Military Governance versus Stability Operations

[TheCurmudgeon]

Moderator's Note

The author has requested a title change; the thread started as "Area Support Group", and now becomes "Military Governance versus Stability Operations" (ends).


All,

I am looking into the old concept of a rear area and specifically how we used to be designed to administer territory and the population of that territory once we took it over. In the post WWII days the US Army used military governors. The next time we did anything close to that would be Kosovo, but I am not sure it worked the same.

In any case, I am looking for a reference, preferably open source, that can provide a little background on how we used to think about how to administer occupied territory before we decided that there was no rear area. If anyone has any insights on why we dumped the ASG (who, if I recall correcely, was in charge of the rear area) I would appreciate it.

Also, for the Marines in the audience, did you handle things differently when you occupied small countires?

How about the UK or Australia - do you even consider post war administration in your doctrine.

Thanks

[Morgan]

Area Support Groups (as far as I know) had nothing to do with security and "area governance" as you refer to but were large support/ log units. They became corps support groups and have now been re-named sustainment brigades.

Not sure who/ what was responsible for administering rear areas (from a governance perspective). The post-WW2 constabulary units come to mind but they were re-organized "cav" units (2d ACR/ CR is given credit for service as a constab unit). I think such elements were adhoc deals given to the senior commander in the area. You may want to begin your search of such efforts with post-WW2 constabulary units as well as precursors to civil affairs units.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Many moons ago, back in the 80's, I was an enlisted MP. I seem to remeber that we conducted Rear Area Combat Operations, which was primarily security type work keeping LOCs open and dealing with small bybassed units. I vaguely remeber that the doctrine then had us under a ASG who also was responsible for civilian control (even though we never considered civilians on the battlefield back then).

I don't know when we got away from dealing with the general administration of the area we took. Not sure if that ended with the beginning of the Cold war or if it continued on in the background somewhere.

It seems to me that the biggest lesson we failed to learn from Iraq is that we need units capable of this type of administration after we take the ground. I am not talking COIN. You only need to fight an insurgency once you screw up the civil administration. Civil Affairs is not equiped for this. They can coordinate but they don't have the internal structure to actually do anything. The concept of the Battle Space Commander is close, but it assumes that there is an ongoing battle, which means that the mindset is all wrong. They don't want to be civil administrators or policemen, they want to kill things. Civilians are not capable of this. They won't be on the ground in time and they have no units of their own.

Not sure what I am looking for, but I will know it when I see it.

[jmm99]

Hi Stan,

If these are relevant, you'll have to find the links; they should still exist. Or, if no present links exist, I could email you the .pdf manuals (which, I'd prefer not to do - the files ~100MB):

1940 FM 27-5 Military Government

1943 FM 27-5 Military Government & Civil Affairs

1944 Ann Arbor, Law of Belligerent Occupation

1947 FM 27-5 Civil Affairs - Military Government

1954 FM 41-15 Civil Affairs Military Government Units

1957 FM 41-10 Civil Affairs - Military Government Operations

1958 FM 41-5 Joint Manual for Civil Affairs - Military Government

1962 FM 41-10 Civil Affairs Operations

1966 FM 41-5 Joint Manual for Civil Affairs

1967 FM 41-10 Civil Affairs Operations

1967 FM 41-15 Civil Affairs Support - TASTA-70

1969 FM 41-10 Civil Affairs Operations

This monograph may be useful: Burgess, US Army Doctrine and Belligerent Occupation (2004).

As to the old, historical doctrine, his take (starting at p.52):

Past Doctrine

The most significant occupation examined in this monograph is post-World War II Germany and from that occupation came many examples of relevant doctrine. Especially when compared with current doctrine on occupation, two documents from the World War II era offer outstanding examples of how occupation should be executed. First, FM 27-5, Civil Affairs Military Governance originally published in 1940. The scope of FM 27-5 differs dramatically from its current doctrinal counterparts.[183]

183. In 1958, FM 41-5, Joint Manual of Civil Affairs/Military Government superceded and removed some of the detail that FM 27-5 had. In 1962, FM 41-10 Civil Affairs Operations replaced FM 41-5 and there was further removal of the specifics for military government. By the next revision in 1969, military government became even further indistinct.

Field Manual 27-5 specifically laid out the scope and purpose of civil affairs and military government activities, organization, personnel, operations orders, proclamation, and tribunals. Where current doctrine only starts to sketch the concept of what an occupation is, FM 27-5 demonstrates the application of legally required occupation tasks on the battlefield including medical care, government, administration, and security. Unlike the lack of current doctrine on occupation, Field Manual 27-5 provided one reference source for anyone needing information on the conduct of an occupation.[184]

184. Departments of the Army and Navy, Field Manual 27-5 Civil Affairs Military Government, Washington D.C., 14 OCT 1947.

Field Manual 27-5 was superceded by FM 41-10 Civil Affairs, provided “procedural and doctrinal framework within which the Army could conduct civil affairs and military government should the need arise.”[185]

185. Ziemke, vi.

The current FM 41-10 is certainly not the procedural and doctrinal framework for occupation. However, the earlier version still has worth today.

The second doctrinal document is the Handbook for Military Government in Germany written by the German Country Unit in 1944,[186] which provided complete guidance and direction for the military government soldier on the battlefield. Moreover, the very existence of this handbook demonstrates that the planners and military government soldiers had completely thought through their upcoming actions. The Handbook for Military Government in Germany is a specific application of the principles outlined in FM 27-5, and was the specific resource for the occupation in Germany. The Handbook provided the framework for execution and the training for military government soldiers, and set forth policy and provided the basic documents such as proclamations, law, ordinances applicable for every military governance officer in Germany.[187]

186. Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force, Handbook for Military Government in Germany, December 1944, <http://www-cgsc.army.mil/carl/resources/books.asp#military> [12 JAN 2004].

