Syria: the case for action

[TheCurmudgeon]

Just to be clear, I think we are making the right move to take action in this case. The question in my mind is, "what action will yield the desired result?"

That is a complex and nuanced question. But unlike others on this council I will not walk away from it just because it is complex. I have seen too many people here try to pass off the observation that a problem is complex as some form of intellectualism - with their next statement being that if it is too complex we should not get involved. Sorry, but that is poor logic and even poorer scholarship. There is nothing profound about standing on the sidelines.

If we want 1) to deter Assad from using these weapons again, and 2) deter other like-minded leaders from using the same tact - what is the response that will yield that result. What can we take away that Assad cares that much about. What can we threaten that other leaders will think twice about before they chose to use chemical weapons.

My response is - we need to know what Assad cares about first - then we act.

An appropriate response against Assad will yield the desired deterrence against others.

[ganulv]

If we want 1) to deter Assad from using these weapons again, and 2) deter other like-minded leaders from using the same tact - what is the response that will yield that result.

What about rewording “we want to deter Assad” to “we want Assad deterred.” The ultimate deterrence might be the threat of direct intervention by the militaries of neighboring countries and/or loss of support from Iran. Non-clandestine U.S. involvement threatens to introduce a whole ‘nother political dimension to whether that might happen, doesn’t it?

[TheCurmudgeon]

What about rewording “we want to deter Assad” to “we want Assad deterred.” The ultimate deterrence might be the threat of direct intervention by the militaries of neighboring countries and/or loss of support from Iran. Non-clandestine U.S. involvement threatens to introduce a whole ‘nother political dimension to whether that might happen, doesn’t it?

I agree that the action, whatever it is, need not be from the U.S. alone or from the U.S. at all. It is not like we have never worked through surrogates before. Even better if the action is taken as part of a coalition.

But it does need to be tailored to achieve the desired result - deterrence.

There were four other objectives of punishment. Revenge should not apply since his actions were not against us directly. I could argue that democracies see all citizens as the rightful powers in any political system. That said any attack on a innocent civilian is an attack on the "Democratic Us" (kind of like the royal "we"), and therefore an attack on all like-minded humans. This is the foundation of R2P. I will not make that argument nor do I believe it is accurate. Incapacitation is laudable, but unachievable. In this case incapacitation means eliminating the ability of Assad to use chemical weapons - a bridge too far in my estimation. Rehabilitation, I think not. Reparation, I don't see how. Perhaps we could seize all of Assad's foreign assets and offer to give them to the relatives of the victims, but I see jurisdictional issues until the relatives file an action in a US Court. Even then it is a wildly unlikely option. So our only reasonable security interest is deterrence. Deterrence against Assad or any other government that would use weapons of mass destruction against their (or any other) population.

If there were a non-military way to achieve this I would be for it. I don't see one.

[TheCurmudgeon]

What about rewording “we want to deter Assad” to “we want Assad deterred.” The ultimate deterrence might be the threat of direct intervention by the militaries of neighboring countries and/or loss of support from Iran. Non-clandestine U.S. involvement threatens to introduce a whole ‘nother political dimension to whether that might happen, doesn’t it?

I am not sure it does. It is not like the players on the world stage (both state and non-state) believe that we are doing nothing behind the scenes. Overt action at least does not allow for wild speculation.

Consultation with key players (particularly Russia) can limit "damage". We have to keep their interests in mind.

[Dayuhan]

An appropriate response against Assad will yield the desired deterrence against others.

The problem with punishment and deterrence is that both are invariably based on assumptions about how other parties will respond. It's easy to say that "If we do x, they will do y", or if we had done x, they would have done y". These assumptions are impossible to verify and as likely to be wrong as right. Any course of action based on assumptions about the responses of other parties has to be balanced by consideration of the lively possibility that we will do x and they will do z, or something from a completely different alphabet.

[TheCurmudgeon]

The problem with punishment and deterrence is that both are invariably based on assumptions about how other parties will respond. It's easy to say that "If we do x, they will do y", or if we had done x, they would have done y". These assumptions are impossible to verify and as likely to be wrong as right. Any course of action based on assumptions about the responses of other parties has to be balanced by consideration of the lively possibility that we will do x and they will do z, or something from a completely different alphabet.

