CAR Central African Republic: Fragile, failed and forlorn

[carl]

Reading that Stars & Stripes story about the C-17s flying in central Africa made me smile. New pilots always react like that 'Wow, there's no radar.' 'Wow, those people on the ground are walking right next to the runway.' 'Wow, those controllers can be hard to understand.' I was the same way. After a while it is 'Ok there is a family of six walking across the runway about halfway down. Hmm, they should be out of the way by the time I get there. Drive on.'

What those crews didn't say is what hardships they face are more than made up for by getting to live in Entebbe. Boy what a nice place that is.

[Stan]

Reading that Stars & Stripes story about the C-17s flying in central Africa made me smile. New pilots always react like that 'Wow, there's no radar.' 'Wow, those people on the ground are walking right next to the runway.' 'Wow, those controllers can be hard to understand.' I was the same way. After a while it is 'Ok there is a family of six walking across the runway about halfway down. Hmm, they should be out of the way by the time I get there. Drive on.'

What those crews didn't say is what hardships they face are more than made up for by getting to live in Entebbe. Boy what a nice place that is.

Hey Carl !

Recalling my HF conversation in 94 with a 141 crew still brings me to tears

"Cedar Radio, MAC 1234 on one eleven upper" (11176).
MAC 1234, Cedar Radio has you loud and clear, over.
"Cedar Radio, the Goma tower is not responding and we are on final approach to land 18."
MAC 1234, negative, land on 36 and I will contact the tower... maybe at lunch.
"Cedar Radio, Charlie Charlie. But there are goats and people on approach 36?"
MAC 1234, I'll get the military to sweep 36, stand by.
"Cedar, there is a huge mountain. Is that the end of the runway ?"
MAC 1234, that's the overrun and is covered in solidified lava.

After minutes of silence she landed !

TIS... This is Africa !

[jmm99]

UN peacekeeping has evolved considerably over the last 15 years or so.

Agreed; from mid-1993, doing a cursory look through folders and files on part of my HD - e.g.:

Peace Enforcement (folder); USIP Peace Enforcement Course (folder); and (files, as named on HD) 1993 Implications for UN Peacekeepiing; 1993 The Peace-Enforcement Dilemma; 1996 Airpower and Peace Enforcement; 1997 From Peace Enforcement to Conflict Termination Operations in Africa; 1997 Allen - Lessons From Somalia, The Dilemma Of Peace Enforcement; 1998 Peace Enforcement - The Real Peace Support Challenge in Africa; 2003 Between Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement; 2006 Peace Enforcement Operations in the DRC 2003-2005; 2007 CRS Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations RL33557; 2009 UN Charter Basis for Astan PEO.

The online full title of the 2009 file is: Case Study on “Afghanistan”, in Blanca Antonini & al, Security Council Resolutions Under Chapter VII, Madrid: FRIDE, 2009 (by Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh)

Since today is my 40th wedding anniversary and I'm used to listening , it's only appropriate that I yield the floor (momentarily) to a strong, assertive woman.

Case Study on “Afghanistan”
pp. 56-57

2. What does Chapter VII really mean?

Of the three streams of resolutions for Afghanistan, ISAF and the sanctions regime were designed under the Chapter VII umbrella, while UNAMA, in virtue of being a political mission in support of the government, was not technically a Chapter VII intervention. The UN did not have police, military components or security installations, even though it did have military advisers. ISAF, however, was not accountable to the UN, despite its being authorised by the Security Council under Chapter VII.

According to an internal memo at the DPKO viewed by this project team, there is a lack of clarity about the legal basis for peacekeeping operations and the operational implication of the Security Council invocation of Chapter VII. Historically, Chapter VI was the reference for traditional peacekeeping operations and Chapter VII for enforcement-oriented operations. In recent years, the Council has adopted the practice of explicitly invoking Chapter VII (Chapter VI has never been invoked) or mandating peacekeeping forces to perform specific tasks without specifying the chapter, but drawing on the language in Chapter VII. Invocation of Chapter VII denotes the legal basis for action and signals firm political resolves as well as reminding the parties and the wider UN membership of their obligation to give effects to its decisions. Yet, as the memo noted, in reality the Council does not need to refer to a specific chapter of the Charter when adopting or extending resolutions for UN peacekeeping operations. The missions should be guided not by references to the chapters involved but by the tasks specified in their mandate, by the accompanying rules of engagement and by other directions pertaining to the use of force and international humanitarian law.

