Quote Originally Posted by Echo Bravo View Post
Dayuhan, I don’t comment on this site for numerous reasons.
However, I need to point out that as “mercenaries” we operated – and still operate -under the domestic laws of the governments that contracted us. That places us in a very different position to other PMCs that operate under their own country’s domestic laws and are therefore not accountable to the host government’s laws. Although we were (and still are) usually called when all other options have failed and the contracting government is close to collapse, we apply and enforce a very strict code of conduct.
I can also add that many of the African troops we have recently encountered and that have been trained by foreign military advisors and PMCs need to be retrained as their “training” has been shocking at best. Similarly, advice given to some African governments by “foreign Africa specialists” has been very poor and in many cases, has done more harm than good.
A lack of credible intelligence, unrealistic strategies, poor operational designs and ill-prepared troops can never result in success. Add to that a lack of political and military will and a misunderstanding of the enemy and his support base and, at best, you have a disaster in the making.
Considering the above, it will most certainly pose “untenable limits on an intervention, it's better not to go there in the first place”.
After thinking about this awhile I do agree we (the U.S.) generally do a very poor job at training foreign troops, despite all our hoopla to the contrary. I won't bore everyone with why that is, it is just the way it is. A self-evident truth that our leadership refuses to recognize.

I think your comments about unrealistic strategies, poor operational designs, etc., if directed against the U.S. military, may be overstated. You stated you work for the state that hired you as a mercenary. I assume in most cases that state believes they have a significant threat, and are looking for a military solution, which is why they hired you.

In contrast, when the U.S. military deploys to Africa we normally are subordinate to our State Department. This is a huge difference, our State Department is using the military as a foreign policy tool to further their diplomatic objectives. They don't care about winning, and they certainly don't share the same level of threat to their diplomacy interests that the state we're supporting feels.

When the U.S. military is in the lead, as it was in the initial phases of our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the military did a great job of defeating its adversaries in battle. What came after that is where we lost our direction and momentum. Mercenaries supporting an existing government don't have the same issues of dealing with what comes next after a government falls. On the other hand, this is where we have failed repeatedly. Until we toss out our naïve ideas of installing the least stable form of government, a newly formed democracy, as an end state and develop an occupation doctrine we'll continue to fail when we oust governments with our military.

I think if you take some of our higher end SOF units and better trained light infantry units and allow them to focus on hunting the adversary, like EO appeared to do in Sierra Leone, they would do quite well. Like any military unit operating in a new area they'll have to go through an initial learning curve.

Lots and lots of other issues, but I think the difference of a military unit for working for a state or their diplomatic corps is a significant difference that results in very different outcomes.