This is the "it's too hard" argument. Let me lay this out.

Blue Team - psychologists, political scientists, and military people brought together to determine Assad's vulnerability (what we want to target) as well as his most likely response.

Red Team - Same makeup whose mission is to determine the most dangerous reaction.

White Team - A more robust element designed to look at third party outsiders (Iran, Russia, Lebanon, Turkey, Israel) to look for issues that could lead to a regional conflict.

Silver team - same makeup as the Blue and Red Teams, but whose mission is to study what total inaction will result in.

Each team should have at least two native Syrian's if possible. They review all relevant data and provide a series of courses of action that have been war gamed (action, reaction, counteraction). Leadership then recommends options to the President's team.

You are never going to be 100% right , and perhaps the Silver team wins and inaction is the best course of action. But I am not willing to concede that because a problem is difficult it is therefore intractable.

[Dayuhan]

This is the "it's too hard" argument.

Actually it's the "it's too uncertain" argument. Given the number of actors and the range of motives involved, our ability to predict outcomes is very limited, and any effort to predict outcomes is likely to be speculative.

What strikes me as odd about the proposals for action is that the adverse outcome of inaction is invariably claimed to be the possibility of escalation and regional spillover. To avert this, we propose an escalation that is very likely to produce regional spillover. I have to question a proposed response that seems very likely to produce precisely the outcome that we're trying to avoid.

From a cynic's perspective, if a stalemate continues, the rebels and the government will continue to butcher each other and anyone caught in between. If Assad wins, he will butcher the rebels and anyone associated with them. If Assad falls, the rebels will butcher each other and anyone associated with Assad. That's horrible any way it comes out, but is it really an equation that we need to be in? If AQ and Iran/Hezbollah are going to square off and duke it out, why should we be trying to pry them apart? No doubt the whole thing is going to be very bad for Syrians, but are a few thousand tons of explosives delivered by cruise missile going to make it any better?

[jmm99]

Senate committee approves Syria attack resolution - Committee voted 10-7, with both Democrats and Republicans voting for and against resolution. (USA Today, by Gregory Korte, 4 Sep 2013):

WASHINGTON — The Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted to authorize President Obama to use limited force against Syria Wednesday, after adopting amendments from Sen. John McCain designed to urge Obama to "change the military equation on the battlefield."

The Senate resolution would limit hostilities to 60 or 90 days, narrow military action to Syria's borders and prohibit U.S. troops on Syrian soil. McCain's proposal didn't change that scope but urged that the end goal should be "a negotiated settlement that ends the conflict and leads to a democratic government in Syria."

The vote was 10-7. Five Republicans and two Democrats voted against it. Sen. Ed Markey, D-Mass., voted "present."

Here's the amended AUMF.

Regards

Mike

[Dayuhan]

McCain's proposal didn't change that scope but urged that the end goal should be "a negotiated settlement that ends the conflict and leads to a democratic government in Syria."

How do you do that "bashing head on wall" emoticon?

I'd love to know how Mr. McCain proposes to achieve that goal within 90 days, without putting boots on ground.

The document looks like a prescription for disaster to me, and I hope it gets voted down. We'll see.

Realistically, force has to be proportional to goals, and "limited force" needs to be paired with limited goals. The goals here seem out of proportion to the approved means and thoroughly unrealistic. That's not even starting on the potential for unintended consequences...

[CrowBat]

It is a ridiculous solution for ridiculous situation - caused by lack of action when there was time.

Sure, in theory, there is a way to do something serious even in a 'limited action' scenario. Especially an 'Obama & Democrats style' Operation - that is: a combo of TLAM-strikes and UAV/UCAV-ops aiming at Assads and their top commanders - would be the most promising.

But, it's already crystal clear they'll not going to do that, so why bother even discussing this.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Actually it's the "it's too uncertain" argument. Given the number of actors and the range of motives involved, our ability to predict outcomes is very limited, and any effort to predict outcomes is likely to be speculative.

Inaction is no less uncertain.

