The new 2014 FM 3-24 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies

[Max Kelly]

Well, they hosed up political legitimacy again.

Under the title "Principles of Governance":



By identifying representation as a core function of government (and in fact, the first core function), they have dictated that only electoral democracies can be a valid form of government. This means that this document is a manual for Democratization. A valid national security goal, but not one that should be confused with Counterinsurgency.

Curmudgeon - the writing team actually agreed with your concern about assuming democracy is the silver bullet solution to political legitimacy. We emphasized the importance of local expectations and perceptions throughout the document, and on page VIII-1 we explicitly wrote that,

(1) Representation includes political participation, decision-making procedures, responsiveness to the needs of the population, and accountability for decisions and their implementation. The effectiveness and legitimacy of representation depend on their appropriateness in the local context. For example, participatory governance does not necessarily equate to Western-style democratic institutions; it could consist of local shuras— informal gatherings of village or tribal leaders common in some countries in the Middle East and Central Asia.

And on page VIII-4 we reiterated that,

(2) Reconcile Local Expectations with USG Goals. In a COIN environment, what is and is not seen as effective and legitimate governance by the population will depend on the local context. A careful analysis is needed to determine what the local population considers appropriate and to what extent a failure to meet these expectations is contributing to the insurgency. The results will have to be reconciled with the USG’s strategic goals being pursued via the COIN operation. If democratic governance is part of the broader USG strategy, COIN efforts focused on locally appropriate governance to undermine the insurgent narrative will have to be reconciled with this more long-term agenda, which may generate challenges in terms of PA, IO, and interagency coordination. Generally, counterinsurgents seek to ensure that governance arrangements are inclusive instead of reinforcing societal divisions. The USG, and at times the joint force, may be able to assist by channeling assistance in ways that force cooperation across those divisions while also countering the insurgent narrative.

Have a look at Chapter VIII on Building Indigenous Governance to Support Counterinsurgency and let us know whether you think we hit the mark.

Bob - strongly agree with your points about the difference between legal legitimacy and political legitimacy. Will be very interested to hear whether you think that difference is adequately reflected in the document.

Cheers,
Max

[jmm99]

is replete throughout the document. The term "political legitimacy" is used twice; the term "legal legitimacy" is not used. The term "rule of law" is used often; the term "rule by law" (which is quite a different concept) is not used.

So, to me, the document is not very clear.

Regards

Mike

[Bob's World]

They all mean the same thing, right?

(I'm with you Mike, your previous discussions on rule by vs. rule off have a lot of merit.)

We won't get better until we shift the focus from the insurgent groups that form to physically act out to challenge government, to a focus on the fundamental political purpose of insurgency; as well as the fundamental dynamics of human nature between those who govern and those who are governed around which all insurgencies turn.

At the end of the day, insurgency is not somthing to be "countered" so much as it is a condition of governance to be understood and ultimately "resolved." Not cured, as every system is infected with a certain amount of insurgency. The goal must be to keep governance and governed in as balanced of a state of cooperation as possible. Which reminds me of a great quote from James Madison that I believe is on point:

"In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself."
JAMES MADISON, Federalist No. 51, Feb. 6, 1788

[Max Kelly]

Mike,

I understand your reservations, but I hope you'll take the time to read the document more fully before dismissing it. While certainly not perfect, I'd hate to think the pub will be judged solely on the basis of a search for particular phrases or terms.

Bob,

I believe (hope?) you will find precisely that emphasis on underlying political drivers in this document.

Cheers,
Max

[Bob's World]

Max

I will read in detail, and happy to discuss my thoughts once done.

I will caution though, that concepts like legal legitmacy vs. political legitimacy and how they interact with the dynamic of insurgnecy is so fundamentally vital that it can literally be that proverbial horseshoe nail that caused the kingdom to be lost.

Insurgency is a difficult topic to have a fair and balanced discussion about in any audience. There is a bias on the part of government and governmental actors (who will always be the legal actor, just as the insurgent will always be the illegal actor) that is both natural and crippling to getting to good understanding of the problem.

