpoint that 'every Islamist is an extremist' (sometimes going much further, and practically declaring every Moslem for 'Islamist extremist').

Such way of understanding the situation in Syria is based on complete ignorance of the facts on the ground, including not only such like that the uprising against Assadists began as wave of entirely peaceful nation-wide protesting, unrelated to ethnic or religious differences between various groups there; that it was the regime that instigated an inter-ethnic and inter-religious war in order to create precisely the situation there is now; etc., etc., etc., to such like complete ignorance of (often 'crucial') differences even between Syrian and Saudi Salafists, not to talk about such groups ranging from 'Islamists' of Liwa al-Islam, or Ahrar ash-Sham, to 'Jihadists' of the JAN or ISIS.

So, where was the failure?

Two years ago, a similar develoment like we've seen in Syria meanwhile, was prevented by relatively swift Western reaction in Libya. There the Western leaders were sane enough to overcome their 'natural' Islamophobia and say, OK, we'll support the 'anti-Q' movement. They did so, and in turn - whether intentionally or not - prevented Libya from becoming a major battlefield between the regime, moderates, Islamists and Jihadists.

This created a sort of 'precendent'; an example that many Syrians were hoping would be applied in their case too, especially if the Assadist regime would react to their protesting in same fashion the Libyan regime reacted to protesting there.

However, because there was no Western reaction, the regime in Syria not only felt free to escallate the situation, but eventually turned it precisely into the kind of struggle it knew was the only way that would save it: namely, an inter-ethnic and inter-religious, internationalized civil war, supposedly vaged 'against the same Islamist extremist terrorists that are threatening the West, and especially the USA'.

It is ridiculous but now we can hear all sorts of excuses for no intervention in Syria. Meanwhile even Hezbollah and the IRGC deployed in Syria are 'better bad guys' than the Syrian insurgents. What's more absurd: the Jihadists - i.e. non-Syrians supposedly fighting on insurgent side and against the Assadist regime - are meanwhile more busy fighting Syrian insurgent groups than the regime (they actually never really fought the regime, except with suicide attacks). Earlier today, the ISIS launched attack on one of Arabist insurgent groups in Dayr az-Zawr only minutes after the same was hit by regime's air force too (probably by pure accident, huh?).

'But', just because of these few groups of Jihadists, the West is considering practically all insurgents for 'Islamist extremists' - and doing nothing (i.e. letting them at the mercy of the latter).

[TheCurmudgeon]

OK, then let's 'limit' this discussion to period since 2009.

The essence of ongoing 'don't get involved in Syria' argumentation in the USA is something like 'we don't want to fight for al-Qaida', primarily based on standpoint that 'every Islamist is an extremist' (sometimes going much further, and practically declaring every Moslem for 'Islamist extremist').

No, the fundamental difference between Libya and Syria is that in Libya the rebels were a cohesive enough group to form a political entity that was recognized by foriegn powers (France first) as the actual government of Libya that then led to a UN resolution. We were largely invited into Libya. None of that happened in Syria. There was never a homogenous rebel front that could request intervention. Add to that the improbability of a UN mandate (because of Russian support for Assad) and the situation changes completely.

Now, you can argue that Syria has no oil, and therefore there was no corporate interest in the country. The business of America is business after all. But it had little to do with our myopic view of Arab extremists.

[Dayuhan]

No, the fundamental difference between Libya and Syria is that in Libya the rebels were a cohesive enough group to form a political entity that was recognized by foriegn powers (France first) as the actual government of Libya that then led to a UN resolution. We were largely invited into Libya. None of that happened in Syria. There was never a homogenous rebel front that could request intervention. Add to that the improbability of a UN mandate (because of Russian support for Assad) and the situation changes completely.

Now, you can argue that Syria has no oil, and therefore there was no corporate interest in the country. The business of America is business after all. But it had little to do with our myopic view of Arab extremists.

In addition, the Libyan rebels occupied a discrete geographical area that was well suited to support without boots on the ground. Defending Benghazi from approaching armored forces on desert roads was a task that was clearly achievable using the means the US and its allies were prepared to use. Once the rebels took the initiative, using those means effectively became far more complicated, especially in urban areas. In Syria those complications would be present from the start.