What strikes me as odd about the proposals for action is that the adverse outcome of inaction is invariably claimed to be the possibility of escalation and regional spillover. To avert this, we propose an escalation that is very likely to produce regional spillover. I have to question a proposed response that seems very likely to produce precisely the outcome that we're trying to avoid.

The motivation for action here is not to prevent regional spillover.

From a cynic's perspective, if a stalemate continues, the rebels and the government will continue to butcher each other and anyone caught in between. If Assad wins, he will butcher the rebels and anyone associated with them. If Assad falls, the rebels will butcher each other and anyone associated with Assad. That's horrible any way it comes out, but is it really an equation that we need to be in? If AQ and Iran/Hezbollah are going to square off and duke it out, why should we be trying to pry them apart? No doubt the whole thing is going to be very bad for Syrians, but are a few thousand tons of explosives delivered by cruise missile going to make it any better?

Here I agree. There may have been a time when we (as in the World, and in particular, the Arab World) could have gotten involved to limit the destruction. That time has passed.

Again, don't confuse the reasons for taking action with anything to do with taking sides or even bringing an end to the conflict. In this particular situation no one is arguing that Assad can't defend his regime using conventional weapons. No one is arguing that the rebels cannot kill Government forces using conventional weapons. They can kill each other using conventional weapons to the last person as long as they are killing each other over political power and not as a form of genocide. And following the logic of your argument, could a few tons of explosives delivered by cruise missile make it any worse?

This has to do with the use of chemical weapons. The ramifications of inaction are not limited to the boarders of Syria.

[wm]

I think we are presented with the analog of the following scene found in the 1983 movie Trading Places (Eddie Murphy as Billy Ray Valentine; Dan Akroyd as Louis Wintorpe III)

Billy Ray Valentine: [watches Louis clean his shotgun] You know, you can't just go around and shoot people in the kneecaps with a double-barreled shotgun 'cause you pissed at 'em.

Louis Winthorpe III: Why not?

Billy Ray Valentine: 'Cause it's called assault with a deadly weapon, you get 20 years for that ####.

Louis Winthorpe III: Listen, do you have any better ideas?

Billy Ray Valentine: Yeah. You know, it occurs to me that the best way you hurt rich people is by turning them into poor people.

The administration seems to want to take the Winthorpe approach when the Coleman approach might be more likely to have some real impact.

[Dayuhan]

For what it's worth:

http://www.scribd.com/doc/165224353/...d-Intelligence

English translation of French report on alleged use of chemical weapons by Syria.

National executive summary of declassified intelligence

Assessment of Syria’s chemical warfare programme

Cases of previous use of chemical agents by the Syrian regime,

Chemical attack launched by the regime on Aug 21

[omarali50]

There can be many ways to put unbearable pressure on the Syrian regime, but I am still not convinced that the US has an official or general culture that is capable of doing it with good results. I don't mean "we are not tough enough" or "we are too squeamish". I mean neither the populace, nor its leaders are really clear about wanting to do this (and about how to do such things in general). If they are not clear going in, it probably won't work.
Suez moment? http://www.thenational.ae/thenationa...an-crisis#full

[jmm99]

Mueller et al, Airpower Options for Syria - Assessing Objectives and Missions for Aerial Intervention (RAND, 2013):

Key Findings

Destroying the Syrian air force or grounding it through intimidation is operationally feasible but would have only marginal benefits for protecting Syrian civilians.

Neutralizing the Syrian air defense system would be challenging but manageable; however, it would not be an end in itself.

Defending safe areas in Syrias interior would amount to intervention on the side of the opposition.

An air campaign against the Syrian army could do more to ensure that the regime fell than to determine its replacement.

Airpower could reduce the Assad regime's ability or desire to launch chemical weapon attacks, but eliminating its arsenal would require a large ground operation.

See also, Table 1. Summary of Mission Assessments at page 16.

Pew, Public Opinion Runs Against Syrian Airstrikes - Few See U.S. Military Action Discouraging Chemical Weapons Use (3 Sep 2013):

President Obama faces an uphill battle in making the case for U.S. military action in Syria. By a 48% to 29% margin, more Americans oppose than support conducting military airstrikes against Syria in response to reports that the Syrian government used chemical weapons.

