The new 2014 FM 3-24 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies

[BrentWilliams]

I saw this article and thought it was pretty interesting because I think it picks up what is the strength of the new FM 3-24.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...s_field_manual

The new manual takes the critique seriously and makes points once understated more explicit. It notes that "counterinsurgency is not a substitute for strategy." Rather, "[t]he strategy to counter an insurgency is determined by the ends the U.S. wishes to achieve, the ways it wishes to achieve those ends, and the resources or means it uses to enable those ways."

There is a saying attributed to the Greek poet Archilochus, "The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing." The drafters of the new manual have embraced the fox. And this is perhaps the most important lesson of the new manual. The hedgehog's mindset is indifferent to context, misses the diversity of tools we have at our disposal, and is insensitive to evidence of (in)effectiveness. When countering insurgencies or making foreign policy more generally, a smart strategy requires foxes.

What the United States should do to counter an insurgency is the dependent on the nature of the insurgency. Counterinsurgency is not the cookie-cutter application of tactics. An insurgency where one needs to enable a host nation in stopping influence of another state will be different from an insurgency that is regionally based with no outside support. Those will be different from other insurgencies. The context of involvement and the strategic approach matter in what tactical units are doing in an insurgency.

It isn't about "nation building". It is about matching tactical tasks to the mission given and the tactical tasks one performs will be dependent on the context of the involvement. While that may be true for any type of operation, that is especially true when policy makers decide it is in our interest to counter an insurgency.

[davidbfpo]

David Ucko (SWJ author and academic) has a short article on the Swiss ISN website 'Best Practice or Best Strategy: Can New Counterinsurgency Doctrine Win Future Wars':http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Libra...g=en&id=180195

He starts with:

Two weeks ago, the United States Army and the Marine Corps updated their counterinsurgency doctrine, last published in November 2006 before the ‘surge’ in Iraq. The publication of the new doctrine has raised fresh questions about the role of counterinsurgency in campaign planning and strategy. Was the 2006 field manual in some way responsible for the subsequent stabilization of Iraq? If counterinsurgency succeeded there, why did it not meet expectations (some might say ‘fail’) in Afghanistan? And will the doctrine published last week allow for better results in campaigns to come?

These questions suggest two fundamental points. First, as the most recent counterinsurgency manual states, ‘counterinsurgency is not a substitute for strategy’. Counterinsurgency theory offers a collection of insights collected from past operations, which, if adapted to local context, can help in the design and execution of a campaign plan....the second point: if counterinsurgency doctrine fails to defeat insurgencies, what good is it?

(He ends with) In learning to answer these questions, there must be fewer assumptions about the nature of insurgency. Rather than accepting slogans like ‘winning hearts and minds’ or ‘population control’, future counterinsurgencies must craft strategies based on the local context, grievances and politics – and their exploitation by specific groups. The indispensable starting point is a strategic assessment of the situation: where does the insurgent organization gains its strength, how does it operate, and why will it win? Only through such an assessment and through a clearer understanding of our own interests and objectives will the fortunes of future campaigns improve