[CrowBat]

@Curmudgeon
Let me start with oil (perhaps it would be good to make it clear I'm not one of 'it's all about oil' conspiracy theorists; but if you decide to brandmark me as such, then as 'it's all about gas conspiracy theorist', please).

There is oil in Syria. There are oilfields in al-Hassaka Province (on Iraqi border), presently held by the Kurds organized by the PYD and defended by the YPG. These oilfields are intact and functioning and 'spice is flowing' - primarily to Iraq and Turkey. The PYD/YPG (YPG is actually the armed wing of the PYD) is stubbornly resisting any calls from various Syrian insurgent factions to share the income from that oil with them. Lapidar Kurdish response is: 'well gents, you're all so far away from us; why should we help you if you don't help us...?'

That said, and not to be brandmarked as 'spoilers of the party', the YPG has organized one armed brigade to go fighting 'with' other insurgents in Aleppo, while at the same time was at least as busy pleasing Assadist regime: not only have PYD authorities 'sillently' taken over all the functions of the former regime, or not reacted to regime's hijacking of dozens of Kurdish teenagers that are then spent as cannon fodder of the civil war, but were also friendly pumping oil to regime-held areas (Homs) until relatively recently, when the ISIS and JAN have interrupted that flow...

There are also oifields in Dayr az-Zawr Province (and a big, Russian-built oil refinery there too). Some of these are burning and disfunctional but most of the others are held by the ISIS and JAN since this summer (after these bribed one of local regime commanders to get a free passage through regime-held areas). The Jihadists are selling some of this to the locals, so these can distilate it for them (an extremely hazardous process if you're not properly equipped, obviously)...

Now, one could say, 'hey, all of this doesn't matter: it's barely enough to satisfy Syrian domestic consumption', and I would be on the border to confirm this.

But, yet more oil was found by Croatian company INA, several years ago. However, exploration of the fields in question (east of Homs) was stopped when INA was sold to Hungarian MOL. Namely, the MOL then got kicked out of Syria because it was caught deploying operatives of the Hungarian intelligence agencies into the country, and then a new Croat government concluded earlier sale of INA to MOL was based on excessive corruption and retrogradely cancelled that process... Whatever, the result of this quagmire was that INA didn't pump more but few truckloads of crude there, and even if would've tried to do more: well, the oilfields in question still need to be completely developed, infrastructure constructed etc. - and INA lacks the money, plus it can't find investors ready to poker their bucks considering the situation in Syria since 2011...

Even should we two agree to ignore this, then perhaps we cannot ignore the following: perhaps it is so that there are poeple that consider such issues like Syrian gas, or Syria as transit country for a possible gas-pipeline connecting Qatar with Europe (in order to breach the Russian monopoly to gas exports into the EU) - as one of reasons for persistent Russian support for Assads, and even for Saudi involvement in Syria? That is at least what one can conclude on the basis of reports of recent offer by Saudi Prince Bandar to Putin, which can be read in reports like this one. And, to make sure: due to links of private nature, no, I definitely have have no doubts that 'certain circles' do have strong interests to breach the Russian monopoly, and that Syria is their 'aim No.1'... Oh, and if you want to explain that Qatar might not be interested in such solution, for example because it has more LGCs than it's going to need for a number of years longer: well, that's where there are other 'certain circles' with their own, very different ideas than those of Qataris (and Saudis, who are in effective control of Qatari gas exports)...

So, perhaps it's not about oil. And perhaps it's not about gas. Perhaps it's not about gas pipelines either. I'm certainly always ready to agree that this about oil and gas is not the reason for US myopic view of Islamic extremism: on the contrary, I'm ready to sign any declaration that the US public has absolutely no clue about all the issues I've mentioned above, any time, 24/7. But, hell, a helluva lot is going on in the backgrounds because of gas and possible gas pipelines. And the people moving these strings from the background not only have lots of more money and influence than either of us can ever imagine, but are also 'primarily from the western side of great barn'...

**********

Having cleared the issue of 'it's about gas', yup, the issue of the UN authorisation and - especially - Russia (then the UN-insue is depending on Russia) is the only major difference.

The rest: sorry, it's surely not. For the start of this part of discussion, let me address your assessment that the cohesion of Libyan rebel groups was the crucial difference to that in Syria.