Add to this the tremendous inertia of thought, lessons learned and effort from centuries of colonial operations and decades of containment operations. That is a lot of fat to distil off of any concept.

Another big obstacle is that so many insurgencies tend to employ violent tactics that overwhelm civil security forces. This results in the problem being punted to the military, and not surprisingly the military then casts it as a form of war and warfare, and seeks to identify a threat to defeat in order to "win." I will concede that a resistance insurgency following the defeat of ones government and military by a foreign force is a continuation of warfare. If one wants to dominate that place one must defeat those people. Grant understood this in his strategy for decisively ending the Civil War. But if it is an internal revolutionary insurgency designed to coerce through illegal means change in whole or part on their own government, it is a very different genus and species of competition, and is probably best thought of as a form of civil emergency rather than as a form of warfare.

Insurgency, IMO, must have the following 4 components or it is not insurgency:
1. Internal to some system of governance (CvC's Army-Gov't-People)
2. Populace-based (must be rooted in some distinct segment of the population)
3. Illegal
4. Political challenge in primary purpose.

Of note, thought of this way:

1. The only difference between democracy and insurgency is legality.

2. There is no such thing as "criminal insurgency." All insurgency is criminal, but if the primary purpose is for profit it is not insurgency no matter how much it challenges governance. Why? because the cure for profit-based opertions are completely different than those for political-based opertions.

In short, we must understand things for what they are, not what we wish them to be as seen though the lens of our respective institution, and not in the context of the tactics applied, activities engaged in, or effects produced. Many dissimilar things look similar at times, or can create similar effects.

Anyway, it's Friday and I need to run. Cheers! Bob

[jmm99]

Who said anything about:

... dismissing it ...

Did I ? No I did not.

I did answer your question - admittedly addressed to Bob, which was:

Bob - strongly agree with your points about the difference between legal legitimacy and political legitimacy. Will be very interested to hear whether you think that difference is adequately reflected in the document.

JP 3-24 does not use the term "legal legitimacy" once; it uses the term "political legitimacy" twice - here are the snips:

I-6 ... Political legitimacy of a government determines the degree to which the population will voluntarily or passively comply with the decisions and rules issued by a governing authority.

II-9 ... Revolutionaries often want to change the fundamental sources of political legitimacy around which government and political authority are organized.

The rest of the monograph otherwise uses the unmodified word "legitimacy" 134 times, without guidance as to whether that word means "political legitimacy" and "legal legitimacy".

So, now, to answer your question again: The difference between legal legitimacy and political legitimacy is not adequately reflected in the document.

Or, perhaps, I'm to assume (which I won't do) that "legal legitimacy" is equated to "rule of law" (used 20 times). Thus, is this also the "definition" of "legal legitimacy" ??:

III-3 (3) Rule of Law. Access to effective mechanisms to resolve disputes without resorting to violence and in accordance with a consistent set of rules is fundamental to ensure that the population feels secure. The rule of law should govern the conduct of COIN forces, transparently and consistently following its own rules to demonstrate the political credibility of the HN government and its allies to the population and the insurgents.

(4) As with governance systems in general, the legal systems deemed most
effective and legitimate in the eyes of the local population may differ greatly from Western models, and may vary across the operational area (e.g., the capital city versus remote rural areas). JFCs should endeavor to support locally appropriate systems while adhering to US and international human rights standards.

Answer that and, perhaps, Bob or I can go on; I say "perhaps" because the term "rule of law" is an arguable point, to say the least. For your reading pleasure (both from the Mansfield Center), The Rule of Law: A Lexicon for Policy Makers (2000); and The Rule of Law: Perspectives from the Pacific Rim (2000). Politics (often very local) and popular culture (again often very local) are more important factors than law in popular insurrections.