187. The Handbook for Military Government in Germany.

Burgess sums the lack of then-current (2004) doctrine:

Summary

Field Manual 27-5 and the Handbook produced for Germany were products that discussed what to do and how to do it. However, a quick review of current doctrine on occupations shows a disturbing lack of guidance. Currently, the military has no more than a few pages on the subject. As such, the civil affairs and military communities have grown and adjusted into an environment based on Cold War thinking, which conjectured military occupation would never again take place, and had grown away from the possibility of conducting an occupation. It is time to reconsider this lack of doctrine and consider the law, history, and past doctrine offer a method to resolve this problem.

The manuals from WWII, and thereafter into the 1960s, were joint Army-Navy efforts.

Regards

Mike

PS: The 1947 Joint Manual may be material to what you seek (at pp.34-35):

b. Control. (1) During combat phase. (See fig. 1).

(a) During the period the theater is divided into a combat zone and a communications or naval advanced base zone, the theater commander exercises control over the combat zone through the commanding officers of field armies or naval fleet or task force commanders, and over the communications or naval advanced base zone through its commanding officer.

(b) If, however, the theater is subdivided into zones of operation assigned to separate task forces, each of which has its own communications or naval advanced base zone, control is exercised through task force commanders.

(2) After active combat has ceased. (See fig. 2.)

As long as military government continues in the occupied area, the theater commander will exercise control through a separate CA/MG command. Only in unusual circumstances will CA/MG be in the tactical chain of command.

It then gets into specifics.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Mike,

Thanks, this is exactly what I was looking for. I am going to read Burgess paper first, but I will probably be back to ask for the various versions of the 27-5.

Stan

[davidbfpo]

Stan aka The Curmudgeon,

You asked at the start:

How about the UK or Australia - do you even consider post war administration in your doctrine.

IIRC there are some British official WW2 history volumes on military government, Germany is one and an assortment of odd places in another (Trieste, Eritrea etc). There is a more recent book on Naples in 1944:http://www.amazon.co.uk/Naples-44-In...ds=naples+1944

Sorry that is all I can recall. It has not been a subject in RUSI Journal.

[Flint]

Check out the book "Civil affairs soldiers become governors" and the Small Wars Manual"

[TheCurmudgeon]

Civil Affairs: Soldiers become Governors looks like a great resource on how and why we ran Civil Affairs after WWII.

The desire to create doctrine for occupation was the result of the failures after WWI

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: IN WORLD WAR I INADEQUATE ARMY PREPARATIONS AND EVENTUAL CIVILIAN CONTROL

[Col. Irwin L. Hunt, Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs, Third Army and American Forces in Germany, Rpt, American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918-1920, 4 Mar 20, pp. 56-57 (hereafter referred to as Hunt Rpt), OCMH files]

* * * All of the energy of the American army had been centered on an early decision in the field and there had been no opportunity to study the civil problems involved in an occupation of German territory. The American army therefore began its duties in occupied territory with only the scantiest information both of the particular situation confronting it and even of a broader nature, such as would permit it to intelligently frame an organization commensurate with its wide governmental powers. From the beginning therefore there was a crying need for personnel trained in civil administration and possessing knowledge of the German nation.1
It is extremely unfortunate that the qualifications necessary for a civil administration are not developed among officers in times of peace. The history of the United States offers an uninterrupted series of wars, which demanded as their aftermath, the exercise by its officers of civil governmental functions. Despite the precedents of military governments in Mexico, California, the Southern States, Cuba, Porto Rico, Panama, China, the Philippines and elsewhere, the lesson has seemingly not been learned. In none of the service-schools devoted to the higher training of officers, has a single course on the nature and scope of military government been established.

And so, with WWII approaching we fixed the problem.

UNTIL 1940 NO FIELD MANUAL FOR MILITARY GOVERNMENT

[Memo, Brig Gen William E. Shedd, ACofS, G-1, for ACofS, G-3, 18 Jan 40, G-1 files, 9985-41]

1. Attached is an extract of a study, prepared by a student committee at the Army War College, pertaining to a proposed Basic Field Manual, entitled: Military Law, The Administration of Civil Affairs in Occupied Alien Territory. It is recommended that a Basic Field Manual be prepared and published by the War Department, using the attached study as a guide.

It appears we may again be in a post WWI world with no realistic version of doctrine covering occupation and military governance.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Does anyone know why the chapter on Tranisitional Military Authority that was Chapter 5 in the FM 3-07 Stability Operations was not included in the ADRP 3-07 Stability Operations? It is referenced three times (with a note to see the FM) but it was not included. I am curious why.

Transitional Military Authority is the doctrinal term used by the US Army and is included in the ADRP 1-02 Terms and Military Symbols

transitional military authority – A temporary military government exercising the functions of civil administration in the absence of a legitimate civil authority. (FM 3-07)

It is not covered extensively, but it is mentioned.

I am now looking to see if it is nested in any of the planning doctrine. Below is the only reference I can find. It was from the ADRP 3-0.

Stability is an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities
conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or
reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergencyinfrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (See JP 3-0.) Army forces conduct stability tasks
during both combined arms maneuver and wide area security. These tasks support a host-nation or an
interim government or part of a transitional military authority when no government exists. Stability tasks
involve both coercive and constructive actions. They help to establish or maintain a safe and secure
environment and facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries. Stability tasks can also help
establish political, legal, social, and economic institutions while supporting the transition to legitimate hostnation
governance. Stability tasks cannot succeed if they only react to enemy initiatives. Stability tasks
must maintain the initiative by pursuing objectives that resolve the causes of instability. (See Army
doctrine on stability tasks.)

Not a lot.