Well, no doubt, various characters in Benghazi were more than happy to create a 'government-like' body - especially so once Q's thugs launched an amphibious landing of a better part of their military force north of Agedabia, that evening of 17 March 2011, and when this force entered Benghazi, two mornings later (only to be smashed by US and French air, the same evening). But, to say they were 'cohesive enough' and thus - even 'roughly' or 'indirectly' something like 'representative' of all the other rebels - including those from az-Zawiya, or Nafuza Mountains, or from Kufra and elsewhere....or call them 'homogenous'... well, that really needs... no, it cries for plenty of imagination.

Having said that, I would like to stress: please, don't take this internally. Although I do find description 'cohesive enough' rather funny, I do not intend to offend you.

... back to the topic: And sure, if we are to measure by such standards, then the Syrian political opposition to Assadists (which is actually far bigger and better developed than what was left of Libyan opposition to Q back in February-March 2011) can only be described as a 'flock of stupid sheep' - alone because they didn't find enough agreement between each other to issue a joint statement and 'invite' the West to intervene in Syria.

If that is what you actually wanted to say, then we're in agreement.

But actually...

It was so that the Benghazi clique declared itself for 'government' irrespectivelly of its actual influence, was rapidly accepted by the West as such - irrespective of its actual (un)significance, (lack of) 'cohesion' or 'homogenity' etc. And the fact is that it was because this clique was flushed with money that it was able to gain influence and create some sort of 'cohesion' in the following months.

Nothing of that kind happened in Syria. Even when people like Col Assad attempted to create an apolitical, non-religious insurgency like the 'Free Army of Syria', when they managed to liberate significant parts of Idlib and Aleppo Provinces, when locals then installed their own, indigenous and freely elected authorities (I guess you haven't ever heard about this?), etc., etc., etc., all of this was blissfully ignored by the West. All that mattered - and still matters - is that various of Syrian political parties in diaspora are not 'united enough'...

Come on. Had anybody in the West came to the idea to provide such organizations like the FSyA with few millions of bucks (definitely much less than was the case with Libya, then Syria is much poorer than relatively rich Libya, and one gets 'more bang for his/her bucks'), and this as late as of autumn 2012, they could've done the same like the Benghazi-clique did in Libya, i.e. declare themselves for 'government', then literaly buy all the other insurgent/rebel factions, and impose themselves as 'moderate force in charge of insurgency against Assads'.

Instead, the FSyA, the Idlib Council, the Homs Council, the Hassaka Council and all the other councils were left on their own device, and various 'private initiatives' from Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey etc. were left to donate to receivers of their preference - with, oh surprise, surprise - 'expected' results of extremist organizations growing in influence.

As if the same would have not been the case if Libyans were left on their own...?!?

And when that was not enough, then also enough time lapsed for the foreign extremists, like the ISIS, to install themselves in the country too.

Like if such organizations would not have appeared in Libya - if the West didn't react there on time?

If somebody wants to tell me something of that kind, then explain me how comes the US embassy in Benghazi was overrun by AQ-allies, two years after intervention and after Q's regime was removed?
...

[CrowBat]

More importantly (from the standpoint of this discussion): what is going on in Syria now? Even now, after two years of bitter warfare, at the time the Obama admin only just began providing weapons and supplies to specific groups, and despite significant donations from various Arab states and Turkey, all the other moderate-, moderate Islamist-, or conservative Islamist- (but genuine) Syrian insurgent groups are so busy fighting the regime, that the ISIS and the JAN are free to roam wide and far in their backs, and take over one liberated area after the other.

Newest example: when the ISIS - which until now did not launch one military attack against any regime position at all (except a few in form of suicide bombings) - attacked the insurgent-held Azzaz, three days ago, the Tawhid Brigade had to be pulled out from running a highly-successful offensive into Lattakia Province, some 200km away, and rushed all the way to Azzaz to intervene there...

And 'we' are again letting Syrians down: the media is now even more full of reports about 'Extremist Islamists gaining Influence in Syria' (which is actually not the case: the Syrians still living in areas under the control of ISIS and JAN despise the extremists as much as they despite the regime), internet is full of photos of various US servicemen protesting 'I don't want to go fight for al-Qaida in Syria', and Russia is maintained happy for no gain at all... All of this despite the fact that there is still time to do something, and invest a few bucks (certainly much less than an outright military intervention would cost) - all provided one is not as frozen from Islamophobia, or so eager to provide all possible excuses bordering on absurdity.