Regards

Mike

[TheCurmudgeon]

OK, I have only got through the first chapter. It amazing me how slow I read. I have to say that it is leap years ahead of the old FM 3-24. It reflects the complicated nature of a political insurgency. I also like the emphasis on WHY there is an insurgency in the first place. To look at what factors created the insurgency and then to address them in an attempt to get ahead of the insurgents. That does not mean I agree with everything I have read so far, simply that I think our doctrine is beginning to reflect the complicated realities of a political insurgency.

I will write more on specific areas as I go.

[TheCurmudgeon]

I have some issues with the way the JP describes an insurgency. My particular issue may be a bit tangential, but it appears that the JP implies that the narrative can control the people.

Compelling Narrative.
It takes dynamic and intelligent leadership to build a compelling narrative that links grievances to a political agenda and mobilizes the population to support an unlawful subversive and violent social movement. That narrative explains who is to blame for the grievances, how the grieances will be addressed, how the population will benefit under the insurgent’s ideology, and how the population and insurgency should work together to accomplish that goal. The compelling aspect of the narrative is not only in its content, but how it is presented (i.e., promoted and publicized) to the target audience, which normally requires ideological leaders. It is consistently reinforced through communication and through propaganda of the deed. Insurgents often frame grievances in terms of local identities, such as religious, ethno-sectarian, or regional groupings. A compelling narrative is often spun around the marginalization of a particular community, region, or class by the government.

Page II-4

First, it creates the impression that insurgency is a rational action and that the participants are rational actors. It is my opinion that passion rules the population when it comes to insurgencies (or at least has a greater influence than rationality). War requires the passion of the people.

Second, identity does matter, but it is complex. To raise the passion of the people you must be able to create a level of hatred that is based on more than a simple narrative. There are plenty of different identities in many countries. They are not all in a state of civil war. The difference is the level or hatred, the need for retribution; for revenge. That is what makes the blood boil. So it is more than just a difference in identity - it is an injustice so sever that only retribution in kind will make up for it.

Third, the narrative seems to be used to create legitimacy in the insurgents. It creates the impression that all it takes to create legitimacy is a good public relations campaign. I have written against this view elsewhere.

Max Weber created a problem for many people when he defined legitimacy as a belief. While a belief is an internal motivator beliefs can be transitory. One can believe in one thing one moment and another thing the next. Beliefs are subject to change based on the influence of others. A powerful speaker or a well-crafted public relations campaign can change what people believe about a topic. This creates the false impression that all a government has to do to be legitimate is to convince its people to believe that it is legitimate. As David Beetham put it in The Legitimation of Power when describing the problem created by defining legitimacy as a simple belief: “[t]aken to their logical conclusion, such definitions would imply that the reason for the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989 lay in a deficiency of public relations, rather than anything actually wrong with the system of rule itself.”[43] While this statement may just be an ad absurdum argument for the proposition the idea that legitimacy can be created is alive and well. It is the foundation of America’s nation building and democratization efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan.[44] Beliefs can be changed easily. Beliefs vary with the situation. Values are beliefs but they are enduring beliefs. They can remain engrained in a culture for centuries[45]. Values are a component of belief that forms the basis of Weber’s “legitimitätsglaube”. Barker recognized this when he identified values as a fourth form of Weberian legitimacy.

You cannot create legitimacy with a good story. Here is the failure of the way the narrative is described.

The JP makes the point that for an insurgency to be created there must be an opportunity. I would argue that that opportunity must have three components. The first is that a section of the population who can clearly identify themselves as somehow being different from, or separate to, the ruling elements of the government. The identity is a preexisting or can be created based on ideological differences. Second, the portion of the population already perceives the government as either being having weak legitimacy or being illegitimate AT LEAST in reference to their group. Third, that there is some recent or historical "wrong" committed by the government that is so severe that it requires retribution. This can be an actual act of the government (shooting protestors), a promise not kept (greater political freedom), or a historical difference (Shia'h versus Sunni).

Again, I am thinking out loud, but I don't believe that a good PR campaign is enough to start a civil war. It has to be tied to passion about an injustice that must be corrected.