In cases like Afghanistan’s, where the UN delegated its responsibilities to a regional organisation, however, the defeating factor was that even when Chapter VII was invoked, the UN had no authority. In cases when UN authorisations happen after the use of force, as was the case in Afghanistan, where OEF operations had already started before ISAF was created, the invocation of Chapter VII may in fact mean little. The real alliance-building and decision to act happened outside of the Council’s negotiations. In this sense, invocation of Chapter VII becomes associated with forceful action. The result is the overstretching of peacekeeping in situations where there is no peace to keep — Afghanistan squarely applies in this category.

The use of Chapter VII in a resolution is supposed to invoke legitimacy and consensus from national actors. Yet, as national actors are hardly consulted in the preparation of mandates, and, as is often the case, national actors, especially in situations of regime change, may not be sufficiently accountable, the question is raised about the issues of sovereignty and national consensus. From the point of view of the national government, reference to Chapter VII does matter. Haiti, for example, had asked for the removal of references to Chapter VII in the Security Council resolutions in order to maintain investor confidence. In the case of Afghanistan, as the government, created through the UN-led Bonn process, gained capacity, legitimacy and sovereignty, it increasingly became critical of the use of force in its territory, especially in discord and in the absence of coordination with its own national forces.

Italics are where I believe we agree; bold are what I think are important points (possible discussion points) made by ST in her Case Study on “Afghanistan”.

At SWC, I've dealt with some Chapter VI, peacekeeping, and Chapter VII, peace enforcement, issues;

chapter vii charter - 13 posts
peacekeeping - 26 posts
peace enforcement - 56 posts

but more often on rules of engagement;

rules engagement - 80 posts
ROE - 74 posts
ROEs - 100 posts
SROE - 13 posts
SROEs - 18 posts

and, of couse, Hague-Geneva "stuff"; Gitmo habeas cases, etc.

Now, moving to some individual points on which we have basic agreement (I think), but where the political facts of life in the UNSC dictate the "terms of engagement".

Max:

It's worth noting though that ONUC went to war against Tshombe's Katangan separatists in the 1960s under a mandate that didn't specify either chapter of the UN Charter. It just said 'go do it.'

Case Study on “Afghanistan”

Historically, Chapter VI was the reference for traditional peacekeeping operations and Chapter VII for enforcement-oriented operations.
...
Yet, as the memo noted, in reality the Council does not need to refer to a specific chapter of the Charter when adopting or extending resolutions for UN peacekeeping operations

My only objection to the UN not citing its source of authority is same as I have to "shorthand pleading" in criminal indictments and civil complaints. That is ambiguity and an absence of command guidance. Of course, the UNSC is ruled by political expediency and the need to be vague in order to pass resolutions.

We hope that deficiency is rectified "by the tasks specified in their mandate, by the accompanying rules of engagement and by other directions pertaining to the use of force and international humanitarian law," as ST suggests above. But, is it in your opinion?

A suggestion is, where you cite somewhat exotic "stuff", you hyperlink the source if online or the full title if it's not online - e.g., "... war against Tshombe's Katangan separatists in the 1960s under a mandate ...'go do it.'"; and "... 97% are serving under Chapter VII mandates ..." Nuff said.

Max:

Since UNAMSIL in 1999, almost all new PKOs have been authorized under Chapter VII to use force to uphold all or part of their mandates (which isn't to say they do so consistently).

Of the nearly 98,000 troops and police currently deployed to PKOs, 97% are serving under Chapter VII mandates

Case Study on “Afghanistan”

In recent years, the Council has adopted the practice of explicitly invoking Chapter VII (Chapter VI has never been invoked) ...

