Dutch state liable for three Srebrenica deaths

[JMA]

Wonderful news:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-23986063

I certainly hope this opens the way for billions of dollars in payouts to those betrayed by the Dutch (excuses for) soldiers... beyond just these three.

From a military POV I am more interested in what action was taken against the commander, his officers and men after this incident. It is at times like these that one laments the fact that capital punishment has gone out of fashion in Europe.

This incident further illustrates the problem with hastily cobbled together UN forces comprising of poorly trained, poorly equipped, unwarlike (and as in this case) cowardly excuses for soldiers who will surrender at the drop of a hat.

[jmm99]

Ah Mark,

In answer to your question:

From a military POV I am more interested in what action was taken against the commander, his officers and men after this incident. It is at times like these that one laments the fact that capital punishment has gone out of fashion in Europe.

I hope you're not in too serious a mood:

Following negotiations between UN and Bosnian Serbs, on Friday, July 21st, 1995, lieutenant-colonel Karremans and Dutch UN soldiers were allowed to leave Srebrenica. On the farewell, Colonel Karremans accepted gifts from General Mladić, smiled, shook his hand and departed. Shortly after his return to The Netherlands Karremans was promoted to full colonel.

Wiki bio of Karremans. In 2010, a complaint was filed by Bosnian Muslims vs Karremans et al, Aangifte genocide tegen Karremans (I expect you handle Dutch better than I).

I ran into this story last nite.

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

Dutch peacekeeper not prosecuted for Srebrenica (AP; by Mike Corder, 7 Mar 2013)

THE HAGUE, Netherlands—The retired general who commanded Dutch peacekeepers in the Bosnian enclave of Srebrenica when Bosnian Serb fighters overran the town and massacred some 8,000 Muslim men won't be prosecuted for involvement in the slayings, authorities announced Thursday.
Relatives of three victims of the worst massacre in Europe since World War II wanted Gen. Thom Karremans held criminally responsible for their deaths, arguing that he turned them over to the Serbs when he should have offered them protection because they had worked for the peacekeepers.

But prosecutors said in a statement that Karremans and two other senior Dutch officers "cannot be held liable under criminal law for having been involved in the crimes committed by the Bosnian Serbian Army in July 1995 in Srebrenica."

Mike Corder, who has reported a number of war crimes stories for AP, has Karremans as a "retired general" - Corder may be incorrect there.

Regards

Mike

[JMA]

Mike, thanks.

Better I say little as such acts of cowardice by soldiers make my blood boil.

I learned recently that when Liberian President Doe was captured (later to be tortured to death on video) he was in the office of the UN commander who had ordered his troops not to oppose the rebels as the attacked the compound.

The Ghanaian UN commander a general had required Doe and his 70 men to disarm before entering the UN compound. When the rebels showed up his bottle went and stepped aside and allowed Doe to be captured and his 70 men executed.

Another glorious example of the performance (or lack thereof) of UN forces.

General Quainoo was obviously one of Ghana's finest.

[jmm99]

I found the Doe story and the video (which is mostly Prince Johnson talking, being fanned by a gal and drinking Budweiser regular).

That story and the Bosnian story revived some thoughts I've been harboring for a little while - since our "police action" in Korea.

The thoughts are not fully formed, and scarcely dogmatic. Here's the hypothesis: "humanitarian interventions" - whether UN or otherwise - tend to be morality plays. Those plays are scripted by politicians (UN, regional, domestic), where soldiers easily become props - "cardboard soldiers". Since they are not really soldiers, can one expect them to act like soldiers ?

The "ideal" (as opposed to realities in Bosnia and Liberia) certainly existed in the mind of another JM (John Milius) and the Marines in Milius' "The Wind and the Lion", where the Wiki sums up the situation:

Gummere, Chadwick and his aide, Marine Captain Jerome, tire of the Sultan's perfidy and the meddling of the European powers and decide to engage in "military intervention" to force a negotiation by seizing the actual seat of power, the Bashaw's palace in Tangier. Jerome's company of Marines, supported by a small detachment of sailors, march through the streets of Tangier, much to the surprise of the European legations, whose forces are with the Sultan at distant Fez, and overwhelm the Bashaw's palace guard, taking the Bashaw hostage and forcing him to negotiate.

By such coercion, the Bashaw finally agrees to accede to the Raisuli's demands. But during a hostage exchange, Raisuli is betrayed and captured by German and Moroccan troops under the command of Von Roerkel, while Jerome and a small contingent of Marines are present to secure the Pedecarises. While Raisuli's friend, the Sherif of Wazan, organizes the Berber tribe for an attack on the Europeans and Moroccans, Eden attacks Jerome and convinces him and his men to rescue the Raisuli to uphold the word of President Roosevelt that he would be unharmed if the Pedecarises were returned safely.

A three-way battle results, in which the Berbers and Americans team to defeat the Germans and their Moroccan allies, rescuing Raisuli in the process. In the United States, Roosevelt is cheered for this great victory, and the Pedecarises arrive safely back in Tangier.

Now, this is historical fiction (made up stuff); but it precisely frames the issue of moral courage presented in both the Bosnian and Liberian situations.

The rifle company captain in "The Wind" passed the test; but then he was far from a "cardboard soldier" and had considerable "freedom of action".

If you can do so, without boiling blood and blowing a fuse, comment ?

Regards

Mike

[JMA]

I found the Doe story and the video (which is mostly Prince Johnson talking, being fanned by a gal and drinking Budweiser regular).

That story and the Bosnian story revived some thoughts I've been harboring for a little while - since our "police action" in Korea.

The thoughts are not fully formed, and scarcely dogmatic. Here's the hypothesis: "humanitarian interventions" - whether UN or otherwise - tend to be morality plays. Those plays are scripted by politicians (UN, regional, domestic), where soldiers easily become props - "cardboard soldiers". Since they are not really soldiers, can one expect them to act like soldiers ?

The "ideal" (as opposed to realities in Bosnia and Liberia) certainly existed in the mind of another JM (John Milius) and the Marines in Milius' "The Wind and the Lion", where the Wiki sums up the situation:



Now, this is historical fiction (made up stuff); but it precisely frames the issue of moral courage presented in both the Bosnian and Liberian situations.

The rifle company captain in "The Wind" passed the test; but then he was far from a "cardboard soldier" and had considerable "freedom of action".

If you can do so, without boiling blood and blowing a fuse, comment ?

Regards

Mike

Mike,

IMHO it is all about that higher level of courage being moral courage. Among those who have seen combat to a repeated and significant degree they have been tested with regard to physical courage. Some greatly.

Sometimes physically brave men collapse like a wet paper bag when their convictions are challenged and they need to make a stand at risk of death or physical harm.

I was never challenged in terms of moral courage as the two mentioned above were. My anger may well be the result of subliminal fear that I too may collapse under those circumstances.

A start to the understanding of all this is the seminal work of Moran, 'The Anatomy of Courage' ( http://ow.ly/oIYeM ) now available on Kindle.

Caesar would be thrashing around in his grave see that "Death Before Dishonour" has so little value in todays world.

Among the Brits it was spoken of "dying well". Sadly even there I understand the concept has become negotiable. Remembering Basra and Musa Qala in recent memory. This pattern or surrender in exchange for safe passage seems to be becoming an acceptable option in British military culture.

An American view on the issue, William Ian Miller's 'The Mystery of Courage' is worth the cost and the reading time.