The new national survey by the Pew Research Center, conducted Aug. 29-Sept. 1 among 1,000 adults, finds that Obama has significant ground to make up in his own party. Just 29% of Democrats favor conducting airstrikes against Syria while 48% are opposed. Opinion among independents is similar (29% favor, 50% oppose). Republicans are more divided, with 35% favoring airstrikes and 40% opposed.

The votes that count are those in Congress, which doesn't necessarily follow the polls.

Regards

Mike

[Dayuhan]

Inaction is no less uncertain.

It certainly keeps us out of the picture, and that's something. The demon you know, and all that... while things are ugly now, we're proposing a substantial escalation that has little chance of making anything better and a very substantial chance of making them worse.

The motivation for action here is not to prevent regional spillover.

I don't see how the goals of this operation can be separated from overall policy goals re Syria.

There's a point at which general principles regarding chemical weapons are in conflict with the real-world calculus of costs and benefits presented by Syrian intervention. Overall, the prospect of intervening in Syria is no more attractive than it was before the use of chemical weapons. There's still no credible ally on the ground. There's still no clear, practical, achievable goal. There's still a huge raft of probable unintended consequences. So do we go out and stick our collective schlong in the meat grinder purely to deter future use of chemical weapons?

There may have been a time when we (as in the World, and in particular, the Arab World) could have gotten involved to limit the destruction. That time has passed.

There may or may not have been such a time. Of course there will be no shortage of claims that at any given juncture we could have done x and "they" would have done y. That's pure speculation. We do not know where the road not taken would have led, and we do know that there were good reasons for not taking that road.

This has to do with the use of chemical weapons. The ramifications of inaction are not limited to the boarders of Syria.

So what happens if you fire off your punitive strike and they turn around and use chemical weapons again, maybe on a larger scale? What's the next step up on the punitive escalator? Have we got a next step up that we can actually use without head-butting the tar baby?

We're not in a position to get on the high horse and claim that the use of chemical weapons must be punished in any circumstances, because we and everyone else know that we've let the use of chemical weapons pass before, when it suited us to do so. At some point our interests have to come into the calculation.

[jmm99]

Several pages ago, I asserted that good legal arguments could be made pro and con Syrian intervention; that legal arguments are therefore not critical to the question; but that the question should be decided on the basis of underlying policy(ies).

Ken Anderson has done the heavy lifting by outlining five different international jurisprudential viewpoints: Five Fundamental International Law Approaches to the Legality of a Syria Intervention (by Kenneth Anderson, September 5, 2013).

First his introduction and posited facts:

Lurking behind international law arguments over a possible US armed intervention in Syria without Security Council authorization are fundamental divides over the nature of international law itself. These divides include its authority with respect to sovereign states, the sources of authority it draws upon and methods of interpretation, and the degree to which it is essentially a “closed” system of law that looks to itself for answers and legitimacy or an “open” one that does not exhaust all the possibilities of legitimacy and action. These deep differences in conception and approach to international law are not simply intellectual arguments without practical implication; on the contrary, they account for much of the sense that the several sides in these international law debates somehow fail to address each other’s arguments.
...
The factual assumptions are those made in the ASIL essay: first, the now largely undisputed claim that the Assad regime engaged in a major chemical weapons attack; and, second, the United States will undertake some military response even if it has no authorization from the Security Council and even if reasonably certain that such authorization, if requested, would be blocked by Russia and possibly others.