Again, basic agreement (100% or 97% - de minimis non curat lex).

In conclusion to this Part 1, the UN Charter may need an amendment Chapter VI-1/2 (and a 1/4 and a 3/4); but we are unlikely to see a charter amendment to that effect. Hence, we have to go to "peace enforcement" with what we have.

- to be cont -

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

JMM
"Humanitarian interventionists" (to include HRW and Samantha Power) have a tendency to sugarcoat their interventions; so as to distinguish them from operations by those bad "military interventionists".

Max:
I think that's painting with too broad a brush. No question there are some that don't understand military ops whatsoever, but there are others who do (Marc Garlasco, for example).

This may be an instance of miscommunication (my "bad", your "bad, both "bad").

Let me start with the "bad military interventionists" ("bad" there is me being sarcastic); of which, on SWC, examples are JMM (I supported removal of Saddam et al in Iraq, but not "state building"; I supported killing UBL et al in Astan-Pstan, but not "state building"); and my friend JMA (He advocated removal of Qaddafi in Libya & Assad in Syria; I was and am negative to US intervention, military or humanitarian, in either country directly or by proxy).

Whether we cite it explicitly or not, the methodologies and historical context are summed in Stephen T. Hosmer, Operations Against Enemy Leaders (2001):

Operations targeted against senior enemy leaders have long been viewed as a potential means of shaping the policy and behavior of enemy states. As a result, the United States has launched a variety of overt and covert operations in efforts to attack enemy leaders directly, facilitate their overthrow by coup or rebellion, or secure their ouster through external invasion. This book examines a number of leadership attacks from World War II to the present to offer insights into the comparative efficacy of various forms of leadership attacks, their potential coercive and deterrent value, and the possible unintended consequences of their ill-considered use. The book concludes that direct attacks, coups, and rebellions have met with only limited success and, even when successful, have sometimes yielded counterproductive results. Moreover, neither direct attacks nor coups have been of significant coercive or deterrent value, although rebellions have at times provided useful negotiating leverage. By contrast, external invasions have proved to be more efficacious both in shaping the targeted countries’ policy and behavior and in exerting coercive effects. The book concludes by outlining the likely conditions under which future leadership attacks are likely to be sanctioned and by delineating the prerequisites of effective use of air power in such contexts.

Worth the read for anyone here who hasn't read it.

Here is an example of a limited military intervention: Special Plan Green - Mexico, which I posted 4+ years ago (link).

I'll just copy my post here.

STP, Iraq turned out much better ... than I expected at the end of 2003. So, you and others here can take credit for that.

My questions were more addressed to the political side of "best practices COIN" in general. I see some disconnects in the concept as laid out in FMI 3-24.3. For that matter, I see the same disconnects in the 1980s Summers-Krepinevich debate, and the current Gentile-Nagl debate - all very interesting from a military standpoint (the military effort); but without any real consideration by any of them as to the political effort required.

Most particularly, what do you do with an incompetent (corrupt, etc.) HN government ?

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I'd quibble about what "expeditions" and "expeditionary forces" do. Of course they can invade with the purpose of occupying the country - we seem to be fixated on that, as opposed to a punitive raid no matter how gigantic it might be. FM 27-10 (par. 352 explains the distinction).

Coincidentally, I was just re-reading parts of Brian Linn's The Echo of Battle. At p.91, he deals with War Plan Green (a war with Mexico). We've had war plans for Mexico since the 1800s, but by 1922 the Mexican army was so weak that War Plan Green was changed to Special Plan Green, an occupation plan not unlike what we intended for Iraq: the army would establish a government, reform the education and legal systems, employ honest police and civil servants, with the clear and expressed US intention to create "peace and good order."

Now, it came to pass in 1924 that Special Plan Green was war gamed; and, surprise, the most probable COA for the Mexicans was not to resist the main invasion columns, but to wait a while and then engage in guerrilla warfare, etc. The majority staff conclusion was that the occupation would morph into a long, slow and frustrating unconventional war.

