The new 2014 FM 3-24 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies

[Newguy]

Newguy,

As much as I have criticized the COINdista doctrine and what I believe to be a misdirected focus on nation-building I should be fair and read the new version. Lots of reading backlogged, so it may take a month or so to get to it, but in the meantime you may find this report interesting and want to compare it to the doctrine to see if there are similar of different findings.

Bill


http://www.usip.org/publications/cou...-afghanistan#!

Yeah, there is a little subgroup that is very very interested. What I think will be interesting is when the new FM 3-24 hits the street. It's much different then the last and it will interesting how it is thought of in comparison to the 2006 version and to the JP that just hit the street.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I am four chapters in and have been impressed by the author’s efforts to not box the JFC into a specific political solution. So far it does not appear to be a document expressly designed to promote democracy.

I have a couple of issues that are still fermenting in my mind. One has to do with the way the document connects identity based groups with insurgents. The other is what appears to be a failure to identify which grievances are likely to result in deadly conflict and which will simply be an annoyance.

There are other structural issues that can be corrected in other manuals. For instance, there should be a manual that specifically deals with Transitional Military Governance instead of making it a subsection of this document. I believe that it is a unique enough to warrant a more in-depth analysis. Plus it seems to assume that a political insurgency will result in the wake of an invasion. Although that has been recent experience, I am not sure that it has to be that way.

Of course, it could be like Steve McQueen (Vin) said in the original “Magnificent Seven”

Vin: Reminds me of that fellow back home that fell off a ten story building.
Chris: What about him?
Vin: Well, as he was falling people on each floor kept hearing him say, "So far, so good." Tch... So far, so good!

[Compost]

Several recent and earlier items in Small Wars Journal have apparently been stimulated by the re-issue of JP 3-24 in November 2013. After skimming through it and also reading some entire pages my first attempt to describe that new JP 3-24 was satisfied by one word: ‘ turbid ‘: defined in Macquarie Dictionary as “ 3. disturbed; confused; muddled. “ and first-up in Chambers as “ disordered; muddy; thick. “

But that description was facile and did not do justice to the people responsible for preparation and issue of JP 3-24. They would surely have been alert to defects and aware that a small editorial group could reduce any bulky committee draft to a more instructive and readily assimilated version.

The conclusion to the Executive Summary is carefully worded. It consists of one sentence: “ This publication provides joint doctrine for the planning, execution, and assessment of COIN operations. “

The purpose of JP 3-24 could be clarified by modifying that conclusion. It might then commence with a sentence such as “ This publication provides joint doctrine for theatre-level command and staff elements, and to assist command issue of doctrine in a format suitable for use by units in a particular military theatre.” It might also mention that the publication is not itself intended for purposeful use by tactical units.

Nowhere in JP 3-24 is it mentioned that subliminal but major goals are to demonstrate scholarship, and achieve a wide span of socio-political acceptance at home and abroad.

JP 3-24 is unlikely to be modified to include any of the above for that would make it less generally acceptable. Nor is it likely to be revised in the near term to become less turbid or to include anything suggested in the streams of comment that continue in SWJ and elsewhere. Nevertheless ‘ useful ‘ could be an appropriate descriptor for the new JP 3-24.

That applies particularly because external comment may result in some useful input to other publications and instructions that are classified military-eyes-only. Hence, SWJ and suchlike even though some of their content will be or will seem to be turbid.

There are, however, two fundamental defects in the new JP 3-24. One: it fails to address the nature, distinction and prosecution of the concept or concepts of operation that is/are currently known as COIN as a component of PO, FID and anti-guerilla operations. Two, it endorses the employment of SOF for strike/DA away from population centres and hence promotes under-use of linguistic and pop-centric training and skills which are routinely concentrated in SOF, and alternately available (to a lesser extent) in intelligence elements.