Here are the five legal philosophies that have been argued - each with a short snipped description (much more in Ken's article):

1. Formalism as Positive Charter Law. Formalism looks to the “formal” law for answers and, moreover, tends to treat those answers as dispositive – a “closed” system in the sense registered above. Any other concerns of policy have to be drawn into the formal system in order to count as law, and law as such trumps policy. Moreover, there is a hierarchy of sources, and the UN Charter is at the apex. Thus, the clearest formalist argument is that US armed action against Syria, irrespective of the reason in morality, politics, or policy, without authorization of the Security Council, violates the plain language of the Charter ....
...
2. Formalism Beyond Positivism. Formalism is not the same as strict Charter positivism, however. Positivism looks to the “positive” law, particularly as written in the Charter’s provisions. But international law, even on a formalist view, includes customary international law, which is evidenced by state practice and the opinio juris of states indicating that their practices are driven by a belief that they act from a sense of binding legal obligation. This is part of formal international law, but important parts of it will always subject to interpretive debate. It is not beyond reason that even some “formalists” would be willing to go beyond strict Charter positivism and acknowledge that the Charter’s wrapping of customary international law of “inherent” self-defense into Article 51 can be seen to create a certain question as to whether the “inherent” rights of self-defense, that the Charter purports not to “impair,” is both formal international law but not necessarily qualified by the Charter’s language of “armed attack.” ...
...
3. Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Neither formalist positivism nor formalism-beyond-positivism yields that sought by those seeking intervention on the basis of humanitarian concerns. They offer an argument that is essentially morality and policy – humanitarian necessity. The best formal legal argument is a descriptive claim offered as justification under the moral argument; mass atrocities are indisputably a gross violation of international law, and that command of law justifies a response under international law itself. It is expressed as a responsibility to protect, and it is – on this argument – both compelled as a legal conclusion arising from the underlying prohibition on mass atrocities and, moreover, something that has gained sufficient acceptance in the community of international law to qualify as, if not necessarily “law,” at least not contrary to international law. The question is where international law locates the “remedy” called for by R2P – cabined within the Security Council’s authority exclusively or not? ...
...
4. “Illegal but legitimate.” One approach that has gained a certain traction is to frankly acknowledge that intervention is illegal under international law, but assert that international law is trumped in such a case by emergency and necessity, in this case humanitarian emergency and necessity. This might be understood as a peculiar form of the strong formalist position – which, recall, had two distinct conditions, first, that one looked to “formal” sources to determine the law and, second, that this formal law take normative precedence over everything else. This “illegal but legitimate” claim is one that, since first offered in the Kosovo intervention, has had peculiar attraction to otherwise formalist international lawyers; it allows them to continue to accept formalism’s “descriptive” condition while abandoning its second, normative claim that the formal law trumps. ...
...
5. “Pragmatic” International Law. Perhaps out of implicit recognition of the methodological and conceptual difficulties in arguments for intervention based in R2P and humanitarian intervention, along with a political desire to confine the “war aims” of an intervention as well as its actual scope, the US government has made the issue not humanitarian intervention, emergency, or necessity, but instead the violation of what Secretary of State Kerry, President Obama, and other officials have described as the long-standing international norm against the use of chemical weapons. The central argument as it stands now is not that the chemical weapons sharply worsen the humanitarian situation – though of course that is true – but instead the defense of the norm against any use of chemical weapons. ...

Pragmatism (which is the rest of Ken's discussion) tends to be a two (or more) -edged sword; multiple good arguments can arise from different practical values being chosen (e.g., Putin vs Obama).

See, Michael Glennon, The Fog of Law: Pragmatism, Security, and International Law (2010); Fixing the UN : A fractured planet needs pragmatism (by Michael Glennon, April 23, 2003):

BOSTON— Some day, following the collapse of the international security system this winter, policymakers will return to the drawing board. When they do, one lesson is that rules must flow from the way states actually behave, not from the way they ought to behave.

"The first requirement of a sound body of law," wrote Oliver Wendell Holmes, "is that it should correspond with the actual feelings and demands of the community, whether right or wrong." This insight will be anathema to continuing believers in natural law, the armchair philosophers who "know" what principles must control states, whether states accept those principles or not. But these idealists might remind themselves that the international legal system is voluntarist. For better or worse, its rules are based upon state consent. ...

Ken Anderson, Living with the UN: American Responsibilities and International Order (2012); free download of the 1st 121 pages (SSRN link):

As a policy message for the US political system, it means two fundamental things: American conservatives need to understand that the UN is not going anywhere; it is a permanent feature of the international landscape, and they have to elaborate policy heuristics to deal with that permanence. American liberals, by contrast, need to understand that the UN is not going anywhere; they need to understand that the UN is an institution that has grown up and reached its full potential, which is to say, not very much at all. The UN is what it is; and it will neither disappear nor fulfill any grand dream of liberal internationalist global governance.