So, in 1927, Special Plan Green was amended to provide for a rapidly moving direct attack with the purpose of deposing the Mexican government, and then immediately withdrawing. The plan required that it be made clear that it did not intend a military occupation, was not an operation against the Mexican nation, but was an operation against the Mexican government.

OK, in Linn's terminology, I'm just a dinosaur "Guardian" of the "Never Again but" school, who apparently sees disconnects where others don't.

The "humanitarian interventionists" (which may very well include you ) rely primarily on Responsibility to Protect (SWC thread)(searching R2P; 75 posts on SWC, including the thread cited); although, as Syria illustrates, multiple legal theories may be asserted.

My point (an opinion) was simply that "humanitarian interventionists" tend to sugarcoat their interventions as something that they are not (e.g., "peacekeeping", "save the children", etc.). I didn't say anything about the military operational expertise of "humanitarian interventionists", because that is not material to my point which addresses their agitprop.

As to Marc Garlasco (interesting Wiki; he's a bit controversial), his military operational expertise can be evaluated by professional militrary SWC members if they wish. It's not material to my point about "sugarcoating". His controversies are also not material to my point.

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To sample Max Kelly's writings, readers of this post may want to read a chapter in Eduarda P. Hamann and Robert Muggah (eds.), IMPLEMENTING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY? (2013), see chap. 7. Fighting for Their Lives: R2P, RwP and the Utility of Force to Protect Civilians, Max Kelly (shown in living color).

See also,

Kelly (with Giffen), Military Planning to Protect: Proposed Guidance for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (2011; Washington, DC: Stimson Center);

Kelly, Protecting Civilians: Principles for Military Operations (2010);

Holt & Taylor (with Kelly), Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations: Successes, Setbacks and Major Challenges (2009).

Regards

Mike

[davidbfpo]

A lengthy newspaper article by a HRW observer:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...-Republic.html

It is very clear that the AU & French intervention is making little difference, with reports this week of more French troops en route and nights filled with gunfire. Put simply the two communities that have lived together - outside of the northern Muslim area - are splitting apart.

Bear in mind the AU & French are mainly, if not exclusively in the capital Bangui, so what is happening elsewhere is unclear.

[davidbfpo]

A critique of the French claim to not understand the situation in CAR, it starts with:

Speaking at a United Nations event marking 20 years since the Rwandan genocide, France’s ambassador to the UN, Gerard Araud, said his government had seriously underestimated the level of hatred between Christian and Muslim communities in the Central African Republic. He said on 15th January that African Union and French forces deployed in the CAR were facing a “nearly impossible” situation. The crux of the problem was that they were dealing with “two communities who want to kill each other”. He emphasised that “they desperately want to kill each other…We knew that there was some inter-sectarian violence, but we didn’t forecast such deep ingrained hatred.”

Forgive me if I seem cynical about this, but the French have been involved in CAR for over 120 years – carving out a territory that bore no relation to ethnic, linguistic or other indigenous factors and did not take into account existing boundaries of communities. Before colonial occupation, the region was no different from any other – experiencing trade, inter-marriage and, at times, raiding and conflict between different communities. It wasn’t some peaceful Eden, but nor was it riven by endemic warfare or hatred between its peoples.

Link:http://africanarguments.org/2014/01/...th-somerville/

[KingJaja]

davidbfpo,

I've always insisted that one of Africa's major problems is the proliferation of artificial states & artificial systems imposed on by Europeans with absolutely zero appreciation of local conditions.

US was never a serious colonial power, so is naive about the true genesis of Africa's predicament, too uninterested to get involved & too trusting of former colonial powers (especially France).

But water must eventually find its level. Just like Sykes-Picot is unraveling in the Middle East, the "Berlin Conference" must unravel in Africa.

As an aside - consider Cameroon, the presence of Boko Haram in neighbouring Nigeria, a succession crisis when Paul Biya finally kicks the bucket (he's 81) and Central African Republic next door - make it the next likely candidate for destabilization.