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Thread: Giap obituary: winner of three small wars

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    Default Giap's The Problem of the Rear and Its Solution

    Admittedly, Giap's Solution for the Rear (the North from 1944-1961) involved more than mere killing, even on a grand scale. Recall that Giap's depth as a scholar was in political economy; and he and other Communist leaders in the North and South were also devoted to the national political economy where it could be achieved by non-violent means. The end justified whatever means.

    Now, we turn to what Giap told us in 1967; Vo Nguyen Giap, "The Big Victory; The Great Task" (October 16, 1967). I'm just going to hit the highlights of its discussion of the "rear" (the North) and the "frontline" (the South), with respect to their interactions in the ongoing political and military struggles (mostly in the South, but some in the North).

    [p.1] Our people are living the most glorious years and months in the history of our people's thousands-year-old struggle against foreign aggression and in the history of the decades-old revolutionary struggle under the leadership of our party. In the heroic south, with 170,000 square meters of land, our people are defeating more than a million troops of the U.S. imperialist aggressors and their lackeys, and winning increasingly big victories. In the north, our army and people are defeating the U.S. imperialists' war of destruction and thwarting their basic plots while pursuing socialist construction and economic development, consolidating national defense, and fulfilling the duties of the great rear toward the great frontline.
    ...
    [p.2] After the Binh Gia victory, between February and June 1965, on the basis of combining armed struggle with political struggle, the southern army and people stepped up the guerrilla war; and, at the same time, developed large-scale attacks, completely annihilating puppet companies and battalions in each battle on all battlefields. They drove the puppet troops into a state of collapse, unable to resist the strong attacks of the Liberation Armed Forces.
    Giap engages in counter-history (wishful thinking) for a bit.

    ... [p.3] On the basis of the 1965-1966 winter-spring victories, the southern army and people stepped up the combination of military struggle with political struggle and actively attacked the enemy, causing an unstable situation in which the puppet authorities and army encountered crises in all fields, and driving the U.S. imperialists into an embarrassed and defensive position. Thirty cities and municipalities throughout the south seethed with the struggle of city people rising up to struggle against the introduction of U. S. aggressive troops and against the Thieu-Ky clique. In Da Nang and Hue, the political struggle movement developed most widely and vigorously during this period.

    It was obvious that contradictions between the U. S. imperialists and the traitors and the southern people were becoming very fierce. The fierce attacks of the southern army and people caused the Americans and puppets to sustain heavy military defeats and encounter grave political crises. This situation brought about quarrels, conflicts, and discord among the puppet authorities and army in the First Corps area. This crisis lasted over two months and led to a change in commanders five times. Six enemy battalions were dispersed as a result of their shooting at each other. Faced with this situation and especially with U.S. troop defeats, the decline of the puppet troops was accelerated. In some months, there were 20,000 deserters. At the same time, many military revolts broke out, such as at the first regiment in Thu Dau Mot and other puppet units.
    The "revolt in the cities" became something of a reality during Tet 1968; and the breakup of the ARVN certainly took place in 1974-1975.

    [p.5] While fighting fiercely, the southern army and people continued to step up the coordination between the military along with political struggles. The political struggle movement of the southern clty people continue to develop strongly. Its anti-U.S. character increased. The southern people's liberated areas continued to be firmly maintained, and some liberated areas were even enlarged.
    The Communists never did achieve that much success in the cities - even in 1974-1975, when the city folk fled the Communists en masse.

    [p.6] In the war, the north has developed the strength of the socialist regime and has fought well, along with achieving good production. The north has constantly insured good communications and transportation and has incessantly developed its economy and culture. Despite many difficulties created by' the enemy, the people's living conditions continue to be stabilized. The determination of our people to oppose the Americans for national salvation has been increasingly strengthened.

    Meanwhile, in the south, with the spirit "The north calls, the south answers", the southern army and people have continuously attacked the U.S., puppet, and satellite troops everywhere and have striven to attack their airbases and logistical depots, thus causing them to suffer heavy losses and to be increasingly passive
    ...
    [pp.7-8] On Our Side ... The military struggle has been stepped up in close coordination with the political struggle, which is developing increasingly deeply and widely. The resistance forces of the southern combatants and people have matured rapidly and are strong.

    In North Vietnam, our armed forces and people have defeated and are defeatlng the U.S. imperialists' war of destruction, have continued building socialism, and at the same time have striven to fulfill the duty of a large rear toward a large frontline. North Vietnam has become increasingly strong and steady in all fields.

    B. The victories achieved by the armed forces and people in tne entire country have been of great political and military strategic significance. Our people throughout the country are standing shoulder to shoulder in steadily advancing and pushing the anti-U.S, national salvation resistance war to final victory.
    Giap then goes on to more than a bit of wishful thinking and counterfactual argument in pp.9-23, but then makes this important point:

    [p.23] In our country at present, fighting against U.S. aggression and for national salvation is the great, sacred historic task of the Vietnamese people as a whole. Our people in the south and the north resolutely stand shoulder to shoulder in fighting until final victory in order to achieve independence and freedom of the entire country.

    Waging a comprehensive resistance war is a very important strategic problem for developing our strength in all fields in order to vanquish the aggressor, an enemy with numerous troops and strong equipment, but with many contradictions and weaknesses in the neocolonialist war of aggression.

    A striking characteristic of the people's war in our country at present is that even within the local war, the fight against the enemy on all fronts - military, political, cultural, diplomatic, and so forth - is waged at the same time, in which the military struggle and the political struggle are the most basic forms of struggle. The military struggle and political struggle are closely coordinated, assist each other, and encourage each other to develop. The coordination between the military struggle and the political struggle is a law of the revolutionary struggle in our country. It is also an initiative of our people in the process of the protracted revolutionary struggle.
    Bernard Fall accurately assessed Giap, several years before Giap wrote this; but then Fall (unlike Hilsman) viewed Giap with open eyes and ears - and without imperial hubris. Fall was ruthless in exposing Giap's ruthlessness.

    This is a good place to take a break until tomorrow (actually it is "tomorrow" vs. when I started writing this) or the next day. In pp.24-54, Giap explains the interactions of the rear and front, military and political struggles in terms of what he expects the U.S. to do - and what Vietnam (North and South) should do to counter the U.S. on all fronts (and rears )

    Regards

    Mike
    Last edited by jmm99; 10-07-2013 at 06:11 AM.

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