And, Michael Schmitt, Legitimacy Versus Legality Redux: Arming the Syrian Rebels (2013):

This article examines the international law issues surrounding the US policy decision to arm Syrian rebels. Topics discussed as potential violations of international law include the prohibition on the use of force, the principle of non-intervention, Security Council action and State responsibility for any unlawful activities of the rebels. The Article also examines possible justifications for the action under international law including self-defense, military aid to a government, humanitarian intervention, an action against the enemy during an armed conflict, and the taking of countermeasures. The article concludes that arming the rebels is questionable as a matter of law, although it notes that it may be legitimate (it draws no conclusions on this latter point).

Regards

Mike

[JMA]

There's still no clear, practical, achievable goal.

I would really appreciate you explaining how you were able to arrive at this conclusion.

[CrowBat]

So what happens if you fire off your punitive strike and they turn around and use chemical weapons again, maybe on a larger scale? What's the next step up on the punitive escalator? Have we got a next step up that we can actually use without head-butting the tar baby?

That's a valid point - from the standpoint of 'Western civilisation'.

But in the case of Syria, the West (and everybody else) is not dealing with a 'Western civilisation', but with a local regime that is in some aspects even 'more weird' than Saddam Hussein.

From the standpoint of Assads and Assadists, the situation is meanwhile like this:

- THEY have a holy mission, and therefore the priviledge of the rights (to do whatever they think is right)
- THEY have the say, THEY are always right, and everybody else is wrong
- They have the CWs and therefore the right to use CWs against 'foreign armed terrorist gangs (and mercenaries)' (read: anybody opposing them)

All of this is valid as long as nobody appears to take out or take away those CWs - which in turn was the reason why they never hit back in response to every Israeli attack of the last 12 years: they knew that the Israelis would hit them where it hurts.

Lesson: hit them where it hurts, then they'll shut up.

We're not in a position to get on the high horse and claim that the use of chemical weapons must be punished in any circumstances, because we and everyone else know that we've let the use of chemical weapons pass before, when it suited us to do so. At some point our interests have to come into the calculation.

Mistakes resulting from actions in the past are no argumentation for inaction now. Especially because 'action now' is very much in our very own interests.

That is: except you want to produce a precedent case?

If so, then 'stay tunned' for everybody opposing the US or any other Western powers, arming himself with CWs - as a 'light' solution (compared to North Korean and Iranian nukes).

that is what concerns me. It doesn't seem to matter which administration is in power the same 7 countries are on the Target List. Obama just recently went into Libya now it is Syria's turn?

The seven countries you're talking about are a 'problem' ever since they were created - by the West, BTW.

And then - and contrary to specific earlier actions (that resulted in some especially negative experiences) - Libya was a justified- and then an UN-authorized action, that resulted in success.

Of course, in our internet times, most of us tend to think differently; primarily because Libya didn't turn into a bright lighthouse of democracy two days after Q was shot to death. But, I do dare to remind some here, that the situation there is acutally very similar to that in a number of East European countries after 1989, and that it's actually 'normal' and there is simply going to be some instability for a number of years to come. That aside, 'spice is flowing', and the new gov is not only allied but also happy to listen to West's advice, so where is actually the problem?

I am just saying I think we have and had other options to go after Assad (spelling). He and his inner circle are ideal set of Drone Targets and if deterrence what you we really want that would be a far better COA than trying trash pieces of his country without sending it into total chaos.

That is very much the same I think - and suggest - to everybody who is ready to listen. Track down and hit Assads. Make it clear to them - and any likes - that THEY will be hit, not somebody else.

Is easily doable, especially within a - say - '60 days limit', and if Obama admin's action is 'limited to UAVs and TLAMs'.

I don't think we are responsible for the total chaos that is Syria, or Libya, or Egypt. We did not create these problems.

'You' didn't?

Well, that's new.

Shall we discuss the US involvement and politics in every single of these cases, in-depth and in detail?