***********

That with 200 kilometres is bringing me to the issue of geography - a topic that is so hapily ignored in our times of high-speed, 'internet warfare'.

Obviously, we're going to agree that the geography of Libya was working to advantage of local rebels. After all, following the early spate of uprisings, they were in de-facto (even though not 'effective') control of much of NE Libya (at least the swath of the coast from Agedabia to Tobruq), NW Libya (az-Zawiya etc.), Nafuza Mountains, oases like Kufra etc.

Regime-held areas between Tripoli and Sirte (with exception of Misurata) were far away from there, there is plenty of desert in between, remaining regime forces were weak, disorganized, much to dependent on support from foreigners etc., etc., etc.

Syria is relatively compact (at least more compact than Libya), and although most of its official Army fell apart by early 2012, the regime had no major problems to shuffle the conglomerate of few surviving Army brigades, but foremost elements of the 4th Division, the Republican Guards Division and various SF regiments, around the country in rapid fashion. At least not early on.

But meanwhile, the situation is entirely different, and much of remaining assets in regime's hands are so much weakened by losses that they rely on Hezbollah and Iranian-provided (and supported) Shia' units from Iraq, Lebanon, Iran and elsewhere - as well as on chemical weapons - for any kind of offensive operations. In fact, they proved entirely incompetent in regards of running offensive operations in urban areas at earlier times (which is one of major reasons for their massive losses), and would've probably collapsed in spring this year, if it wasn't for Iranian-Hezbollah intervention.

So, actually, geography might have been an issue early on, when the regime was still managing to move its units and crush specific nests of protesting and then insurgency. But, meanwhile, heh, sorry, this is definitely not the case.

[davidbfpo]

Paul Rogers latest commentary:http://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-ro...nd-negotiation

Even good cooperation between the former cold-war adversaries, however, would leave in place the other ingredients of the double proxy. Iran and Saudi Arabia ......But the position of Qatar and especially Saudi Arabia presents a difficulty to this evolving equation, for their support for Islamist rebels has a strong strategic basis. These states believe that Assad has to be defeated, as part of a wider war to prevent the establishment of a powerful Shi'a crescent stretching from the Mediterranean through southern Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Iran to the Indian Ocean.

Ordinary Syrians, let alone Russian-American diplomats, need real friends, not those who appear to regard them as unwilling pawns in a struggle way beyond their country.

[TheCurmudgeon]

CrowBat:

I won't dispute your in-depth analysis of the situation. I have not had the time nor the inclination to look into these matters. I think we have learned since Libya that the "Arab Spring" is not as much about promoting democracy as we wanted to believe. Add to that the inability to find a surrogate government to support and Russian resistance and the situation changes significantly.

As things developed in Syria concurrent with the political machinations in Libya and Egypt and even Tunisia it became clear that the final outcome in many of these places was not going to be a stable democracy. Promoting democracy is a foriegn policy as well as a security objective, but is it not achievable in Syria. Promoting regional security is also a security interest but ths situation looks fairly contained (has been for almost two years). So no reason to act there.

Chemical weapons created an exigency that warranted action. Beyond that, I don't see a national security interest in Syria that warrants intervention. That could change, and so planning is always done. But without the threat of CW, I don't see a reason to intervene.

[jmm99]

Syria turns over list of chemical arsenal in 1st step of disarmament (by Matthew Schofield, McClatchy Foreign Staff, 20 Sep 2013):

BERLIN — Syria met the first deadline of its pledge to surrender its chemical weapons arsenal on Friday, delivering its initial disclosure to the headquarters of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in The Hague, Netherlands, by the time limit that Russia and the United States had set last weekend.

In a statement on its website, the organization said it had received the filing but it revealed nothing else, except that the disclosure “is now being examined by the Technical Secretariat,” the group’s experts.

Reaction from the U.S. State Department, which has voiced skepticism that Syria would abide by the U.S.-Russia deal, was muted. When she was asked whether it was an encouraging sign that Syria had submitted the document on time, spokeswoman Marie Harf said she didn’t want “to get ahead of the process.”

“But you are right that there has been a document submitted,” she said, adding, “We’ve said all along that we need to see forward momentum within these timelines that we’ve set up in the framework.”

The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons website has a number of relevant documents, including the as distributed US-Russian framework with Annex A.

The Syrian list was submitted in accord with John Kerry's demand that it be submitted within 7 days of Syria's accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention. That Convention (Overview) allows 30 days for that submission and 10 years to destroy the weapons. Syria is going to be held to a much faster track according to Mr Kerry and other Obama administration spokespeople.

Regards

Mike

[CrowBat]

I think we have learned since Libya that the "Arab Spring" is not as much about promoting democracy as we wanted to believe.

Why not?

And if not, then what is it then about?

Surely, we can continue discussing the Russo-Saudi confrontation over gas-pipelines, monopolies etc., and its repercussions for Syria and so many other countries.

But, for Arabs - and, sorry, but 'Arab Spring' is about Arabs - things are actually developing between 'perfectly within expected' and 'excellently' in places like Egypt, Libya, Tunisia - and even in Yemen. That is, of course: considering local circumstances and problems inherited from earlier regimes. Anybody expecting these countries to transformate into some sort of 'brilliant watchtowers of democracy and pluralism' by the turn of some switch, perhaps then also supported by double-digit-expanding economies, is simply naive: it's not so that people and nations can adapt, adjust, learn and change faster just because the internet accelerated the flow of information.

As things developed in Syria concurrent with the political machinations in Libya and Egypt and even Tunisia it became clear that the final outcome in many of these places was not going to be a stable democracy.

Sorry, but can't agree with this.

'Political machinations in Libya'?

I understand and accept that on 'some internet forums', we all to tend to 'escape into simplicity'. There is neither place nor time to write more. But, please, let's not lose the 'big picture' out of sight because of this.

Libya is undergoing a 'perfectly normal' process of reorganization of political system. An eccentric dictator renown for state-sponsoring dozens of terrorist organizations around the world and brutalizing own population in all possible ways, was removed. Presently, the political system is at a stadium where a system of power-sharing is developing in various parts of Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan, based on tribes, militia, state authorities, renegades, civilians and military. Sometimes in the future, that system is going to evolve into something more 'Western-like', that's unavoidable.

Nothing changed in regards of religion (and is unlikely to change), and except for few isolated attacks on place of worship (most of which were protected by local Moslems), and that attack on US embassy, nothing bad happened in this regards of general security.

But, a LOT happened in regards of economic opportunities for everybody, in regards of foreign investment, in regards of female rights (especially in regards of female participation in public life, which increased drastically: now there is a law that stimulates minimal participation of women in every single political party), in regards of press freedoms, and in regards of respect for the rights of minorities etc. And, regardless of media reports about 'disastrous policy' in Libya, the country is the most Western-friendly nation in the entire Middle East and Africa, right after Israel (this is based on recent Gallup pools).

So, where is actually a problem in Libya?

Shall we perhaps take the 'most troublesome' of MENA nations hit by the 'Arab Spring' (except Syria, of course) - namely Yemen - as the next example?

The revolution there was spearheaded by women, there is press freedom, there are different political parties etc. All the same like in Libya. At least as important: since Salleh is out, the military and security apparatus are finally free to openly tackle the issue of AQ, because Mr. 'Don't-remove-me-or-AQ-is-going-to-rule' President was actually coopearting with the AQ. The new gov is happily cooperating with the USA and Saudi Arabia - especially in regards of its security and anti-terrorism.

Egypt? A nearly brilliant example of 'nation undergoing learning process'. A place where even biggest of Morsi's fans have learned - the wrong way, of course - that one should not vote for politicians based on their religion alone (which is then why the population in general is so supportive for military intervention and removal of Morsi)... Surely, it's going to take few years longer until Egyptians develop their civilian authorities well enough to takle the issue of military's dominance in politics and economy, but meanwhile it's certain they'll manage that too.

Of course, I really have to disappoint anybody who might be expecting all of the Egyptians, Libyans, Tunisians, Yemenis etc. that have removed their dictators now to decide to convert to Christianity and start preaching Gospel tomorrow morning: sorry, that's not going to happen.

But, that doesn't mean that all of these countries are not well-underway in regards of developing pluralist political and economic systems.

Promoting democracy is a foriegn policy as well as a security objective, but is it not achievable in Syria.

Sorry but, upon what experience is that assessment based?